Commonwealth Development Corporation Bill

Debate between Fiona Bruce and Stephen Doughty

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Tuesday 29th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I have clearly touched a nerve with some of my comments about the Bill, which I am afraid I will not be giving the wholehearted support that some in the House have given it today.

The Government have attempted to portray the Bill as a minor technical matter, which should go through on the nod with minimal scrutiny and to which we should all give a big hurrah. What appears to be a minor technical two-clause Bill, however, is in fact far more significant and controversial. As we have heard, it proposes an immediate quadrupling of the limits on taxpayer funding of the CDC and then suggests a further doubling at the whim of the Secretary of State and without further primary legislation.

Now the CDC expansion, which has been significant from 1999 to the present day, has required only £1.5 billion of taxpayers’ money, a large amount of it in the recapitalisation that took place last year. By stark contrast, the Bill will permit an increase of up to £12 billion over an as yet undefined period, although the explanatory notes make it clear that the Secretary of State intends to

“accelerate CDC’s growth over the current Spending Round”.

That could imply giving three times extra to the CDC— £4.5 billion—in three to four years’ time than it has needed in the last 17 years. According to the explanatory notes, this is justified as a response to an as yet undefined or evidenced

“forecast market demand over CDC’s next strategy cycle and in order for the CDC to play a fuller role in the delivery of the UK’s international development objectives.”

Ministers rarely take powers without the intent to use them fully, and the transfer of powers to use secondary legislation should always be subject to robust scrutiny. I will explore in due course whether I believe this Bill, and the proposed increase for the CDC, meets three key tests. It is not whether it has met its plans as defined in 2012, but whether, first, it has demonstrated enough effectiveness to justify such a huge increase; secondly, whether it ensures an adequate focus on tackling poverty in the poorest countries; and thirdly, whether it acts in a coherent way with respect to the rest of DFID and indeed wider HMG policy.

Let me first suggest my own answer as to why such a huge increase has been proposed, and why now. One of the primary reasons may lie in a little noticed change to the reporting of our aid spending—official development assistance or ODA—last year, which saw the CDC’s contribution to meeting the 0.7% aid target dramatically altered. Until 2015, the investment activities of the CDC could either add to or subtract from our total aid spending. Simply put, we used to look at the net benefit of the CDC to developing countries by subtracting money flowing back to the CDC from the new investments it was making. In fact, this resulted in a positive contribution to our aid spending of £228 million in 2010; £91 million in 2011; £103 million in 2012; £100 million in 2013; and £42 million in 2014.

In 2015, however, there was a significant change. Instead of reporting with the same measure, which incidentally would, according to the House of Commons Library, have resulted in a negative contribution to the aid budget of minus £9 million, DFID changed its reporting so that the capital flow from the UK Government to the CDC is scored as ODA by DFID rather than the CDC scoring its own net disbursements as ODA. Instead of a negative impact on aid last year, the UK reported the capital increase reported to the CDC as aid, which was £450 million—a stark difference. We now looking at the total money DFID puts into the CDC counting as aid, regardless of which country or sector it ends up in, let alone whether it resulted in a net flow of resources to the poorest countries.

Why does this matter and how does it relate to the Bill? It matters because it would allow the Secretary of State to classify the entirety of future capital increases to the CDC as ODA or aid, potentially diverting, and effectively privatising, up to £12 billion of our future aid via the CDC, yet continuing to count it towards the 0.7% target. This is particularly important, given the different focuses and priorities of the CDC. I acknowledge that the differences have narrowed in recent years, and I shall come on to praise the work undertaken by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) in this area. However, the differences between the CDC and DFID’s objectives, and indeed its stated aims, are still significant, not least over whether our aid is focused on the very poorest countries that most need our support or on higher-income countries where we can more easily achieve quicker and bigger returns on investment. I shall return to this point.

[Fiona Bruce]

The hon. Gentleman suggests that the aims are significantly different, yet 83% of the new CDC investments are in DFID partner countries and 56% of new investments are now in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Is that not in line with DFID’s objectives?

[Stephen Doughty]

As I shall come on to explain more fully, there has been a significant change and there has been a narrowing, but there is still a significant difference. If we look at the bulk of the spending still being in India, we see a significant divergence from DFID’s priorities, as I shall come on to show. We were told that aid to India had ended, but apparently it has not.

