Syria

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Wednesday 6th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it this morning.

This month marks the second anniversary of the start of this brutal conflict. As the Foreign Secretary rightly pointed out to the House, two years on, the death toll is now estimated at some 70,000 and is rising by the day. Only today the United Nations announced that the number of Syrian refugees had now reached 1 million. Half are children. More than 400,000 have become refugees since 1 January 2013 alone. More than 7,000 are now reported to be fleeing every day. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees today declared:

“Syria is spiralling towards full-scale disaster”.

As the number of casualties rises, frustrations too have been growing. That has understandably led to renewed calls for the international community to do more. The primary responsibility for the crisis rests with Assad and his regime, but does the Foreign Secretary accept that the deteriorating situation in Syria also represents an abject failure by the international community and that it shares a collective responsibility for that failure? It is right that efforts must now intensify, but the key issue is the breadth of those efforts, how they are channelled and how likely they are to deliver results.

There are some vital areas where the international community must better co-ordinate and target its efforts. First, on international diplomatic efforts, the stalemate at the United Nations Security Council is more than just frustrating: it is deplorable. The case must be made to Russia and China that supporting or aiding Assad not only harms Syria but harms their own interests, and indeed their standing in the wider region. Will the Foreign Secretary set out what representations he will make to Foreign Minister Lavrov when he is in London next week on this issue and the prospects of a change of position in the Security Council?

Secondly, 11 separate rounds of sanctions against Syria have already been agreed. The issue at present is not necessarily new sanctions, but effective enforcement of existing ones. Given the Foreign Secretary’s recent visit to Lebanon, does he agree that more must be done to ensure that countries fully comply with the existing sanctions to which they have already signed up?

Thirdly, on international accountability, the responsibility for the crisis primarily rests with the Assad regime, as I have made clear, and the perpetrators must ultimately be held to account. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that efforts to collect and publish the names of Syrian army officers ordering the ongoing atrocities are vital? Such efforts could serve as a clear signal of intent that those officers will face the full force of international justice for their crimes—and of course that includes the use of chemical weapons.

Fourthly, on the issue of peace talks, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, the leader of the Syrian National Coalition, last month reportedly offered to engage in talks on a political settlement without demanding Assad’s resignation. In an interview last week, Assad claimed that he was

“ready to negotiate with anyone, including militants who surrender their arms.”

Neither of those offers has yet been accepted, nor can we make a judgment as to the spirit in which they were intended, but will the Foreign Secretary offer his assessment of whether they constitute even a slight narrowing of the gap between the Syrian authorities and opposition forces?

Finally, let me turn to the central issue of the UK’s support for the Syrian opposition and the announcements in today’s statements. It is right that the UK is at the forefront of co-ordinating international efforts to deliver aid to those most in need, both within and beyond the Syrian borders, and I welcome recent announcements to that effect. Beyond humanitarian assistance, when it comes to our support for the Syrian opposition forces, it is vital that all our support must continue to be targeted and accountable if it is to be effective.

The Foreign Secretary has today said that the Government will move towards

“more active efforts to prevent the loss of life in Syria.”

It is right that the international community must increase its efforts, but it is vital that the parameters of those efforts are clearly set out, defined and understood. Indeed, on this issue, the Foreign Secretary’s statement at times raised more questions than answers as to the real direction he is suggesting for British Government policy.

The Foreign Secretary has today spoken of the amendments to the EU arms embargo. I welcome the fact that those changes were collectively agreed at the EU Foreign Affairs Council. Those amendments were focused on ensuring that the right to non-lethal equipment and technical assistance could be delivered to opposition forces, but the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the right hon. Member for East Devon (Mr Swire), seemed to add confusion to an already complex issue when he told the House on Monday that this

“is not about lifting any arms embargo.”

However, he also said that the recent amendments to the existing EU arms embargo were about

“ensuring that all options are on the table and that EU countries have maximum flexibility to provide the opposition with all necessary assistance to protect civilians.”—[Official Report, 4 March 2013; Vol. 559, c. 674-76.]

Given those statements, it is understandable that there is some confusion over the Government’s position that requires further clarification. Will the Foreign Secretary say more about the next steps that he mentioned in his statement? Will he confirm whether the Government will push for an EU arms embargo to be lifted? Will he also set out what, if any, further amendments to the embargo he will call for?

The Foreign Secretary has recently admitted that, when it comes to lifting the arms embargo, the risk of arms falling into the wrong hands is

“one of the reasons we don’t do it now.”

We agree that that risk is, indeed, very serious, so will he set out what would have to change on the ground in Syria for him to change his view on the relative risks involved in such a strategy? Does he accept the reality that today’s Syria is replete with arms, and does he also accept the great difficulties involved in guaranteeing the end use of weapons, given the lack of clarity today about the identity, intent and, indeed, tactics of some of the rebel forces? Does he accept that it is perfectly possible that, if Europe or, indeed, the west more generally, were to decide to arm the rebels, Russia or, indeed, Iran, which he referenced in his remarks, would simply increase its provision of arms to the Assad regime? Rather than pushing for the EU arms embargo to be relaxed, amended or lifted altogether, may I urge the Foreign Secretary to direct his efforts towards getting the Russians and Chinese to agree to impose a UN-mandated arms embargo? This would undeniably be the most effective way of cutting off a key lifeline to the Assad regime that it is currently relying on.

