Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

James Clappison Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Offord]

My hon. Friend, like my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford North (Mr Scott), has mentioned something that I hope to come on to in my speech. It remains a great concern that, while Iran is engaging in the process of reconciliation through the talks and the agreement, it is also engaging in activities not only in places such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but in places such as Lebanon, combining forces with Hezbollah and others.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he share my concern at the reports coming out of the area that only in recent days Iran has been stepping up its military and material support, and the provision of personnel, for the Bashar al-Assad regime? Would it not be strange for us to be granting new favours to the Iranian regime and helping it economically when it is supplying that terrible regime, which is slaughtering its own citizens?

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is another issue I intend to raise. The fact that we are seeking to allow a country greater economic freedoms that in turn allows it to support terror in others parts of the region is of great concern. That seems to act counter to the things that are being said by President Rouhani and others in that country.

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[Dr Offord]

Yes, I dispute them. I am not a chemical engineer or a nuclear engineer, but on the basis of my research and the evidence I have read, I dispute those estimates and I maintain that Iran is on the verge of making a breakthrough. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), said in the House on Monday, with as many as 10,000 centrifuges in operation already, Iran retains the capability to break out and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. The deal does not roll back the vast majority of the advances that Iran has made in the past five years, which have drastically shortened what nuclear experts call its “dash time” to a bomb—the minimum time that it would take to build a weapon if Iran’s Supreme Leader or military decided to pursue that path.

Most concerning of all, the world’s leading powers have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrichment, which has been the Islamic Republic’s key demand for many years. The interim agreement states that the permanent deal will involve

“a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters”,

but the deal abandons the demand made by the six United Nations resolutions that Iran must halt all enrichment. That may undermine confidence in global non-proliferation norms. Iranian state media carried boasts by, among others, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif that the US had caved in on its long-standing position and recognised Iran’s right to enrich. President Rouhani said:

“No matter what interpretations are given, Iran's right to enrichment has been recognised.”

He went on to say:

“"Do you know what the Geneva agreement is? It means the superpowers’ surrender to the great Iranian nation. The Geneva agreement means that the world accepts [Iran’s] civil nuclear technology, which we achieved through the efforts and the sacrifice of our young scientists”.

The agreement does not stop Iran enriching uranium to a low level of 3.5% or compel it to dismantle any of its existing centrifuges, which can be used for military purposes. Iran can continue to enrich uranium with its 10,190 operational IR1 centrifuges. They are in addition to 8,000 machines that have been installed but are inactive. Iran can also continue to build new centrifuges to replace those that wear out.

The situation has not been lost on the Iranian rulers. In January this year, President Rouhani said that there would be no destruction of existing centrifuges “under any circumstances.” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister said in December last year:

“The structure of our nuclear program has been maintained and the 20 percent enrichment can be resumed in less than 24 hours”.

A month later, he said:

“We did not agree to dismantle anything”.

In January, Iran’s Parliament introduced a Bill to step up enrichment to the threshold of 60% fissile purity. That would put Iran on the technical verge of 90% fissile purity, which is enough for the core of a nuclear bomb. At least 218 of the Iranian Parliament’s 290 members have expressed support for the measure. The Bill’s supporters say that uranium refined to 60% concentration would be used to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. Some analysts have speculated that the Iranian Government might be using Parliament as a bargaining tool in nuclear talks with the P5 plus 1, because they would have no choice but to obey such a Bill if the Parliament passed it.

The deal also leaves untouched Iran’s portfolio of 1,008 installed advanced IR2m centrifuges, which can speed up break-out times using 3.5% enriched uranium. This month, Iran revealed that it had developed a new generation of centrifuges that are 15 times more powerful than those currently in use, and Iranian officials have stated that the centrifuges do not violate the joint plan of action. Although enrichment using those machines has not started, the vast majority of them are fully installed and under vacuum, which means that Iran could quickly begin feeding natural uranium into those cascades and more than double its enrichment capacity.