This is also significant when coupled with an answer I received to a parliamentary question. I discovered that the amount of aid—ODA—to be spent by Departments other than DFID is set to increase from 18% this year to 26% in 2019. That is over a quarter of our aid spending going through Departments other than DFID. Even if we focus on the lower end of the implied proposal to spend billions extra via the CDC by the end of the spending review—let alone the £12 billion—we could be looking at anywhere from 35% to 45% of the DFID budget being spent, but not by DFID in the traditional sense. If the Secretary of State used her full power and more quickly than expected, it could be even higher. It is particularly ironic that the Secretary of State who promised us greater effectiveness, transparency and accountability in our aid spending appears to be willing to hand over billions of our aid funding to less transparent and less accountable parts of government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

Absolutely. I shall return shortly to what the NAO report actually said, as opposed to the slightly glossed-over version that we heard from the Secretary of State.

[Fiona Bruce]

The hon. Gentleman is a member of the International Development Committee. He will therefore be aware that the Committee has committed itself to scrutinising ODA whichever Department it is spent through and that the Secretary of State has confirmed that we should have full authority, and her backing, to do so. If he had attended the ICAI sub-committee meeting last week, he would have seen that, for the first time, we had before us a witness from another Department who was scrutinising its spending of ODA.

[Stephen Doughty]

Indeed. I apologise for not being present at that meeting, but, as you will know, Madam Deputy Speaker, I had other commitments at the time. Obviously, the hon. Lady cannot attend all the meetings of all the groups in the House at any time either; she and I are both busy people. I hope that the Committees will investigate those matters, not least because of the volumes that we are talking about, but also because of the lack of transparency when it comes to documentation and the ability to scrutinise CDC’s spending, not least through its use of tax havens.

These dramatic shifts—under the cover of a “minor technical change” that we should all rush through in the House—must always set the alarm bells ringing for those of us who seek to scrutinise the Government and their decisions. I do not want to spend long on this, but we must feel additional alarm when we look at the agenda of the Secretary of State and consider what she has said about the Department being scrapped and about money being “stolen” and squandered. She does not like some of the headlines that have appeared in the Daily Mail. Obviously, she does not like the headlines that have appeared in newspapers such as the Financial Times. However, we are now seeing wild claims and accusations in the right-wing press which are clearly coming from her Department. Indeed, her special adviser has previously called for the 0.7% target to be abandoned, and in 2013 in The Sun described aid as an

“unaccountable, bureaucratic and wasteful industry”.

Why does all this matter to the Bill? I believe that, faced with the legislative and political constraints of the cross-party support for the 0.7% aid target, the Secretary of State has opted for a stealthier route and has chosen to undermine the Department by diverting and reclassifying aid. I appreciate that others may not share my sense of scepticism, so let me now deal with three practical objections to the Bill. The Secretary of State said that she wanted facts, so let us have some.

I should make it clear at the outset that I am not opposed to the existence of a development finance institution of the CDC’s nature, or to its playing its part in our portfolio of international development efforts. Nor, obviously, do I oppose the funding of private sector projects. The development of a vibrant private sector, key infrastructure and the support of new and emerging businesses in the world’s poorest countries should be a key part of any balanced portfolio of development assistance, alongside investments in basic public services such as health, education, water, and support for agricultural improvement to tackle hunger and nutritional challenges.

The Secretary of State likes to give us the impression that she is the only person ever to have realised the importance of private sector development and trade to tackling poverty and promoting economic development, but the fact is that both have been at the heart of DFID’s work since it came into being, under Governments of all political persuasions. Supporting trade is crucial to international development.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I did; I have read the whole report. It also states:

“It remains a significant challenge for CDC to demonstrate its ultimate objective of creating jobs and making a lasting difference to people’s lives in some of the world’s poorest places.”

It goes on to make other serious criticisms. On reporting impact, the NAO says:

“Changes in reporting development impact over the last four years have made it difficult for CDC and the Department to set out a consistent picture of what has been achieved.”

It criticises the CDC’s failure to deliver on the evaluation contract, which was a key part of the business case for the last recapitalisation involving more than £700 million. It criticises the CDC’s claim to have created 1 million jobs, stating that

“in 2015 it reported that more than one million direct and indirect jobs had been created…CDC does not attribute these jobs directly to the investment it makes in the company. Since 2012 it has been considering how to measure job quality but has not yet established an overall methodology to do so…its progress has been slow”.

Worryingly, the NAO warned that

“recruitment and retention challenges remain a significant risk to CDC’s operations.”

That is crucial for an organisation planning a massive financial expansion.

