Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Paddick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the rationale behind this amendment which would, as he has acknowledged, fundamentally change the nature of the offence provided for in Clause 6. As the noble Lord pointed out, we return in part to the arguments that he put forward in the first group of amendments. I appreciate the noble Lord’s concerns, but I will set out the reasons why we are seeking to introduce this new possession offence.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made reference at Second Reading to the existing legislation in this area, and I will explain why it is not sufficient to tackle the problem of individuals carrying corrosive substances in public. Under Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, it is already the case that anyone who is in possession of a corrosive substance can be prosecuted for the offence of possession of an offensive weapon. However, for the accused to be guilty of the Section 1 offence, it is necessary to prove that they are carrying the corrosive substance with the intention of causing injury. Such intent can be proved, for example, in cases where an individual has decanted the corrosive substance into a different container for the purposes of making it easier to squirt or throw at another person and also to conceal it from the police. However, the intention of Clause 6 is to strengthen the powers available to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. We want to remove the burden on the police and the prosecution to prove that the person was carrying the corrosive substance with the intention to cause injury.

This approach is not novel; it is consistent with the possession offence for knives and bladed articles. We have modelled the new offence on existing legislation in place for the possession of knives under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. There is also a similar offence in place in Scotland. We have put in place suitable defences for members of the public to prove that they had good reason or lawful authority to be carrying the corrosive substance in a public place. These defences are also modelled on existing legislation for the possession of knives.

I know that noble Lords may be concerned about law-abiding members of the public being stopped by the police as they leave their local supermarket or tradespeople being stopped. However, I reiterate the points that my noble friend made at Second Reading about how we envisage the new offence being used by the police. This is not about the police criminalising tradespeople, children sent on an errand or law-abiding members of the public. We would fully expect the police to use this new offence in response to information or intelligence from the local community that someone was carrying a corrosive substance in public.

Furthermore, as my noble friend also indicated at Second Reading, with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, we have jointly commissioned the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory to develop a testing kit for the police to use to be able to identify corrosive substances in suspect containers. This work is well under way, and we want to have a testing kit in place before commencing the new possession offence.

We need to strengthen the law to tackle the abhorrent use of corrosive substances as weapons. This amendment would effectively leave the criminal law as it currently is. I hope that, in these circumstances, the noble Lord is persuaded of the case for the new offence as currently formulated and would be content on reflection to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I seek clarification, however, on Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, about which the noble Earl said that in order for somebody to be guilty of an offence under that Act, intent had to be proved. However, if the person is in possession of a made offensive weapon—an offensive weapon that has no other purpose than to cause injury: a dagger, for example—then my understanding is that no intent is required. Indeed, if the article that the person has with them is adapted to cause injury—for example, a water pistol filled with a corrosive liquid—again, there is no need to prove intent. That would make the existing offence even stronger than this offence as amended by this amendment.

The noble Earl talks about consistency with Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 regarding bladed and pointed instruments. I accept that the offence as drafted is consistent with that Act, but, in my view, two wrongs do not make a right. The noble Earl and the noble Baroness earlier talked about how the Government envisage that the police will use this legislation. They fully expect the police to use it in response to intelligence. I go back to what I said on the first group: having been an operational police officer for more than 30 years, I do not share the confidence that the Government have about how, in every case, the police are going to use this legislation. This is the source not only of my concern but, as I have said, of the concern of the organisations I mentioned in proposing the amendment.

As far as the testing kit is concerned, that is something that we will return to in a successive group later on. However, having made those points, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Paddick

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 3rd December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, very briefly, I completely agree with my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who has addressed all the amendments in this group other than Amendment 15. I have added my name to Amendment 15 and made clear my reasons for supporting it during our debate on the second group of amendments. I do not wish to add further to my comments.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has argued for the expansion of the Government’s list of indicative reasonable excuses to include peacekeeping and visiting a very seriously ill relative. I understood her not to have spoken to her Amendment 14, which proposed that we include in Clause 4 a power to further add to the list of reasonable excuses by regulations—I hope I was right in understanding that.

