Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Duncan Hames Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I will do my best to comply with that, Madam Deputy Speaker—[Laughter.] Sorry, I meant to say that I will indeed definitely comply with that.

This is a difficult issue for those who, like me, have massive concerns about civil liberties and privacy. It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). We do not always agree on these issues, but I care passionately about the abuse of surveillance that has taken place, and seeing the state have more control. I expressed that view when we got rid of the draft Communications Data Bill in calling for our only debate to consider the post-Snowden situation, and in the digital Bill of rights that my party passed. There is much we need to do, and I have called for many years for reform of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and of other legislation such as the Telecommunications Act 1984, which has some really amazing powers in section 94. I therefore start off instinctively concerned about anything proposed in this way.

Communications data and lawful intercept are very important, although we need improvements in how they are dealt with—for example, communications data should be collected for a much shorter time. We could have a system of retention for a short period followed by preservation orders to address many of the concerns raised. Accessibility should be limited; there is definitely too much access with 500,000 requests a year. I believe we should have judicial warrants for lawful intercept, as that is a much better way to proceed. We can improve those measures, but we need them because it is clear that we face a problem now.

I raised this issue on 8 April when the Home Secretary appeared before the Home Affairs Committee on the day of the European judgment. I pressed her on the matter and she insisted that the regulations were still valid. I understand why she feels she has to say this, but I do not think it is correct. I think the Home Office is continuing on a hope and a prayer, and at some point that will end, and that is the emergency that persuades me. I am also very aware of the circumstances around the lawful intercept drop-off. That is true and I have spoken to many people, so I do not entirely trust the Home Office when it says there is a problem in some areas. I think the Home Office is largely to blame because of the way it has conducted itself in its interactions with other companies. When we considered the draft Communications Data Bill, we expressed concern that the way the Home Office misportrayed what companies were saying might drive some of them overseas, and we have seen that.

On new powers, the data retention regulations are as before but with more constraints; the Bill is slightly less powerful than what it gets rid of. Is lawful intercept a new power? We have had interesting discussions about whether we knew it was applicable overseas, and when we considered the draft Communications Data Bill we published a report that highlighted the fact that it appeared to impose no limits on the telecommunications operators to whom it applied. We heard from different companies about how they complied with the requests they receive. That should not be a surprise given that two years ago we published a report on that. I know that other hon. Members have been here longer. We knew this measure was there; it is not a new power.

What is not allowed is what was in the snoopers charter—the draft Communications Data Bill. We will not allow website logs; that is clearly not allowed by anything in that provision. There is nothing in the Bill that would allow domestic companies to be forced to collect information on third-party overseas companies, which was in the Communications Data Bill. Such things are not allowed and will continue not to be allowed.

There are safeguards, and if it were not for those there is no way I would support the Bill. I have called for these safeguards for many years. The Liberal Democrats made them a condition of acceptance of the Bill, and I am pleased that we have secured them. There is a sunset clause with no possible extension, and the RIPA review, which we desperately need.

[Duncan Hames (Chippenham) (LD)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, contrary to remarks from those on the Opposition Front Bench, it is not only the passage of time and the advance of technology that has discredited RIPA?

[Dr Huppert]

My hon. Friend is partly right. RIPA was an improvement on no regulations, but it gave far too much power to far too many people, and we needed to fix that situation much earlier. The approach taken by the previous Government to try to collect more and more powers with the interception modernisation programme and so forth is not the right way to go.

We have a number of safeguards. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board that I and other hon. Friends have been mentioning for a while is an important safeguard and will be written into law. We are reducing by hundreds the number of bodies that are able to get direct access to data. Councils used to be able to get direct access to communications data to find out whether somebody was applying to the right school for their child. That is no more. This Government are ensuring not only that councils cannot get direct access, but that they also have to get a magistrate’s say-so. We have annual transparency reports—a key requirement—and the trimming of powers for access to communications data. A huge amount in the Bill provides safeguards and we are in a better place as a result, although we are not in a perfect place. I would like to see a much more substantial rewrite of RIPA, with many more limitations and a new approach. That is what I hope we will get from the RIPA review. We would certainly want any improvements that could be implemented to be implemented.

People often talk about the trade-off between security and privacy or civil liberties. I do not think it is a trade-off; I think we can have more of both at the same time. The Bill preserves the security we currently have, which is a good thing, and, because of the safeguards and the changes, it actually supports privacy and is a pro-civil liberties measure. The Guardian highlighted the fact that the Bill could

“prove a major opportunity to bring the relentless rise of the surveillance state under democratic control.”

The Independent said that:

“the law may in fact, in a few years, benefit the civil libertarian cause.”

Having seen sustained assaults over many years on this issue, I support that and hope we can achieve a better balance.