(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe present Governor has commented on the dire state of the economy. The new Governor has international commitments, will face European commitments, and new regulations going through the other House give him many other responsibilities. Will the Chancellor please genuinely reconsider the number of posts that the new Governor will be forced to hold under the new arrangements? The grimness of the economic situation demands his full attention, and the posts are far too many for one person.
The one thing that we have learned is that regulation of banks and managing of demand in our economy cannot be separated; they are part of a continuum and that is one of the things that went wrong. Of course the Bank of England takes on heavy responsibilities, and the new Governor will have to manage the Bank in a very effective way to manage those new responsibilities. Mervyn King has already said that there needs to be a chief operating officer in the Bank, and there will be three deputy governors: for macro-prudential, micro-prudential and monetary policy. They too need to shoulder the burden, as indeed they currently do.
One thing that attracted the panel that interviewed Mr Carney, and me when I interviewed him, was his management experience in Canada. He is well regarded for having run a good bank in Canada as a manager, as well as for the international credibility he has earned for his economic and financial policies.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThe FSA’s report is very clear about the interaction between the Bank of England and Barclays. Paragraph 176 says:
“No instruction for Barclays to lower its LIBOR submissions was given”
during the telephone conversation that caused the press interest.
Will the Chancellor confirm that there will be no Government majority on the Joint Committee?
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe need to reform the labour market, which is why, as my hon. Friend will know, we have this month extended the qualifying period for unfair dismissal cases from one to two years. That has been welcomed and will encourage people to take on new employees. We also have a call for evidence on compensated no-fault dismissal. I have no doubt that she will make a submission to that call for evidence.
T5. In view of earlier answers on corporation tax, will the Chancellor tell the House how many FTSE 100 companies paid full corporation tax in the last available tax year? It would be understandable if he does not have the figure now, but will he place it in the Library of the House for hon. Members?
As the hon. Gentleman knows, because he is an experienced Member and sits on the Treasury Committee, there is a very important principle of taxpayer confidentiality, so I am not shown the individual tax returns of businesses or indeed individuals. We have recently published data on the average tax rate that people on the highest incomes were paying under the last Labour Government, and we can see that it was very much lower than Treasury Ministers were telling us.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, I can give that assurance. This is an important point that I want to flag up so that the House understands what we are collectively embarking on. We are seeking to give the Financial Policy Committee the tools to help to dampen down a credit boom or to help in a credit crunch. As my hon. Friend has said, it will be able to alter the maximum loan-to-value ratios in mortgage lending in order to curb an unsustainable rise in house prices. It will also be able to do the reverse, should we face unwanted house price deflation. It will also, potentially, be able to alter capital requirements for banks, in a counter-cyclical way. I should say that these are just possibilities; they are potential tools that the committee might want to use.
One key feature is that the measures will be independently applied, so there will be no political pressure to, say, keep a housing boom stoked up as an election approaches. Another key feature is that the Financial Policy Committee should act symmetrically—that is the intention of Parliament. Its job will be to act not just to moderate a credit boom but to try to alleviate a credit bust. The precise tools that we give the FPC have yet to be determined, as my hon. Friend has just said. We have sought the advice of the interim organisation that we have created, and it will come to us with proposals for the kind of tools that the permanent body will need. We will then seek the approval of both houses of Parliament through the affirmative resolution procedure—which will of course involve a debate—before we pass those tools over.
I freely accept that we are in largely uncharted policy- making territory, here or anywhere in the world. Many other jurisdictions are considering such measures, but we are ahead of most of them. Surely the experiment of making no attempt to moderate the credit cycle—letting the bubbles grow and burst, then cleaning up afterwards—has been an unmitigated disaster, and we would be failing if we did not look for an alternative approach.
One suggestion from the Treasury Select Committee was that the Chancellor should not send the proposals to a statutory instrument Committee. That would involve a 90-minute discussion and the proposals would not be amendable. He should instead allow the matters to be debated seriously on the Floor of the House. I wonder why he would think it attractive and helpful to send them upstairs where they cannot be amended; that would suggest a foregone conclusion by the governing party that they would be accepted.
I would certainly be happy to have a debate about that on the Floor of the House. It is a decision for my colleagues, the usual channels and so forth, but in my opinion the important tools given to this body will have a real impact on our constituents. It will affect the kind of house they are able to afford on their income—the bread and butter of people’s daily lives—and it is important for us all to understand that as we create instruments of policy.
