Trade (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Gareth Thomas and Ranil Jayawardena

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Gareth Thomas]

All I say to the hon. Gentleman is that I have recognised that there are benefits to accession, which is why we are not seeking to divide the House tonight, and that I will come on to the issue of potential new countries joining CPTPP in a bit.

The temptation for Ministers to exaggerate the significance of what this Bill ushers in—

[Mr Jayawardena]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Gareth Thomas]

Why not?

[Mr Jayawardena]

Given that the hon. Gentleman recognises that there are opportunities from this deal and that, thanks to the success of our continuity agreement programme, we have trade deals with many countries there already, does he not accept that the diagonal cumulation that is part of CPTPP is a huge boost to British businesses, in terms of supply chains?

[Gareth Thomas]

As I think the right hon. Gentleman may have heard—perhaps he was not listening—I did acknowledge that one of the benefits that will come from CPTPP accession is better rules of origin. However, I gently say to him that we should not exaggerate the benefits of those, because the benefits are not likely to be that huge. They are important to have, of course, given the economic mess he and other former Ministers helped to create, but those benefits are, none the less, modest.

As I said, the temptation for Ministers to exaggerate the significance of what this Bill ushers in is understandable, given that over the past 10 years Britain has had the worst export record of any member of the G7 apart from Japan. That partly explains why the British people have lower living standards now than they did when Labour left office. It is one reason why the British people have become, on average, £10,000 worse off since 2010 and it is key to why the UK is forecast to have the lowest growth in the G7 this year.

Ministers have published no trade strategy and provided no clarity about how the Bill fits in with wider trade ambitions. They have axed support for businesses to get to trade shows and cut funding for business groups to lead trade missions. There is little obvious planning to help businesses use the limited extra opportunities opened up through this Bill and other trade deals. Sensible policies to improve trade with Europe and cut red tape have been vetoed. Sadly, it is therefore not surprising that the independent OBR now expects our trade to grow by just 0.1% this year and in the next two years—that is a shameful record.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Gareth Thomas and Ranil Jayawardena

Thursday 2nd December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jayawardena]

My hon. Friend is of course right; the TPP offers a great opportunity to access a fast-growing part of the world as part of our Indo-Pacific tilt, as detailed in our integrated review. The opportunity to engage with this part of the world, where there is a growing middle class and increased demand for our products, goods and services, is one that we should seize.

[Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

Free trade negotiations with the US are vital to lifting Donald Trump’s tariffs on British steel and aluminium exports, which in turn are crucial to protecting jobs and businesses in communities across our country. Given that the US has already agreed to lift tariffs on many EU steel products, if we are to get a level playing field for our firms and our workers, might it not be time for Lord Frost to be given a little help to stop bungling discussions with the EU so that this vital US-UK trade deal can be sorted?

[Mr Jayawardena]

We will always stand up for the British national interest, and that includes with the European Union. We will make sure that our United Kingdom remains strong and can trade with the world. The truth is that America’s unjustified tariffs on UK steel, aluminium and derivatives are unfair and unnecessary as those imports do not harm US national security, so we will continue to make representations to back British businesses.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Gareth Thomas and Ranil Jayawardena

Thursday 25th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jayawardena]

I do not doubt the hon. Gentleman’s passion for this issue, but where is the passion for jobs, where is the passion for exports, and where is the passion for investment? That is what this Government are getting on with. Perhaps it is because they cannot make up their minds on the Opposition Benches: they are against deals with democracies such as Israel as well, and yet they have cosied up to regimes such as Venezuela. Although this question was about future trade deals, we will get on and deliver jobs and prosperity for the British people.

[Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

It has now been two months since Ministers agreed a trade deal with Cameroon. It was shortly before the US Senate voted to suspend theirs because of President Biya’s human rights record. Incredibly, we do not know what the UK’s trade deal with Cameroon says on human rights, because it has still not been published. Can the Minister tell us when Parliament will be finally shown that deal, and can he guarantee a debate on it in Government time?

