Defence: Rotary Strategy

Debate between Jack Lopresti and Robert Courts

Wednesday 29th January 2020 Westminster Hall

[Robert Courts (Witney) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered UK defence rotary strategy.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh, and to return to a favourite topic of mine. Many hon. Members present have joined me on this topic before, which is future flying capability for the UK armed forces. At the outset, in the usual way, I refer the House to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

In November 2018, in a debate on the RAF’s centenary, I pressed the Secretary of State for Defence to start thinking about helicopters. I warmly welcome the new Minister to his place, because I know that his experience and enthusiasm for the topic will be a great asset to the Department. If I may, I suggest that this might be one of the first things in his in-tray.

I will give some brief background, although I am conscious that a number of other Members wish to speak. The UK helicopter fleet is unusually diverse. The days when our three flying services, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm and the Army Air Corps, could boast a glittering kaleidoscope of different aircraft types—large, small, generalised, specialised—are long gone and, realistically, will not return. However, although capability in other spheres—fast jet most obviously—has seen a contraction of platform types and a concentration on one or two multi-mission types, the rotary fleet and indeed the transport fleet more generally have tended to buck that trend. There are good capability reasons for that, which we will probably touch on, mainly concerning capability and lift.

I will briefly lay out the position as it is today, because it and the background bear thinking about. There are 322 rotary-wing aircraft in the UK armed forces, across the three services. The Army Air Corps operates the Apache attack helicopter, a battlefield close air support aircraft, which will probably fall largely into a different category from those that we will debate today. It is a highly specialised strike platform that does not have the capability for any significant lift, and certainly not for carrying troops.

The Army operates one variant of the Wildcat, primarily for reconnaissance and command, with a limited air transport capability. The Royal Navy operates a naval variant of the Wildcat, as well as two variants of the Merlin: the Commando Merlin—the ex-Royal Air Force Merlin—and the naval variant, as well as some ex-Danish examples used for training only.

The Royal Air Force operates the Chinook—the heavy-lift delivery truck of the skies—and the Puma. There are a number of other types used for training or transport to a lesser or greater degree: the Gazelle, the Bell 212, the Leonardo AW109 and the Juno and Jupiter training aircraft used by the defence helicopter flying school at RAF Shawbury. That makes a relatively large number of platform types, which will present an increasing headache as they all move towards their retirement date, subject to upgrades, and need to be replaced.

I applaud the recent approach by the Ministry of Defence to many aspects of procurement policy. I have spoken about that in the House, particularly back in 2017 when calling for the combat air strategy, in conjunction with colleagues on both sides of the House. I have spoken of the dreadful historical spectacle of outstanding British defence products that have either been cancelled or have not reached their full potential, because of an historical lack of political will or long-term procurement thinking.

In 2017, we welcomed the national shipbuilding strategy, which set out an aspiration for an holistic plan to build the Royal Navy’s Type 31e frigates and support ships, and the industry backing to make them happen. Later that year, we led a call for a combat air strategy to begin considering the aircraft that will, in due course, replace the Typhoon. Because of the development period, for all those systems it is necessary to start developing replacements sometimes decades in advance. I asked the then Secretary of State in November 2018 to start thinking about helicopters, and I return to that theme today, because a similar approach would bear fruit when we start to consider the UK’s future rotary capability and where it will come from.

Let me take a quick canter across the types. The Chinook, as I mentioned, is essentially a giant delivery truck, with a lift capability of 10 to 11 tonnes. That is expected to continue in service until approximately the 2040s under the Chinook heavy lift sustainment programme. Similarly, the Apache, as upgraded and replaced with the final delivery of the second type bought but expected only in 2024, is intended to go out of service in 2040. Those two types are probably the least urgent platform types to be considered.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. He always makes knowledgeable and interesting remarks.

He alluded to the Chinook being the delivery truck of our armed forces. I draw his attention to the role it played in operational theatres, picking up casualties and operating a pretty much mobile operating theatre to make sure we got casualties back to Camp Bastion as quickly as possible, to give them the best possible chance of surviving what were quite often terrible injuries. Will he join me in congratulating Boeing and the RAF on operating that aircraft or 40 years? As he says, that will have a continuing service until probably the 2060s.

