(2 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman. What he said about securing Northern Ireland’s place within the constitutional and economic integrity of the UK is absolutely vital. The Prime Minister has been very clear on that, as has the Foreign Secretary. Of course, the Chancellor will say more tomorrow on the economic measures and, in particular, on the fiscal measures that the right hon. Gentleman referred to.
I totally agree that we need to strain every sinew to stop this appalling trade in misery. There is no silver bullet, although I think the agreement the Home Secretary made with her French opposite number will help, and we are embedding UK officials with their French counterparts for the first time. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) is right to say that the Bill of Rights can also help, not least in preventing interim orders from the Strasbourg Court from being recognised in UK courts. On ID cards, we already have e-visas for people coming to visit and live in the UK, and they act as digital evidence of a person’s immigration status. What is clear, however, is that we will have to do all these things in the teeth of opposition from Labour Front Benchers.
(3 years ago)
Commons ChamberI think the hon. Gentleman must have read the papers a little bit quicker than I did. It is not just Conservative politicians. Indeed, former members of the judiciary make the case for reform very powerfully, and there is of course the Labour architect of the Human Rights Act in Jack Straw, who has made the case for reform. But the real truth is that the calls for reform and a bit more common sense in the system have come from our voters—the public—and he would do well to remember that.
I am a member of the Council of Europe, which I think has lost its way. It lets Russia literally get away with murder but interferes in the minutiae of so-called human rights in western democracies. I support what the Secretary of State has said today, but I want to be convinced that if we stay in the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe, what he is doing will actually make much difference. He can convince me in one way. At the moment, our deportation policy is a complete joke. We never deport anybody. Illegal migrants know that they can vanish in the community. Will he now convince me that after we pass this we will be able to deport these people and stop this illegal migration?
Human rights reform will no more be a silver bullet for all the ills of the world than any other reform, but it will deal with a whole range of serious and significant issues that the people of this country, my right hon. Friend’s constituents and mine, want dealing with. The reason I give in the consultation paper—I wrote about it in The Times today—is that article 8 is an example of a qualified right that allows us to stretch, or to press, the margin of appreciation. Some 70% of the successful human rights challenges to deportation orders by foreign national offenders come from people claiming under article 8 on the right to a family life. That is a very good example of what we can address.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI hope that the expressions of support for Sergei Magnitsky give solace to Natalia and Nikita through their enduring grief. The hon. Member is absolutely right. One of the reasons that this matter has not been discussed quite so much has been the opportunity with this regime to follow the money; if we can cut off the money and the people who are profiting from these appalling human rights abuses, we have a better chance of cutting out the activity and deterring it for the future. The hon. Member is bang on.
The largest group in the world subject to persecution today are Christians. We are not just discussing lethal persecution such as in North Korea; in many parts of the world there is persecution for churchgoing, blasphemy and many other issues. Will the Foreign Secretary assure me that this new regime will be used to target with sanctions those who deliberately target Christians?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this new regime gives us that power. On top of the legal regime, the asset freezes and the visa bans, the work of the Prime Minister’s special envoy for freedom of religion or belief has been immense; it has been a herculean shift. We are working with our international partners and intend to co-host a conference on freedom of religion or belief. That will give us the ability to do precisely what my hon. Friend wants us to do.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt has already been materially resolved. When I was out in Washington, I met many members on the hill from all sides of Congress, including Richie Neal, who chairs the Friends of Ireland caucus. We were able to show that, with the changes we have made to the withdrawal agreement and the protections and safeguards for the Good Friday agreement, we are protecting the situation in Northern Ireland. We have strong support on both sides of the aisle in the US for the approach we have taken and, indeed, for US-UK free trade agreement. I hope that the hon. Lady will now get behind it.
