Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Tuesday 10th September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills is investigating zero-hours contracts. It is seeking to establish whether there is abuse, and, if there is abuse, what we should do about it.

The Labour party seems to have suddenly discovered this issue. I do not remember a single Minister ever raising it when Labour were in government. Moreover, a number of Labour councils use zero-hours contracts.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

Although the economy is improving, I am afraid that the same cannot be said of the deputy Chancellor—[Interruption.]

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The business bank, which was established last year, is now making loans to the funds that will lend to small businesses, creating non-bank lending channels. [Interruption.] There was no business bank under the Labour Government. I will tell the House what we had instead: we had a socking great banking crash under the Labour Government, and the person sitting opposite, the shadow Chancellor, was City Minister when it happened. We are cleaning up the mess from one of the biggest financial crises in the country’s history by ensuring that it never happens again.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

May I say to my right hon. Friend that after a lifetime as a stockbroker and fund manager, my instinct, as bond yields rise all over the world, is that we are heading for another banking crisis that will certainly choke off the already inadequate lending of banks to small businesses? May I put on the record my dismay that he has not yet committed himself to the total separation of investment from commercial banks, which I have been urging on him ever since he became Chancellor? I am absolutely convinced that if we do not go back to something approaching Glass-Steagall, it will be an absolute disaster when the next banking crisis hits us.

[Mr Osborne]

Of course, I respect my right hon. Friend’s experience. A powerful argument has been made that we should completely separate and split up retail banks from investment banks. We asked John Vickers to convene a commission to look at this specific subject, and he came forward with proposals to ring-fence retail banking, as he thought that that would be a better approach. We also set up a cross-party parliamentary commission to consider the ring fence, and it thinks that the ring fence is the best approach. It made a specific recommendation that we should give the regulator the power to split up a bank that had refused to comply with the ring fence, and we are giving the regulator—[Interruption.] The shadow Chancellor shakes his head, but again not one of these things was done when he was City Minister. Let me say to him again, because he obviously does not understand, that we are giving the regulator a specific power to split retail from investment banking in a bank that is ignoring the ring fence. I think that that is the right way forward.

Bank of England

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Monday 26th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

Canada had the advantage of going into the crisis with properly managed public finances, and it avoided the large bank bail-outs that we had in this country—RBS was the biggest bank bail-out in the world—because its banks were better regulated. Hopefully, Mr Carney will bring some of that experience.

The right hon. Gentleman makes a serious point about lending in the economy. The Bank of England has created the funding for lending scheme, and we see the impact of that in new products that banks such as Santander and Lloyds have launched. He is right to say that that is one of the things we have to be on in terms of economic management. The de-leveraging in our economy is still one of the real headwinds to recovery.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend, if I understood him aright, has just said that Dr Carney supports the ring-fencing arrangements recommended in the Vickers report. May I ask him to bear in mind that Sir Mervyn King made it clear last week that he does not support them and nor do Mr Paul Volcker and the Archbishop of Canterbury-select? And nor do I.

[Mr Osborne]

My right hon. Friend has read out an extremely distinguished group of individuals. What he did not say was that, as I understand his position, he would like the banks split entirely in a Glass-Steagall-like separation. Over the past couple of years we have constructed a consensus on ring-fencing. We appointed John Vickers and his very experienced commission to do the job, and they looked explicitly at ring-fencing and came forward with their proposal. That proposal has now been discussed in this Chamber and commands consensus across the system. If we were suddenly to back away from it now and say that we wanted to start all over again with some other approach, that would delay everything. That would not be the right approach, and it would destroy the consensus that exists on ring-fencing.

LIBOR (FSA Investigation)

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Monday 2nd July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

There was one question that dared not speak its name: who was the City Minister when the LIBOR scandal happened? Who? Put your hand up if you were the City Minister when the LIBOR scandal happened.

