Hywel Francis
Main Page: Hywel Francis (Labour - Aberavon)Department Debates - View all Hywel Francis's debates with the Cabinet Office
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberDo I detect from the warm way in which the Minister responded and referred to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that he will be minded to accept many of its recommendations?
Minded to? Certainly—we will accept some of them. I speak warmly of the Joint Committee because I do not believe it was pursuing objectives that differed from mine or those of my colleagues. I think it will probably fall to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) to explain in Committee why we are not wholly convinced that every one of the amendments is quite right, or even that some of them would have the effect that the Joint Committee proposed. I will not, however, get into that level of detail so early in a Second Reading speech, if I may be allowed not to do so.
We discussed the Green Paper about a year ago, and I recall that it was a comparatively non-controversial occasion. Such was the general satisfaction and understanding on all sides that I left the Chamber wondering whether I needed to have bothered to make an oral statement. Quite a lot has happened since then, but I trust it has not shifted the opinion of the Members who joined in the debate at that time, particularly that of the shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan). I still strongly agree with what he said, which I shall quote:
“We need, as a matter of urgency, to bolster the safeguards and scrutiny mechanisms concerning issues of security and intelligence.”—[Official Report, 19 October 2011; Vol. 533, c. 901.]
I am glad to see the right hon. Gentleman nodding his head in response to his own quotation. I was glad to read in a recent interview in The Guardian that he still believes that, as he said:
“In two and a half years’ time, it could be me in that seat making that tough decision. So it is very important for ministers to have the opportunity to protect sources, to protect delicate operations and all the rest of it. They shouldn’t be jeopardised by a civil action.”
I will not comment on the right hon. Gentleman’s political optimism and ambition to occupy any seat at all, but he is certainly right, in my opinion, to identify a serious problem with the current arrangements. At the moment, total secrecy is all that happens to the sensitive intelligence information in far too many cases and no judicial judgment is pronounced on the merits of plaintiff versus defendant. I believe that the present system needs to be reformed urgently. That is why the principle of the Bill is certainly necessary.
In support of the need for change, let me remind the House of a letter written to The Times newspaper last month by a number of individuals for whom I personally have the greatest respect. The signatories included the former Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord Woolf; the former Home Secretary, Lord Reid; and my right hon. Friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, a former Lord Chancellor. I am sure we all agree that all those people are totally committed to the rule of law and the principles of justice. In their letter they explained:
“In national security matters our legal system relies upon a procedure known as public interest immunity…Under PII, evidence which is deemed to be national security sensitive is excluded from the courtroom. The judge may not take it into account when coming to his or her judgment.”
This procedure, they say, is
“resulting in a damaging gap in the rule of law.”
They are right to say that.
In my opinion, it has become well nigh impossible for British judges to untangle, and adjudicate on, claims and counter-claims of alleged British involvement in the mistreatment of detainees. If we, as citizens, want to know whether the Security Service could challenge and rebut what is claimed against it, no judge can give us guidance as things stand. Some of the allegations of British involvement in the mistreatment of detainees are really serious, and I do not think that the system should continue to prevent judges from scrutinising the secret actions of the state in such cases.
Nothing in the Bill will affect the criminal law. No one will be prosecuted on the basis of secret evidence. However, there are plenty of cases—for instance, those involving MI5 or involving victims of certain types, such as vulnerable victims—in which it is proper to screen witnesses from public view, or otherwise protect them. The Bill, however, has nothing whatever to do with criminal cases.
The purpose of closed procedures is not just to ensure that no one can see what the agent looks like; there are some cases in which we cannot let people know what the agent was doing. The plaintiff may have been compromised as a result of terrorist or other activity, and he and his friends may be dying to know how they were caught. What were the British agents doing that put them on to it? They want to know who shopped them, and that will make things very difficult for a person who they come to suspect is the source of the material that is emerging. As I think everyone knows perfectly well, it is not possible to share that information with the parties in each and every case of this kind. However, while some people might consider it satisfactory to say “Well, in those cases the Government never defend themselves and we just pay millions of pounds”, I really do not think that we need tolerate that situation any longer.
Given what he said earlier about closed material procedures, how would the right hon. and learned Gentleman respond to what Lord Kerr said recently in the Supreme Court? He said:
“The central fallacy of the argument”—
the Government’s argument, that is—
“lies in the unspoken assumption that, because the judge sees everything, he is bound to be in a better position to reach a fair result. That assumption is misplaced. To be truly valuable, evidence must be capable of withstanding challenge.”
I was intending to return to the details of closed material procedures later. We could easily trade quotations, because various judges and legal authorities have expressed different views.
Closed material procedures sometimes achieve success. We have them now—the previous Government introduced them—and as I shall say later, as I should save it until I get to the relevant part of my speech, there are cases in which the special advocates have overturned the Government’s case. The most well known case is that of Abu Qatada, who won in a closed material procedure before a British judge only about a month ago—
I welcome the contribution of the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), who joined me last week in seeking—and, I think, securing—clarification from the Prime Minister of the Government’s intentions. May I say how pleased I am by the desire among Members on both Front Benches to improve the Bill in Committee?
