Iran

Douglas Alexander Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

May I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for advance sight of it? He was generous to end his remarks by recognising the reality of the bipartisan approach that has been characteristic of this House and, indeed, this country to these issues over recent years, including the approach of my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) when he was Foreign Secretary. Let me echo that and add that all those involved in the Geneva negotiations, including the Foreign Secretary and Foreign Office officials, deserve real credit for their role in helping secure this deal.

In particular, the work of the European Union High Representative, Baroness Cathy Ashton, has been fundamental. Indeed, as the Foreign Secretary acknowledged in his statement—a little late, I would argue—she was “indispensable” to ensuring that agreement was finally reached. We on this side of the House feel a particular pride in the role that Baroness Ashton has played and the determination, skill and diplomatic perseverance she has shown, and we offer her our sincere congratulations.

The international community stands united in believing that if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon, that would make the world less safe, so the deal agreed in Geneva was a necessary and important first step. Iran has, of course, over recent years proceeded apace with its enrichment programme despite repeated calls by the international community for it to stop.

This is not a perfect deal, nor is it guaranteed to lead to a comprehensive resolution, but, based on the Foreign Secretary’s statement, it appears to address a number of central concerns. First, it caps every aspect of Iran’s nuclear programme. Secondly, it includes strong verification mechanisms and measures. Thirdly, its text does not concede that Iran has an inalienable right to enrich. I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary about each of those three points.

The Foreign Secretary will be aware that the agreement does not call for the dismantlement of the Fordow plant, so will he set out what steps are envisaged to help ensure that that deeply buried facility will ultimately be decommissioned?

The Foreign Secretary referred to the heavy water research reactor at Arak. Although the deal specifies daily access for the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to Natanz and Fordow, it does not set out the frequency with which inspectors will have access to Arak, so will the Foreign Secretary give us further details of how they will gain access?

The Foreign Secretary did not mention Parchin in his statement, and neither did the final text of the agreement agreed yesterday, so will he now clarify whether the deal requires Iran to grant IAEA inspectors access to the Parchin military base, where Iran is suspected of carrying out tests related to the detonating of a nuclear weapon?

There has been much speculation over the past 24 hours about the absence from the final agreement of the phrase “right to enrich”. Will the Foreign Secretary set out the British Government’s understanding of whether that absence reflects a continuing point of difference between the P5 plus 1 and Iran, or whether the omission reflects a shared understanding on the issue?

Although an interim deal seeks to prevent Iran from developing its enrichment programme while talks are ongoing, it could also ease the pressure on Iran and, in fact, undermine the urgency with which a comprehensive resolution may be sought. Given that risk, will the Foreign Secretary set out how he intends to prevent that outcome and what steps he will take with others to continue negotiations on a comprehensive deal within the time frame that has been set out?

The announcement of $7 billion of sanctions relief, effective immediately, will be seen as a necessary step to secure the concessions agreed by Iran as part of the interim deal, but pressure must still be maintained. Will the Foreign Secretary offer the House assurances that the net effect of that sanctions relief will not exceed the projected amount?

As of yesterday, Iran’s so-called critical capability will be extended. That, of course, is welcomed by everyone in this House, but while the interim agreement sets Iran back, it does not prevent future progress. It would, of course, be far better to secure the end of all enrichment and to see the dismantling of all relevant facilities.

One key test of the interim agreement will be whether what has now been agreed in principle can be implemented in practice. That means keeping sanctions tight, verification intrusive and all options on the table. A second key test will be whether the interim agreement can, in the months ahead, be translated into a comprehensive agreement. That means building on this weekend’s agreement through urgent and sustained negotiations on a final resolution.

The interim agreement reached over the weekend will give us the time and flexibility to negotiate the much more difficult and complex final agreement to dismantle much of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Government can be assured that they will have our support in pursuit of that objective in the weeks and months ahead.

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman the shadow Foreign Secretary for his clear support. There has indeed been a bipartisan approach for a long time, and it is clearly continuing in relation to this agreement.

The right hon. Gentleman is quite right to say, as he did at the end of his remarks, that it is very important to keep sanctions tight and verification intrusive to maintain the confidence and the pressure needed to reach a comprehensive agreement. He is also right that no such agreement can be perfect—it is the product of negotiations and compromise—or guaranteed to lead to a comprehensive agreement, but in my judgment it is the only route to a comprehensive agreement.

Some have made the criticism that we should have concentrated on moving straight to a final and comprehensive agreement, but from everything that I have seen, I know that that would not have been possible, and while we negotiated such a comprehensive agreement, the progress of the Iranian programme, which has now been brought to a stop in many ways, would have continued. This is therefore a crucial step on the way to a comprehensive agreement and makes it possible to set about negotiating one.

The right hon. Gentleman asked some specific questions. He asked about how the agreement relates to the plant at Fordow. The agreement specifically refers to that:

“Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant…, Fordow…or the Arak reactor”.

Footnote 2 on the second page of the agreement states in relation to Fordow that there should be

“no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium”,

and no feeding of uranium hexafluoride into the other 12 cascades and so on. There are therefore specific requirements on that plant. As for each of the plants, its longer-term future, including whether it operates at all, will be up to the final and comprehensive agreement and must be addressed at that stage.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about inspections at Parchin. That remains a point of difference between the IAEA and Iran, including in their latest talks, and it is another aspect of the Iranian programme that must be addressed as part of a comprehensive and final settlement.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the urgency. On that, it is important to put the $7 billion of sanctions relief into perspective, because he referred to it as being effective immediately. The $7 billion of sanctions relief is actually available to Iran over the six-month period once that period has begun, which we hope will be by the end of January. A good deal of the $7 billion involves the unfreezing of assets, so those assets will be unfrozen in stages. Iran will not therefore receive $7 billion on the first day, and then decide whether to implement its side of the agreement.

It is also important to see that $7 billion in perspective. In January, Iran’s Oil Minister acknowledged that the fall in oil exports as a result of sanctions was costing Iran between $4 billion and $8 billion every month. Reports suggest that Iran currently has between $60 billion and $100 billion of assets frozen overseas that it cannot access. The $7 billion of relief is therefore a very small proportion of the total frozen assets and of the total effect of sanctions applied to Iran.

That is why I have said that how we apply sanctions relief leaves Iran with a huge incentive, since it wants wider relief from sanctions, to negotiate a comprehensive and final settlement. That will help to maintain the urgency, but of course all our diplomatic activity—seeking to maintain the momentum behind the agreement, and to ensure that it is implemented and that we can go on to negotiate a comprehensive settlement—will also convey that urgency. The right hon. Gentleman can be assured that we will leave no stone unturned to try to bring that about.