Centrifuges are not the only concern. Iran is in the process of constructing a 40 MW heavy water research reactor, for which there is limited peaceful civilian purpose. When it is operational, that facility at Arak will be able to produce plutonium, which is one of two substances that can form the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran is not required to dismantle the incomplete heavy water research reactor or convert the plant into a light water reactor, which would be less useful for military purposes.

Under the joint plan of action, Iran agreed to freeze progress on the Arak heavy water research reactor and not to commission it or transfer fuel or heavy water to the site. It also agreed not to produce or test additional fuel or install remaining components. The interim deal does not explicitly prevent Iran from manufacturing components offsite for Arak’s nuclear reactor that could then be installed later. Iran claims that its purpose is only to make medical isotopes and conduct research, but western countries believe that it could also produce plutonium, which is the plan B route to producing a full nuclear weapon.

The one mechanism we held over Iran was the sanctions, but the interim deal has unravelled the internationally imposed sanction regime that has taken years to enforce. Sanctions were having the desired effect, so why did we take a step back from a method that was working and put trust in a state that has given us no reason to assume that that trust will be guarded? However limited, the relaxation of sanctions will relieve the pressure that has brought Iran to seek an agreement, by giving direct financial relief and indirectly restoring confidence in the Iranian economy.

Many nations and companies—as well as the Iranians themselves—have interpreted the recent agreement as the beginning of the end of the sanctions regime. It is likely that a number of countries will apply pressure to resume trade with Iran, including its former key trade partners, such as South Korea, Japan, India and China. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—that is a capital gain of almost 40%, generated entirely by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions. On top of that, Iran is already making efforts to recapture its dominant role in OPEC.

All of that goes to ensure that the agreement is rewarding Iran despite the fact that its long history of clandestine nuclear activities, support for international terrorism and repeat calls for the destruction of Israel are cause for legitimate trepidation and scepticism over its intentions. Although President Rouhani’s negotiating team has reportedly been more constructive in talks, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on major issues, including national security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Most worryingly, Iran continues to support terrorism in the region. It is a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hamas, Hezbollah and insurgencies against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran agreed to the deal as part of a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme. The six-month timetable to reach a final agreement could be extended by a further six months by mutual consent. President Rouhani has previously spoken of Iran buying time to advance its nuclear programme. In 2004, he gave a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, in which he explained how he was playing for time during the nuclear talks he was conducting with the EU3. He said:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear conversion] facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work there”.

Answers to the parliamentary questions I have asked provide little assurance that the IAEA will ensure that inspections take place. Iran has agreed to the IAEA conducting only limited inspections at the main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Its history of deception about its nuclear projects requires higher levels of accountability. Iran is not required to provide unfettered access to its full portfolio of nuclear facilities, including many underground and undeclared sites where the USA, Europe and Israel believe that hidden enrichment facilities might exist. It is not possible to rule out the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran without it agreeing to allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections anywhere beyond declared atomic installations under the agency’s additional protocol regime.

Iran is still not required to grant IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear-related Parchin site, a suspected weapons-testing facility, but it is required to declare all facilities containing nuclear material under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the joint statement on a framework for co-operation between Iran and the IAEA, Iran has agreed to give the IAEA information on the 16 sites designated for the construction of new nuclear power plants, clarification about its announcement about new enrichment facilities, and information about all new research reactors. Fully verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities will require a level of co-operation and information-sharing between the IAEA, the western powers and Iran that is probably unprecedented for one country’s nuclear programme.

The overt military actions of missile development are also of concern. The interim agreement does not include a promise by Iran to abstain from pursuing work on ballistic missiles or weaponisation. UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires Iran to cease activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend is touching on a key issue. Does he agree that if we are to treat Iran’s protestations seriously, we must see progress being made on the ballistic missile programme?

[Dr Offord]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I am concerned about the fact that the agreement does not touch upon ballistic missiles and remains an opportunity for Iran to continue its programme—as President Rouhani said—in a calm environment, and to focus on its work and experimentation on such weaponry.

