Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Debate between James Clappison and Matthew Offord

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Offord]

My hon. Friend, like my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Mr Scott), has mentioned something that I hope to come on to in my speech. It remains a great concern that, while Iran is engaging in the process of reconciliation through the talks and the agreement, it is also engaging in activities not only in places such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but in places such as Lebanon, combining forces with Hezbollah and others.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he share my concern at the reports coming out of the area that only in recent days Iran has been stepping up its military and material support, and the provision of personnel, for the Bashar al-Assad regime? Would it not be strange for us to be granting new favours to the Iranian regime and helping it economically when it is supplying that terrible regime, which is slaughtering its own citizens?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is another issue I intend to raise. The fact that we are seeking to allow a country greater economic freedoms that in turn allows it to support terror in others parts of the region is of great concern. That seems to act counter to the things that are being said by President Rouhani and others in that country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Offord]

Yes, I dispute them. I am not a chemical engineer or a nuclear engineer, but on the basis of my research and the evidence I have read, I dispute those estimates and I maintain that Iran is on the verge of making a breakthrough. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), said in the House on Monday, with as many as 10,000 centrifuges in operation already, Iran retains the capability to break out and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. The deal does not roll back the vast majority of the advances that Iran has made in the past five years, which have drastically shortened what nuclear experts call its “dash time” to a bomb—the minimum time that it would take to build a weapon if Iran’s Supreme Leader or military decided to pursue that path.

Most concerning of all, the world’s leading powers have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrichment, which has been the Islamic Republic’s key demand for many years. The interim agreement states that the permanent deal will involve

“a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters”,

but the deal abandons the demand made by the six United Nations resolutions that Iran must halt all enrichment. That may undermine confidence in global non-proliferation norms. Iranian state media carried boasts by, among others, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif that the US had caved in on its long-standing position and recognised Iran’s right to enrich. President Rouhani said:

“No matter what interpretations are given, Iran's right to enrichment has been recognised.”

He went on to say:

“"Do you know what the Geneva agreement is? It means the superpowers’ surrender to the great Iranian nation. The Geneva agreement means that the world accepts [Iran’s] civil nuclear technology, which we achieved through the efforts and the sacrifice of our young scientists”.

The agreement does not stop Iran enriching uranium to a low level of 3.5% or compel it to dismantle any of its existing centrifuges, which can be used for military purposes. Iran can continue to enrich uranium with its 10,190 operational IR1 centrifuges. They are in addition to 8,000 machines that have been installed but are inactive. Iran can also continue to build new centrifuges to replace those that wear out.

The situation has not been lost on the Iranian rulers. In January this year, President Rouhani said that there would be no destruction of existing centrifuges “under any circumstances.” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister said in December last year:

“The structure of our nuclear program has been maintained and the 20 percent enrichment can be resumed in less than 24 hours”.

A month later, he said:

“We did not agree to dismantle anything”.

In January, Iran’s Parliament introduced a Bill to step up enrichment to the threshold of 60% fissile purity. That would put Iran on the technical verge of 90% fissile purity, which is enough for the core of a nuclear bomb. At least 218 of the Iranian Parliament’s 290 members have expressed support for the measure. The Bill’s supporters say that uranium refined to 60% concentration would be used to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. Some analysts have speculated that the Iranian Government might be using Parliament as a bargaining tool in nuclear talks with the P5 plus 1, because they would have no choice but to obey such a Bill if the Parliament passed it.

The deal also leaves untouched Iran’s portfolio of 1,008 installed advanced IR2m centrifuges, which can speed up break-out times using 3.5% enriched uranium. This month, Iran revealed that it had developed a new generation of centrifuges that are 15 times more powerful than those currently in use, and Iranian officials have stated that the centrifuges do not violate the joint plan of action. Although enrichment using those machines has not started, the vast majority of them are fully installed and under vacuum, which means that Iran could quickly begin feeding natural uranium into those cascades and more than double its enrichment capacity.

Centrifuges are not the only concern. Iran is in the process of constructing a 40 MW heavy water research reactor, for which there is limited peaceful civilian purpose. When it is operational, that facility at Arak will be able to produce plutonium, which is one of two substances that can form the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran is not required to dismantle the incomplete heavy water research reactor or convert the plant into a light water reactor, which would be less useful for military purposes.

Under the joint plan of action, Iran agreed to freeze progress on the Arak heavy water research reactor and not to commission it or transfer fuel or heavy water to the site. It also agreed not to produce or test additional fuel or install remaining components. The interim deal does not explicitly prevent Iran from manufacturing components offsite for Arak’s nuclear reactor that could then be installed later. Iran claims that its purpose is only to make medical isotopes and conduct research, but western countries believe that it could also produce plutonium, which is the plan B route to producing a full nuclear weapon.

The one mechanism we held over Iran was the sanctions, but the interim deal has unravelled the internationally imposed sanction regime that has taken years to enforce. Sanctions were having the desired effect, so why did we take a step back from a method that was working and put trust in a state that has given us no reason to assume that that trust will be guarded? However limited, the relaxation of sanctions will relieve the pressure that has brought Iran to seek an agreement, by giving direct financial relief and indirectly restoring confidence in the Iranian economy.