We are seeking to address another flaw in the system by making the Bank of England the single point of accountability when it comes to the prudential regulation of banks, large and complex investment firms, building societies and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff North (Jonathan Evans) reminded us, significant insurance companies. A new prudential regulation authority will be established within the Bank to perform that major new function.
As the shadow Chancellor pointed out, the Federal Reserve in the US already has responsibility for the prudential regulation of major banks, but not of other financial firms. Let me cite what Ben Bernanke said in what I believe was testimony before Congress:
“The Federal Reserve’s role in banking supervision complements its other responsibilities, especially its role in managing financial crises...During the current crisis, supervisory expertise and information have repeatedly proved invaluable in helping us to address potential systemic risks involving specific financial institutions and markets and to effectively fulfil our role as lender of last resort...The Fed’s prudential supervision benefits, in turn, from the expertise we develop in carrying out other parts of our mission—for example, the knowledge of financial and economic conditions we gather in the formulation of monetary policy.”
I raise this matter because at the heart of the new arrangements we are seeking to establish an understanding that today’s financial markets are so interconnected that the failure of a single firm can bring down the whole system, and risks across the system can bring down many single firms. These feedback loops are what proved so devastating in the crisis.
Some critics of the legislation now accept the need for a macro-prudential Financial Policy Committee, but still doubt whether we should give the Bank responsibility for the micro-prudential regulation of individual firms, too. I would argue that because the interconnections are so great, the FPC could not do its job without knowing what is going on in firms, and a prudential regulator could not do its job without knowing about risks across the system. The best way to combine the insights is to put them both under the aegis of the same institution—the central bank.
I understand that the shadow Chancellor is concerned that our Bill does not create additional lines of communication between the deputy governors of the Bank and the Chancellor, bypassing the Governor, so he might like to explain what he meant. I considered the idea, but rejected it. I think we need to force the Bank of England itself to reconcile its internal differences rather than create additional lines of accountability between the Chancellor and a deputy governor. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] He says, “Dear me”, so perhaps he will explain why he wants to institutionalise a regime in which the No. 2 constantly undermines the No. 1.
The Joint Committee and the Treasury Select Committee have raised what I regard as a far more relevant concern—the accountability of the Bank of England, given its important new responsibilities. We have listened carefully to the recommendations from both Committees and while I do not propose to abolish the court of the Bank of England, I do propose to give it important new powers to hold the executive Bank to account. The Governor and the court of the Bank of England have agreed that a new oversight committee, consisting of the non-executive members of the court, should be created. This group of external independent people will ensure that the Bank discharges its financial oversight responsibilities correctly; it will be able to commission both internal and external reports on the Bank’s policy makers’ handling of particular events and particular periods of policy making. Those reports will be published, with market-sensitive information protected, if necessary.
The Governor is of course, as is the case today, a key figure in the arrangements. It is important that he or she is not only independent of the Government of the day, but seen to be so. The recent experience of reappointing Governors after their first five-year term has expired has not been a very happy one. It has created unnecessary uncertainty and called into question political confidence in the Governor. Although I would hope that this Government would handle the whole thing better than their predecessors did, it makes sense simply to eliminate the possibility of discord entirely, so schedule 2 provides that the next Governor of the Bank of England and his or her successors will serve a single eight-year non-renewable term. That is a sensible reform.
The third flaw in the current arrangements was the fact that the Chancellor of the day felt he did not have the necessary powers to act in the interests of taxpayers. This is another area where the work of the Joint Committee and the Select Committee have proved invaluable. The Bill makes it clear that the day-to-day responsibility for financial stability lies with the Bank of England. We do not want the Treasury second-guessing that work. Beyond setting the parameters for the regulatory system, the Chancellor should become involved only if there is a material risk to public funds. The responsibility in this regard is made clear in the Bill, and in the memorandum of understanding that we have drawn up with the Bank. The Bill makes it clear that the Governor has a responsibility to inform the Treasury immediately as soon as there is a material risk of circumstances arising in which public funds might reasonably be expected to be used.