[Mr Jayawardena]

I welcome the fact that the shadow Minister is interested in our trade agreement with Cameroon, which benefits both countries to the tune of £177 million-worth of bilateral trade, but the British people will have heard today six questions from the Labour Benches and not one of them included anything about jobs. That just shows, sadly, that Labour has no intention of delivering for the British people and capitalising on our independent trade policy, because it is anti-trade, anti-jobs, EU-obsessed and it sneers at those who do not share their world view and are proud to be British.

Draft Export Control (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Debate between Gareth Thomas and Ranil Jayawardena

Tuesday 8th December 2020 General Committees

[Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging at the outset the error that the Joint Committee has identified. The noble Lord Grimstone, when commenting on its report, said:

“Nothing is weakened by this error; indeed, the situation is strengthened for this particular category of software that might be used for weapons of mass destruction.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 December 2020; Vol. 808, c. GC202.]

Given the significance of the issue—we are talking about potential items that could be used to do huge damage—why not just leave the strengthened provision, albeit that it was originally conceived in error, on the statute book?

[Mr Jayawardena]

I welcome the shadow Minister’s reflections on my noble Friend Lord Grimstone’s remarks. I will come to the point about this being a strengthening of the regime, but also how it interplays with the Northern Ireland protocol, in a moment, if the hon. Gentleman will allow me.

Re-enactment is necessary overall because the existing exception, which applies in relation to the entire United Kingdom, is to be removed at the end of the transition period and export controls will be applied for exporting from Great Britain, so there is a distinction. As the shadow Minister has just said, the effect of the incorrect conjunction in article 42N(2)—“and” instead of “or”—between sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), is to make the exception less permissive. In other words, as he implies, it makes the exception less of an exception: it makes our export controls from Northern Ireland even tougher than intended, as exporters wishing to use the exception will need to comply with both conditions, not one or the other.

To be clear, the provision does not take effect today; it would only be in relation to transfers from Northern Ireland after the transition period. Given that the drafting makes the regulation tougher, not weaker, my Department did not consider the error to have sufficient impact to warrant the withdrawal and re-laying of these draft regulations. To do so would mean that appropriate export controls would not be transposed into the United Kingdom’s own law at this point. That is not an outcome that anyone here would want.

For context, I should say that my Department assesses the likelihood that people and businesses transfer software or technology from Northern Ireland to the European Union by non-electronic means, despite awareness that the software is or may be intended, in entirety or in part, for WMD purposes, as very low—a very rare event. None the less, I have instructed my Department to correct the error later this month.

[Gareth Thomas]

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation, but I genuinely say to him that he has not yet explained why we do not just leave the provision as it is. Will he get to that point?

[Mr Jayawardena]

Of course I will; the hon. Gentleman has not given me a chance yet. That is indeed my very next point. As I said, I have instructed my Department to correct the error later this month, and we will do so through an instrument using the negative procedure, as is appropriate in these circumstances.

To the point that the shadow Minister makes, I should say that the United Kingdom already has one of the strictest export control regimes in the world. Members will know that all export licence applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. In reaching a decision, the Department for International Trade receives advice from several Departments, including the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Together, we draw on all available information, including reports from non-governmental organisations and our diplomatic missions.

The consolidated criteria provide a thorough risk-assessment framework and require us to think hard about the impact of exporting any equipment. These are not decisions, whatever the use of the conjunction, that my Department would take lightly. We would not license in any circumstances the export of items where to do so would be inconsistent with the consolidated criteria. Those are our guiding principles.

The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 enables a functioning statute book at the end of the transition period by providing Ministers with the tools to deal with deficiencies in domestic law arising because of our exit from the European Union.

[Gareth Thomas]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Jayawardena]

I will make a bit of progress.

Some hon. Members will recall that this House has already debated and approved legislation to ensure that there is continued functioning of retained EU law in Britain in respect of export controls. The Trade etc. in Dual-Use Items and Firearms etc. (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 were debated here on 25 March 2019 and the Trade etc. in Dual-Use Items and Firearms etc. (Amendment) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019 were debated here on 13 May 2019.

Those new regulations are necessary because under the Northern Ireland protocol, which forms part of the withdrawal agreement, the EU regulations and directives relating to export control of dual-use items, civilian firearms and goods usable for capital punishment or torture will continue to apply directly to and in Northern Ireland.

[Gareth Thomas]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. He will be aware that under the German presidency of the European Union, new rules have been provisionally agreed, allowing for

“more accountable, competitive and transparent trade of dual-use items.”