[Robert Courts]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right; the Chinook is an extraordinarily capable aircraft. I referred to it as a delivery truck of the skies simply in reference to its extraordinary lift capability, but he is quite right that that lift capability means that it is able to take a great deal of medical facilities. Many people owe their lives to that aircraft; I pay tribute to everybody who has flown it and kept it flying over the course of many years. He is quite right to draw attention to the aircraft’s capability.

The Apache and the Chinook may need upgrades to avionics, cockpits and perhaps engines as time progresses, probably because of their expected longevity, as my hon. Friend said. It would be good to consider, as part of the strategy that I am calling for, whether any of those roles could be absorbed by other fleets as we look at upgrading or replacing capability. I suggest that the case is more pressing with medium-lift types. The difficulty with Chinook is its sheer size. While it is able to operate happily from aircraft carrier decks, it is far more challenged in urban environments, as is the Merlin—although in theory a medium-lift and smaller airframe, it actually covers much the same footprint size.

The Puma is critically important. That fleet of approximately 23 is based at RAF Benson in Henley, which borders my own constituency. I understand that it is due to go out of service in about 2025, although some service updates may keep it in service longer. In any event, we are looking at an out-of-service date for that aircraft of 2025-30—about five to 10 years away. That will have an impact on all the other types of helicopters in service.

In theory, the Merlin, which is operated by the Royal Navy, supplements that capability as another medium-lift type, but is primarily designed to operate at sea level as a naval helicopter. That means it is not ideal for some of the environments we have asked it to operate in, such as the hot and high environment of Afghanistan. Its lift capability is closer to four tonnes, meaning that while very capable, it approaches the size and weight of the Chinook but without anything like as much lift capability. Crucially, as the Minister will probably refer to in due course, some of those air frames are earmarked—approximately 10, I think—for use in the Crowsnest role, which will limit their capability for other purposes.

The impending retirement of Puma in five to 10 years’ time leaves a potential shortfall among that medium-lift capability. That is particularly the case because any incoming platform does not come up to full operating capability immediately, but has to be operated alongside the type it is replacing for a period of time. The obvious example of that in the fast-jet world is the way that Tornado and Typhoon operated alongside each other until Typhoon was able to take over all or most of the capabilities of Tornado, under the Centurion programme. The teething problems that have to be worked out—as we saw with the Hercules and the A400M—may mean a period of running in parallel, which would bring the decision point closer, bringing forward the date on which replacement would need to be considered.

The type of aircraft system or systems that we might need is very much dependent on what we envisage the need to be. Let me make a general foreign policy point, which I think many hon. Members will agree with: foreign policy goals ought to be decided first, with the military capability developed to match those goals, and then appropriate funding. It has often been the case in the past that defence capability is trimmed piecemeal in order to fit the available budget, leaving our forces ever more stretched as they try to fulfil a full-spectrum capability, from peacekeeping to expeditionary warfare, but with fewer platforms to do the work. The Minister will tell me that there is a review ongoing, and critical it is, too.

Equally serious, although perhaps a matter for another debate, is the fact that budgetary pressure on procurement of kit means that the men and women operating it do so under deteriorating service conditions, as more of the defence budget is required to deal with platform renewal. That leads to an increasing concern, as we have all spoken about many times, with retention of those men and women who fight and run our armed services.

Let me take the two aircraft carriers as an example of a microcosm of how this works. I refer to the relatively recent debate on a carrier strategy. The nation has to decide how and in what circumstances it is to use this new capability. The obvious deployment is for power projection: carrier strike, using the F35s that we are buying. If that is the case, those carriers are likely to be kept as far offshore as possible, to keep them safe from land-based threats. If so, would there be a need for organic carrier-based air-to-air refuelling capability, to maximise range or to sustain combat air patrols? What about the resupply of weapons or engine changes? Our American allies have a different approach; they have the speed and lift of something like the V-22 Osprey to resupply their smaller carriers, but I fully anticipate that the complexity and cost of a machine such as that may not be realistic for us to consider. On board our carriers, the absence of cats and traps means that a fixed-wing-capability delivery truck such as the Grumman Greyhound equally is not possible for us to have. There is the lift capability of the Chinook, as I said, but that severely limits range. That would also be available for any littoral role, which of course presents another set of challenges, particularly with regard to land-based threats. In any event, it is clear that those carriers and carrier battle groups will require a huge amount of protection. I referred to the Merlin force and Crowsnest, although of course other platforms will be required for anti-submarine capacity, which is now highly defensive rather than primarily offensive, as submarine capability was in the past.