I am sure that your knowledge of ballistic missiles is better than mine, Mr Williams, but I can tell the Chamber that a nuclear weapons programme has three main components: the fuel, the warhead and the delivery system. Iran is free, in the coming six-month period of the interim deal, to continue with the missile and warhead-development activities to which my hon. Friend just referred. It has successfully test-fired two new domestically made missiles, including a long-range ballistic missile with radar-evading capabilities and a fragmentation warhead. It also test fired a laser-guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile known as a Bina. The country already has long-range surface-to-surface Shahab missiles with a range of about 1,250 miles that are capable of reaching Israel and—indeed—US military bases in the middle east. The recent deal does not grant IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s Parchin military facility, which is a long-suspected location for nuclear-related weapons testing.

In conclusion, it is worth reiterating the questions that I would like the Minister to answer. Does he share my concern that limited processes and structures appear to be in place should Iran walk away from negotiations with the P5 plus 1 before a permanent nuclear deal is reached within the six-month period? Given its history of duplicity and procrastination over its nuclear programme, would the Minister agree that it is only right that there will be a degree of concern that Iran might abuse the interim deal merely to pocket the concessions and walk away?

A more receptive Iranian negotiating team is being welcomed internationally. However, Iran has not tempered its anti-Israel rhetoric, recently labelling Israel as the

“sinister, unclean, rabid dog of the region.”

Does the Minister understand why many of us think Israel should be concerned about the agreement? There are also concerns that the joint plan of action has green-lighted Iran’s right to enrich, or at least that it has done so according to Iranian interpretations. Iranian state media carried boasts by President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister that the international community had caved in. What assessment has the Minister made of such statements by Iran? Iran’s latest actions do not suggest that it is complying fully with the spirit of the joint plan of action.

Does the Minister share my concern that domestic production of advanced centrifuges, which further reduce break-out times, raises questions as to Iranian intentions? Under the joint plan of action, Iran retains its full portfolio of centrifuges. Would the Minister agree that any final agreement must seek to dismantle the bulk of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? The interim agreement is undoubtedly asymmetrical in structure, with Iran merely freezing its programme while the international community chips away at sanctions. Does the Minister agree that that might influence whether Iran decides to abandon negotiations for a comprehensive deal over the next six months? Finally, does the Minister share my concern that the joint plan of action will result in billions of pounds of financial relief for Iran, enabling its continued ability to arm, fund and train its global terror network?

As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) said, it is right that the P5 plus 1 strive for a deal that reduces the threat of a nuclear Iran, but we must not agree to measures that have the potential to expedite such a scenario. A bad deal is worse than no deal at all. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Williams. I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) on securing this important debate. He also deserves congratulations for asking all the right questions in his well-informed and technical speech, which was a great contribution. He asked all the questions that have to be asked about the scientific and technical aspects of the negotiations with Iran, and I certainly back him in all his points.

I intend to speak only briefly. I want to make it clear that I support the actions being taken by our Government; the approach that has been outlined by my right hon. and hon. Friends; and the approach taken by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on the Floor of the House on Monday, with the realism with which he approached the issue, saying that there are many obstacles to be cleared. I support him in his ultimate intentions on the matter and in the way in which he is carrying them out. I also commend the Minister of State for the realism and hard-headedness that he has shown on the issue; he is absolutely right to do so.

In conducting the negotiations, if we really want to have any chance of bringing them to a successful conclusion, it is important not to get ahead of ourselves. It is fair to say, looking at the history of the matter, that we are dealing with a regime that has played for time; is extremely astute; and takes a long-term strategic view on prosecuting its interests. We need to be equally hard-headed in our approach.

Therefore, while I commend my right hon. and hon. Friends, I have concerns about what is happening in other quarters. I also fear that some people are getting a little ahead of themselves. I am concerned by press reports saying that Baroness Ashton is due to visit Iran next month. I suppose that Baroness Ashton, in a way, represents us all, as the European Union’s High Representative under the Treaty of Lisbon. I certainly have concerns about that, and I wonder whether that is sending the right signal at this stage of events.