Curiously, having previously mentioned the fact that al-Qaeda is known to be operating in Syria, the Foreign Secretary was silent on that issue in his remarks today. In the light of potentially increased UK support for the opposition forces, will he set out the British Government’s assessment of the present level of activity by al-Qaeda and related jihadist groups in Syria?

The Foreign Secretary spoke about the Syrian National Coalition, but is he able to give any assurances about the degree of authority and control exercised by the SNC over the wide range of opposition forces operating on the ground?

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I am mildly alarmed by my sight of a further full page of text in front of the right hon. Gentleman, but I know he will put my mind at rest when he tells me that, in fact, it relates to something entirely different and he does not intend to deal with it.

[Mr Alexander]

One of my missions is to always seek to put your mind at rest, Mr Speaker, so I will endeavour to keep my remarks as short as possible. In my own defence, I would simply say that, by way of introduction, I indicated that the Foreign Secretary’s statement prompted more questions than it answered. I am, however, mindful of your view, Mr Speaker, so I will conclude shortly.

I understand that the frustrations of Government Members are growing, but a strategy born of frustration is less likely to deliver than one based on clear thinking and strategic insight. Surely the priority now for Britain should be to work to unify the Syrian opposition, not to arm it. The continuing loss of life underlines the fact that Syria needs to see a de-escalation and a political resolution. Although the Government have our support for their actions to provide the humanitarian and non-lethal assistance to Syria announced today, it is far from clear that taking steps to intensify this conflict in the months ahead would do anything to reduce the present level of violence being suffered by the Syrian people.

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman correctly draws attention, as I have done, to the extent of the human suffering. The fact that the United Nations has launched the largest ever financial appeal for humanitarian assistance underlines the catastrophic scale of that suffering. We must all remember that that is the background to the situation and to deciding what we have to do.

The right hon. Gentleman made some recommendations towards the end of his remarks, some of which we have done, including work to unify the Syrian opposition, which, of course, is what we did for many months. They have been unified, to the extent that it can be practically achieved, in the Syrian National Coalition and we have recognised that group as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. I do not suppose that any opposition or political grouping will be perfect in the eyes of this or any other country, but I do not believe that there will be a better attempt or greater success at unifying the Syrian opposition than the national coalition.

It would be wonderful if some of the right hon. Gentleman’s other recommendations could be achieved, including Russian and Chinese agreement to impose an arms embargo by the whole world on Syria. We would, of course, support that—we will go over this ground in our meetings with the Russians this afternoon and next week—but I have not seen any prospect of Russia agreeing to such an arms embargo. It is a good thing to wish for, but in practical, diplomatic terms there is no possibility at the moment of it being achieved. That is the background to the decisions that we have to make. Many things would be far preferable, such as an immediate agreement on a negotiated political transition in Syria.

The right hon. Gentleman asked, rightly, how seriously we should take the offers to negotiate. Having talked to President al-Khatib of the national coalition last week, I believe not only that his offer is sincere but that he would love it to be taken up and that he really would negotiate with members of the regime without prior insistence on the departure of Assad. However, President Assad’s insistence during his weekend interview that the regime is ready to negotiate is something that we have heard for two years but that has never turned into actual substance. Of course, we will discuss with Mr Brahimi again this afternoon whether those statements can be used to bring both sides closer together. It is part of his job to try to do that. The evidence of the past two years, however, is that, in current circumstances, offers to negotiate by the regime are not sincere, are not followed up and do not lead to the sort of progress that we all want to see.

It is against that background of diplomatic deadlock and political stalemate while tens of thousands die that I argue that we have to do what we can in a very cautious, considered and clearly thought-out way to try to change that situation and to save human lives as best we can, working at all times with our partners and allies, including those in the Arab world. There is a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League today.

We will continue to use every diplomatic effort, but the situation that the right hon. Gentleman and I are describing cannot remain static. He is quite right to say that the international community has been an abject failure collectively. The United Nations Security Council has not shouldered its responsibilities. We have tried many times to put that right, but our resolutions have been vetoed. We have been working in the last month since Mr Brahimi’s last briefing to the Security Council to find a new common way forward for the council—we will discuss that again with the Russians in the coming hours—but that common ground has not emerged in a month of discussions behind the scenes in New York.

Given that situation, we all have to ask ourselves whether we are going to hold our policy completely static or show that we are prepared to change as the situation deteriorates—reluctantly perhaps, and cautiously at all times. I argue that we must be prepared to show an increased level of support for the opposition, and that it has to take a practical form if we are to exert any pressure on the regime—and, indeed, on Russia as well—to successfully negotiate on this matter. The parameters have, I hope, been clearly set out in my statement. They are clearly set out in the amendment to the United Nations arms embargo. It is amended, not lifted. The arms embargo remains in place; these are specific exemptions for non-lethal military equipment and for technical assistance for the protection of civilians. I have just given examples of what that means in practice.

As for the future, the EU sanctions have now been rolled over, with that amendment, for three months. There will therefore be a further discussion in May about the renewal of such sanctions, and the Government—and every Member of this House—will be able to form their views on what we should do, in whatever situation we have arrived at in May, about further amendments to the embargo, if they are necessary. I think the parameters are clear. The policy is clear, and above all I want to make it clear that its direction is clear: we must be prepared to do more in a situation of such slaughter and suffering, and a more static policy would not measure up to the gravity of the situation.