European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Hilary Benn and Wayne David

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). I shall also follow him in not taking interventions, because many Members wish to speak. I wish to talk about the EEA amendment tabled by our Front Benchers and the EEA amendment that came from the House of Lords, and to explain why I shall be voting for both.

Time is running out, not just in the debate this afternoon but for the country. For far too long over the past two years, we have wasted time with a lot of dreaming—dreaming about the easiest trade deal in history, dreaming about us holding all the cards and dreaming that we will get the exact same benefits. The moment when that finally came to an end was when the Prime Minister spoke at the Mansion House and admitted that it was not really going to be like that. This is the moment when we need to tell each other the truth: there are choices that we face; there are trade-offs that we have to accept; and there are decisions that need to be made, which is the point just made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe.

If I may use an analogy, it seems to me that we have decided as a country to disembark from a liner in the middle of the ocean, and we have two basic choices: we can jump into the sea, which is what a hard no-deal Brexit would mean, or we can climb down into a lifeboat and decide where we are going. What are those in the Cabinet doing at the moment? They have spent two years arguing, first about how to create a deep and special lifeboat. They are trying to come up with a lifeboat that will not breach their red lines, and they have broken up into working groups, probably discussing the size, colour and shape of the lifeboat. The only thing that has not happened yet is a Minister getting up at the Dispatch Box and announcing that no lifeboat is better than a bad lifeboat. I tell you, Mr Speaker, it is not funny. The truth is that it is extremely serious indeed.

What does all of this mean? It means that we have not yet agreed as a country what we want for the future of the relationship. Not only is the promised White Paper now not going to appear until next month, but we learned this week that there will be a two-day away day in Chequers where the Cabinet tries to thrash things out. That means there will be one European Council left on 18 October—one—at which to sort out all the things we have been debating yesterday and today and to agree the political declaration, which is all about the future of our country. As a result, we have barely begun to discuss what might be in that political declaration at a time when, as the Prime Minister said in her G7 statement on Monday, the international rules-based order is under a threat that it has not been under at any time since it was created at the end of the second world war.

We are in a perilous place. Business is losing patience; we know that. The EU is frankly bewildered about what is going on in this country. The British people, to judge by the polls, think the whole thing is going very badly. The right hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) made the point really well—it is true—that in this place and outside, people have whispered conversations in which we say, “What on earth is going on?”

The consequences of getting this wrong for the country will be deeply damaging for our future and for the jobs, livelihoods and public services that depend upon our economic strength. That is what we are debating. There is so much at stake that it is frankly difficult to overstate it. Let me say it plainly: we have had enough of management in the party interest. What we desperately need now is leadership in the national interest.

That brings me to the EEA amendment and the question of our future relationship with our biggest, nearest and most important trading partner: the 27 countries of the EU. The truth is that on both sides of the House we are all debating, and sometimes disagreeing on, what kind of framework would be best. The Government now accept that we will be staying in a customs union and, in all likelihood, aligning with the rules of the single market for quite some time to come, because nothing has yet been agreed that can possibly replace the benefits we derive from both.

The same outcome will inevitably result from the proposed Northern Ireland backstop, although it is currently silent on the question of regulations and the internal market, which is why I described it last week as half a backstop. That omission will have to be remedied between now and the end of this month, because half a backstop will not do the business when it comes to getting the European Council to agree with it. And by the way, it is ludicrous to debate whether the backstop is time-limited, because the truth is terribly simple: the backstop will remain in place as long as necessary, until something else comes along that can replace it and achieve the same objective, which is maintaining an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. I am afraid that was about politics, not about policy.

That is also true of the debate about maximum facilitation and the customs partnership, although both ideas strike many people as costly, bureaucratic, burdensome and reliant on technology that is not yet in operation. However, being a generous soul, let me say that even if the Cabinet, on its away day, manages to reach agreement on one or the other, and even if the EU negotiators said, “Okay, let’s give it a go”—I do not think there is any prospect of that whatsoever—we all know that neither of them could be put in place by December 2020. It is too late: too much time has been wasted. That is why the transition period, or a transition period, is going to have to be extended by one means or another, whether that is with the backstop or an agreement on a way forward. That is where we are heading by default, so the question is: what form should the next transition, from January 2021 onwards, take? This is where the EEA comes in, because that would be one way of doing it.

Let me turn to the amendment moved by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and Lords amendment 51 on the EEA. Both are about a future framework and the internal market, and the difference here—apart from the free movement issue, which I will say a word about in a moment—is really quite small, and I very much welcome what was said by my right hon. and learned Friend, who leads for the Opposition, about having an open mind. I will of course vote for his amendment, because who could argue with the notion of full access to the single market? If it is not successful, I will vote for the EEA amendment, because we need to keep our options open. To return to my analogy, it has the one great advantage that it at least looks like a lifeboat, and I have to say that the closer we get to October, the less inviting the cold sea appears to those thinking of jumping off the side of the ship.

I am the first to acknowledge that the EEA option is not perfect. I do not want us to be like Norway, and I am not arguing that we should have a deal like Norway’s. Apart from anything else, we want to remain in a customs union. As Michel Barnier repeated yesterday, it would be an option to have the EEA plus a customs union. Let us acknowledge that.

We should seek some changes to the way in which free movement currently operates. Some of those could be made within the current rules of the European Union, which we will be leaving. Others would involve discussion of the emergency brake, which is why my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and I have tabled amendment (b), which refers to “safeguard measures”. The Exiting the European Union Committee, which I have the honour to chair, drew attention, in its report on the future UK-EU relationship, to the possibility of additional flexibility on free movement. We need to make sure that our agricultural and fish exports can continue to move freely.

[Wayne David]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Hilary Benn]

I will not give way, because of the time.

Who knows whether the EEA option may turn out to be a temporary state, but as a potential starting point, with a customs union, it would provide a means of solving the Northern Ireland problem, keep goods flowing freely, ensure common standards, maintain the flow of data, protect employment and environmental rights and enable us to continue to co-operate in really important areas such as aviation, consumer safety, medicines and space research. Crucially, it would also gain us a place in the room when some future decisions are being taken. In the EEA, not all EU legislation has to be transposed, and there are consultation mechanisms and a separate court. When it comes to EU agencies, in many of which UK regulators have led the way, we could continue to influence what happens because we would be part of the conversation, even though we would not have a vote, which is not the case under the transition period that we will shortly be entering.

The EEA option would diminish in part—I acknowledge that it would do so only in part—the rule taker problem. However, given that we are leaving, I see no outcome in which the United Kingdom will be a rule maker. We will have to follow the rules of our biggest export market for goods and services because so much of our prosperity depends on doing so. I think the Solicitor General accepted that in his answer to my earlier question, although he tried to couch it—and I see the argument—in terms of us, as a free sovereign country, being able to choose to follow the rules of other people. Indeed we can, and the same is true of the European Court of Justice and any other part of the agreement that we may seek to reach.