Will the Foreign Secretary assure the House in clear, explicit terms that under no circumstances will there be any role for the European Court of Justice, that there will be no acceptance of EU rules, and that there will be no weakening in our resolve to impose tariffs if the EU will not conduct a fair and free negotiation? In the words of our former Prime Minister, “No. No. No.”—and this time we will back the Prime Minister.
We of course enter the negotiations with a spirit of optimism, ambition and good will, but we also want to be clear. I think a question was asked earlier about the EU side not understanding what is and is not up for negotiation. We are not going to allow the European Court of Justice to adjudicate disputes that affect the United Kingdom. That is not global practice and it would be totally lopsided. Equally, in relation to a level playing field or other areas of high alignment, we have been absolutely clear—the Prime Minister was this morning—that we will have full economic and political independence and full control over our laws.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThere has been much reference to the Procedure Committee, of which the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) is of course a distinguished ornament.
The evidence given to the Procedure Committee last week was very clear. If there is no deal under section 13(4) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, there will be a vote on a neutral motion. If there is a deal, there must be a meaningful vote under section 13(1). That motion is amendable, and amendments must be taken first, unless the Government produce their own business statement, and there has to be a vote on it. That is the procedure.
The important point to understand, however, is that deal or no deal, meaningful vote passed or not, can only affect the deal; it cannot affect the outcome of Brexit, because that is in statute. Only the Government can introduce legislation, so only the Government can stop Brexit on 29 March. Will the Secretary of State therefore give an unequivocal declaration to the House that in no circumstances—deal or no deal, deal rejected by the House or accepted—will Brexit not proceed on 29 March?
The Government are absolutely committed to giving effect to the referendum and leaving the EU in March next year.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind words. That is a draft agreement, which has not yet entered into force. We will of course be champions of global free trade with precisely those emerging markets of the future, from Asia to Latin America, which is where the jobs and opportunities will come from. Like him, I want to see more of that. In fact, one of the advantages of leaving the EU is that we will be able to have an even more energetic and liberal approach to free trade.
My right hon. Friend was talking about the facilitated customs arrangement. Before Monday, it was already going to be difficult enough to persuade the EU that it was in its interests for us to collect tariffs on its behalf, but after Monday’s vote the arrangements must be reciprocal. Is there the remotest chance of us persuading the EU to collect tariffs on our behalf on some distant border? It just will not happen. It’s dead in the water, isn’t it?
My hon. Friend mentions the earlier approach. Under the earlier proposals for a new customs partnership, businesses would only receive tariff rebates after tracking goods through the entire supply chain to the point of final consumption in the UK. In contrast, the FCA—I hope this addresses his point—will be an upfront system. That means that most businesses, the overwhelming majority, would pay the right tariff to begin with. Other businesses could claim a tariff repayment as soon as possible in the supply chain. We will agree with the EU the circumstances in which repayments can be granted. As the White Paper makes clear, we will negotiate a reciprocal tariff revenue formula, taking into account goods destined for the UK entering via the EU and goods destined for the EU entering via the UK.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe voted in the referendum as one country, and we need to respect it as one country.
Paragraph 76 of chapter 1 is ambiguous. It states that we will seek reciprocal mobility arrangements, but it does not say when. Will the Secretary of State give an absolute assurance that any preferential treatment given to EU migrants will not be part of a withdrawal agreement but will be entirely in the hands of this Parliament post Brexit? This is a vital point. The people voted for Brexit because they want to control migration. They do not want to be sold down the river on this point as the negotiations proceed.
I thank my hon. Friend. I can give him the reassurance that it would not be part of the withdrawal agreement process; it would be part of the future deep and special relationship. In the same way as we approach global free trade with partners from Latin America to Asia, when we look at the liberalisation of trade in goods, for example, through the reduction of tariffs or services, we can also ensure that we have sensible arrangements on visas.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI am glad that the hon. Lady made that intervention. Clauses 2, 3 and 4 are subject to the savings and the caveats in clause 5 and schedule 1. The point about schedule 1 is not that no EU principles will apply after the date of exit, but that that date is the cut-off point for recognising EU principles as reflected in UK law. New principles that may evolve after that point do not become part of UK law; only the ones that arose before that point do. That is the clear intention schedule 1(2). I hope that that gives the hon. Lady some reassurance, but we will come on to talk about the savings in clause 5 and schedule 1 on a separate day next week, when I will be happy to return to that point if she has any outstanding concerns.