I have three particular concerns. The first concerns the signal that the visit sends to the Iranian side about what they can get out of the talks and what they have to give up in return. I am keen on the principle, which should have been enunciated by the international community, that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. I do not see how that principle is consistent with the actions of Baroness Ashton in going to Iran, and the message that that will send all around the world about the Iranian regime and the possibility of doing trade and opening up relations with it. I am worried about the signal that is being sent.

Secondly, I am worried about the signal it sends when Iran, as has been rightly said already by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, is so concerned in exporting terrorism and aggression throughout the region. It has a history of doing that in many parts of the region—most of all, at the moment, in the Syrian conflict. The Iranian regime is a key linchpin of Bashar al-Assad in his efforts to fight back against the Syrian opposition. The Iranian regime is the pillar for Bashar al-Assad as he goes into action and counter-attacks the Iranian opposition. We know that during the four years of the conflict, thousands of Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen have been sent into Syria to help Bashar al-Assad, and Iran has been helping to send them there. There is no doubt about it. It is widely believed that the Iranian regime has been responsible for the successes that Syria has had, resulting in the conflict coming to a stalemate.

It was reported at the weekend that Iran is stepping up its support for Bashar al-Assad, providing elite teams to gather intelligence and train troops. There have been other reports that Iran has been sending specialists in with the direct intention of helping the regime to survive. Analysts believe that this renewed support has meant that Assad feels no need to make concessions at the currently deadlocked talks in Geneva, because he thinks that things are going his way with the support that he is receiving from Iran. It therefore looks slightly strange for Baroness Ashton to be going to Iran to fly the flag when talks with Iran about its nuclear position are taking place in Vienna, and in Geneva roughly the same parties are taking part in talks about Syria, which are deadlocked because of the actions of the Iranians.

I do not think we should be sending a signal about the Iranian regime either directly or indirectly through our EU High Representative Baroness Ashton—not when that terrible conflict is still taking place, when civilians are still losing their lives, and when terrible means are being employed against them. I do not believe that we should be sending that signal at this time.

My third reason for not wanting to endorse the Iranian regime with a visit by the EU High Representative is because of the message it sends to people at home in Iran. I draw a careful distinction between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people, who are a constructive, creative people with a great culture and a great history. There is a big difference between them and their regime. I congratulate the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) on his speech about the suppression of human rights in Iran. It is a cause that I have been particularly interested in, and I know there are grave concerns about human rights across the whole human rights piece in Iran.

Like the hon. Member for Strangford, I too have been interested in the persecution of Christians in Iran. What he said was absolutely right. People who try to change their faith or who try to promote their faith in any way in Iran are subject to terrible persecution. They are thrown into prison, their homes are raided and Bibles are confiscated. Hopes were expressed that the situation would change with the election of President Rouhani, but, for whatever reason—whether he is sending mixed messages or whether he is being undercut by conflict within the regime—there is no relaxation as far as the Christians are concerned. They are still languishing in prison for their faith, and in recent times we have heard terrible reports of four Christians being sentenced to 80 lashes for partaking of communion wine. That is since President Rouhani came to power.

I simply do not want the High Representative going to Iran to take part in discussions with the regime and endorsing it by visiting when human rights violations are taking place. We should take a much more hard-headed approach. We know that sanctions have been very effective against the regime. They have had a severe effect, and there must be concerns that a premature relaxation of sanctions would send the wrong message to the regime.

Not only is the EU High Representative Baroness Ashton getting ahead of herself, but others more widely seem to be getting ahead of themselves as well. We have seen reports of a French trade delegation of 100 leading businesses visiting Iran. Apparently, there is a German delegation in Iran this week. There are reports of a Greek delegation, led by the Greek Deputy Prime Minister, going to Iran. All that is going on when the talks have barely got going and we have no idea what the final settlement might be. One wonders what signal this sends to the Iranian side about what they need to do to get concessions in return. All the beneficial economic effects and the prosperity that flows to the regime as a result can be used by the regime, giving it more resources to support Bashar al-Assad and all the other activities taking place in the middle east.

