Investigatory Powers Bill

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Before I begin, I am sure that right hon. and hon. Members will be aware of the death of a prison officer who was attacked 10 days ago in east Belfast. I am sure that the whole House will wish to send its deepest sympathies to his family, friends and colleagues at this time.

The Government are committed to updating and consolidating our country’s investigatory powers in a clear and comprehensive new law that will stand the test of time. Over the past two years, there has been detailed analysis of those investigatory powers through three independent reviews; consultation with law enforcement, the security and intelligence agencies, civil liberties groups, and industry; and now, following the publication of the draft Bill last autumn, scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, the Intelligence and Security Committee, and by the Science and Technology Committee. I would like to place on record my gratitude to the Chairs of those Committees—Lord Murphy of Torfaen, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), and my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood)—for the invaluable work that they, and their members, have undertaken over recent months. Their thorough scrutiny has helped to shape and improve the Bill, which today reflects the majority of their recommendations.

The revised Bill is clearer, with tighter technical definitions and strict codes of practice. It includes stronger privacy safeguards, bolstering protections for lawyers and journalists’ sources; it explicitly prevents our agencies from asking foreign intelligence agencies to intercept the communications of a person in the UK on their behalf unless they have a warrant approved by a Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner; it reduces the amount of time within which urgent warrants must be reviewed by a judicial commissioner, cutting it from five days to three; and it strengthens the powers of the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Alongside the introduction of the Bill, we published six draft codes of practice in order that they could be reviewed by the House.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

Under this Bill, the current system of three oversight commissioners is to be reduced to one commissioner. Given that there have been miscarriages of justice in the past, not least with the Maguire seven and the Guildford four, can the Secretary of State convince the House that it is in the interests of freedom and democracy that we reduce the number of commissioners from three to one?

[Mrs May]

Although one person will oversee the Investigatory Powers Commission as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, they will have under them a number of judicial commissioners who will have extensive experience and will undertake certain tasks—first, on the new process of the double-lock authorisation for warrantry that we are introducing. They will also undertake the inspection and review of the operation of the agencies in the same way that the three commissioners have done so far. Far from reducing oversight, this Bill will enhance the oversight that is available.

The pre-legislative scrutiny that the Bill has undergone builds on the previous work of the Intelligence and Security Committee in its “Privacy and Security” report; the independent inquiry into surveillance practices by a panel convened by the Royal United Services Institute; and the review of investigatory powers carried out by David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. All three reviews made it clear that legislation relating to interception and communications data needed to be consolidated and made subject to clear and robust privacy safeguards. Taken together, the scrutiny that this Bill has received may well be without precedent. Three authoritative reports informed the Bill’s drafting, three influential Committees of Parliament then scrutinised that draft, and now the Bill proceeds to full and proper consideration by both Houses of Parliament.

The Bill will provide world-leading legislation setting out in detail the powers available to the police and the security and intelligence services to gather and access communications and communications data. It will provide unparalleled openness and transparency about our investigatory powers, create the strongest safeguards, and establish a rigorous oversight regime.

As the House is aware, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, which the Bill is intended to replace, contains a sunset clause requiring us to pass legislation by the end of 2016. That is the timetable set by Parliament, and the grave threats we face make it imperative that we do so. Today terrorists and criminals are operating online with a reach and scale that never existed before. They are exploiting the technological benefits of the modern age for their own twisted ends, and they will continue to do so for as long as it gives them a perceived advantage. We must ensure that those charged with keeping us safe are able to keep pace. The Bill will provide the police and the security intelligence agencies with the powers they need, set against important new privacy protections and safeguards. It will ensure that they can continue in their tremendous work, which so often goes unreported and unrecognised, to protect the people of this country from those who mean us harm.

I turn now to the contents of the Bill. In its scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Intelligence and Security Committee quite rightly concluded that

“privacy protections should form the backbone”

of legislation in this most sensitive area. That is indeed the case, and privacy is hardwired into the Bill. It strictly limits the public authorities that can use investigatory powers, imposes high thresholds for the use of the most intrusive powers, and sets out in more detail than ever before the safeguards that apply to material obtained under these powers. The Bill starts with a presumption of privacy, and it asserts the privacy of a communication. Part 1 provides for an offence of unlawful interception, so that phone tapping without a warrant will be punishable by a custodial sentence, a fine, or both. It creates a new offence of knowingly or recklessly obtaining communications data without lawful authorisation, so misuse of those powers by the police or other public authorities will lead to severe penalties. It abolishes other powers to obtain communications data. Subject to limited exceptions, such as court orders, public authorities will in future be able to obtain communications data only through the powers in the Bill, with all the accompanying safeguards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

I will make a little more progress, but my hon. Friend may be able to catch my eye later.

In truly urgent circumstances, such as a fast- moving kidnap investigation, a warrant can still come into force as soon as the Secretary of State has authorised it, but that decision will need to be approved by a judicial commissioner within three working days. If the commissioner disagrees with the Secretary of State’s decision, the commissioner can order that all material gathered under the urgent warrant must be destroyed.

Furthermore, the Bill provides considerable additional safeguards for the communications of parliamentarians and lawyers. In any case, where it is proposed to intercept a parliamentarian’s communications, the Prime Minister would also be consulted, in line with the Wilson doctrine. Equally, the deliberate interception of legally privileged communications can be authorised only in exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as where it is necessary to prevent the loss of life.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Will the Home Secretary give way?