Perhaps shortly, but I am going to make some progress now, because I am hearing censorious noises from the Chair and I want to respond very obediently to them.
I turn to amendment 70, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford). I think the sentiment behind the amendment is laudable, but I reassure the House that the amendment is unnecessary for the protection of rights. In fact, it is potentially counterproductive. Clause 4 will save all the directly effective rights that arise under the EU treaties to the extent that they are available now; that is the point that I wanted to get across to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). We have deliberately not included a list of those directly effective rights in clause 4 or in the rest of the Bill, because there is no single, comprehensive and reliable list of all directly effective rights in the EU treaties. They are not set out in legislation—UK, EU or otherwise—but they are determined by the courts. Our approach is therefore based on procedural as well as substantive legal continuity.
The explanatory notes to the Bill set out a list of the articles from the treaty on the functioning of the European Union that the Government consider to contain directly effective rights, which will remain available in domestic law following our departure from the EU. That list, which includes article 157 on the right to equal pay, is intended to be illustrative of some of the rights that will continue to be available under clause 4. If we were to define a single list—especially if it was a non-exhaustive one—and legislate for it, we would inevitably run a significant risk of inadvertently omitting or mis-stating rights that individuals and businesses rely on, or suggesting to the courts that those rights were supposed to have a special status beyond the ones that were not listed.
We can reasonably expect individuals and businesses to want to rely on any list that we produced. Quite reasonably, they may not realise that they can rely on a wider set of rights that are not on any such list. The effect of amendment 70 would be at best to create legal uncertainty, and at worst—this is my concern—to mislead people about the rights available to them. The Government do not want that to happen, and I hope that I have persuaded the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts (Neil Gray) not to press the amendment.
I want to turn as briefly as possible—I will not take any further interventions to allow others to speak—to amendment 148, in the name of the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), who is in her place. It is important that the issue of children’s rights has been raised through the amendment, and I hope I can give her some reassurance. Most importantly, I want to reassure the Committee that the UK’s commitment to children’s rights and the UN convention on the rights of the child is and will remain unwavering. Our ability to support and safeguard children’s rights will not be affected by UK withdrawal from the EU.
Domestically, the rights and best interests of the child are protected in England primarily through the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002, as well as in other legislative measures. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own measures for the protection of children’s rights, in accordance with the UN convention on the rights of the child.
The UK will of course continue to be a party to the UN convention, but amendment 148 is flawed in seeking to apply an EU principle of direct effect to a global UN treaty, which is of course governed by general principles of international treaty interpretation under the Vienna convention and customary international law. I am afraid that that is a recipe for legal confusion.
In any event, we already give effect to all our international obligations under the UN convention. For example, the Children Acts 1989 and 2004 set out a range of duties to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. In 2013, we issued statutory guidance to directors of children’s services, which requires them to have regard to the general principles of the convention and ensure that children and young people are involved in the development and delivery of local services. The Children and Social Work Act 2017 is a further example of how we constantly seek to make sure that we not only protect children’s rights but enhance them.
No, I will make some progress, otherwise I will be in serious trouble. I have taken several interventions.
I must turn to amendment 94, in the name of the hon. Member for Bristol East, who has also tabled amendment 95. I will address the two amendments as briefly as I can. Amendment 94 is intended to include within the scope of clause 4 rights that might arise under EU directives, but which have not yet been recognised by the European Court or the domestic courts, and might only be recognised many years after we have left the EU.
