Scotland Bill

Earl of Lindsay Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Lindsay]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend the Minister for introducing the Bill to the House. I declare an interest as a member of the Calman commission and, in doing so, I express my broad support for what the Bill intends to achieve and the opportunity that it provides for implementing the recommendations put forward by the Calman commission.

I have listened with care to the concerns and fears that a number of noble Lords have expressed about the fact that the landscape and circumstances have moved on since the Calman commission reported in 2009, as well as concerns that there may be unintended consequences from some of the Bill’s provisions. The value of the process that the Bill will be subject to in this House is that we can both test those fears and test the robustness of the provisions that were rooted in the Calman recommendations in the light of modern circumstances.

Equally, I should like to caution noble Lords against seeing the proposals in the Bill purely from the political end of the telescope. Those of us who served on the Calman commission were struck by the extent to which there is a real appetite within civic Scotland for an increase in choice and responsibility and the extent to which there is a desire within the Scottish Parliament to serve the people of Scotland better. There is a real appetite for a Scottish Parliament that is more financially and fiscally accountable to the people of Scotland. Therefore, there is not just a political manifesto lying at the root of the provisions of the Bill; there is a real strength of view in non-political Scotland that these provisions will be good for Scotland, and the quality, quantity and diversity of the evidence that we took from civic Scotland underpinned that assertion.

The noble Lord, Lord Elder, made a brief reference to the process of the Calman commission, which helps to underline the point that I have just made. We sat for well over a year. We met almost weekly at times. We received a substantial amount of evidence in a variety of formats designed to engage with the widest possible range of views across Scotland. We sought views on everything that was raised with us and we also sought counterviews. We did that not once but twice in that the commission had a two-part process. We also sought independent expert advice as necessary, and we spent some considerable time understanding the experience of other countries with devolved Governments.

The sum of those efforts was that our report was shaped not by our own preconceived views or by the political mafia but by the sheer weight of evidence, submissions and advice that we received across the length and breadth of Scotland, and largely from civic Scotland. To further put the Calman commission report into a proper context, the report and recommendations were unanimously endorsed by all its members. The commission had a majority of non-political members from different parts of Scotland, as described by the Minister in his opening speech, and we shared a wide range of backgrounds. However, the endorsement of our recommendations was unanimous, and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the deft and wise chairmanship of Sir Ken Calman.

Since the Calman commission formulated those recommendations, the proposals in this Bill have been further subject to scrutiny, amendment and improvement within the Scottish Parliament and in the other place, as well as by committees, as described by my noble friend, in your Lordships’ House. I hope and believe that the proposals that we are looking at are going to deliver the benefits that we were tasked with securing when we set forth on the Calman commission remit. Ten years after the Scotland Act 1998, a review of how it worked and a revision of certain boundaries has been a sensible exercise. Queries raised by various Members about specific proposals in this Bill with respect to some of the changes in devolved or reserved matters can be studied in greater detail in Committee. It illustrates that there are boundaries between devolved and reserved powers which require continuing surveillance and discussion.

The improvement in the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament is also going to be a beneficial step. The extent to which beyond the Scottish income tax it is able to raise new taxes, which my noble friend Lord Forsyth mentioned, is, I understand, subject to the approval of the United Kingdom Parliament, but perhaps my noble and learned friend might confirm that. The commission recognised the complexity of the recommendations for a Scottish income tax. We recognised the need to understand and anticipate the logistics, administration and operation of such a proposal before it came into effect. We recognised the need to avoid unintended consequences from the proposed Scottish income tax. We were categorical in our view that no such proposal should take effect until considerable time had been spent preparing and understanding the ground, and that that prior work should be followed by transitional arrangements when the Scottish income tax was introduced so that further teething problems could be properly dealt with.

The Scotland Bill takes forward the commission’s recommendations that require primary legislation. These are set out in parts 3, 5 and 6 of the commission’s report. I would like to draw the House’s attention to part 4, entitled “Strengthening cooperation”, as the commission saw the recommendations set out there as being of special relevance to the recommendations requiring primary legislation. Tonight’s debate on the various proposals for legislative change, and some of the comments and concerns that noble Lords have expressed, further emphasise the importance of this part of the report in dealing with the relationships between Governments and Parliaments.

In paragraph 4.2, at the start of part 4 of the report, we state:

“Between the UK and Scottish Parliaments and Governments, issues regularly emerge that require discussion, co-ordination or joint action. On some occasions this may involve disagreements about policies or priorities. On others there may be broad political consensus but a need to ensure that joint interests are co-ordinated, information is properly shared, the impact of the choices at one level on the responsibilities of the other are recognised, or that different circumstances or institutional background are taken into account.”

In paragraph 4.6 we make the point, and I paraphrase, that wherever there is a boundary between reserved and devolved powers and responsibilities, there is going to be a need for mechanisms to manage the issues that will arise around that boundary. Some of the topics of concern cited tonight range from speed limits to air rifles and energy policy. Wherever there is a division in responsibilities, powers and interests, there is a need for mechanisms that can ensure and manage discussion around that division.