Presumably, if the process of application continues, what has been agreed under the German presidency will apply to the rules in Northern Ireland very shortly. There will be one set of export control rules for the rest of the UK under domestic law and a slightly different set very quickly for Northern Ireland. Will the Minister comment on that point?

[Mr Jayawardena]

I am, of course, happy to comment on that point. The shadow Minister is right that Northern Ireland will be subject to slightly different rules than Great Britain. For example, under this instrument, unamended by any future negative statutory instrument that will be introduced, an exporter from Great Britain would require an export licence full-stop, whereas an exporter from Northern Ireland would need to secure one only if the export were, first, from Northern Ireland and, secondly, to the European Union. The technology will be worked on in the European Union, as reflected in article 42N(2).

Going forward, we will correct that under the statutory instrument that I referred to earlier and, indeed, European Union law will apply in Northern Ireland as opposed to in Great Britain, where we will incorporate it into our own law using the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.

I continue with my reflections on the draft regulations themselves. The provision of the European Union directive on the intra-Community transfer of defence-related products will also continue to apply to all movement of military goods between Northern Ireland and the EU. The regulations amend provisions of retained EU law to accommodate the Northern Ireland protocol, which is why they are important. Let me explain to Members how that will work. Beginning at 11 pm on 31 December, the export control rules applying in Great Britain will be derived solely from domestic law, as I referred to a moment ago, which will include retained EU law. In contrast, the export control rules applying in Northern Ireland will continue, as I referred to a moment ago, to be derived from EU law, as required by the Northern Ireland protocol.

My Department will continue to be the licensing authority for strategic exports from the whole of the United Kingdom, but exports of such items from Northern Ireland will be done under a licence issued under EU regulations.

[Gareth Thomas]

On that point, will the Minister give way?

[Mr Jayawardena]

No, I will make progress.

To make that work, the draft regulations amend existing legislation. First, they amend the Export Control Order 2008, which has been the centrepiece of domestic export control legislation since April 2009. Secondly, they amend two instruments: the Export Control (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Trade etc. in Dual-Use Items and Firearms etc. (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which were made last year in preparation for EU exit. In addition, they amend the draft Trade in Torture etc. Goods (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations, which were debated here on 8 April last year and approved by both Houses, but have not yet been made. It is necessary to amend them to remove a dependency on the non-existent Customs Tariff (Establishment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

Let me be clear that today’s regulations do no more than is necessary to ensure the continued functioning of export control law, and therefore the continued effective operation of our export control system in both Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

[Gareth Thomas]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Jayawardena]

No, I will make progress; the shadow Minister will be able to make his own remarks shortly.

Without the draft regulations, our ability to control the export of such goods would be undermined. The legislation will ensure that the Secretary of State continues to control exports from all parts of the United Kingdom of dual-use items, firearms and goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Her Majesty’s Government believe that the procedures for assessing licence applications and decision-making processes are robust, and will remain so following the end of the transition period.

The eight criteria used to assess export licence applications, as set out in the consolidated criteria, will remain the same. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence will continue to provide my Department with advice and analysis. A licence, for the avoidance of doubt, would not be granted if to do so would be inconsistent with any of the criteria.

My Department will also continue to provide detailed advice and guidance about export controls, and, at the end of the transition period, to support legitimate exporters. I remind the Committee that these regulations are solely about preparing for the end of the transition and making sure that we have a functioning statute book after the end of the year. These amendments need to happen, and Parliament needs to make sure that the existing controls remain in place. Negotiations about the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union—or, indeed, the wider world—are a separate matter, of course, and play no part in the debate today.

I am sure that the Committee will want to work in the interests of our national security and in support of retaining robust strategic export controls by making sure that the legislation passes; it is essential to the preparation for the end of the transition period. The legislation is necessary, and I commend the motion to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jayawardena]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions. I must confess that they seemed to stray a bit further than the regulations in front of us. I am sure he will table questions to me in due course in respect of a number of those issues, as he has done to date.

[Gareth Thomas]

On a point of order, Mrs Miller. I would be grateful if you could clarify whether I was at any point out of order in asking those questions of the Minister and expecting a reply from him.

