(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberClearly, it is not possible to comment on specific future events, but Ministers are liable for the actions of civil servants, through vicarious liability, and we would expect regulators to take a similar approach and, putting it simply, to own the problems they are trying to solve. If that is a lesson learned from this sorry saga, in my humble opinion that would be a good thing. Clearly, it is for the FCA to take a good long, hard, look at itself, and other regulatory bodies, and decide how it will run itself going forward, with suitable input from Government.
Will the Minister give way?
I will not give way any more. I apologise, but we are trying to do this whole debate in 58 minutes. Please bear with me.
As the House will be aware, on 19 April the Economic Secretary to the Treasury provided a written ministerial statement on the Government’s approach to setting up a compensation scheme for London Capital & Finance bond holders who lost money following the firm’s collapse in 2019. LCF was an FCA authorised firm, which sold unregulated non-transferrable debt securities, commonly known as mini-bonds, to investors. Sadly, 11,600 bond holders lost around £237 million when LCF went into administration. For some investors that will have formed part of an investment portfolio, but for others it will have represented a significant proportion of their savings.
Following LCF’s collapse, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury directed the FCA to launch an independent investigation into its regulation and supervision of LCF. As we have discussed, Dame Elizabeth Gloster led the investigation and concluded that the FCA did not effectively supervise and regulate LCF. The LCF business model was, it is accepted, highly unusual in both its scale and structure. In particular, the firm was authorised by the FCA, despite generating no income from regulated activities. That allowed LCF’s unregulated activity of selling non-transferrable debt securities, known as mini-bonds, to benefit from the impact of being issued by an authorised firm. While other mini-bond firms have failed, LCF is the only mini-bond firm that was authorised by the FCA and sold bonds in order to on-lend to other companies.
In response to the regulatory failings detailed in Dame Elizabeth’s report and the range of interconnected factors that led to losses for bondholders, the Government announced two things: first, they would establish a compensation scheme, and secondly, they would accept all of Dame Elizabeth’s report, as did the FCA. It is, however, important to emphasise that the circumstances surrounding LCF are unique and exceptional, and the Government cannot and should not be expected to stand behind every failed investment firm. That would, with respect, create the wrong incentives for individuals and an unacceptable burden on the taxpayer.
Clause 1 of the Bill, which is the LCF measure, covers two key elements. First, it provides parliamentary authority for the Treasury to incur expenditure in relation to the scheme. Secondly, it makes a minor technical change that disapplies the FCA’s rule-making processes for the purpose of the LCF compensation scheme. The Treasury intends to use part 15A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to administer the scheme at speed on the Treasury’s behalf. The scheme will be available to all LCF bondholders who have not already received compensation from the FSCS and represents 80% of the compensation that they would have received had they been eligible for FSCS protection.
Around 97% of LCF bondholders invested less than £85,000 and will not reach the compensation cap under either the Government’s scheme or the FSCS. The Government expect to pay out around £120 million in compensation to around 8,800 bondholders in total and are committed to ensuring that the scheme has made all payments within six months of this Bill securing Royal Assent.
As colleagues will be aware, this is a two-measure Bill, the second clause of which concerns the Department for Work and Pensions and involves loans to the board of the Pension Protection Fund. Clause 2 amends the Pensions Act 2004 by inserting a new section that will give the Secretary of State a power to lend money to the board of the Pension Protection Fund.
The Pension Protection Fund manages the Fraud Compensation Fund, which pays compensation to occupational pension schemes that have lost out financially due to dishonesty. When set up in 2004 by the Blair Government, the PPF and the FCF did not envisage that pension liberation schemes were in scope for FCF payments. This clause will allow compensation to an estimated 8,806 individuals who have been defrauded following the pronouncement of the recent Court judgment in the Dalriada case.
Pension liberation fraud involves members being persuaded to transfer their pension savings from legitimate schemes to fraudulent schemes, with promises of high investment returns or access to a loan from their pension scheme before the age of 55 without incurring a tax charge. The Pensions Regulator has now placed professional pensions trustees in charge of the affected schemes. Those trustees are seeking compensation on behalf of scheme members through the Fraud Compensation Fund.
Following receipt of a significant number of applications, the Pension Protection Fund sought guidance from the High Court in a test case on which schemes should be eligible for the Fraud Compensation Fund. The Court judgment in the case of the Pension Protection Fund vs. Dalriada was pronounced on 6 November 2020, and the High Court concluded that such pension liberation schemes would be eligible, subject to meeting eligibility criteria. The Government have decided to fully accept the Court’s judgment on this and are committed to ensuring that all those who have been victims of pension liberation schemes are able to claim through the Fraud Compensation Fund. However, it is estimated that claims will exceed £350 million, which is far greater than the £26.2 million of assets currently held in the Fraud Compensation Fund, hence the requirement for clause 2 of the Bill and the action that the DWP and the Government are taking.
This is a necessary, urgent and important Bill which will ensure financial protection and fair outcomes for those falling victim in these particular circumstances. My hope and expectation is that the Bill will receive widespread support, and I commend its contents to the House.