We were firmly of the view that a vital element of the success of any devolutionary settlement is the strength of those relations, both formal and informal, between Governments, Parliaments, other democratic representatives and institutions of the state. This prompted us to look closely at how the arrangements for dialogue, collaboration and dispute resolution worked in practice and had worked since 1998 and whether they could be improved. In doing so, we also received extensive evidence on the widely seen need for Governments, officials and Parliaments to work together and, indeed, on the widely held expectation that, on behalf of the wider public good, such joint working and collaboration would be the norm, not the exception.

In respect of Government Ministers and officials, we considered and took evidence on a number of the mechanisms, such as the Sewel convention, the memorandum of understanding, the various departmental concordats and the joint ministerial committees. We also looked at inter-parliamentary relations. There, we found relatively few mechanisms to promote communication, dialogue, information exchange and even access between Members of the Westminster and Holyrood Parliaments. The evidence that we heard suggested that there is significant room for improvement and a need for more structured relations between parliamentarians and parliamentary committees in London and Scotland.

The general picture on cross-border co-operation was not without one or two brighter spots. We acknowledged that the two Governments can and have worked well together on some issues—for instance, on civil contingencies and in response to bio-security scares. We also recognised that there is a good example of the two Governments and two Parliaments working together regularly and effectively with what is known as the Sewel convention, which, as has been explained by various noble Lords, enables the UK Parliament to legislate for Scotland on devolved matters with the agreement of the Scottish Parliament. I regret that, overall, these examples were relatively few in number, and we were struck by how underdeveloped inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary arrangements are.

This was especially striking when looking at other countries where there are not dissimilar arrangements between sovereign and devolved levels of government. In other countries, these relationships tend to be much better organised, and they are seen as being a key ingredient of a resilient, flexible and successfully functioning devolved constitution.

We therefore came forward in part 4 with a series of recommendations to strengthen the degree, effectiveness and transparency of co-operation at all levels. In fact, of the 63 recommendations made in total by the Calman commission, over one-third of them—23 to be exact—dealt with strengthening co-operation, dialogue and collaboration. Noble Lords will be glad to hear that I shall not go through all 23 recommendations, but I shall give a flavour of one or two of them because they are relevant to the proposals in the Bill and to some of the fears and concerns expressed by noble Lords in relation to it.

In regard to collaboration between Governments, Ministers and officials, our recommendations included reinvigorating and further developing the joint ministerial committee structure and network, making it subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. Importantly, we want to see its remit developed so that its primary purpose is to champion and ensure close working and co-operation on joint interests, rather than merely being a dispute resolution of the last resort.

In regard to Parliaments, we made a number of recommendations. These included strengthening the Sewel convention and ending the United Kingdom Parliament's self-denying ordinance of not debating devolved matters as they affect Scotland. If we ended that self-denying ordinance, we would achieve some symmetry with the Holyrood Parliament, where there is no self-denying ordinance to prevent it discussing reserved matters. We recommended introducing a regular “state of Scotland” debate in another place, an initiative that we may want to consider in this House as well. We also recommended strengthening the existing mechanisms of both Parliaments for working together and communicating with each other, either in respect of the Sewel convention or on other matters.

We proposed that a standing joint liaison committee of the UK Parliament and Scottish Parliament be established to oversee the strengthening of inter-parliamentary relations and consider the establishment of subject-specific and ad hoc joint committees of the two Parliaments. Likewise, we proposed that committees of the United Kingdom and Scottish Parliaments should be able to choose to work together when appropriate and that any barriers should be removed in terms of reciprocal access, sharing information and evidence and holding joint evidence sessions. In recognition of the importance of the joint interaction between both Parliaments and Governments, we felt that both United Kingdom and Scottish Government Ministers should commit to respond positively to requests to appear before committees of the other’s Parliament.

We brought forward a large number of considered recommendations in this section, covering other matters such as the conduct of inter-governmental ministerial meetings and Europe. Importantly, we felt that there should be ongoing UK parliamentary oversight and stewardship of the constitution by way of regular scrutiny of the shape and operation of the devolution settlement.

I raise this part of the Calman commission’s report and its 23 recommendations in this evening’s debate for good reason. The ability of different Governments and Parliaments to work together in a constructive and structured manner is a fundamental dynamic in the management of a series of divided and overlapping responsibilities and powers. The ability to manage and collaborate around the boundaries between reserved, devolved and overlapping interests has a bearing on all the proposals in the Bill.

I welcome the Bill. We need to test in Committee and on Report both its proposals and the concerns that have been expressed today. I would welcome an update from my noble and learned friend the Minister on the progress that is being made with the recommendations in part 4 of the commission’s report, because it has underlying relevance to the Bill and to the whole constitutional relationship between Holyrood and London Governments and Parliaments. I would welcome information also on any other relevant plans or initiatives.