High Speed Rail (Crewe - Manchester) Bill (Instruction) (No. 3)

Debate between Jack Brereton and William Cash

Tuesday 21st May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Jack Brereton (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Con)]

I must say that the motion before the House is quite bizarre. Now that the hybrid HS2 Bill has been adapted to supposedly deliver Northern Powerhouse Rail, we are asking the Select Committee on the High Speed Rail (Crewe – Manchester) Bill to agree a Bill for a railway that ends in a field, with no connection to the rest of the rail network. This is effectively a railway to nowhere. The motion and the adaption of the hybrid Bill will not facilitate a functioning railway until a connection is established to the rail network at Latchford in Warrington. The Department for Transport is presuming that the remainder of the line will be approved through a completely separate planning process, but does not say what that process is and when it will be brought forward. That is a massive departure from what was experienced in phase 1 or even phase 2, in which a whole corridor approach was considered, with clear connections possible, in each phase, to the existing network. It is totally flawed to segment NPR in the way proposed, rather than looking at the whole corridor, or even a whole phase or section. The proposal does not even properly consider what could be thought of as the NPR core route. The House should not be asked to approve something that will not deliver a functioning piece of infrastructure.

[Sir William Cash]

The instruction states:

“The Committee shall, before concluding its proceedings, amend the Bill by—”

and then sets out certain arrangements relating to certain aspects of the railway. It then states:

“making such amendments to the Bill as it thinks fit in consequence of the amendments made by virtue of”

the previous sub-paragraphs. The words “as it thinks fit” are an absolute carte blanche. If the railway ends in a field, it is not a railway. That is just the starting point. Have the examiners been asked to look at the Bill using the procedures for a hybrid Bill? Effectively, it will not be a Bill, when it has been treated in this way, if the instruction goes through. Should we not put forward petitions, irrespective of the constraints imposed by the instruction, to test just how much this is a matter of principle? The Bill is also constrained by the fact that Second Reading is now effectively torn up, and a new principle is being inserted into the Bill.

[Jack Brereton]

I thank my hon. Friend for those very thoughtful points. I entirely agree that the instruction is wide-ranging. It is concerning to see those sorts of powers being put forward to the Committee. It really does show the abuse of the hybrid Bill process. If any services are to use the line, the railway would have to secure much wider enhancements and additional complex infrastructure, and there is no guarantee of that being delivered. As I said, the delivery of any services on this line will depend on permission being secured for the rest of the section, and that will be approved under a completely separate planning process. The approach being taken really is totally back to front.

[Jack Brereton]

We may come to that shortly, but I am very concerned about this. Certainly, we may consider dividing on the motion.

We should focus first on properly understanding the connectivity enhancement need, and then design the infrastructure to meet that need. Instead, we already have the infrastructure design, and are trying to make it fit with the improvements that we would like for connectivity across the north, because we do not want to spend time doing this properly and restarting the hybrid Bill process. It might have made sense to use the proposed route when the track would be shared with HS2, but it does not make any sense now that phase 2 has gone. It is neither the optimal route for benefits nor the most cost-effective to deliver. I am afraid that this really is an abuse of the hybrid Bill process.

[Sir William Cash]

May I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 3 of the motion? It states:

“The Committee shall treat the principle of the Bill, as determined by the House on…Second Reading, as comprising the matters mentioned in paragraph (4); and those matters shall accordingly not be at issue during proceedings of the Committee.”

What the motion is actually saying, surely, is that the principle of the Bill as originally passed will now be replaced by a new principle, and that any petitioner or anyone else who gets up to speak about it in any context will be told, because of an instruction by the whole House on what I could describe as the misleading basis—I am not accusing the Minister of this; I am merely commenting on the wording of the motion—that the issue cannot be put, and indeed is not to be regarded as an issue. That is a contradiction of what is clearly going on.

[Jack Brereton]

My hon. Friend has made a powerful point. That, too, illustrates the failings of the hybrid Bill process. My hon. Friend and I know about this all too well because of the abuses of the process that we have seen in Staffordshire, which really have not guarded against some of the issues and challenges to which people have been drawing attention. It brings into question the fitness of the process in its entirety, and the way in which hybrid Bills have been enacted.

This Bill was designed and set out to deliver phase 2b of HS2. It was never about NPR alone, so its original objectives were very different. To try to adapt the Bill in this way is totally flawed. It would not afford the due process that is required for the decision in question. I believe we should abandon this phase 2b Bill, and come back with a new hybrid Bill that will deliver NPR properly. We should look at the whole corridor between Liverpool and Manchester, and at areas beyond, not just at the section in the middle, which does not go anywhere. We need a Bill that is capable of delivering the whole project. We cannot just deliver a partial scheme, and expect it to magically result in capacity being released to enable the promised enhancement of services.