The shadow Chancellor was not here on Thursday, so he has had days to think about it, but there was not one word of apology for what happened when he was in charge of regulating the City. He blamed central bankers around the world and he blamed the Opposition of the day, but he did not take personal responsibility for the time he was regulating the City when the LIBOR scandal started, and that is why he will not be listened to seriously until he does. Indeed, we need to know whether he knew anything of what was going on. Did he express any concern about the LIBOR rate? When he was in the Cabinet and Gordon Brown, the right hon. Member for wherever it is, was Prime Minister, was he concerned about the LIBOR rate and Barclays? We shall find out in due course.

Let me now deal with the specific questions asked by the shadow Chancellor. He said that the criminal penalties exist in legislation. As I said, the Serious Fraud Office—which is totally independent of politicians, and rightly so—is looking at the law and seeing what it can do, but Lord Turner himself has said that the Financial Services Authority does not have adequate criminal powers. [Interruption.] Opposition Members are shouting, but let me read to them something a member of their own Front-Bench team has said. Lord Tunnicliffe said this:

“Criminal sanctions are extraordinarily difficult to bring about because of the burden of criminal law. It is fair to say though that you can’t find them in the current legislation. And, yes, OK, it’s our fault. I hope my leaders don’t hear me say that.”

That is a member of the Labour Front-Bench team clearly placing the blame on the late Labour Government, of which the shadow Chancellor was the principal economic adviser. That is the problem with the current law, and we are seeking an urgent review in order to amend it and make sure we can deal with the problem.

The shadow Chancellor talks about our acting belatedly in respect of regulation. He had 13 years in which to regulate properly, yet in the space of two years we are changing the entire system of regulation by getting rid of the FSA and introducing a change to the structure of banking. That is happening because of the recommendations from the committee that we set up under John Vickers, and we have still not heard from the shadow Chancellor whether he supports John Vickers’ proposals. He often gets up and says what is wrong with them—[Interruption.] Well, if he has just welcomed them for the first time, that is very welcome, but he goes out of his way not to do so on other occasions.

The shadow Chancellor then said that, somehow, a parliamentary inquiry would be wrong and that I was complacent to say we knew what had gone wrong. This is what my predecessor, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), said at the weekend, however:

“We know what went wrong and we don’t need a costly inquiry to tell us”,

so that is not just the view of the current Chancellor.

I hope the shadow Chancellor reconsiders his position. We will have good people from both sides of this House and the House of Lords to consider the matter. We will put the motion to the House. Let us have a serious inquiry, but let us have an inquiry that comes to a conclusion within a measurably short period so that we can amend the law that will be going before the House next year. That is the sensible step to take. In the meantime, the shadow Chancellor should reflect on his role and his responsibility, as the City Minister who let Northern Rock sell those dodgy mortgages, as the City Minister who let RBS explode, and as the City Minister who presided when the LIBOR scandal began.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

Unlike the shadow Chancellor, I strongly opposed the tripartite regulation of the banks when that was brought forward by the then Labour Chancellor, as I said in a speech I made in the House in 1997. May I now revert to questions that I put to both the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General—who is still with us in the Chamber—suggesting we should urgently consider introducing the concept of the directing mind as defined in the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, which would enable English commercial law to be strengthened so that the heads of banks can be held answerable for the actions of rogue subordinates?

[Mr Osborne]

My right hon. Friend reminds us that he was absolutely right about the problems that would emerge with the creation of the tripartite regime, and, sadly, his predictions have been borne out by events. He also makes a specific proposal about legal changes and the introduction of the directing mind. We are aware of that idea, and we will look into it. The House can look at it, too, in the inquiry over the next few months.

IMF

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Sir Peter Tapsell?

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

I had rather changed my mind about asking a question because of the extremely unappealing way in which the shadow Chancellor put his case; but in order to be consistent with everything that I said in October and November, I am bound to say now that I regard it as the prime duty of Germany to solve the European problem, and that I hope that this further support from the IMF will not weaken the pressure on the German Government to do exactly that.