The CDC has indeed clamped down on excessive pay, although the CEO still takes home more than £300,000 a year, which is significantly more than the Prime Minister. However, the NAO also reports that

“the Department and CDC will shortly be negotiating a new remuneration framework”.

Could we expect salaries to go back up? Particularly worrying, one would think, for a Secretary of State who thinks that most of our aid is being “stolen” or squandered is some of the NAO commentary on the CDC’s efforts to tackle fraud and corruption. The NAO tells us that the CDC has

“only recently established systems to consolidate records of all the allegations it receives…This made it harder for it to provide comprehensive reporting to the Department. ”

The NAO report states that DFID’s own internal audit team concluded that the figure of just four allegations of fraud and corruption at the CDC in the entire period from 2009 to 2016 was “surprisingly low”. At the very least, the CDC is worthy of the same level of robust scrutiny and criticism that is levelled at other development funding outlets.

[Fiona Bruce]

The hon. Gentleman asks where the business case is. Has he seen the letter of 23 November from the Secretary of State? In it, she says:

“No new capital to CDC would be released without a business case subject to full Ministerial scrutiny and approval and the agreement of CDC’s board.”

[Stephen Doughty]

That might be reassuring to the hon. Lady, but it does not reassure me, not least because the CDC has not even let the evaluation contract that was a key part of the last business case.

Let me turn to the disjoint between DFID’s priority countries and those in which the CDC operates. That disjoint is likely to grow even larger with such a significant uplift in funding. Even with the refocus in 2012, the list of 63 countries in which the CDC is allowed to invest is significantly larger than the approximately 35 countries on which DFID normally focuses its efforts. The list includes many countries to which DFID has ended its bilateral funding. The CDC can invest in India, South Africa—albeit with caveats—the luxury Indian ocean islands of the Seychelles, the Maldives and Mauritius, and many countries across north Africa including Egypt. Despite their problems and challenges, those countries would not normally be regarded as among the poorest in the world.

According to the House of Commons Library, the CDC spends more in gross aid and official development assistance than DFID does in certain—often middle income—countries and regions, including some rather odd examples such as Algeria, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Thailand, as well as the more expected locations such as Cameroon, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire. Even if we discount the pre-2012 legacy investments in Latin America, the CDC is still investing the largest amounts in higher-income countries, according to data released to me in another parliamentary question.

At the top of the CDC investment list are India, which has received £760.5 million since 2009, South Africa with £194 million and, oddly, Egypt with £53.6 million. If we include the pre-2012 legacy investments, we find even more odd examples. India, South Africa—with caveats, as I said—and Egypt remain on the list of eligible countries for CDC investments, which is rather remarkable, given the fact that the last three Conservative Secretaries of State have made a huge meal of the fact that aid to India was ending. I find this strange. I took a long time to be convinced of the need to end our aid programme in India. There is clearly severe poverty in a whole series of Indian states. It is odd that a lion’s share of the CDC’s investments continue to go into a country that is not exactly the kind of frontier place for investment that the Secretary of State was talking about earlier. Is she really saying that India struggles to attract private investment capital and that we should be there at the forefront of those giving aid? I would find that hard to believe.

The House of Commons Library has found that the share of new investments in the poorest least-developed countries increased, but from just 4% to 12%, and the increase was from less than 1% to just 4% in the lower-income countries. The lion’s share of the CDC’s investments remained in the lower middle-income countries. The CDC’s own annual report for 2015 admits that its top four highest country exposures are India with 23%; China with 14%; Nigeria with 7%; and South Africa with 6%. It also tells us that just 6% of its investment goes into agriculture and just 6% into education. Bizarrely, those are not far ahead of real estate and mineral extraction. Focus has clearly improved, but the easiest and quickest returns for the CDC remain in certain sectors that are far removed from traditional, vital development impacts and in huge markets such as India and South Africa, not the world’s poorest countries. If the Secretary of State’s agenda is all about building a bilateral trading relationship with India in the post-Brexit environment and if we need to push our aid that way to sweeten deals, we should come clean about that. Many people feel that things are headed that way. Funds are not going towards the Department’s original development objectives.

Why does the CDC require such a potentially massive capital injection of taxpayers’ money when it managed perfectly well without one until last year? It recycles 100% of its profits and has total net assets of £4 billion, which rose by 16% in the last year, and an investment portfolio of £3 billion. Why does it need additional money in such large volumes?