The first point I make is to stress again that this is an indicative and not an exhaustive list. I am not suggesting that the amendments from the noble Baroness are without merit, but, in a phrase, we need to draw the line somewhere. I firmly believe that Amendment 11 draws it in the right place. In this regard, we have taken into account the Australian precedent. Trying to put more and more situations beyond doubt—the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton—is simply unnecessary in this context. As I have argued before, we are consciously not creating an exhaustive list of reasonable excuses; it would be quite wrong to try. Juries will be able to make up their own minds on the reasonableness of particular excuses in the light of the circumstances of the case.

I entirely accept the importance of peacebuilding activity, and I am sure noble Lords would agree with me that it is vital that such activity continues. However, as I have explained, the government amendment does not preclude a person advancing this or any other category of reasonable excuse. I am of the view that legitimate peacebuilding activity could very well be a reasonable excuse. However, I must say again that it will ultimately be up to the jury to determine whether a particular excuse is reasonable on the basis of all the evidence.

Much the same arguments apply to Amendment 13, which would add visiting a seriously ill relative to the list of reasonable excuses. I am not sure how fruitful it would be to get into a debate about the difference between being “seriously ill” and “terminally ill”. Again, the line has to be drawn somewhere. Given that the Foreign Office would inevitably advise against any travel to a designated area, it is right that we set the bar at a high level. But I say again that it would be open to any person to advance as a reasonable excuse the fact that he or she was visiting a seriously ill relative.

Amendment 17 seeks to place on the Home Secretary a duty to lay before Parliament an annual report on the outcome of the review of a designation. This amendment misunderstands the nature of the duty on the Home Secretary to keep a designation under review. The requirement does not imply a set piece review with a beginning and an end, culminating in a report which can then be published.

Rather, the ongoing duty to keep a designation under review will ensure that, as the situation on the ground changes, the Government can react and make a judgment, as and when required, as to whether to alter any designation to reflect a change in the threat. However, I reassure the noble Baroness that, should the Government need to amend a designation, that will require a new regulation to be made, which in turn, by virtue of Amendment 20, would require the Secretary of State to issue a statement setting out the reasons why he considers that the legal test for designation is met.

The noble Baroness referred to international humanitarian standards. As she said, there are various commonly recognised international humanitarian standards. The point to appreciate is that the government amendment provides flexibility and future-proofs against developments in this area. She may know, for example, that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides guidance on principles and standards relating to humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. I say to the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, that the concerns he expressed are satisfactorily addressed by government Amendment 11 as well as by the explanations that I have already given for the provisions of Clause 4 in Committee.

Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is in many ways similar to government Amendment 11. There is, however, a key difference, as he carefully explained. This is not an indicative list of reasonable excuses, but an exhaustive list of exclusions from the offence. We have already debated the difference between these two approaches when we considered Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in an earlier group, but it may be helpful to remind ourselves of the issues in play.

I reiterate that under either approach a person returning to the UK from a designated area abroad would not have immunity from investigation and possible prosecution. The police would still need to investigate to determine whether, under one approach, an offence had been committed or, under the other approach, whether the person has a reasonable excuse such that the investigation can be discontinued. It is worth noting that the police have been extremely clear for some time—since well before this new power was introduced—that any person returning from Syria who has travelled there for any reason can expect to be investigated to establish what risk, if any, they may pose. That is simply common sense given the level of risk associated with such areas.

That would likely also be the approach in any future scenario analogous to the Syrian example in which an area might be designated under Clause 4, whether or not an area is in fact designated. While I appreciate that the intention of the noble Lord’s amendment is to provide greater comfort and assurance to legitimate travellers so that humanitarian aid workers, for example, would not have the prospect of police investigation hanging over them, that would not in fact be the result. The only circumstances in which it could be achieved would be if we were to go further still and provide for any person who travels to a designated area simply to declare that they did so for a specified legitimate purpose, thus unilaterally providing themselves with immunity from any investigation or prosecution. However, that would be wide open to abuse by those who travel for terrorist purposes and would render the new power in the offence entirely unusable.