One new factor that will have to go into the strategy is how much of the current rotary output could be conducted by unmanned aircraft. That is why I call for a strategy rather than just talking about helicopters per se. The advent of unmanned aircraft and artificial intelligence brings a whole new dimension to this picture.

Looking first at the naval picture, the role of naval surveillance aircraft is to loiter and search—to spend time looking for submarines or hostile small craft. Some of that could be done by unmanned aerial vehicles based on warships, either alongside or to a certain extent replacing—supplementing—piloted helicopters. That would have benefits in terms of cost and survivability, and it would free up manned assets for use where they are truly needed, such as for troop transport. In short, UAVs could be used for dull, dirty, dangerous tasks such as stand-off surveillance, search and reconnaissance, and long-term anti-submarine operations, but they would be a real game changer in terms of their size on a warship, payload, and persistence.

Having considered the maritime domain, it is easy to see that many of the same benefits could apply across the land domain as we look at some of the smaller helicopters used by the Army Air Corps. This technology is only emerging, and it is vital that we put a strategy in place to ensure that we are leading in the digital world—the artificial intelligence world—particularly so we do not end up having to rely on technology developed by others, who may not have our best interests at heart.

Let me say a few words before I conclude about sovereign capability and other nations. There has been a trend across defence recently towards foreign military sales and purchases, for various reasons. I do not want to critique the rights and wrongs of any of those decisions, but whereas an off-the-shelf purchase can provide a proven, established, matured capability and speed of procurement, it means we lose British sovereign capability and experience all the impacts of that in terms of defence security, investment, tax revenues and, of course, jobs.

As with combat air, I suggest that anything we do in the future is likely to be in concert with other nations, with Britain likely to add value in the high-tech sphere rather than in airframes. As with combat air, it will take time to explore the options, but we need to consider what we would want to contribute to any such future programme and what the industrial base would be. In so doing, we will ensure that we do not either miss out on making the most of everything British industry could add to that or, by failing to think about the issue in advance, failing to plan and failing to have a strategy—frustratingly, this has so often been the case in the past—have to buy off the shelf because there is an urgent procurement requirement for an operational reason.

We ought to consider who our partners might be, whether we could expand bilateral relationships and what that might mean for foreign policy. For example, France’s largest helicopter is the Super Puma, our medium-lift aircraft, so our Royal Air Force has been assisting the French in Mali and they are considering a heavy-lift acquisition of their own. One option might be to consider some sort of NATO helicopter force along the lines of the Heavy Airlift Wing, which provides three C-17s to 12 participating nations including the United States, either to provide a heavy-lift joint helicopter capability or to address the requirement for medium-lift capability that France is likely to have at about the same time as the United Kingdom.

There are other bilateral arrangements that could build on the Lancaster House principles, and all sorts of issues would need to be worked out. We would need to consider what would happen in a war-fighting rather than a peacekeeping situation, and what would happen if only one country were operating and wished to use part of the fleet. At this stage, I do nothing more than to ask for those things to be considered, because it takes time to work them through. I am conscious that I am asking not so much for a rotary strategy as for a defence/foreign policy/industrial rotary strategy. What I ask for is multi-pronged and multi-departmental—perhaps we could call it a global rotary strategy to fit with global Britain—and it will take time.