Turning to tax havens and coherence, the Chancellor told us in last week’s autumn statement that the Government are committed to tackling tax evasion, avoidance and aggressive tax planning, and today the Business Secretary told us all about Government plans to crack down on corporate governance. The Government have repeatedly claimed that they have attempted to crack down on tax havens—not least in the aftermath of the Panama papers. Yet we find the CDC’s investment vehicles in those very papers. No less than 11 CDC subsidiaries are located in the Cayman Islands, 40 in Mauritius, and five in the Channel Islands. Oxfam points that three quarters of CDC investments in 2013 were routed through jurisdictions that feature in the top 20 of the Tax Justice Network’s financial secrecy index. Christian Aid has also been critical of the CDC, stating that it

“has been shown to be a heavy user of secretive tax havens, which serve both to obscure what is really going on with its investments and can also reduce the amount of tax its investee companies pay in poor countries”.

Even if Ministers, the International Development Committee or others wanted to scrutinise properly what is going on, the lack of transparency and detail provided by the CDC and the fancy shell companies make it incredibly difficult.

Our wider development and sustainability policies might also be incoherent. Many CDC projects are clearly coherent with DFID objectives and the sustainable development goals. We heard about electricity in Uganda and other excellent examples of investment in micro-finance, so there are clearly many high-quality projects, but there are some odd inconsistencies. The CDC apparently invests £29.2 million in GEMS Education Africa, the website of which describes a network of private fee-paying schools and education providers in “leafy, residential” locations that charge anything from around 582,000 to 1,287,000 Kenyan shillings a year—up to £10,000. The CDC also holds a 22.8% share in Rainbow Children’s Medicare Private Ltd, a fee-paying private hospital group in India that the NAO visited as part of its inquiry, saying that the investment was apparently in the whole company and not even focused on improving access for the poorest, for example. The former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), mentioned Feronia Inc. in which the CDC has invested £15.1 million. The main boast on its website is of replanting 13,000 hectares of palm oil, a commodity which is linked to deforestation, habitat degradation and climate change.

Without being able to get more detail from the CDC’s documents, it is difficult to know where the money is going and what it is being used for, but those are odd examples of spending going towards wonderful development objectives. The CDC continues to operate free from day-to-day policy guidance and intervention from Ministers. Oxfam points out that the CDC was assessed as poor in the aid transparency index in 2012, but there have been few improvements since then. All who support the cause of international development and poverty eradication face a tough task in justifying that spending to the public—however small a proportion of overall Government spending it remains. I am sorry to say that the task is not helped in any way by the misleading spin put out weekly in tabloid newspapers by the current Secretary of State, which was not a hallmark of her Conservative or Labour predecessors.

I am normally able to make a case for our development spending by appealing to moral duty and our national interest, not least when it comes to dealing with countries of conflict or instability, or with the huge migration flows we see. I am heartened by those among the younger generations who care about the prospects of our fellow humans around the world. I recently visited Moorland Primary School, in one of the more deprived areas of my constituency, where children told me that they wanted me to speak to Ministers to get more money provided for education in the poorest countries and to ensure that children are able to go to school and that they have healthcare and clean water. I will struggle to explain to those children why the Secretary of State wants to spend billions of our taxes handing money to what is, in effect, a privatised firm that does not need this amount of money; that gives large portions of it to countries that do not need it; that pays its chief executive officer more than £300,000 a year; and that invests through tax havens. It has some laudable aims, but it is not proving its effectiveness.

In conclusion, the Bill massively increases that funding to CDC and it fails three crucial tests. The first of those is the effectiveness test; the NAO assessment simply does not provide the evidence needed to back up such a huge increase in funding—has CDC even requested it? Secondly, it fails the poverty-focus test, as CDC remains massively focused on higher-income countries and high-return sectors, rather than on those that we should be pushing our efforts into. Thirdly, it fails the coherence test, given the continued use of tax havens and projects that simply do not sit comfortably with our wider development objectives. In its current form, this is a bad Bill. That does not mean that I do not support the continuation of the CDC and that I do not recognise that much of its work is good, but this level of increase is a stealthy way of diverting money away from our work in DFID, alongside the diversion to other Departments. We ought to scrutinise the Bill very carefully in Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

On behalf of other members of the Select Committee, I inform the House that many of them are abroad on a visit to the middle east but would have spoken in the debate had they been here. It would be wrong for me to indicate how they would have spoken or whether, like me, they support the Bill, but I will put on the record one or two comments previously made by members of the Committee. As long ago as 2011, my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy) said in a debate on the CDC:

“It is extremely important that the Government should continue to support CDC.”—[Official Report, 14 July 2011; Vol. 531, c. 169WH.]

