Leaving the EU: Economic Impact of Proposed Deal

Debate between Hilary Benn and Mel Stride

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mel Stride]

It is important to recognise that the modelling is on the basis of the status quo, so the model would not take into account factors of the kind that my right hon. Friend has raised, or indeed changes in productivity or trade flows and other factors. It will be for individual Members to assess the specific issues that he raised, in that context.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

Things have come to a pretty pass when here we are, 37 days from Brexit, and the House of Commons is actually discussing which of several options—all of them economically damaging—we should choose for the future of our country’s economy. Since it is the Government’s policy that they are planning for a no-deal Brexit, could the Minister explain to the House what possible justification there is for that? Given that their own economic assessment shows that it would have the most damaging impact on the British economy, how could such an act of economic self-harm ever be justified?

[Mel Stride]

What the right hon. Gentleman overlooks is that whilst he is absolutely right that no deal, in essence, is something to be avoided, and indeed is not in the interests either of the United Kingdom or of the European Union, that is not the same thing as saying that we should be reckless and not make sure that we are prepared for it, should it happen. That is precisely what we are doing.

Leaving the EU: Economic Analysis

Debate between Hilary Benn and Mel Stride

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. There was nowhere I would rather have spent my birthday than in the House of Commons questioning the Prime Minister on the Brexit deal, and I am sure that the same is true of the Prime Minister. On today’s urgent question, the Government are of course unable to analyse the political declaration because no one has the faintest idea about what kind of economic relationship will result from it, so instead, they have chosen to model the Chequers plan—the facilitated customs arrangements and the common rulebook—which has already been explicitly rejected by the European Union, which is why we have ended up with a vague political declaration. What is the purpose of trying to rest the Government’s case about minimising economic damage to the country on an option that the EU has already told us that it will not agree to?

[Mel Stride]

I echo your congratulations, Mr Speaker, to the right hon. Gentleman on his very special day. In the case of the political declaration, the right hon. Gentleman will know that it does not give a specific outcome because that is to be negotiated as we go forward, as was always going to be the case. However, while the analysis that we are presenting today is anchored on the Chequers arrangements and the July White Paper, it of course provides a sensitivity analysis around that to reflect the fact that there is a spectrum of potential outcomes.

Leaving the EU: UK Ports (Customs)

Debate between Hilary Benn and Mel Stride

Monday 19th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will make a statement on customs clearance arrangements at UK ports after the UK leaves the European Union.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mel Stride)]

The Government have been clear that in leaving the European Union the UK will also leave its customs union, allowing us to establish and enhance our trading relationships with old allies and new friends around the world. The Government have also set out that in leaving the EU customs union, we will be guided by what delivers the greatest economic advantage to the United Kingdom and by three strategic objectives: continued UK-EU trade that is as frictionless as possible; avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland; and establishing an independent international trade policy.

As we implement the decision of the British people to leave the EU at the end of March 2019, we want a deep and special partnership with the European Union. The Government set out in our future partnership paper last summer two options for our future customs arrangements—two options that most closely meet these objectives. One is a highly streamlined customs arrangement. That approach comprises a number of measures to help to minimise barriers to trade, from negotiating the continuation of some existing trade facilitations to the introduction of new technology-based solutions. The other is a new customs partnership, which is an unprecedented and innovative approach under which the UK would mirror the EU’s requirements for imports from the rest of the world that are destined for the EU, removing a need for a formal customs border between the UK and the EU. Those models were detailed again in the Government’s White Paper last October, and by the Prime Minister in her Mansion House speech and subsequent statement to the House. We look forward to discussing both those options with our European partners and with businesses in both the UK and the EU as negotiations progress.

[Hilary Benn]

I am grateful to the Minister for that reply, but when was the Transport Secretary proposing to tell the House—or indeed him—about the new policy of not checking goods at Dover after we leave the EU, as opposed to telling the BBC last Thursday:

“We don’t check lorries now—we’re not going to be checking lorries in Dover in the future ”?

Given that the Government are committed to leaving the customs union, but that all free trade agreements involve some checks at borders, how exactly can this be squared with no checks at all? Which border crossings will be covered by the no-checks policy? Will they just be ro-ro ports, for example? Are the Government confident that World Trade Organisation rules allow for not applying certain customs checks at some ports but not others? Which checks do the Government intend to forgo? Have the Government had any discussions with the French, Belgian or Dutch authorities about whether they intend to apply a reciprocal approach at Calais or other channel ports? Will there be no checks on goods that have arrived in Dover from outside the EU? What risk assessment has been undertaken and will Ministers publish it?

When is Parliament going to see the information and analysis that has apparently been shared with businesses— it is reported that they have been required to sign confidentiality agreements—about possible new customs arrangements? Lastly, when are Ministers finally going to realise that if they actually want frictionless trade with the EU and to keep an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the best way to achieve that is to remain in a customs union?

[Mel Stride]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for asking a variety of questions about what the Secretary of State for Transport said last Thursday. In addition to the remarks that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned, the Secretary of State also said that

“we will not in any circumstances create a hard border in Dover that requires us to stop every lorry in the port of Dover”.

That is absolutely right. The right hon. Gentleman will know that the discussions that we have had with other authorities in the EU27 are formal discussions, because the negotiations that we have been having with the EU have not been possible. However, some informal discussions have taken place.

The right hon. Gentleman raises the issue of confidentiality agreements for those with whom Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is in discussions. As I am sure he will know, this is an entirely normal state of affairs for such discussions. Incidentally, this works both ways, in that while there is confidentiality on the part of those private sector organisations, that is also binding on the Government, as anything of a commercially sensitive nature will not be divulged by the Government either.

The right hon. Gentleman raised the issue of Northern Ireland, on which we have made our position extremely clear: there will be no return to the hard border of the past. As we have made it clear to the EU27, we will not accept a situation in which we have a customs border down the Irish sea. We will respect the Belfast agreement, and we are engaged in further discussions with the Irish Government to come to a sensible arrangement that is in the mutual interests of ourselves, of Ireland and of the wider European Union.