[Mr Osborne]

Germany made a $55 billion dollar contribution to the IMF this weekend, which is a much greater contribution than the $15 billion that we are putting in, and it is the principal contributor to the various eurozone bail-out funds of which we are no longer part. However, I agree with the spirit of what my right hon. Friend is saying, which is that Germany needs to stand behind its currency. That is indeed a very important part of solving this problem.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The key issue in our regulatory system that we are seeking to restore is judgment by the regulator, and I will explain how the Bill will enable us to do that. I agree with my hon. Friend that the financial services are an incredibly important industry for this country. They employ more people than any other industry in Britain and, crucially, its proper regulation is not only good for the economy, but essential to prevent taxpayers from being exposed to what they have been exposed to in recent years.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

As we are in the mood for recollection, and I am one of those who strongly opposed the tripartite system of supervision when it was introduced, may I say that I very much welcome the Bill? However, the whole strategic object of what we should be doing now is to ensure that we get rid of the shibboleth of the bank that is too big to fail. I doubt whether this admirable Bill, even combined with the Vickers report, will go anywhere near to restoring Glass-Steagall. We will not get rid of banks that are too big to fail until we get back to Glass-Steagall.

[Mr Osborne]

My right hon. Friend has been entirely consistent in the views he has expressed, and he was right all along about the weaknesses of the tripartite system. On the explicit issue of whether to introduce the actual physical separation of retail and investment banking—in other words, to introduce Glass-Steagall- like legislation in Britain—I asked John Vickers, who everyone accepts was an independent and extremely expert person for the job, to look specifically at this issue with his commissioners. Some of them were probably inclined at the start to believe that physical separation was the right way to go, but when they examined the issues—and they took an enormous amount of evidence—they believed that the same objective of protecting retail customers from the collapse of an investment bank, and giving the authorities of the day greater powers to protect retail customers as they resolved problems in a retail bank, could be achieved through the ring-fencing proposal that the Vickers commission put forward. That would also maintain some of the benefits of one part of the bank being able to support another part in trouble.

The commission explicitly considered the Glass-Steagall issue, but decided that ring-fencing was a better approach. We will introduce legislation that I hope and intend will have pre-legislative scrutiny in the House during the coming Session. I hope that that will be an opportunity for Parliament to examine the issue that my right hon. Friend rightly raised. As a country, we must decide once and for all how to proceed with the structure of our banking industry.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Osborne]

There are examples of central banks, such as the Canadian and Spanish central banks, which were much more aggressive in counter-cyclical regulation, and which felt empowered to make the decisions. In the United States—I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman has had conversations about this with the United States Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve chairman—things have been taken to the opposite extreme. There is a plethora of regulators—too many different regulators. The single biggest problem in the United States probably occurred in the insurance industry, in the American International Group. There was an insurance regulator based in one particular state and it was not something for which the Federal Reserve had a responsibility. Ben Bernanke has talked about the role of central banks, and I shall say something about his view later.

I think it right for us to create a Financial Policy Committee that is on a statutory footing. I have talked about the importance of its having external independent members who are able to provide market expertise and challenge received opinion, but I believe—and this may be something that we can tease out in Committee—that we should think about how we can get the balance right, and avoid conflicts of interest while also bringing in people with real expertise.

What makes the Financial Policy Committee that the Bill will establish such a radical departure in terms of policy making is that we are not only asking it to assess the risks throughout the financial system, but proposing to give it powerful tools with which to do something about those risks. The Monetary Policy Committee assesses the risks of inflation and whether it will overshoot or undershoot the target, and then alters interest rates as appropriate. The Financial Policy Committee will be given macro-prudential tools with which to hit the financial stability objectives set out in the Bill, and to reduce and remove systemic risks to the stability and resilience of the UK financial system.

[Sir Peter Tapsell]

The shadow Chancellor raised the question of both Barings and BCCI, and it underlines the nature of the regulatory problem. The Barings failure was largely a failure of the Singapore regulatory authority. I was closely involved with Singapore as an adviser to the monetary authority at the time. The Government in Singapore were horrified by the fact that a British rogue trader had not been spotted, but it was the responsibility of Singapore to find him.

As for BCCI, which I also knew well in my stockbroking days, its regulator was in Luxembourg, which was the reason why the Bank of England did not spot the problem until too late. That problem will continue. There are considerable limits to what any regulator can ever achieve. In worldwide banking, there will always be people overseas who are up to mischief, and no regulator based in London can ever conceivably know what they are all up to.