There are constraints along the whole route. What about the complexities of crossing the M56, the M6 and the Manchester ship canal to connect with the rail network at Latchford, east of Warrington Bank Quay? What about the enhancements that will be needed between Warrington and Liverpool, including the upgrading of the Fiddlers Ferry line to facilitate services, and what about the capacity improvements that are needed at Liverpool Lime Street station? All these issues need far more detailed consideration and focus, as well as a proper process for approval—and we have not even mentioned how all this will be delivered within a tight £12 billion budget envelope; it is more likely to cost more than £16 billion. As for the point raised by the hon. Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick) about connecting with the west coast main line, I am afraid that that will not be possible because of the challenges presented in the Warrington area; the Arpley chord cannot provide a connection with the west coast main line to serve west coast stations north of Warrington.

One might ask why we in Staffordshire are so interested in these matters. It is because we fear those who are seeking to reignite phase 2 of HS2 and all the horrors that it was set to wreak on our fine county. People in Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire have overwhelmingly welcomed the Prime Minister’s courageous and correct decision to scrap phase 2. They want the £36 billion released to be spent on projects that will truly deliver the improvements in local transport that will help to transform their lives, and not on remote “white elephant” pet projects.

It is disappointing that the eagerness to progress the plans set out in the motion has not been mirrored in the actions to wind down site compounds, fill in the thousands of boreholes that have been left, and return land to its rightful owners across the rest of the phase 2 route. Little to no progress seems to have been made yet, and the significant costs continue to spiral, even though the project has been cancelled. People in Staffordshire communities such as Swynnerton and Yarnfield, in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), are still fearful, given that they have not yet seen any visible signs of unwinding. Motions like the one before us today do nothing to dispel those fears, and there are concerns that some people would like nothing better than to see phase 2 restarted. That is why I have tabled several probing amendments, because we need to know that all elements relating purely to phase 2 will be removed.

Amendment (a) would leave out the provisions relating to the entirety of phase 2b from the junction with phase 2a at Crewe to where it would have joined the line to share track with NPR—importantly, including the stub and junction for where the line would join NPR, which would otherwise remain part of the design. Clearly, following the cancellation of phase 2, the stub and junction are no longer needed, so they should be removed from the design. Removing them would help to reassure that phase 2 could not be restarted at a later stage.

HS2 Cancellation and Network North

Debate between Jack Brereton and William Cash

Wednesday 17th January 2024 Westminster Hall

[Jack Brereton]

My hon. Friend has been a long advocate of restoring the important cross-city line. I very much hope that such local considerations will be taken on board and that funding will be directed locally to make a difference. I am sure the Minister will clarify the position and expand on what my hon. Friend said.

When we can see the wood for the trees, the important point is this: there are localised projects that will help knit together our national transport network for the benefit of a far wider range of people than the elite who want to get in and out of London on business expenses as quickly as possible regardless of the consequences for local communities in Staffordshire, like those in Yarnfield and Swynnerton in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). We have already experienced that in north Staffordshire, even before HS2 phase 2a. I am not just talking about the Beeching axe, which was bad enough and of course did not exclusively affect the Potteries; I am talking about the last Labour Government’s decision to make it quicker to get between Manchester and London via the west coast mainline Potteries arc by annihilating three local stations that had survived the Beeching cuts of the 1960s.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Is my hon. Friend aware that we led a massive campaign to reopen Stone station, and that the footfall there has been absolutely phenomenal since it was opened, which demonstrates the need to get these stations back in line?

[Jack Brereton]

Absolutely. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Stone station was a victim of the west coast upgrade changes, but thanks to his work and that of those who campaigned for its reopening, it has reopened and been extremely successful. I hope we continue to see those types of station reopen.

The west coast upgrade meant that in Stoke-on-Trent, for marginal time gains between Manchester and London, Etruria station—the very place where the fist sod was cut for the North Staffordshire railway in September 1846—was closed by the Labour Government in September 2005. To the south of the city, Wedgwood and Barlaston stations were suspended in 2004 and neither has subsequently reopened or been maintained in a good state of repair. I understand from Network Rail that neither can now be reopened to passenger services without significant investment and potentially being completely rebuilt, which means that there is now no intermediate local station between Stoke-on-Trent and Stone.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Stone illustrated, the same happened with Stone station, but thanks to his efforts and those of the community, it was reopened in December 2008 and now has some services for that town. So much for Labour’s Strategic Rail Authority! That experience has made us determined that HS2 would either have to work for Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire, or we would have to drop it entirely. Unfortunately, it had become clearer and clearer that HS2 would not bring benefits to Staffordshire, certainly not the net benefit that we would need to see to justify the horrendous disruption, painful compulsory purchases and the disruption of ancient woodland.