[Gareth Thomas]

I look forward to the Minister’s answers then.

[Mr Jayawardena]

At no point did I say that the hon. Gentleman was out of order; I simply said that he was straying.

I am not going to apportion any blame for the drafting. That is not my job, nor is it my style. Rather, I believe that we should focus on fixing any drafting errors that might have been made. To that end, I welcome the fact that, in order to secure the licensing controls on strategic exports, the Labour party will be supporting the regulations. If these measures were not in place, we would not have the correct controls across the United Kingdom.

The hon. Gentleman asked, why not leave it? Why not leave the wrong conjunction between sub-paragraphs (a) and (b)? I thought I had made this point clear, but let me restate for the record that it would not be consistent with EU law and it would be a breach of the Northern Ireland protocol. That is why we cannot leave it. That is why we wish to bring forward a statutory instrument using the negative procedure. I hope to bring that forward this month, but certainly we will bring it forward as soon as possible.

In terms of any future changes to the regime, we will always consider how we can further improve our system, but we are confident that we have one of the most robust systems in the world, and we do think very hard before licensing any goods so that all licences are always consistent with the consolidated criteria.

I will write to the hon. Gentleman in respect of the number of people who might benefit from an exception, or the number of licences that might be granted before 31 December.

The hon. Gentleman rightly wanted the flavour of a real-life scenario to draw reference to how things might be different between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Let me provide the House with such a scenario. Take Neil and Eleanor, who are both mechanical engineers designing a component typically used in horticultural spraying equipment. They intend to courier their respective printed technical drawings—on paper, non-electronic—to their customer in the European Union, and they know that their customer intends to incorporate those technical drawings into their design schematics for use by a manufacturing plant outside the European Union. The Secretary of State has informed Neil and Eleanor that the type of technology they are working on may be intended for use in connection with the dissemination of a chemical weapon—that is, a WMD purpose.

Neil works in Belfast; Eleanor works in Coventry. The current exception would mean that no export licence is required if the export is from the United Kingdom to the European Union, and the exporter knows that the final destination of the software or technology is the European Union or that processing or working is to be performed on the software or technology in the European Union. The issue that we have identified through the scrutiny of the JCSI is that no export licence is required if the export is from Northern Ireland to the European Union, and the exporter knows that the final destination of the software or technology is the European Union and processing or working is to be performed on the software or technology in the European Union.

That would mean that Neil in Belfast requires an export licence, because the export is from Northern Ireland, the export is to the European Union, the technology will be worked on in the European Union, but the final destination of the technology is not the European Union. Eleanor requires an export licence full stop: the export is from Great Britain, and the exception only applies to exports from Northern Ireland.

The correct exception, once we have brought forward the amending statutory instrument using the negative procedure, will mean that Neil does not require an export licence because the export is from Northern Ireland, the export is to the European Union, and although the final destination is not the EU, the technology will be worked on in there. However, Eleanor would still require an export licence because she is based in Great Britain. I hope that clarifies the matter.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Export Control (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Gareth Thomas and Ranil Jayawardena

Thursday 3rd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jayawardena]

My hon. Friend is right to say that we can go much further, and increasing bilateral trade and investment with India will benefit both Indian and British businesses, and, of course, our peoples. Here at home this work will support businesses located in every corner of the country, including Vernacare, in his constituency. It is just one example of a company that my Department has worked with to achieve significant success in India already, including agreeing a five-year supply deal with Manipal, one of Asia’s largest healthcare management groups

[Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

Although the growth in trade, particularly in services, with India is good news, the UK’s trade in goods with India increased by just 5% in the past five years, while the rest of the G7 all saw double-digit growth, with the US and France seeing increases of almost 40%. There is not a UK trade envoy with India, and the Select Committee thinks that visa restrictions are holding Britain back. Why does the Minister think other G7 countries are doing so much better on trade in goods with India?

[Mr Jayawardena]

I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman has joined the party in welcoming the fact that we will take back control of our trade policy. We will now have the chance to shape our relationship with India, which we have not had in the past. This Government have already delivered value to British businesses worth £250 million a year, based on industry’s own estimates, through unlocking exports of spirits, oats, pigs for breeding, poultry and lamb to India.