[Mr Osborne]

My right hon. Friend makes a very good point about the international nature of this business. We must try to design a regulatory system that protects the British taxpayer from rogue traders and illegal activity in individual firms that might create broader systemic risks. We must also be alert to broader risks building up in the system—for example, when trying to moderate the impact of a credit boom. This is not just a question of dealing with individual risks and individual firms; it is also a question of dealing with risks across the financial system.

My right hon. Friend is completely right to draw our attention to the need for regulators to work together better internationally. The least well-developed piece of the financial regulatory system, post-crash—the one lesson that has not yet been taken far enough—involves the way in which we can better protect the world from large international businesses that live internationally but die nationally, such as Lehman Brothers. Co-ordinating resolution regimes across the different jurisdictions will be the work of international bodies such as the G20 and the Financial Stability Board in the year ahead.

Independent Banking Commission Report

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Monday 12th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The right hon. Gentleman was the Minister responsible for the City when Northern Rock totally lost control of its wholesale funding; he was the Minister responsible for the City when RBS launched its takeover of ABN AMRO; he was the Minister responsible for the City when HBOS was making all those unsupportable loans. No one in this House knows more about how to get it wrong than the right hon. Gentleman. He talks about unseemly bickering on the Government Front Bench, yet we have just been reading the memoirs of a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), who is no doubt about to speak. What he reveals about the regime that the shadow Chancellor operated shows that this is the pot calling the kettle black, to put it mildly.

Let me come on to the specific points that the right hon. Gentleman made. First, on the legislation in this Parliament and the draft Financial Services Bill, he is trying to make hay by exploiting a completely false distinction between principle and practice. We support these measures in principle and will put them into practice through detailed legislation. One cannot support all of this in practice because it requires detailed legislation, which even John Vickers says is not for the commission. Let there be no doubt that we support the Banking Commission’s report and that we will legislate in this Parliament. The draft Financial Services Bill might well be a vehicle for implementing some of the changes, but we might also require a separate Bill. That is partly because we need to get the draft Financial Services Bill through the House so that the new regulatory regime, which we are also introducing, is up and running by the beginning of 2013. As I said, I think it is sensible to stick with the proposal put forward by John Vickers that we set ourselves the deadline of legislating in this Parliament.

Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman talked about the international environment. He knows, as many hon. Members do, that there has been a lot of movement on the international front to introduce the new Basel requirements, which are, of course, on the same timetable as the Vickers proposal that the changes should be completed by 2019. Those are sensible changes, but we will argue for other changes that we would like to see at international level, not least the implementation of some of the agreements made under both this Government and the previous one at G20 level, on such things as bankers’ pay and remuneration. We want to see those properly implemented in all regimes. Of course, we hope that other jurisdictions, the Financial Stability Board and others will look at the report, but John Vickers was not asked to produce a regime for the world; he was asked to produce a regime for the UK to reflect the fact that we have 500% banking assets as a proportion of our GDP.

Thirdly, I am afraid that I just do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman on competition, and nor does John Vickers. The right hon. Gentleman says that we should have a Competition Commission inquiry in 2013, but my office has contacted the secretariat of the Banking Commission today to ask it for its view. The commission said that the reason why it chose 2015 is that three vital things that it wants to be operational, including the new challenger bank and the new switching of bank accounts proposals, do not come into effect until 2013. By the way, the latter is a very significant proposal, and I hope that it will get some coverage in the media among all the discussion of investment banking—the proposal is that people can easily switch their current accounts, and their direct debits and so on will follow automatically. However, that does not come into effect until 2013, and the Financial Conduct Authority is not operational till 2013.

The Banking Commission considered that timetable, and it thinks that 2015 is the right year in which to consider whether the changes are working in practice. I agree very much with that—[Interruption.] The shadow Chancellor says “12 months”, but he had 13 years to get these changes right. At the last general election, I remember having a debate with my colleague the Business Secretary and others in this House. The only party arguing against structural change of the banking system was the Labour party, so it is simply ludicrous of the shadow Chancellor to suggest that we are dragging our feet. We are getting on with it. We have produced this report within a year and a half of being in government, and now we are getting on and putting it into practice, so that we do not make the mistakes he made when he was in office.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

After that uncharacteristically guilt-racked contribution by the shadow Chancellor, may I, by contrast, applaud the Chancellor for appointing this Banking Commission and for withstanding the intensive lobbying against it by the very same universal banks that very nearly destroyed the world economy? May I thank him also for accepting the recommendations of the Vickers commission? Finally, may I put it to him that I very much hope that we will proceed as he has promised, not only with legislation in this Parliament, but in implementing it as soon as possible, and well before 2019, when the long grass may have grown into a forest?