I support hon. and right hon. Members in the course they have taken; they deserve our support. I simply ask them and everybody else—I know the hon. and right hon. Members have this in mind—to keep a tight hold on Iran and to keep in mind the objective of ensuring that it does not develop a nuclear capability. I have no doubt that Iran intends to develop such a capability. I am not remotely technically qualified to pass a judgment on how far it is on the road to acquiring one, but there can be little doubt that Iran is seeking to acquire such a capability. The rest of the international community think that. Why would Iran expose itself to sanctions if it did not have that intention in mind?

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[Hywel Williams (in the Chair)]

Mr Clappison, had you finished your remarks?

[Mr Clappison]

As long as it is shown that I was saying that we must make every effort and use every endeavour to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, I will conclude.

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[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Hugh Robertson)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) on securing the debate and thank all hon. Members for their contributions. Given that this has been something of a question fest, I suspect that my best approach in summing up is not to read through the beautifully drafted piece of English that has been supplied to me, but to try to pick out the questions that have been asked and to go through them as swiftly as I can in the 10 minutes remaining.

In a sense, the debate has highlighted the issue. It would be a bit simplistic to call it a glass-half-full, glass-half-empty debate, but in a sense everyone is occupying the same piece of ground. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) gave us a wonderful historical tour de force of relations with Iran. There are ample reasons to be extremely cautious and very suspicious. On the other hand, once every so often an opportunity comes around. The question is whether to make that leap of faith and test it, being well aware of all the past problems, the history and the dangers, in the hope of getting to a better place eventually. Alternatively, we can be extremely cautious at every stage to the extent that it impacts on the ability to conclude that final deal. Those are difficult and complex judgments, and there are no right or wrong answers.

The last time the international community had a go at this was when the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) was Foreign Secretary. It got to a stage where all the suspicions present in today’s debate were aired, and a combination of the hard-liners in Tehran and Washington derailed the deal. The consequence of that was that the steps towards nuclear production simply continued. Arguably, as a result of not being able to take those bold steps, the situation got worse, not better—I know it is difficult to second-guess these things now. It is absolutely right to be cautious and sensible and to have an eye to history, but we should see on this occasion whether we can test the feelings and sentiment in Iran.

I will try to answer the various questions that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon asked. He is absolutely correct to say that the interim agreement does not resolve international suspicions. As he will have guessed from my opening remarks, I absolutely agree that it does not. It is merely a first step that buys us the time to move towards further discussions on the issues, of which he raised a great many. A comprehensive agreement will absolutely need to address the proliferation concerns that he set out. Let me be clear: we will not sign a deal if it does not address those concerns. Secondly, he made the point that, through the sanctions relief regime, we have eased the pressure on Iran’s economy for very limited concessions in return.

It is worth saying that the interim deal addresses some of the nuclear programme’s most concerning elements: the eradication of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium; and Iran being forbidden from installing further centrifuges, which is different from developing them. It also eases the monitoring regime carried out by the IAEA. We and the US estimate the sanctions relief given to Iran to be about $7 billion over the six-month period. That is a relatively small fraction of the $60 billion to $100 billion of restricted Iranian oil funds held abroad and of the $60 billion to $70 billion it needs to finance its foreign imports. I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, but there is a sense of proportion in that.

My hon. Friend asked about what are called in the parlance the PMDs—possible military dimensions—of Iran’s nuclear programme. That is very much a concern. He is right to say that they are not addressed in the interim agreement, but they are a key part of the final negotiations that will take place so they will be addressed. Indeed, the joint plan of action makes it clear that the joint commission, composed of the E3 plus 3 and Iran, will work with the IAEA to facilitate the resolution of all those issues.

Fourthly—if I have got the order right—my hon. Friend asked about the sanctions relief enabling the Iranians to fund terrorism, which touches on a point made by several other Members. There is no doubt that Iran’s support of terrorism throughout the region is a malignant force. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) mentioned, were there need for evidence, considerable evidence is available—it is a statement of fact—that Iranian support for Hezbollah and directly through the Quds Force has played a considerable part in the conflict in Syria. That is not the only example by any means of Iran’s malign influence in the area; it has been seen recently in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and right around the Arabian peninsula. That will have to be addressed if relations with Iran are to be normalised in any meaningful way.