That leads on to my second point. I have explained that the noble Lord’s amendment would make little difference from the perspective of a potential defendant, and I appreciate that that may beg the question why we should not then accept it. That is simply because the Government’s preferred approach in providing for a reasonable excuse defence fits better with the grain of the Terrorism Act 2000. That approach has been in place for 18 years in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which Clause 3 of the Bill amends as well as other provisions in the 2000 Act. As I previously said on the noble Lord’s closely related suggestions for changes to the burden of proof for these offences, which we have already debated today, that approach is well understood by the police, prosecutors and the courts, and clear case law on it is provided by the then Appellate Committee of this House, no less. It has not resulted in judicial concerns, inappropriate prosecutions, upheld appeals or any credible complaints that it has been unfair or inappropriate in its operation. I therefore reiterate that we are not approaching these matters from a neutral starting position. Rather, if we were to adopt the noble Lord’s amendment, we would be choosing to depart from the settled, long-standing position in relation to the Terrorism Act 2000, and I am simply not persuaded that there is any need or good reason to do so.

Furthermore, I am concerned that in unsettling that existing position we could create more uncertainty for defendants and judges in relation to Clause 4, not less, and we could also call into question the currently settled approach that the courts take to Section 58 of the 2000 Act as well as other provisions for similar offences, creating instability and uncertainty in our ability to prosecute serious terrorists. Those strike me as quite undesirable outcomes and risks that we should not run.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked me what would count as proof that an aid worker was employed by a legitimate NGO. The police have been clear that they will investigate any person returning from Syria to establish what risk they may pose. That would likely be the case in relation to any area designated under Clause 4, including investigating whether an offence has been committed under Clause 4. It will be an operational decision for the police as to how they would conduct that investigation and what proof they would seek. It is not possible for me to set out those considerations in advance.

Finally, Amendment 19, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would provide for the sunsetting of any regulations after two years rather than three. He seeks to split the difference between the one year he advocated in Committee and the three years proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Again, this comes down to judgment. There is clearly no absolute right or wrong in this case; it is just that, on balance, the Government consider that three years is the right timeframe. Again, I pray in aid the Australian criminal code and, as I have already indicated, if the situation changes after six months, a year or two years, the Government would inevitably want to review the regulations well before the three-year period was up. The Government agree with the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in Committee that three years is the appropriate period and I hope that other noble Lords are similarly persuaded. I realise that he has shifted his position since Committee, but I hope that on reflection he will feel content to revert to his original view.

I invite the House to agree with the government amendments in this group and I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, not to move his Amendment 15. If he is minded to do so, I invite the House to reject it.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Paddick

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Possibly the answer is for me to write to him after this Committee sitting. My feeling would be that to require someone who was not detained to supply a DNA sample would cross a civil liberties line that many would find uncomfortable. In my judgment, it should therefore be only for those detained—obviously you are detained only for a good reason—to be required to supply such a sample.

[Lord Paddick]

I agree with the Minister on the civil liberties issue. The other problem is that taking a DNA sample would assist in identifying who the individual was only if that person’s DNA had already been taken and was on the database. I do not think we have many Russian spies’ DNA that we would then be able to use to identify that they were hostile actors by taking a DNA sample from them. It is only a small proportion of the UK population who have been arrested and convicted and whose DNA would therefore appear on the database. So, in addition to the infringement of civil liberties of completely innocent people having to provide DNA samples, the proposed measure would be of limited benefit because of the limited nature of the existing DNA database against which the DNA sample could be compared.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Paddick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments seek, in various ways, to raise the threshold for the offence of viewing material over the internet provided for in new Section 58(1)(c) of the Terrorism Act 2000. Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seeks to restore the concept of a pattern of behaviour which was, as he pointed out, inherent in the so-called three clicks version of the offence as originally introduced in the House of Commons. Amendments 12 and 13, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would introduce a requirement to prove not just that the material being accessed is likely to be useful to a terrorist but that it was accessed by the individual with the intention of using it for terrorist purposes.