[Mr Osborne]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his support for the Banking Commission, and for his kind words. He has many decades of experience—

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

That is why we introduced the bank levy, which Labour had 13 years to introduce but did not. It raises £2.5 billion. We are also taking action to clamp down on tax avoidance. We recently proposed a measure to tackle something called disguised remuneration, whereby high earners, often in the financial services sector, disguise their income to avoid tax, but the Labour party voted against the measure.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

As we are discussing banking, may I again put it to the Chancellor that further delay in ring-fencing retail banking from investment banking can only perpetuate the appalling shibboleth that big banks cannot fail? Until we debunk that shibboleth, the capitalist system will remain at risk.

[Mr Osborne]

My right hon. Friend makes a powerful point. We must learn the lessons of what went wrong in the regulation of our banking system and ask deep questions about how, as an economy, we underwrite that system. That is why the Government asked John Vickers and his fellow commissioners to look at the structure of the banking system and at how we can ensure that Britain can be home to global banks but, at the same time, the British taxpayer can be protected should those banks fail. Of course, John Vickers will publish his final report next week and I am sure that there will be plenty of discussion about it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

The hon. Lady is right that those countries do not have a flexible exchange rate. That is because they are in the euro, which I campaigned to keep Britain out of. I do not know how she has campaigned in recent years, but the last time I checked I think it was still official Labour party policy to join the euro in principle. Perhaps the shadow Chancellor will clear that up when he gets to his feet. The comparison I make is a good one: a year ago almost to the day, people were looking at the British budget deficit, which was larger than those of Portugal and Ireland, and asking whether Britain could pay its way in the world. Our credit rating had been put on negative watch. Now, however, thanks to the policies of this coalition Government, Britain has economic stability again.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

I also wish to pay tribute to the memory of David Cairns. May I ask the Chancellor how the co-ordination is organised to achieve a synthesis between our tight fiscal policy and our lax monetary policy?

[Mr Osborne]

Obviously, monetary policy is independent—the MPC sets it in the way we all know—so there is no co-ordination in that sense. I do not have a direct influence on monetary policy, but it is clear that by setting a credible fiscal policy, we give the MPC maximum room for manoeuvre and the freedom to keep interest rates lower for longer. The Governor of the Bank of England made that clear when he gave his Mansion House speech last year, and it is an observation also made by many independent observers of the British economy. Interest rates would be higher if we had a less credible fiscal policy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

I think that I pointed out in an earlier exchange that an ex-Lehman Brothers and RBS banker contributed to the leadership campaign of the shadow Chancellor, so if the hon. Member for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson) wants to make that point again, and if you would allow, Mr Speaker, perhaps he could intervene.

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

Does the Chancellor agree, as I do, with the Governor of the Bank of England in asserting that if we are to avoid another banking crisis in this country, we must have a complete separation between commercial and investment banks, which of course create these collateralised debt obligations?

Financial Services Regulation

Debate between George Osborne and Peter Tapsell

Wednesday 16th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con)]

As one of those who strongly opposed the introduction of the tripartite regulation of our financial institutions as soon as it was announced in 1997, may I congratulate the Chancellor on getting rid of the FSA, which has been a major contributor to the disasters in the economic sphere in recent years and which was regarded in the City, throughout the whole of its lifetime, as a thoroughly inefficient organisation?

[Mr Osborne]

To be fair to the FSA, it has been rather candid about the mistakes that were made when the shadow Chancellor was the Chancellor and when the former Prime Minister was the Chancellor. We have to learn from those mistakes. As I have told the House, we will set out the details of the institutional arrangements in a parliamentary statement tomorrow.