The Bill is also rightly clear that the use of public funds is entirely a decision for the Chancellor, as he or she is the person accountable to Parliament, and through Parliament to the public. My predecessor is, again, revealing about the limitations of the current arrangements in his book:
“My frustration was that I could not in practice order the Bank to do what I wanted. Only the Bank of England can put the necessary funds into the banking system…I asked Treasury officials if there was a way of forcing the Governor’s hand. The fact that we had given the Bank independence had a downside as well as an upside.”
Of course my predecessor had, as any Chancellor does, the general power of direction over the Bank that the Bank of England Act 1946 provides, but that general power of direction has never been used, so it is a nuclear option that might blow up anyone who tries to use it. That was the conclusion that my predecessor reluctantly came to.
That is unsatisfactory. The Bank must, of course, be protected from politicians who want to use its balance sheet against the wishes of the Governor simply because those politicians want to avoid using the Government’s balance sheet, but the Bank should not be able to use that as an excuse to withhold its services as an agent from a Government prepared to use its own Government balance sheet. Otherwise, in many situations that becomes, in effect, a veto on an elected Government’s fiscal decision making.
The Bill and the memorandum of understanding give the Chancellor of the day not only the right to be informed when there is a material risk to public funds, but the right to ask the Bank to analyse different options that might be available to deal with the risk, and in the newly added clause 57 the Bill gives the Chancellor a defined power of direction to require the Bank to provide liquidity to a particular firm or to put a particular firm into resolution or to provide liquidity to the general system, provided that the Chancellor does so using the Government’s own balance sheet, and makes that clear.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe first thing I would say to my hon. Friend is that he is right to allude to the debt dynamics in some of the countries involved, and I mentioned that specifically in the case of Greece. The difference between the Greek situation and the Irish situation at the moment shows that countries can take different paths, and with political will they can deal with their problems. However, if the political system is unable to address those problems, the rest of the international community has to step in.
My hon. Friend’s second allusion—the decoupling—is, I guess, a reference to the break-up of the euro. As he knows, I was against Britain joining the euro—I perhaps did not argue the case on quite as many occasions as he did—but as the world stands today, the break-up of the euro would be absolutely calamitous for the British economy, and it is not in our interests to advocate that. It is profoundly in our national interest to try to make monetary union work. Monetary unions can be made to work, but greater fiscal integration and fiscal union are needed, and—this is a crucial additional part—we also need the competitiveness of the other, peripheral European economies to be greatly improved.
The Chancellor has said that the asset purchase facility is the best way to get money into the real economy and stimulate growth. Why is the Bank of England refusing to use the asset purchase facility, when the last Government used it successfully, and instead allowing the money to be channelled through the banks, which keep hold of it for their own security, and not to be sent into the real economy?
I am not sure that the asset purchase facility was the enormous success that the hon. Gentleman implies. It probably did do a good job—again, I defer to the views of the Chancellor at the time, who would have seen the data closer up. The asset purchase facility helped to stop the collapse in the corporate bond market at the time, but it never led to the big increase in lending that the previous Government hoped it would. The Bank of England did not make use of the £50 billion facility that was made available. Although the facility remains, to date the Bank has made use of only around £1 billion. Instead of revisiting the theology, as it were, of who is responsible and the role of the Bank, my view has been that in order to maintain the proper division of responsibility between the Bank and the Government, who are accountable to Parliament, the Government should undertake credit easing operations with their own balance sheet, and that is what we are working on at the moment.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI hesitate to read out bank share prices, as they might have changed in the 45 minutes I have been on my feet The reaction from the banks today has not dramatically affected the prices of UK bank shares. There has not been a dramatic fall, nor indeed a dramatic rise. They have remained broadly flat—unlike those of French and German banks, which are very substantially down today. What that also suggests is that John Vickers—and, I would argue, the Government—did a good job in trying to price the proposals into the share price by giving clear signposts about the way in which we were going, so that it did not come as a big surprise. I completely agree with my hon. Friend about the Financial Conduct Authority. As a member of the Select Committee, she can look at some of the Vickers’ proposals potentially to change the FCA’s remit. We need to consider that, as do Members who are looking at the Bill.
On ring-fencing, Vickers suggests 2019 as a back-stop, but page 151 of the report makes it clear that “efforts” should be
“made to complete it sooner.”
Does the Chancellor accept that recommendation from Vickers and, if not, why not?