In responding to Amendment 11, it may assist the Committee if I explain that the intention behind the original three clicks provision was to ensure proportionality, and to provide a safeguard for those who might inadvertently access terrorist material by ensuring that there was a pattern of behaviour in accessing such material. However, we recognised the difficulties underlying that approach, and the uncertainty around how it would be implemented. Having reflected on the concerns that were raised about the three clicks provision, we believe that the reasonable excuse defence is the better way of proceeding. Introducing a pattern of behaviour test would recreate many of the same issues we faced with the three clicks provision. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said on that issue. For example, it would beg questions such as how many viewings were required to constitute a pattern of behaviour and over what period such viewings would need to take place. Indeed, a pattern of behaviour test arguably introduces a greater degree of legal uncertainty than the three clicks test and, for that reason, I respectfully suggest that it is best avoided.

Amendments 12 and 13 would very significantly raise the threshold for the offence, and would alter its fundamental purpose. Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which Clause 3 amends, is a preparatory offence, rather than one aimed at the actual planning or commission of terrorist acts. It has a lower maximum sentence than other offences covering more developed terrorist activity, which can attract up to life imprisonment. I suggest to the noble Baroness that, in that sense, it is not comparable to the offence in Clause 2. The Section 58 offence, as amended by the Bill, is formulated so as to catch people who make a record of, or who view online, information likely to be useful to a terrorist, without requiring them to have actually used that information for a terrorist purpose or to intend to do so. This is in itself harmful behaviour, and such people can pose a very real threat to public safety. I do not agree with the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of the changing of the guard. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, hit the nail on the head again when he spoke about what is reasonable for the authorities to suppose in all the circumstances.

If there is evidence that the individual is preparing or committing an act of terrorism, or is assisting another person to do so, then they would be likely to meet the threshold for a more serious offence, such as Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which covers the preparation of terrorist acts, and for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. As such, a requirement to prove terrorist intent would effectively render unusable the new limb of the Section 58 offence that Clause 3 will insert. This is because the offence would be moved into territory that is already well covered by existing offences and could not be used for its intended purpose so that the police and courts would remain powerless to act against individuals accessing very serious terrorist material online.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has suggested that her amendments are intended in part to address her concern that the offence will inappropriately criminalise those who seek out terrorist information through foolishness, inquisitiveness or curiosity, without intending to do harm. I have sympathy for that concern. The Government have been clear that this offence is aimed at those of a terrorist mindset and we do not wish to cast its net unnecessarily widely. However, I cannot agree with the noble Baroness’s suggestion that this is the best way to address the concern.

For the reasons that I have set out, these amendments would fundamentally undermine the purpose of the offence, and would go much further than I believe is intended in narrowing its application. We consider that the existing “reasonable excuse” approach is a better and more appropriate means of doing so, together with the normal CPS tests of whether there is evidence that would provide a reasonable prospect of conviction, and whether prosecution would be in the public interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. This is particularly so, because the question of whether it is legitimate for someone to intentionally seek out serious and potentially very harmful terrorist material, through foolishness or inquisitiveness, will be very fact-specific and particularly prone to grey areas. It needs to be considered on the basis of all the circumstances and all the evidence in any particular case.

While clearly there will be cases of this type, where prosecution will not be appropriate, it will certainly not be responsible to provide a blanket exemption for any person to access any quantity of terrorist information and be able to rely on such an exemption, whatever the potential harm associated with their activities. I hope, having heard my explanation, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be content to withdraw his amendment, and that the noble Baroness, when it comes to her turn, will be content not to press hers.

[Lord Paddick]

I would like to explain my concerns to the Minister. In order for a police officer to make an arrest, all the police officer will need is a reasonable cause to suspect that the person is committing the offence. Therefore, the “reasonable excuse” defence provided in the Bill does not come into play. I accept that no Crown prosecutor would prosecute something that is clearly an innocent mistake, for example by someone clicking on to information. But my concern is that there is nothing to stop a police officer arresting a person, and the person being detained, until there is detailed consideration about whether this is a grey area, or whether it is reasonable or not.

