Monday 20th May 2024

(7 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Jack Lopresti Portrait Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)
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This is day 816 of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have grown increasingly capable in the months since October. They are now frequently striking high-value targets at depths of 120 km behind the frontline. Operationally, they have demonstrated some success in engaging Ukrainian vehicles that were recently moved to Kharkiv. Overall, the Kharkiv offensive is likely part of a broader effort to stress the entire line. It is unlikely to yield a decisive breakthrough, but it will ease the pressure on Russian units fighting in other areas. If that trajectory continues, it will become increasingly difficult for Ukraine to stabilise the front and prevent further territorial losses and casualties.

Russia has deployed precision-strike assets with greater regularity and confidence, typically with reconnaissance from a long-range drone that is closely integrated with missiles such as Iskander, Tornado-S and, occasionally, D-30 SN air-launched missiles. That is called a “reconnaissance-strike contour” in Russian military parlance, and it is clearly having a significant impact on Ukraine’s air defences and command-and-control structures. It is coupled with more tactical elements, such as the widely covered use of guided glide bombs, laser-guided artillery and the Lancet loitering munition.

The shift seems to have occurred because Russia’s reconnaissance drones are able to fly longer and further as Ukraine lacks the air defence missiles to shoot them—and close air support—down. To give an example, Russia’s use of the Lancet loitering munition has expanded significantly in the past three months. There were 178 strikes in March and 140 in April, but there have already been 157 this month. Many of those strikes will have disabled or destroyed key Ukrainian systems such air defence platforms and artillery.

Alongside that, Russian units are adapting to the use of first-person vision drones in various ways, there are more electronic warfare systems for vehicle protection, and the turtle tank concept is proliferating, which indicates that it is a successful counter measure. FPVs have also provided Ukraine with a powerful and cost-effective form of firepower until now, and have largely served to ameliorate the lack of artillery ammunition. However, if Russian units become more effective at countering them, Ukraine’s lethality will decline significantly.

Russian activity should be expected to peak around the G7 summit in June and the NATO meeting in July. The Government therefore have a window of opportunity to maximise their activity and help Ukraine. The UK has been the driving force in supporting Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion and before. It has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Ukrainian people, delivering the kit that the Ukrainian military needed most and when it needed it, quite often over the initial objections of our allies. The UK was the first to offer training, to provide NLAWs—next-generation light anti-tank weapons—to ship 155 mm artillery shells, to provide tanks, and to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles.

Ukraine must win this war; as has been said by other Members, its failure to do so would result in severe consequences for NATO and the rest of the world. If Ukraine concedes one inch of land to Russia, then Putin, as well as our other enemies in China and Iran, will draw the inevitable conclusion that the west simply is not up to the task of defending our freedom and protecting our way of life, or does not have the willpower to do so. We have trained some 40,000 Ukrainian troops since the invasion began, in addition to our commitment to train Ukrainian jet pilots, but the question remains: how does Ukraine win this war? How does it fully expel Russian forces from its territory? Ukraine needs the right weapons to defend against Russian attacks, but also weapons to support its campaign to liberate its land.

Throughout the war so far, Ukraine has used ammunition and artillery at an astonishing rate: approximately 6,000 artillery rounds per day on average over the course of a two-year period. To put that into perspective, during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the ground war was concluded in just four days, using 15,000 rounds per day. Estonian analysts estimate that around 2.4 million shells will be needed for Ukraine to mount an effective counter-offensive against Russian forces, or against Russian-backed separatist forces such as those in Donetsk. That target of 2.4 million artillery shells is achievable eventually, but only with additional American support. However, the American capacity for manufacturing 155 mm high explosive artillery stands at 28,000 per month, and an anonymous American defence official has said that the inventory of 155 mm military artillery shells has fallen to an “uncomfortably low” level. As a consequence, there is a target to ramp up production to 100,000 per month by the end of the year.

A discussion paper published by the Estonian Ministry of Defence notes that 4,800 anti-air missiles are required on an annual basis. However, meeting that target would exceed all NATO production capacity at the current rate, with current American levels standing at 3,600 and the rest of NATO’s standing at 1,000. Of those anti-air missiles, Ukrainians have been asking for Patriot missiles; according to the Heritage Foundation, US army stockpiles have stood at approximately 4,410 from 2005 until now, with a production capacity of 240 per year. However, with instances of Ukrainians firing 30 missiles in as many seconds and employing around 10% of annual global production last year, it is clear that the production of air defence missiles has to be stepped up. Companies such as MBDA in my constituency are a key part of that effort.

The manufacturing of Storm Shadow missiles will make a tangible difference on the battlefield. That long-range, conventionally armed, deep-strike weapon is designed to be used in pre-planned attacks against high-value stationary targets with pinpoint accuracy. Those missiles have proven invaluable in targeting Russian positions in Crimea, and the use of those munitions has been highly effective in containing the Russian onslaught. I am glad that our Government agree that Ukraine can use British weapons to strike any targets it deems necessary for its defence. I would like to see our allies in the US and others follow our lead in allowing the Ukrainians to use the long-range missiles that the Americans and others have given them against Russian targets in Russia itself, which would be an absolute game changer.

The facts I have outlined demonstrate that all our NATO allies should follow our example by putting their defence manufacturing on a war footing, especially when it comes to artillery and ammunition. Alliance members must meet NATO requirements, such as the requirement for all members to have a 30-day stockpile of wartime munitions. Only half of members met that requirement prior to the invasion, which is brought home by the fact that by November 2022, 20 NATO allies had significantly diminished their stockpiles. We should be in no doubt that Russia will remain a belligerent neighbour even after it has been thrown out of Ukraine. NATO members, including the UK, will need to maintain war levels of equipment reserves well into the medium term.

The UK was also the first major ally to sign a long-term defence security partnership with Ukraine. That alliance foresees helping Ukraine develop a sustainable defence industrial base while at the same time expanding and fortifying our own. The UK has ringfenced £350 million to forge collaboration and partnerships between UK and Ukrainian drone companies, in order to marry technologies and scale up production to get thousands of drones to the frontline within the next six months. That type of practical co-operation is a win-win for both of our countries and an example to our allies. Both of our countries benefit from the sharing of technologies, the real-time battlefield testing of equipment, and the further iteration of technological development and collaboration that will help defend this country. That form of practical collaboration should be expanded into other areas of defence manufacturing, and we must assist the Ukrainians to start producing their own equipment in-country, or as near as damn it.

We need to be clear that the money we spend in engaging in this type of co-operation is not aid: it is an investment in the United Kingdom’s long-term defence and security. The defence of Ukraine today is the defence of the United Kingdom tomorrow. Over and over again, I have heard at first hand from senior members of the Ukrainian Government their frustration with the bureaucracy that is slowing down that co-operation. I call on our Ministers to work even closer with their Ukrainian counterparts to identify and eliminate those obstructions. I have met representatives from Ukrainian small and medium-sized enterprises; just today, somebody told me that they want to talk directly to their British counterparts in order to develop technology together. I want to see the Ministry of Defence facilitating those conversations, not merely directing them to the big prime contractors.

On Monday 15 January, in response to a question from me, the Prime Minister said in this House that he agreed that we must place defence manufacturing on a wartime footing. We are now in mid-May, and in my view, that process has to be accelerated. We do not have the luxury of time; this cannot be business as usual. We must work with our Ukrainian friends to build the arsenal of the free world together.