I guess that the question about the granting of access to the IAEA was driven by the Parchin military facility issue. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon is right that the interim agreement does not allow the IAEA access to Parchin. However, following Iran’s agreement with the IAEA on 8 February about the exploding bridgewire detonators, we hope that we can make progress. Indeed, that will have to be addressed as part of any final and comprehensive agreement.

My hon. Friend asked, perfectly reasonably, about our assessment of whether the Iranian actions at the moment are within the spirit of the JPA agreement. The hon. Member for Harrow West (Mr Thomas) asked in particular about the continued production of advanced centrifuges with reduced break-out times and whether that poses questions about Iranian intentions. There is no doubt that we would much rather that Iran had not done that. The IAEA, however, has looked at what it has done thus far and confirmed that it is currently complying with the JPA’s strict terms. As part of the 24 November agreement, Iran has committed not to install or bring into operation any new centrifuges in the main enrichment facilities.

That, however, does not help with confidence-building measures and, as we touched on earlier, there will be a real trust issue if the Iranian Government continue to act in this way. Again, that will have to be addressed as part of the comprehensive agreement.

Finally, my hon. Friend asked about the concerns that Iran could simply pocket the benefits and walk away from the negotiations. Indeed it could, but, if so, it has a great deal to lose. The Iranian economy is going through the floor and there is real hardship in Tehran. Anyone who looks at this—intelligence agency or otherwise —realises that the Iranian economy is in a very bad place indeed, and the key electoral promise of the Government was to restore the economy, so they have a considerable incentive. Without such an agreement, they can do absolutely nothing to bump-start their economy.

If the deal falls to pieces, no doubt international reaction will be tough and Iran will wear the blame for that. The full sanctions regime will simply be reinstated and it will move backwards very quickly. In an environment in which Iran had toyed with the international community and let it down, it would be difficult to restart talks for some time. My hon. Friend is right that, in theory, Iran could pocket what it has got at the moment and walk away, but that might not be wise on its part. There is no intention whatever to offer further sanctions relief over and above what it has got until it has delivered on the key terms of the agreement.

Let me turn to some of the other questions asked in various contributions. It is always a pleasure to hear from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). He talked about the power struggle in Iran and he is absolutely right. At the moment, the indication is that the supreme leader backs the regime in the talks being conducted: indeed, the substantive concessions made thus far would not have been possible without his support. However, as we all know, hard-liners who do not wish the process well are operating in the background. The hon. Gentleman asked a good question about whether Rouhani can deliver. Our assessment is that he can, but if we push him too hard, it probably will not take a great deal for that to change. If he cannot show real benefit from the process, that assessment must be called into doubt.

The hon. Gentleman asked about human rights abuses in the country and he is right to highlight them. I have the figures here and the situation is appalling—there are no two ways about it. There have been reports of at least 400 executions in 2013. Iran has the second highest number of journalists in prison in the world. Opposition leaders have been detained for more than two years. Arrests of human rights defenders and journalists continue, as does persecution of religious and ethnic minorities. The Government will continue to hold Iran to account. We are not being soft: more than 80 EU sanctions are designated on individual Iranians and entities responsible for human rights violations.

[Mr Clappison]

May I say how grateful I am to the Minister for his personal interest in and attention to the issue of persecution of Christians in Iran? He deserves tribute for his stand.

[Hugh Robertson]

I thank my hon. Friend. He is very kind. One of the curious things about my job is that I end up handling the majority of the correspondence that flows into the Foreign Office. In my first few months, it was noticeable that one of the subjects raised most regularly by Members throughout the House was the fate of Christians in the middle east. In the various visits I have made around the region, I have tried to make a specific point of seeking out Christian leaders to talk to them about what is happening. I had a fascinating couple of hours with the Copts in Egypt—there are between 10 million and 12 million of them—and I will continue to take a close interest as I make my various visits.

To finish my response to the hon. Member for Strangford, he is right that religious freedom is a key part of where Iran needs to get to. That is something that is largely lacking under the current regime.