Can the Minister give me any reassurance, other than what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has said about most police officers being reasonable? The particular offence that I am thinking of, which is no longer on the statute book—Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 —of being a suspected person,

“loitering with intent to commit an indictable offence”,

was routinely abused by the police in order to arrest people who were innocently going about their business. I am concerned that offences like this, which are very widely drawn and rely on a “reasonable excuse” defence, do not protect the innocent person from arrest and detention by the police.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I bring the noble Lord back to the issue that I flagged—that a judgment needs to be made in all the circumstances of the particular case. I turn the question back to the noble Lord. We are dealing with the viewing of material that must have a clear link to terrorism, and must be objectively capable of being useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.

One has also to bear in mind what the existing offence consists of. How does the noble Lord think the proposed new offence differs in its substance or its degree of seriousness from the offence already established in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000? How does accessing this kind of harmful material by way of a streamed video differ from accessing it by way of a download or a book? Have we seen examples over the last 18 years of people being wrongfully hauled to the police station as a result of innocent activity? I am not aware that we have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, although I have some reservations about all of them now that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has spoken. However, I have concerns about Amendment 14, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for the reasons I have expressed in previous groups about having a blanket exemption for journalism and academic research. A terrorist could access information with the intention of committing a terrorist act but could claim that it was for the purposes of journalism or academic research. Surely the acid test should be the intention of that person, not the content of the material.

I have added my name to Amendment 15, in the names of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, although I accept what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with his wisdom and legal background. Obviously the intention of the amendments is to suggest that the law is not clear here about what would amount to a reasonable excuse. Perhaps the mechanism suggested in the amendments is not the right one, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has alluded to, maybe the approach outlined in amendments that we will consider shortly is the right one. However, there is concern about what would amount to a reasonable excuse under this clause.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there have been calls both in your Lordships’ House and in the House of Commons to place on the face of the Bill a definition of legitimate activity that would not be caught by the Section 58 offence as amended or to specify categories of reasonable excuse. The Government’s position on this issue is well rehearsed, including in our response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Noble Lords opposite have clearly been following this debate closely, because Amendment 15 proposes a slightly different approach, and Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, follows a similar path.

Rather than seek to write exemptions or examples of reasonable excuses into the Bill, as Amendment 14 seeks to do, Amendments 15 and 16 instead seek to place a requirement on the Government to publish guidance on the same matters. I commend noble Lords for their constructive approach in seeking alternative solutions, and I hope that they will find my response to their suggestions similarly constructive, even if I am not able to support these amendments.

The Government’s starting point on this issue is that Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 already contains a well-established safeguard, in the form of a reasonable excuse defence, for those with a legitimate reason to access terrorist material. As a result of Section 118 of the 2000 Act, if a person raises this defence, the court must assume that it is satisfied unless the prosecution can disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. We will debate the operation of Section 118 when we come to Amendment 18 in a later group.

Where a person has a reasonable excuse, a prosecution should not in fact commence, because the case would not pass the Crown Prosecution Service threshold tests of being in the public interest and of there being a realistic prospect of conviction. This safeguard has operated successfully in relation to Section 58 since that offence was first created in 2000, and it reflects the approach taken across the criminal law, where many other offences with a similar defence also do not list specific categories of reasonable excuse. As such, it is well understood by the police, the CPS and the courts. It will continue to apply equally to the offence as amended by Clause 3, and it will not be narrowed or reduced in any way.

This is an important safeguard, and I understand the intention of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness in seeking to put its effect even further beyond doubt, whether through the amendment of Clause 3 or through guidance to be published under it. However, it is my view that, whichever route is taken, it is simply not necessary. Furthermore, such an approach could in fact have the unintended and unhelpful consequence of unsettling the current position, and of reducing rather than increasing clarity. I hope the Committee will indulge me while I explain why this could be the case.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Paddick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 26 and 27 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. The rigour that these amendments bring is similar to that in the amendments that the noble Lord will attempt to introduce when we get to proscribed organisations. It seems something that he feels, from his experience as a former reviewer of terrorism legislation, is very much lacking.