There are three basic objections to amendment 94, notwithstanding the commendable spirit in which the hon. Lady has introduced her amendments. First, amendment 94 is at odds with EU law. It conflicts not just with the UK’s approach, but with the EU’s approach to what counts as—or what the definition is of—a directly effective right. By definition, such rights need to be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, and they must be recognised as such by UK courts or the European Court at the date of exit. The effect of her amendment would be to inflate the definition of what counts as EU law at the very moment that we are departing from the EU, which cannot be right.
The second objection is that the amendment would not provide the accurate snapshot of the law that we are seeking to take on departure. From a practical point of view, that would risk confusion for anyone trying to glean the true legal position with any reliability.
The third persuasive argument is that the fact that we are leaving the EU means that we are taking back democratic control of our laws. With that in mind, it would not be right, as the amendment envisages, to retain an ability for thousands of directives—parts of EU law that we are not incorporating—to continue to produce new legal effects long after we have left the EU. That would run in direct conflict with the objective of clause 4 and, indeed, the whole Bill. Given the number of EU directives in force, newly found directly effective rights would have a hugely disruptive effect on UK law.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a great privilege and pleasure to speak on behalf of the Government on this essential Bill, and particularly on clause 6 and the various amendments proposed to it. The Bill is complex, but at root it boils down to achieving two basic but fundamental objectives, which it is worth bearing in mind as we consider the clause and amendments.
The first is that we are delivering on the referendum by taking back control over our laws, which is a major opportunity; that was the No. 1 reason why people voted to leave the EU in the referendum. The second thing that the Bill does is make sure there is legal certainty, with a smooth transition for citizens and businesses, mitigating one of the key risks of Brexit, which I believe is felt by people whether they voted leave or remain.
It is essential that the Supreme Court has certainty. The first part of clause 6(2) is admirably clear:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court”.
Why then have the Government included the following phrase at the end of the provision:
“but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so”?
I think Lord Neuberger has a point, and I give the Minister an opportunity to make the Government’s position clear.
I thank my hon. Friend for that, and I shall come to that point a little later. The basic point that I respectfully make to the House at the outset is that the various clauses and amendments should be judged according to those basic strategic objectives: taking back control over our laws and making sure that there is a smooth legal transition, which I believe is my hon. Friend’s point.
Clause 6 serves both objectives. It sets out how, once we have taken back control over EU law, retained EU law should be interpreted on and after exit day. It makes it clear that once the UK leaves the EU, domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the European Court—an affirmation of the supremacy of our own courts and our own legal order.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) on securing tonight’s debate and pay tribute to his recent work as chair of the UK delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He is very knowledgeable in this field and he made a very powerful speech.
For all the contentious debate about human rights, few argue against the common-sense list of rights set out in the text of the European convention on human rights. The Government are and will remain committed to the protection of those rights. The United Kingdom was a founder member of the convention and was instrumental in its drafting. I have said on a number of occasions that those who suggest it was somehow an exclusively British creation are overegging the pudding or rewriting history. The negotiation of the convention saw an interesting contest of views between the common law and civil law traditions, as evidenced clearly in the travaux préparatoires of the convention, which are available online. The convention—the product of those negotiations —reflects the compromise between those two very different traditions and approaches.
Nevertheless, the concerns that have arisen about the convention are far less about being objections to the strict list of rights set out there; they lie more with its interpretation and application, which has been expanded and extended exponentially, well beyond what the original drafters intended. That is partly the result of judicial legislation by the Strasbourg Court, but it has been compounded by the design and structure of the Human Rights Act. It should be pointed out at this stage that serious criticisms have come from Labour Lord Chancellors, lawyers across the spectrum and senior British judges, as well as from Government Members. These problems have fuelled a rights inflation that has undermined this country’s liberal tradition of freedom and its approach to human rights, which is founded in Magna Carta and in the thinking of great British philosophers from John Locke and John Stuart Mill through to Isaiah Berlin. We have shifted towards imposing more and more obligations on government that require it to provide, rather than merely insisting that it refrain from acting in certain arbitrary ways, which was very much the history and tradition of the liberal approach. These developments have exposed us unnecessarily to judicial legislation at home and in Strasbourg that takes decisions out of the hands of this House.
