(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThere are some instances where it is obvious, and some where it is less obvious. The hon. Gentleman is correct to say that even if a judgment is made by the Attorney-General, and indeed if the declaration is made by the British courts of incompatibility with the convention rights, section 4 of the Act makes it absolutely crystal clear that those provisions remain in force. That was part of the elegant architecture of the Human Rights Act. The role of the Parliamentary Counsel was to ensure that parliamentary sovereignty over individual legislation was maintained. The problem of the hon. Gentleman—as he knows I really wanted to support his position—is that the Home Secretary has a duty under section 19 of the Act to say whether or not the provisions in the Bill as it goes forward are or are not compatible with the convention.
I once signed a certificate saying that a particular Bill was not compatible with the convention, and Parliament still passed it. None the less, it does create difficulties. We cannot suddenly, on a wing and a prayer, say, “Well, in five years’ time, this will end up before the Strasbourg Court.” It is something that will come before Parliament at the next stage of this legislation.
I am slightly troubled by the right hon. Gentleman’s argument. When the original Act was brought forward, the Home Office publication was clear. It said that the Bill provides for legislation
“to be interpreted so far as possible so as to be compatible with the Convention. This goes far beyond the present rule which enables the courts to take the Convention into account in resolving any ambiguity in a legislative provision.”
At the time the Human Rights Act was put before the House, the Home Office knew exactly how far-reaching the change would be.
I do not follow the hon. Gentleman’s point. None the less, it is still the case that the Home Secretary signs a certificate under section 19 saying that the Bill is compatible with the convention. Section 3 of the Act requires primary legislation to be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with convention rights, and that is what we are talking about. Parliament can pass any Act it wants. It may be incompatible, but it can still be in force. We are all concerned to ensure that as many people as possible are deported, where it is justifiable, as quickly as possible.
The right hon. Gentleman was saying that the courts had gone too far in the interpretation of section 3. My point was that the Home Office at the time was clear that that was the purpose it wanted to achieve.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI know about optimism bias contingency costs because I faced exactly the same situation when I chaired the Cabinet Committee for the Olympics. My initial reaction was the same as that of my hon. Friend and my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras: “Why on earth are we building in a contingency reserve on this scale?” I got the Treasury officials in and cross-examined them—I bumped into one the other day who remembers it—but in the end I was convinced that what was proposed was prudent, to use an adjective that used to be owned by the Labour party, and still is. Contingency reserves of that size are sensible and realistic. Yes, the cost is £42 billion, but that is over 20 years, so we are looking at a cost of about £2 billion a year, of which the optimism bias contingency reserve is about £700 million. In my judgment, such things are manageable.
I must make some progress.
Of course I understand the concerns of Members on both sides of the House about their constituencies. Were I in their position, I would probably be voicing similar concerns. However, when the grand motorway schemes were being built across the country, including in the Chilterns—the M40 goes right through them—there was no parliamentary process of this kind at all. There were no private Bills; there were private inquiries and compulsory purchase orders, and on it went. Of course there was an argument about the exact route the M40 would take when it went through the escarpment out of the Chilterns and around Oxfordshire, but I do not recall any Member from Buckinghamshire standing up in the House recently to say that building it was a disaster, that the effect on biodiversity was terrible and that we should return the land to the way it was.
Had there been a parliamentary process for the M40, the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham can bet her life that such would have been the opposition in the Chilterns—I understand exactly why, because we are all concerned about our own back gardens, including me—that it would never have been built. However, that road, at far greater disruption to the area than any railway will ever cause, has brought benefits to her constituency and county. While she continues to pursue her constituency concerns, I hope that she also recognises that there is a national interest in rebalancing our economy and ensuring that people in the north can get to the south more quickly.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo, they are not, and I will come on to that. The fundamental distinction to be drawn is this: all of us, as I have just spelled out, are required to respect and observe decisions of the Court on fundamental human rights, because it was in respect of those that we and other countries signed up.
No, I have to make progress.
The issue before us today—here is the heart of the matter—is by no stretch of the imagination a breach of fundamental human rights. Rather, it is a matter of penal policy, which the minority of judges at Strasbourg—and very senior they were, too—said should be left to the UK Parliament. Through the decision in the Hirst case and some similar decisions, the Strasbourg Court is setting itself up as a supreme court for Europe, with an ever-widening remit. That is why the tension that I mentioned now threatens to become a collision.
Even in countries with supreme courts much more powerful than ours, there is a democratic override of their decisions. For example, in the United States or Germany, which have very strong courts that can strike down primary legislation, the courts’ decisions can be overridden by, for instance, democratic amendment to their constitutions. There is no such democratic override available for decisions of the Strasbourg Court, so we are faced with a court judgment following which, without warrant from the treaties to which we signed up, we as elected MPs are expected to do the opposite of that in which we believe.
My predecessor as Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, and I wrestled for five years to find a way through the problem. Initially, Lord Falconer’s view was that the requirement on us following the 2005 Hirst decision was simply
“to consider carefully the basis”
of our law. He went on that it could be the case
“that it is a proportionate conclusion that all people who are convicted and sent to prison cannot vote.”
He began one consultation, and when that was inconclusive I launched a second. However, unless and until I found a way—if one existed—that could satisfy the Strasbourg Court, this House and the British people, there was no appetite throughout the House, or among our Whips, for me to bring forward legislative proposals.