Amendment 29 appears to be perhaps a way of getting round the problem of there being intelligence that cannot be put into the public domain around decisions made in connection with this clause, in that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has the necessary clearance to review that evidence. Perhaps the noble Earl could comment on that.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, Amendments 26 and 27 would add to the existing requirement in the Bill that the Secretary of State keep under review any designation made under Clause 4 and revoke it if the legal test for designation is no longer met in respect of it. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, explained, they would specify that such reviews must take place on an annual basis and would prescribe the options open to the Secretary of State when conducting such a review, as well as requiring the outcome of the review to be published.

I should start by saying that I am in full agreement with the principle that any designation under Clause 4 should not be indefinite, that it should be kept under review and that it should be revoked as soon as it is no longer necessary.

In saying that, perhaps I can take the opportunity to correct something stated by my noble friend Lady Williams when she said earlier that the list of proscribed organisations is subject to regular review. This was an inadvertent slip by my noble friend, for which, on her behalf, I apologise. I understand that she has already approached noble Lords privately to make that correction, but I do so on the record.

Where I depart from the noble Lord’s views, much as I respect them, is that I believe the current drafting of the Bill is the most effective way of delivering the objective. In particular, I cannot agree that a rigid requirement for an annual review is needed or is appropriate. I say that, first, because the type of situation in which this power is expected to be used may be fluid and rapidly evolving, but it may equally be one where there is an obvious and enduring threat. In the former case, an agile review, more frequent than once a year, may be appropriate—I accept that the amendment would not preclude this. In the latter case, an annual review may simply be unnecessary, and may be a poor use of the time and resources of those in government and the security and intelligence agencies tasked with protecting us from the terrorist threat.

I note in this regard that the Australian legislation sunsets a designation after three years, but with the option of an area being redesignated. If we were to go down this road—as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seeks to do with his Amendment 28—three years strikes me as more appropriate in this context compared with the annual review provided for in these amendments. Once again I have in mind the Syrian example, where the nature and extent of the threat, and the involvement and intent of UK nationals and residents, is self-evident and has indeed been proactively publicised by its protagonists over an extended period of time.

However, secondly, I say this because, regardless of its frequency, a formal review process at a fixed point is not likely to be appropriate. In all cases where the level of terrorist threat is so high that it is appropriate to designate an area under Clause 4, as your Lordships would expect, the Government and the security and intelligence agencies will keep the situation in that area under extremely close and continuous review.

This will be a comprehensive ongoing assessment across the full spectrum of government. It will involve consideration and ongoing review of every aspect of the Government’s response to the situation, including their use of legal powers and any designation under Clause 4. In reality, this is a closer and more effective consideration than that envisaged by the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. It will enable the Government readily to identify if the situation on the ground has changed such that the legal test for designating the area is no longer met, and to take prompt action should this be the case.

I remain to be persuaded that the more elaborate annual process provided for in these amendments would serve the public interest, or would be an effective use of resources, or would lead to any more rigorous or effective a review of whether a designation remains necessary. As I have indicated, I can see more merit in a backstop three-year sunset clause with the option of redesignation. I am ready to consider this option further ahead of Report.

Amendment 29 would require that before a Motion to Approve any designation regulations may be tabled, the regulations must have been reviewed by the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the committee must have laid before both Houses a report providing a recommendation on whether the regulations should be approved.

I recognise and appreciate the constructive spirit in which this amendment is intended and I am happy to make clear that I share the view that Parliament should have as well informed a debate as possible on any regulations made under this power. However, I am not persuaded that involving the Intelligence and Security Committee in this way is the right approach or would be an appropriate extension of the committee’s role, which is what it would amount to. The Intelligence and Security Committee has a specific statutory remit under Section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, which focuses on the administration and operation of the intelligence agencies. This is extended to certain aspects of the Government’s activities in relation to intelligence or security matters by means of a memorandum of understanding agreed under Section 2(2) of the 2013 Act.

Section 2(3) of the 2013 Act specifically excludes from the committee’s remit any matter that is,

“part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”.

This clearly and intentionally establishes the committee’s role as one of retrospective oversight and review—not one of real-time authorisation, approval or review of operational decisions or the use of powers.