An IDC report on jobs and livelihood in the last Parliament stated:

“We are encouraged that CDC has followed our recommendations and has refocused on job creation.”

A final Select Committee example is a recent report on the sustainable development goals, which stated:

“The Government must ensure that the work it carries out to encourage private sector investment, through CDC…is focused on developing and fragile states”.

It went on to mention

“a positive impact on the achievement of the SDGs”,

which the CDC had the potential to achieve. It was interesting to note that in response the Government stated:

“CDC’s mandate is aligned with achievement of the Goals”.

Before I touch on a few of my prepared remarks, I would like to deal with some of comments made by another member of our Select Committee, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty). He mentioned his concerns about the effectiveness, the poverty focus and the coherence of the CDC’s work, and I would like to respond to these.

The hon. Gentleman said that there should be more emphasis on health and education. However, the CDC’s development impact is amplified by the billions of pounds in local taxes that are generated by the companies it invests in. These help to support the public services such as health and education in developing countries. Over the past three years alone, these companies have generated over £7 billion-worth of local tax revenue. It is important to remember the impact that these taxes can have on those kinds of essential services.

The hon. Gentleman spoke about coherence, and he and others have mentioned transparency, but DFID works very closely with the CDC to ensure that it is at the forefront of global standards of transparency in development impact. Information about all the CDC’s investments is available on a comprehensive database on its website, with details of the name and location of every investment in the portfolio. I am sure that further information would be made available if members of the Select Committee requested it. If DFID is working, as we know it is, with the CDC on a new results framework, this will result in an even better capture of the broader impact of investments on development—even beyond job creation and tax revenue generated.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman raised his concerns about investment by the CDC in a private, fee-paying hospital in India, stating that this might be at odds with DFID’s general approach towards the expenditure of UK aid. However, I clearly remember the Select Committee visiting a private, fee-paying school in Africa not so long ago, and Committee members agreed that DFID’s support for that school was, in fact, well spent, particularly when there was no other option for children in that area to obtain an education. I believe these issues need to be looked at in context, and I am not so sure that support for this hospital is so out of line with DFID’s general approach.

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Lady raises the issue of private fee-paying education and health. The issue is about where we focus our efforts. Does she not accept that if we continue to support the expansion of private healthcare and education as opposed to supporting public systems that enable free access to healthcare and education, we will effectively supplant countries’ ability to provide national healthcare and education systems that support all their citizens, including the poorest?

[Fiona Bruce]

As with so many of these cases, it is not an either/or. It is often both when the need is clearly there and the money can be well spent.

I shall move on to my few prepared remarks about the Bill. I absolutely support the Bill and speak in favour of it. It is essential to look at how to support capital investment in countries where there is a paucity of it. A 2014 report from the UN Conference on Trade and Development calculated a £2.5 trillion annual investment gap in key sustainable development sectors, so the CDC has a very important role to play. It is important to remember that the Bill will allow DFID and the British people, as the CDC’s motto states, “to do good without losing money” on an even greater scale than hitherto. I cannot believe that anyone, even aid sceptics, could really object to that.

The NAO report, published yesterday, chronicles the many positive steps that the CDC has taken and the many improvements that it has made. We have heard many references to the report. It says that through

“tighter cost control, strengthened corporate governance and closer alignment with the Department’s objectives, CDC now has an efficient and economic operating model.”

This morning I spoke to NAO officers who had produced the report over eight months and had visited many projects, including some in Africa. They said that DFID now had a really good grip on the CDC’s work, that there were good lines of communication between the CDC and DFID, and that DIFD’s in-country know-how was being utilised, while it was rightly not interfering in day-to-day management. They identified several cases of CDC investments in areas where the private sector would not have initially dared to go, but three years later private sector money had come in. Indeed, in several instances they saw the results of what they described as “catalytic” investments. They said of the 13 or 14 funds they had inspected in Africa that, with one exception, they were “transformational”. I think that we have a really positive report on which to act.

Of course, there are views about previous investments, but I think it encouraging that 98% of investments are now in Africa and south-east Asia and 82% are in one of the seven priority sectors identified in DFID’s key objectives, which were devised in 2012, following the excellent review conducted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell).

Without further ado, I shall end my speech, although there is much more that I would like to say in praise of the CDC.