A constituent attended my surgery recently whose business has been and continues to be affected. Unbelievably, he has recently been asked by HS2 Ltd to commission further thousands of pounds of costly reports to prove the value of his business, despite the 2a route no longer even going ahead. He is not alone: many businesses and property owners throughout Staffordshire continue to be hounded by HS2 Ltd and forced to give up their businesses or sell their land, despite phase 2a being cancelled. A line must be drawn under the compulsory purchase order process. I am sure we will hear more about that tomorrow in the Backbench Business debate on HS2 compensation that is being led by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Theo Clarke). Ultimately, however, it is essential that the Government keep to their word and urgently lift the safeguards on the 2a route, and that efforts are made to rapidly extricate HS2 from the lives of people in those communities and elsewhere in Staffordshire.

Every day that goes by costs the public purse considerably in extortionate security costs and wasteful legal processes for sites that are no longer even needed. If further clarity were needed that HS2 would not bring benefits to Staffordshire or indeed nationally, it was striking to hear from Trevor Parkin and Trevor Gould from the Stone Railway Campaign Group at the oral evidence session of the Transport Committee in Birmingham on 30 November last year. Trevor Gould said:

“I was a great advocate of the HS2 project. I fully support the idea in principle and I still think that it is important that high-speed trains are segregated from freight and slower passenger trains, but unfortunately this HS2 is not the way to do it; it does not do what it says on the tin. It does not release capacity north of Birmingham, it does not improve connectivity because of that”.

As we know, the three fast trains an hour currently serving Staffordshire—one via Stafford and two via Stoke-on-Trent—were set to be replaced by one HS2 service calling at both, which would have terminated at Macclesfield. That is a major reduction on what we currently enjoy, so it is not at all clear that there would have been extra capacity or connectivity, which is what HS2 was supposed to address. In fact, according to HS2 Ltd’s updated 2022 strategic outline business case, the only places north of Birmingham that would have received a higher number of services than they do today would have been Runcorn and Liverpool.

In the meantime, there is a pressing list of other projects that need to be delivered to ensure local services and connectivity into the hub stations are maximised. The reason for that is the major constraints at Crewe, particularly Crewe North junction, which were made worse post phase 2. HS2 had no plans to increase the number of platforms or address the constraints at Crewe North junction, which means the only possible way to run HS2 services would have been to take out what already exists, removing local and regional connectivity. I am not even convinced that HS2 intended to run any meaningful service to Stafford, Stoke-on-Trent and Macclesfield.

On 10 January, the executive chair of HS2 Ltd, Sir Jon Thompson, appeared before the Transport Committee and I asked him to clarify some striking comments that he had made to the Public Accounts Committee on 16 November. I put it to him that he had said to the PAC that if HS2 phase 2a had indeed been built,

“HS2 trains would never have gone on to the west coast main line”

at Handsacre and that “they would have joined” the west coast main line only “north of Manchester.” To that he replied: “Yes.” Of course, I pressed him on that because it would mean that the proposed services to Stafford, Stoke-on-Trent and Macclesfield were never actually going to materialise, even on completion of phase 2a. Sir Jon said that

“if 2a had been constructed, the advice to me, which I have got written down here, is that we would not have used that junction.”

That is Handsacre junction. I await further clarity in writing, but that does, at face value, confirm my worst fears about what HS2 Ltd was actually planning at Handsacre, which is a fait accompli of connections that would not have carried HS2 trains up the Potteries arc—and it would have all been too late by then to do anything about it.

Macclesfield—always a very odd choice of terminus, fine though that market town undoubtedly is—appears to have been a fig leaf to quieten Staffordshire down during the construction phase. Originally, under the hybrid Bill of 2013, it was proposed to create a full connection at Handsacre for HS2 by connecting the new track into the existing fast lines, enabling HS2 services to join on to the west coast main line. Then, in 2019—Trevor Parkin of the Stone Railway Campaign Group made this point very well at the Transport Committee on 30 November—HS2 redrew its intentions at Handsacre in order to join the slow lines of the west coast main line and not the fast lines. The options analysis for that extraordinary move has never been published, and we still do not know why that bizarre decision was taken.

With the cancellation of phase 2, it is clearly essential that we now revert to the original design for the Handsacre junction, to enable a proper connection with the fast lines to maximise capacity and allow services to run beyond. As I said, we await further clarification in writing about the reasons behind the changes, which are unlikely to be to do with cost, as people have attempted to claim. It seems unlikely that HS2 had intended any real, meaningful Stafford-Stoke-Macclesfield services to run at all.