I, too, used the phrase “back-stop” in the statement. Vickers recommends that the changes be completed by 2019, but also recommended in his press conference that they be legislated for in this Parliament and that some of the changes might take place before that. We need to consider all these issues, but I think we need to pay attention to the 2019 date that Vickers sets out in his report.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs my hon. Friend points out, we have taken more than 1 million low-paid people out of income tax. We are committed to further such moves through this Parliament, and that is in stark contrast to the 10p tax raid in the previous Parliament. Of course, we now discover that, before the decision was made, the shadow Chancellor knew all about its impact on the poorest fifth in our society.
The Chancellor thought it proper in his Mansion House speech to give the bankers of the City first go on his views about the ring-fencing of banks. Apart from that being discourteous to the banking commission, which he set up, does he not think it discourteous to this House that he is prepared to give bankers that information but not to come and explain it to the House and take questions?
First, the announcement was made with the consent of the Independent Commission on Banking. Secondly, it is established that the Chancellor is able to give the Mansion House speech each year. I seem to remember that the last-but-one Chancellor announced the renewal of the nuclear deterrent at the Mansion House without coming to the House of Commons to do so. If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to say something about banking reform at the Mansion House in the years to come, I will therefore be grateful.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is surprising. I noticed that in the shadow Chancellor’s rather extraordinary response there was no mention of lending. Indeed, I am not even sure what the Labour party’s plan is to get the banks to lend more and whether Labour Members welcome this move or not. I know for a fact that the previous Labour Government tried to negotiate a cross-bank agreement on gross lending, and failed. One would have thought, therefore, that they would welcome this, but they have not done so. My hon. Friend makes the good point that the key is to get lending to small businesses going, which is where the market failure has been over the past couple of years. That is absolutely crucial to our economic recovery.
Now that the Chancellor is into transparency on salaries, can he, as the largest shareholder in RBS, the bailed-out bank, tell the House whether it is true, as the Financial Times has suggested, that 100 bankers are earning more than £1 million? If not, how many are?
The transparency arrangements are the ones that I have set out, and the arrangements for managing RBS are the ones put in place by the Government of whom he was a Whip.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that that is certainly not the purpose of the measure and that tax avoidance is what we are going to seek to avoid. The measure is there to keep pace with the changes in corporate tax regimes that have been introduced in many other countries, not only Ireland, which we have just been talking about, but countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, which have also made corporate tax changes that attract international companies to headquarter there, rather than in the UK. We have to keep pace with those changes, which is why we are taking the measures that we are.
The Chancellor and the Business Secretary have apparently postponed the long-awaited growth White Paper. Officials say that this is because of the lack of serious content. Can the Chancellor tell us when we can expect this long-awaited document? In which financial year?
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a very good point. As I say, a bilateral loan will be debated in this House and require the Government to take primary powers, so it is within the control of all Members, and we are accountable to the taxpayers of Britain for that. I have explained the situation, so I will not go over it again, but we are part of the European mechanism, which involves a qualified majority vote, and even if we had exercised a no vote we would have been completely outvoted. That is why I want to see that the UK is not part of the permanent bail-out mechanism, which will be discussed at the December Council.
We are contributing to the IMF deal and to the stability mechanism deal. Is the £7 billion additional to that, or is it broken up between those two with a topping-up sum?
I am not going to give a specific figure today, because it simply has not been agreed as part of the overall package with the Irish. In these situations, it is perfectly normal for the sovereign Government, in this case the Irish, to invite the IMF and the EU in and to ask for their help, and for that to be negotiated over the following week or two. Of course, we will be part of that, but as I say, I expect the UK’s support to be in the billions, not the tens of billions.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI know that my hon. Friend takes a keen interest in these matters, so she will have seen the G20 communiqué signed in South Korea that says:
“Those countries with serious fiscal challenges need to accelerate the pace of consolidation. We welcome the recent announcements by some countries to reduce their deficits in 2010 and strengthen their fiscal frameworks and institutions.”
That is, of course, precisely what the OBR does.
Has the Chancellor seriously come to this House and told us he does not have any concerns or see any danger of high unemployment or damage to the economy in taking a short-term approach to clearing the structural deficit?
We have demonstrated that the OBR, alongside some of the other things we have done, is a commitment to the long-term sustainability of the British public finances, and I remind the hon. Gentleman of the following words of the Governor of the Bank of England:
“The most important thing now is for the new Government to deal with the challenge of the fiscal deficit. It is the single most pressing problem facing the United Kingdom”.