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I chair, spent a long time scrutinising the proposal before the House today. We took the unusual step of holding an inquiry into the Green Paper that preceded the Bill because some of the proposals in the Green Paper constituted such a radical departure from the country’s constitutional tradition of open justice and fairness that we thought they deserved the most careful scrutiny.
Our examination of the Green Paper revealed serious human rights concerns about a number of the proposals. The Government accepted some of our recommendations on the Green Paper, and when the Bill was introduced in the other place they made some changes to the original proposals. The Government’s decision not to extend closed material procedures to inquests and the narrowing of the scope of the proposals to national security material were particularly welcome.
The Bill as introduced still represented a radical departure from our traditions of fair and open justice. Amendments made in the other place, based on some of the recommendations made by my Committee, have improved the Bill, but I want to explain why the Government still have a long way to go in improving this measure before they can plausibly claim that it is compatible with British traditions of fairness and openness, of which this House has been a proud defender.
Our starting point must be a recognition of how radical a departure from our common law constitution it is to extend closed material procedures to civil proceedings. During my Committee's scrutiny of the Bill the Government appeared to be in denial about this, but every other witness before our inquiry agreed about the enormity of what the Government propose. Let us not forget that in the case of Al-Rawi the Supreme Court refused to countenance such a radical change by judicial development of the common law.
Why does the Bill amount to such a radical departure? There are two main reasons. First, we in this country have always enjoyed a right to an adversarial trial of a civil claim. This includes the right to know the case against us and the evidence on which it is based, the opportunity to respond to evidence and arguments made by the other side, and the opportunity to call witnesses to support our case and to cross-examine opposing witnesses.
The second main reason why the Bill amounts to a radical departure from our constitutional traditions is that it derogates from the principle of open justice—the principle that litigation should be conducted in public and that judgments should be given in public, so that the media can report fully and accurately to the public on what the courts decide. One of the central questions for the House is this: have the Government demonstrated, by reference to sufficiently compelling evidence, the necessity for such a serious departure from the fundamental principles of open justice and fairness? My Committee subjected to careful scrutiny the evidence that the Government say demonstrates the necessity for making closed material procedures available in civil proceedings. We appreciated the Government’s difficulties in proving their case with reference to ongoing cases. We were anxious to give them a proper opportunity to prove their case and did so, but the Home Secretary refused to allow the special advocates to see the material that had been shown to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. The Government were unable to provide the Committee with a detailed breakdown of the civil damages claims pending against them in which sensitive national security information is centrally relevant to the case.
The Committee’s report on the Bill states that we remain unpersuaded that the Government have demonstrated by reference to evidence that there exists a significant and growing number of civil cases in which a closed material procedure is essential, in the sense that the issues in the case cannot be determined without a closed material procedure. I am sympathetic to the arguments made by many human rights organisations, including Liberty, Justice and Amnesty International. They argue that, because the Government have not made their case for introducing closed material procedures into civil proceedings, that part of the Bill should be removed altogether. Indeed, I note that a number of eminent lawyers in the other place voted to do just that.
My Committee’s judgment, however, is that the Bill is likely to pass in some form, and it is therefore better to seek to improve it with amendments than seek to make it compatible with the important traditions of open justice and fairness. I will therefore not vote against the Bill today, but the Government are on notice of the need to show us the evidence that demonstrates the necessity for extending closed material procedures into civil proceedings.
The amendments made to the Bill by the House of Lords made some of the necessary improvements, but I shall conclude by outlining four areas where the Committee and I believe improvements are required. First, we need provision for full judicial balancing of interests to take place within a closed material procedure. The House of Lords—by an overwhelming majority—amended the Bill to ensure that there is full judicial balancing of interests at the gateway stage, when the court decides whether a closed material procedure is appropriate. However, the amendment to ensure that the same judicial balancing takes place within the closed material procedure, when the court is deciding whether material should be closed or open, was defeated in the Lords late at night. Labour backed the amendment recommended by my Committee in the Lords, and I hope it will do so in this House. The amendment is essential to ensure that judges have the discretion they require to ensure that the Bill does not create unfairness.
Secondly, the House needs to listen to the expert views of the special advocates and act on their recommendation that the Bill must include what has become known as a gisting requirement, which has been referred to. My Committee recommended that such a requirement be included in the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, but the Government resisted, and the High Court last week held that such a requirement is necessary for the legislation to be compatible with human rights. The House should not leave it to the courts to correct the Government’s mistakes, so we should amend the Bill to give effect to the Committee’s recommendation.
Thirdly, the Bill needs to make provision for regular reporting to Parliament, as has been suggested. The Secretary of State should report regularly for independent review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and for annual renewal, to ensure a regular opportunity for Parliament to review the operation of the legislation and to debate its continuing necessity.
Fourthly and finally, the Bill needs to be amended to provide a more proportionate response to the problem of preventing courts ordering the disclosure of national-security sensitive information.
In conclusion, I look forward to the House, particularly in Committee, living up to its responsibility to ensure that the legislation we pass is compatible with the basic requirements of the rule of law, fairness and open justice.