Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Eleanor Laing and David Hanson

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hanson]

This has been a useful debate, which is reflected in the fact that it has been longer than I expected. Significant concern has been expressed by right hon. and hon. Members on the Government Back Benches, by Liberal Democrat Members and by Opposition Members, including members of the Scottish National party. The hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) did not table any amendments to the Bill, so to criticise the Labour party for doing so is slightly unnerving.

Deep down, the Minister knows that he has lost the argument on this issue. The Government will return in another place with an amendment that will be broadly similar to what we have proposed today and that will have the approval of the Liberal Democrats and his own Back Benchers. That amendment will come back to this House and we will have another debate in a few weeks’ time in which we will once again agree that this is the right thing to do.

I wish to withdraw new clause 1, but the essence of this debate is new clause 3, on the appeal mechanism, so I wish to support new clause 3, give the House an opportunity to vote for what it will ultimately agree when another place has determined it and let this House today determine this policy. Therefore, I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote in support of new clause 3, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw new clause 1.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Prior permission of the court

‘(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State—

(a) makes the relevant decisions in relation to an individual, and

(b) makes an application to the court for permission to impose measures on the individual.

(2) The application must set out a draft of the proposed TEO notice.

(3) The function of the court on the application is—

(a) to determine whether the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed, and

(b) to determine whether to give permission to impose measures on the individual and (where applicable) whether to exercise the power of direction under subsection (9).

(4) The court may consider the application—

(a) in the absence of the individual;

(b) without the individual having been notified of the application; and

(c) without the individual having been given an opportunity (if the individual was aware of the application) of making any representations to the court.

(5) But that does not limit the matters about which rules of court may be made.

(6) In determining the application, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.

(7) In a case where the court determines that a decision of the Secretary of State that condition A, condition B, or condition C is met is obviously flawed, the court may not give permission under this section.

(8) In any other case, the court may give permission under this section.

(9) If the court determines that the Secretary of State‘s decision that condition D is met is obviously flawed, the court may (in addition to giving permission under subsection (8) give directions to the Secretary of State in relation to the measures to be imposed on the individual.

(10) 1n this section “relevant decisions” means the decisions that the following conditions are met—

(a) condition A;

(b) condition B;

(c) condition C; and

(d) condition D.”—(Mr Hanson.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The House proceeded to a Division, and Madam Deputy Speaker having directed that the doors be locked—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. As there was a reason for the delay and a large number of Members were held up coming into the Chamber, we will unlock the doors.

Whereupon the doors were unlocked.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hanson]

I beg to move amendment 10, page 30, line 14, schedule 1, at end insert—

“(c) the individual subject whose travel document has been removed may appeal against this decision in the courts over the evidence on which conditions in paragraph 2(1)(a) and (b) of this Schedule were met,

(b) the Secretary of State must by regulations make provisions about—

(i) the relevant court;

(ii) a time limit by which an appeal must have been heard;

(c) the power to make regulations under this section—

(i) is exercisable by statutory instrument;

(ii) includes power to make transitional, transitory or saving provision;

(d) a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”

This amendment would create the right for an appeal in court following a temporary seizure of a passport, and requires the Secretary of State to set out in regulations a relevant court and time limit by which an appeal must have been heard.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 11, page 30, line 14, at end insert—

“(c) the individual subject whose travel document has been removed may appeal against this decision in the courts over the evidence on which conditions in paragraph 2(1)(a) and (b) of this Schedule were met,

(b) the appeal must have been heard within seven days of an application,

(c) the Secretary of State must by regulation make provisions about the relevant court,

(d) the power to make regulations under this section—

(i) is exercisable by statutory instrument;

(ii) includes power to make transitional, transitory or saving provision;

(e) a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”

This amendment would create the right for an appeal in court following a temporary seizure of a passport and require the appeal to have been heard within seven days.

[Mr Hanson]

The power to seize a passport is set out in clause 1 and schedule 1. For the sake of clarity, I reiterate that we support the general principle of seizure, provided there is sufficient evidence to warrant such action being taken by the officials listed in schedule 1. The question today, which we discussed in Committee, relates to proportionality and to the opportunity for individuals to make representations to officials on the reasons why the temporary seizure has been made. The decision to seize a passport is taken on evidence and on intelligence.

In Committee, we discussed—I hope we can revisit the discussion speedily today—the range of intelligence that could be linked to third party intelligence on the movement of an individual, or to intelligence secured by the agencies. There are a whole range of reasons for such intelligence to be gathered, but that does not necessarily mean that it is correct. There may be a range of reasons for mistakes or for concerns about intelligence. As we discussed in Committee, people may have legitimate reasons—weddings, business, tourism and so on—to travel abroad to areas with difficult challenges. I accept that it would be the exception and that if the Government or a qualifying officer seized a passport, it would be based on strong intelligence, but the purpose of the amendments is to provide a couple of options to put in place stronger oversight and appeal mechanisms for individuals who feel aggrieved. Amendment 10 would ensure a

“right for an appeal in court following a temporary seizure of a passport, and requires the Secretary of State to set out in regulations a relevant court and time limit by which an appeal must have been heard.”

Amendment 11 would do pretty much the same by creating

“the right for an appeal in court following a temporary seizure of a passport and require the appeal to have been heard within seven days.”

It is not only the Opposition who are concerned. In an article on 3 September, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) wrote in support:

“Allowing police to confiscate passports at the UK border to prevent an aspiring young jihadi from leaving for Syria via Istanbul may be justifiable on good intelligence and a sensible extension of the home secretary’s powers. But unless there is some rapid means of review there must be the likelihood that mistakes will occur as the use of this administrative power increases and perfectly innocent young people will find their travel plans wrecked. We would be wise to insist on oversight, rapid review processes and compensation where justified.”