I thank hon. Members for listening. I am conscious that I raised more questions than solutions, but my aim really was just to provoke debate. I have no preference for any particular outcome, but I would like gently to press the Department to consider what the rotary fleet is likely to look like in around 10 years’ time, what it is the country wants or needs—I accept that is a foreign policy consideration as much as anything—when it will need it by, what it will cost, and the technological and industrial requirements of that. Then we will have a rotary fleet fit for the future.

Carrier Strike Strategy

Debate between Jack Lopresti and Robert Courts

Thursday 28th February 2019 Westminster Hall

[Robert Courts]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making that excellent point. I will refer to it in a little more detail shortly and I know that some of my hon. Friends will, too. I am keen to make the point that while the carriers are big grey ships that live in Portsmouth, they are not purely a Portsmouth matter. They have been built by constituents in all our areas and by companies across the whole United Kingdom. That has sustained the building of the carriers, but we need to ensure that they can be maintained and kept in service for decades to come. For that reason—it is exactly the point that the hon. Gentleman made—I am asking the Minister to consider a strategy.

We need a whole-Government approach. It is no good us just looking at this purely as a Ministry of Defence issue. I am conscious that I am asking the Minister to do more than is in his power, but it has to be a cross-Government approach. We have to look at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to see whether we have the industrial base to ensure that the supply chain that built the carriers remains in place to sustain and maintain them in the years ahead. The hon. Gentleman’s point is absolutely the point I wish to make.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. He is making a brilliant speech. I am just thinking about the point he made earlier about the improbability or unlikeliness of us using the carrier fleet to act unilaterally. Although it might be difficult to imagine such circumstances, we cannot rule them out. There may be a time when we will have to act unilaterally, possibly on a smaller scale than the Falklands conflict. It is also not strictly easy to make a comparison between the carrier fleet today and what we sent to the Falklands. The capabilities are infinitely greater, even if it is smaller in size.

[Robert Courts]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who must have read my speech in advance, because I will go on to make exactly that point. If he will forgive me, rather than respond directly to his intervention I will move on to the next part of my speech.

In the Falklands, as I have said, we had approximately 60 destroyers and frigates as escorts. Of those, eight destroyers and 15 frigates were part of the taskforce. In the course of that conflict, four of those were lost and many more were damaged, some very seriously. The initial concern is that a similar impact today would destroy about one third of the Royal Navy’s air defence fleet, which would be unsustainable. Of course, we need more than the minimum deployed in case such damage takes place. I appreciate, as my hon. Friend said, that history never repeats itself exactly, and I entirely accept that the Falklands was a one-off, probably unique event. We would need many more ships available if we were looking to support an invasion force, as we were then, particularly when operating at the other end of the world, a long way from supply chains. I entirely accept that, and the parallels are not precise.

I accept entirely that the Type 45s are vastly more capable than the Type 42s that they replaced. It is also true that they are the best in the world as air defence destroyers. Essentially, they combine the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke mission platform into one. They are better than each of them on a platform-to-platform basis, but it is not always the case that we can do the job with fewer. The Type 42s were the cutting-edge destroyers of their day, but as soon as the Falklands war started, we found their weaknesses ruthlessly exposed, particularly with regard to the survivability of damage. That was so horrifyingly exposed in the case of HMS Sheffield. I simply suggest that there comes a point where we need mass.

Although I want us to be able to act unilaterally—I do not disagree with my hon. Friend at all—we need to consider that in most cases we will not be doing that, so I simply ask the Government to consider a strategy for that. I am instinctively very reluctant to follow a line of argument that says that because a single platform is more capable than what it replaced, we can make do with less. I say that simply because all these high-tech platforms—this is true across the whole military capability—can turn out to be horribly vulnerable in ways we do not expect. I am thinking of the USS Cole incident with the speedboat packed with explosives. I am thinking of small drones, cheaply and easily available on the internet, that are packed full of explosives in a swarm capability, such that they overwhelm even the most potent defensive systems. I am thinking of the carrier killer missiles that we know are being developed by some potential adversaries. We can already see where the threats are. I simply say no more than this: while I accept that the parallels are not precise and the capability is streets ahead of what we saw when I was a child, there comes a point where we need mass, and we need to think about how we are going to provide that, given our finances.