This reflects the long-standing principle that national security and the exercise of executive powers in this area is a matter for the Government of the day. There should of course be effective and robust oversight of decisions the Government have made—including, where appropriate, by the Intelligence and Security Committee and, in the case of this power, through debates in Parliament on any regulations designating an area, as well as by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. However, that is of a very different nature from the role proposed for the Intelligence and Security Committee in this amendment, which would be a significant extension of the committee’s role. I do not know if it is one that the committee would necessarily welcome, and it is not one that the Government consider appropriate.

Setting aside more fundamental questions of principle, I can see the amendment also giving rise to difficult practical issues—for example, around the speed with which the committee would need to prepare reports given the need for regulations to be approved within 40 sitting days; and around the extent of redactions that might be needed in such reports to protect sensitive intelligence, which might have informed the committee’s considerations but which could not be shared more widely to inform the consideration by Parliament.

I am, however, happy to give a clear assurance that the Government will always provide Parliament with as much information as possible about the reasons why any designation under Clause 4 is necessary. This will, of course, be constrained to some extent by the need to protect sensitive intelligence which cannot be revealed in public. However we recognise that this does not mean that Parliament will simply take on trust that a designation is necessary. We will always need to make a clear case for it.

I hope these arguments have reassured noble Lords that the current drafting of the Bill will deliver the outcomes they seek. I hope too that the Committee will take comfort from the fact that we will consider further Amendment 28. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to withdraw his amendment.

Terrorist Attacks

Debate between Earl Howe and Lord Paddick

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and associate these Benches with the Home Secretary’s sentiments concerning those affected by the terrorist outrages. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just reiterated, there is no doubt that the blame for the suffering that was inflicted remains with those who carried out these criminal acts and those who supported them. As far as I am concerned, we have the best intelligence and policing services in the world.

It is important to explain what a “dramatic upshift” in terrorist threats actually means. Having been briefed by those at the highest level, my understanding is that the number of people being influenced by extremist propaganda, particularly online, who are then tempted to conduct unsophisticated attacks such as those at Westminster, London Bridge and Finsbury Park, is increasing. Can the Minister confirm that it is the volume rather than the degree of sophistication, the amount of strategic planning or the co-ordination that is seeing a “dramatic upshift” in the threat?

In the case of the Westminster, Manchester and Finsbury Park attacks, which were apparently carried out by so-called “lone wolf” attackers, can the Minister explain how end-to-end encryption mentioned by the Home Secretary would have made any difference to the likelihood of those attacks being prevented? Bearing in mind that in all these attacks, except the London Bridge attack, none of the murderers was under active investigation, how would their communications have been monitored, whether end-to-end encrypted or not? In the case of the one attacker who was an active subject of interest, can the Minister confirm that the investigative means that were deployed against him could have overcome end-to-end encryption? Is it not the fact that end-to-end encryption is a global issue that cannot be banned, and that we should be focused on what we can do something about, rather than on what we can do nothing about?

Can the noble Earl confirm that David Anderson agrees with MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing’s conclusion that they could not,

“find any key moments where different decisions would have made it likely that they could have stopped any of the attacks”?

The Home Secretary reflects David Anderson’s conclusion that intelligence is imperfect and investigators are making tough judgments based on incomplete information, and she promises to deliver the resources Counter Terrorism Policing needs to deal with the threats we face. Does the Minister agree that a vital part of the intelligence picture is provided by community policing, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, alluded? The day after the London Bridge attack, a neighbour of one of the attackers told journalists how he thought that the man was being overfriendly and was asking about hiring a van without using a credit card on the day of the attack. Despite, as the Home Secretary said, a “number of” investigative means being deployed against him, this intelligence, which might have been discovered by a community policing team to whom the neighbour may have had links, did not surface until afterwards.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, among many others, have warned about the erosion of police resources and the demise of community policing. Despite assurances from Ministers to the contrary, the facts are that police budgets continue to fall in real terms. For example, the Metropolitan Police has already had to make savings of £600 million, with £400 million of cuts in the pipeline. Does the Minister agree that effective community policing is as important, if not more important, against the current unsophisticated threat, as Counter Terrorism Policing, and that community policing must also have the resources needed to deal with these threats?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for the very appropriate sentiments that they have expressed in relation to these terrible attacks. They asked about police numbers and the police budget. Overall police numbers is a big subject and it is probably appropriate that I write to them as comprehensively as I can with the details of the approach that the Home Office is taking.