Many nations and companies—as well as the Iranians themselves—have interpreted the recent agreement as the beginning of the end of the sanctions regime. It is likely that a number of countries will apply pressure to resume trade with Iran, including its former key trade partners, such as South Korea, Japan, India and China. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—that is a capital gain of almost 40%, generated entirely by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions. On top of that, Iran is already making efforts to recapture its dominant role in OPEC.

All of that goes to ensure that the agreement is rewarding Iran despite the fact that its long history of clandestine nuclear activities, support for international terrorism and repeat calls for the destruction of Israel are cause for legitimate trepidation and scepticism over its intentions. Although President Rouhani’s negotiating team has reportedly been more constructive in talks, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on major issues, including national security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Most worryingly, Iran continues to support terrorism in the region. It is a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hamas, Hezbollah and insurgencies against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran agreed to the deal as part of a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme. The six-month timetable to reach a final agreement could be extended by a further six months by mutual consent. President Rouhani has previously spoken of Iran buying time to advance its nuclear programme. In 2004, he gave a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, in which he explained how he was playing for time during the nuclear talks he was conducting with the EU3. He said:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear conversion] facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work there”.

Answers to the parliamentary questions I have asked provide little assurance that the IAEA will ensure that inspections take place. Iran has agreed to the IAEA conducting only limited inspections at the main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Its history of deception about its nuclear projects requires higher levels of accountability. Iran is not required to provide unfettered access to its full portfolio of nuclear facilities, including many underground and undeclared sites where the USA, Europe and Israel believe that hidden enrichment facilities might exist. It is not possible to rule out the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran without it agreeing to allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections anywhere beyond declared atomic installations under the agency’s additional protocol regime.

Iran is still not required to grant IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear-related Parchin site, a suspected weapons-testing facility, but it is required to declare all facilities containing nuclear material under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the joint statement on a framework for co-operation between Iran and the IAEA, Iran has agreed to give the IAEA information on the 16 sites designated for the construction of new nuclear power plants, clarification about its announcement about new enrichment facilities, and information about all new research reactors. Fully verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities will require a level of co-operation and information-sharing between the IAEA, the western powers and Iran that is probably unprecedented for one country’s nuclear programme.

The overt military actions of missile development are also of concern. The interim agreement does not include a promise by Iran to abstain from pursuing work on ballistic missiles or weaponisation. UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires Iran to cease activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend is touching on a key issue. Does he agree that if we are to treat Iran’s protestations seriously, we must see progress being made on the ballistic missile programme?

[Dr Offord]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I am concerned about the fact that the agreement does not touch upon ballistic missiles and remains an opportunity for Iran to continue its programme—as President Rouhani said—in a calm environment, and to focus on its work and experimentation on such weaponry.

I am sure that your knowledge of ballistic missiles is better than mine, Mr Williams, but I can tell the Chamber that a nuclear weapons programme has three main components: the fuel, the warhead and the delivery system. Iran is free, in the coming six-month period of the interim deal, to continue with the missile and warhead-development activities to which my hon. Friend just referred. It has successfully test-fired two new domestically made missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile with radar-evading capabilities and a fragmentation warhead. It also test fired a laser-guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile known as a Bina. The country already has long-range surface-to-surface Shahab missiles with a range of about 1,250 miles that are capable of reaching Israel and—indeed—US military bases in the middle east. The recent deal does not grant IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s Parchin military facility, which is a long-suspected location for nuclear-related weapons testing.

In conclusion, it is worth reiterating the questions that I would like the Minister to answer. Does he share my concern that limited processes and structures appear to be in place should Iran walk away from negotiations with the P5 plus 1 before a permanent nuclear deal is reached within the six-month period? Given its history of duplicity and procrastination over its nuclear programme, would the Minister agree that it is only right that there will be a degree of concern that Iran might abuse the interim deal merely to pocket the concessions and walk away?

A more receptive Iranian negotiating team is being welcomed internationally. However, Iran has not tempered its anti-Israel rhetoric, recently labelling Israel as the

“sinister, unclean, rabid dog of the region.”

Does the Minister understand why many of us think Israel should be concerned about the agreement? There are also concerns that the joint plan of action has green-lighted Iran’s right to enrich, or at least that it has done so according to Iranian interpretations. Iranian state media carried boasts by President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister that the international community had caved in. What assessment has the Minister made of such statements by Iran? Iran’s latest actions do not suggest that it is complying fully with the spirit of the joint plan of action.

Does the Minister share my concern that domestic production of advanced centrifuges, which further reduce break-out times, raises questions as to Iranian intentions? Under the joint plan of action, Iran retains its full portfolio of centrifuges. Would the Minister agree that any final agreement must seek to dismantle the bulk of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? The interim agreement is undoubtedly asymmetrical in structure, with Iran merely freezing its programme while the international community chips away at sanctions. Does the Minister agree that that might influence whether Iran decides to abandon negotiations for a comprehensive deal over the next six months? Finally, does the Minister share my concern that the joint plan of action will result in billions of pounds of financial relief for Iran, enabling its continued ability to arm, fund and train its global terror network?

As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) said, it is right that the P5 plus 1 strive for a deal that reduces the threat of a nuclear Iran, but we must not agree to measures that have the potential to expedite such a scenario. A bad deal is worse than no deal at all. I look forward to the Minister’s response.