[Mrs May]

I had an idea that my hon. Friend would intervene.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Of course Members of Parliament should not be above the law, and the Procedure Committee has ensured that a Member of Parliament who is arrested is treated exactly like a member of the public. We all recognise that, but in some of the most dodgy regimes—ours is not, of course, one of them—Governments do intercept the communications of Members of Parliament. Surely, just so that we can be absolutely reassured, we need the extra safeguard of having you, Mr Speaker, look at such an interception as well. Why not?

[Mrs May]

I heard my hon. Friend’s earlier exchange with you, Mr Speaker. Two important extra safeguards have been put in this legislation: the first, which is stated in the Bill, is that the Prime Minister will be consulted, but there is also the double lock authorisation. In future, a warrant to intercept anybody—including Members of Parliament, should that be the case—will be subject not just to the determination of a democratically elected individual, but to the independent decision of the judiciary, through the judicial commissioners. That important safeguard has been put into the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Burnham]

I do agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I was making the point that the provisions need to be strengthened in respect of prime ministerial approval, but also in the way that he describes to give our constituents that extra trust, so that if they come to speak to us in our surgeries, they can be sure that they are speaking to us and nobody else.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

If there is a matter of acute public concern and a whistleblower is making himself a real nuisance to the Government, and communicates that to his Member of Parliament, should one member of the Government, the Home Secretary, ultimately authorise it, with it then being referred to the Prime Minister, who might also be affected by the decision? He would effectively be judge in his own court and surely it is at least arguable that some other scrutiny should be involved.

[Mrs May]

The judge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

That is one of the most combative and partisan speeches in support of an abstention on the Second Reading of a Bill that I have heard from a Member of this House for a very long time. I urge the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and her Scottish National party colleagues to calm down a bit and accept that everyone is in agreement that this is a huge and comprehensive Bill. Its terms are often quite obscure, and it is not light reading to try to analyse it. I think we are all agreed that some issues need to be addressed in Committee and at later stages. Despite her excellently combative speech—I have nothing against partisan politics on the right occasions—it would be useful to accept that there is almost a consensus in this House about the principles that we should be adopting. As I think the standards of liberal democracy in this country at the moment are not too bad, we need legislation that enshrines them for the future, in case even wilder protest groups eventually get elected to the House, so that we stick to those principles.

The principles are, I think, that we wish to give the strongest possible support to our intelligence and policing authorities to defend the national interest and to defend our citizens. There are very real dangers in the modern world and we must not be left behind. When our intelligence and police services are dealing with terrorists, or serious organised crime—drug trafficking, human trafficking and so on—or child abuse, as people have said, I want them to be as tough as anybody else’s intelligence and police services. I want them to be as effective as they possibly can be and as successful in avoiding risk; that is essential.

Spies—the intelligence services—have had to do slightly odd things ever since they first emerged on the scene, ever since they started steaming open envelopes and started intercepting telephone calls. We must not be left behind by technology, and we must not be left behind by modern society. The spies have to act in the same way towards the internet as they have been acting towards envelopes in the post for the past 200 years. I hope we are all agreed on that. I hope we also accept that this poses a dilemma for a liberal democracy like our own, because we have to do this as well and as toughly as anybody else in the world, and to the highest technical standards, without compromising our underlying values. The reason we want such actions to be so effective is that we have, we hope, the highest standards of human rights and the highest regard for the rule of law and democratic accountability, but perhaps the thing we have neglected the most in recent times as the pace of events has speeded up is privacy—the privacy of the individual. We have recent examples—although not in this area—of the abuse of privacy by the press and others, of which we are only too well aware. I think our citizens expect that their privacy should be intruded on only in the right cases.

The real heart of the test of getting the balance right—we all talk about getting the balance right—is the proportionality of very intrusive powers, which should only ever be used when the national interest is threatened and our security is at stake. That should be—

[Sir Edward Leigh]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

I will give way just once.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I am sorry I am worrying on about this issue, but my right hon. and learned Friend has been Home Secretary. Let us suppose that there is a matter of national security and acute political crisis, and a Home Secretary feels it is necessary to authorise some snooping, for want of a better word—I am sorry to use that word—on a Member of Parliament’s communications with a constituent who has raised these issues. The Home Secretary said when I intervened earlier, “Don’t worry; the judge will authorise it or review it, and the Prime Minister will consider it too.” Judges are very responsible, but they do not really understand these acute political sensitivities. Should not somebody else, like the Speaker, have some sort of oversight to protect these very valuable communications between Members of Parliament and their constituents?

[Mr Clarke]

I do not think I am persuaded, although I do not totally reject my hon. Friend’s case. I was about to say that we must realise there are dangers in a democratic society if we are not constantly vigilant against some future Administration—although none that I have experienced, either in opposition or in government have done so—abusing this. There are western democracies —I think some things have happened in America at times that we would not approve of here—where political opponents, political rivals, have found the intelligence services and other sources of information used against them. [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) recklessly suggests France. A Frenchman might not agree, but it would not surprise me if that were the case. In modern politics, the temptation to do that is actually quite strong.

The other reason for insisting that this legislation is as tight as we can make it is that it is all too easy to get accustomed to these things. I was Home Secretary, and Home Secretaries are overwhelmed with applications for warrants. In the middle of the night, doing a red box—contrary to popular belief, I was conscientious about my red boxes—there is very little time to make decisions. There are vast numbers of applications. I used to make a point of challenging one or two just to find out more detail than I had been given.

The volume hitting my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is massive, compared with that which I experienced. That shows that there is a danger. In the intervening 20 years, the world has changed so profoundly that I suspect she has vastly more of these cases to consider than I had, and I suspect some of them involve much more difficult matters of judgment than most of the ones that I faced. Even in those days, when I suspect we were less concerned about these things, I found some pretty surprising applications being made if I went into what they were about. It is too easy even for the best people in the intelligence service—