As regards counterterrorism policing in particular, however—that is surely our focus for these purposes—we will, as the Statement made clear, shortly announce the budgets for policing for 2018-19. Ministers are absolutely clear that we must ensure that counterterrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threats that we face. We agreed £24 million of additional funding for CT policing this year, following the recent attacks and the move to “critical”. We will continue our regular dialogue with the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and wider policing to understand demand in relation to the increasing complex threat that we face from terrorism.

It is, however, worth reflecting that, when it comes to policing in the community, it should be incumbent on all of us—communities as a whole—to play our part in being vigilant. We have, through various means, encouraged communities to report on suspicious activity. To defeat terrorism, CT policing launched the national awareness campaign, Make Nothing Happen. The campaign urges the public to act on their instincts and report suspicious activity, including all types of extremist behaviour, to the police.

I was asked by both noble Lords about the words used by David Anderson in relation to the Manchester attack, when he said that MI5 and counter-terrorism policing got a good deal right and,

“could have succeeded had the cards fallen differently”.

MI5 and the police conclude in their reviews that a successful pre-emption of the plot would have been unlikely had an investigation been open on the basis of the available intelligence. Ministers have probed this issue carefully both with David Anderson and with MI5 and the police, and having done that, we believe that the decisions made by MI5 and the police were entirely reasonable. However, while the scope of the inquests relating to the Manchester attack has not been set, I expect that the coroner will want to consider whether the state could have prevented the deaths. In any event, it is vital that we learn the lessons from these attacks. There are, as I have mentioned, 126 recommendations arising from the reviews, and we will be working with MI5 and the police to ensure that they are implemented.

I was asked about border controls. Of course, that is a very relevant topic when we consider the number of individuals who have travelled to Syria and parts of Iraq during the recent conflicts there. The flow has reduced considerably in recent months. Approximately 850 UK-linked people of national security concern have travelled to engage with the Syrian conflict. We estimate that just under half of these will return to the UK and more than 15% have been subsequently killed while fighting in the region. Everyone who returns from taking part in the conflict in Syria or Iraq must expect to be investigated by the police to determine whether they have committed criminal offences and to ensure that they do not pose a threat to our national security. Where there is evidence that criminal offences have been committed, those responsible should expect to be prosecuted under the full weight of the law.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether the intensification of the threat was a reflection of the volume of cases that the security services and the police are dealing with. Broadly, the answer to that is yes. Much of the radicalisation that we are concerned about is, of course, radicalisation online. The internet must not be used as a safe space for terrorists or for those who mean us harm. The noble Lord will know that the Government were at the forefront of encouraging Facebook, Microsoft, YouTube and Twitter to jointly launch the global internet forum to counter terrorism this year. Collectively, the launch of the forum and the development of the hash-sharing database is welcome progress, with 40,000 hashes so far. On an individual basis, since the Prime Minister led an event at the UNGA on preventing terrorist use of the internet, we have seen the companies be more public with their efforts, which is welcome. Recently, YouTube stated that 83% of its extremist videos had been taken down after being identified automatically, and Facebook stated that 99% of removed terrorist content is automatically detected, and 83% of original and uploaded copies are removed within one hour of upload.

On end-to-end encryption, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about, encryption of that kind undoubtedly makes the job of MI5 and policing harder—there is no getting away from that. As I am sure he will understand, there is a limit to what I can say about these particular cases and the part that end-to-end encryption played in them. For example, there is a potential prosecution relating to the Manchester attack, which none of us would want to compromise. However, the noble Lord is right that end-to-end encryption cannot be banned. His part in the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act, which I am sure we both remember with a good deal of pleasure, will remind him that we had long debates on this subject during which it was made clear that end-to-end encryption was something that the security services and the police had to live with.