(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI broadly accept that point. Much as I admire the Secretary of State and her advisers, I freely accept that she may make a mistake. However, I think that, just as in the second world war, the threat is such that there must be some diminution of our traditional civil liberties to protect the liberty of the wider public. I am not saying that the end justifies the means, but we are in a very dangerous situation.
We are talking about the Bill; we are not talking about hypothetical situations. The Bill lays an injunction on the Secretary of State to act reasonably, and if a court finds that the Secretary of State has acted unreasonably, it can reverse her decision. I repeat, however, that we are not talking about some fundamental assault on civil liberties, or about depriving people of their liberty in this country. We are simply talking about a reasonable belief that people have fought jihad and a reasonable belief that they are a threat to our people. I think that the bulk of members of the public and the majority of Members of Parliament trust the Secretary of State to act reasonably.
I want to make a few brief comments about the important and, in many respects, symbolic issue that is being raised in the wider context of the Bill.
I think that there are strong principled arguments in favour of judicial oversight in relation to the power of temporary exclusion, especially when it involves a British citizen. A range of points have been made about that, but I want to stress that this is a very strong power. We are talking about the exercise of state power—Executive power—against the citizen. I think that, both in that context and in the broader context, the presumption, or general principle, should be that there ought to be a judicial check. I say that first in the light of basic principles of natural justice, and secondly because the focused, efficient exercise of state power requires checks and balances. The House of Commons is one of those checks on state power, and the courts are another.
I do not think that judicial oversight would weaken the exercise of that power; I think that it would strengthen it, because it would prevent arbitrary abuse. It would ensure that the power was exercised against the crazed fanatic rather than the misguided youth who finds himself wrapped up in some business of which, on reflection, he genuinely wants no part, let alone mistaken cases involving the genuinely innocent. We know from the exercise of state power, particularly under recent counter-terrorism legislation, that there is a risk of innocent people becoming wrapped up in cases. We do not think that the Secretary of State or other Ministers act from any sense of bad faith, but, given the accumulation of state and Executive power, the broader that power becomes in the absence of checks and balances, the more likely it is that innocent people will be caught up in the net. That is my first principled argument.
My second argument is that there have been a number of objections to judicial consideration of the exercise of the power by the Secretary of State. It has been suggested that it may be an emergency power and that the courts are too slow. I think that it is the other way round. If British jihadis come back to this country after being up to no good in Syria, or wherever they may have been, it is hardly an emergency power. A wider argument could be that we are locking the stable door after the horse has bolted, but it is certainly not an emergency power in that sense, although of course we want to keep track of the individuals who are returning home.
I do not buy the argument that the courts would be too slow. In practical terms, of course, the individual could be barred from returning until the court had given due consideration to the application by either the Secretary of State or the individual concerned. I do not entirely understand either the public safety argument or the emergency argument against some form of judicial oversight.
The second point has been made about judicial review, but that is clearly about process rather than the substance relating to an individual case. Notwithstanding the proliferation of judicial review claims—which the Government are rightly trying to curtail—I do not think that judicial review will provide an adequate judicial check on the exercise of state power of this nature, given how intrusive it is in relation to the rights of the individual citizen.
Let me make one broader contextual point about the power and the amendments. Hundreds of British jihadis are coming home from abroad following some form of involvement in foreign conflicts and thousands of individuals are under the radar of M15. However, according to the Home Office’s annual update, released in March 2014, the number of people convicted of terrorism offences under terrorism legislation, or wider legislation, dropped from what was a pretty meagre 54 in 2006-07 to 27 in 20013-14.
The real hole in the Bill is the gaping gap in our ability to enforce the law, and that is true of successive Governments across the board. We have a huge, broad criminal base, and we have very wide powers, but what is missing from the Bill, and, to some extent, from in the debate, is a reference to measures—not necessarily legislative to improve law enforcement. We seem constantly to legislate, although not necessarily hyperactively: I think that a great deal of consideration has gone into the Bill. The elephant in the room is our inability to enforce the laws that we already have. I do not subscribe to the view that there is a zero-sum game between liberty and security. The justice system is a powerful tool in the fight against terror and should not always be viewed as some sort of heavy, onerous baggage that is weighing us down.
I hope that the Minister’s clarification of the compromise changes that are likely to be forthcoming in the Lords will be sufficient to enable me either to abstain or to vote with the Government if the new clause is pushed to a vote.