The Minister is making a powerful critique of the convention, so perhaps he can now tell the House when we are going to fulfil our manifesto commitment to get out of it.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons Chamber2. What steps his Department is taking to increase value for money in its spending.
We are determined to help eliminate the budget deficit and deliver better justice, which is why we are cutting 15% from the Ministry of Justice budget over the spending review, but finding £1.3 billion to overhaul the prison estate so that we drive down reoffending and ensure that my hon. Friend’s constituents get better value for money and better bang for their buck out of the justice system.
The Ministry of Justice has faced spending cuts as deep, or deeper, than any other Department in Whitehall, and yet, despite the occasional criticism and row, I am not sure whether the public has noted any discernible reduction in the service provided by the Department. Will my hon. Friend summon in the Secretaries of State for Health, Work and Pensions, International Development and Defence and give them a verbal tongue lashing about how we can emulate the private sector and create more wealth, goods, enterprise, deregulation and lower taxation and still provide better services?
I thank my hon. Friend for his insightful remarks. As a former Public Accounts Committee Chairman, he will appreciate that we have already slimmed back-office by £600 million so that we can extend rehabilitation to the 45,000 offenders on short sentences, where we have some of the highest reoffending. Now we are cutting the admin budget by 50%, but investing £700 million to modernise our courts. It shows that, whether we are talking about delays at courts or the offenders passing through them, we can drive efficiencies and deliver a more effective system.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI broadly accept that point. Much as I admire the Secretary of State and her advisers, I freely accept that she may make a mistake. However, I think that, just as in the second world war, the threat is such that there must be some diminution of our traditional civil liberties to protect the liberty of the wider public. I am not saying that the end justifies the means, but we are in a very dangerous situation.
We are talking about the Bill; we are not talking about hypothetical situations. The Bill lays an injunction on the Secretary of State to act reasonably, and if a court finds that the Secretary of State has acted unreasonably, it can reverse her decision. I repeat, however, that we are not talking about some fundamental assault on civil liberties, or about depriving people of their liberty in this country. We are simply talking about a reasonable belief that people have fought jihad and a reasonable belief that they are a threat to our people. I think that the bulk of members of the public and the majority of Members of Parliament trust the Secretary of State to act reasonably.
I want to make a few brief comments about the important and, in many respects, symbolic issue that is being raised in the wider context of the Bill.
I think that there are strong principled arguments in favour of judicial oversight in relation to the power of temporary exclusion, especially when it involves a British citizen. A range of points have been made about that, but I want to stress that this is a very strong power. We are talking about the exercise of state power—Executive power—against the citizen. I think that, both in that context and in the broader context, the presumption, or general principle, should be that there ought to be a judicial check. I say that first in the light of basic principles of natural justice, and secondly because the focused, efficient exercise of state power requires checks and balances. The House of Commons is one of those checks on state power, and the courts are another.
I do not think that judicial oversight would weaken the exercise of that power; I think that it would strengthen it, because it would prevent arbitrary abuse. It would ensure that the power was exercised against the crazed fanatic rather than the misguided youth who finds himself wrapped up in some business of which, on reflection, he genuinely wants no part, let alone mistaken cases involving the genuinely innocent. We know from the exercise of state power, particularly under recent counter-terrorism legislation, that there is a risk of innocent people becoming wrapped up in cases. We do not think that the Secretary of State or other Ministers act from any sense of bad faith, but, given the accumulation of state and Executive power, the broader that power becomes in the absence of checks and balances, the more likely it is that innocent people will be caught up in the net. That is my first principled argument.
My second argument is that there have been a number of objections to judicial consideration of the exercise of the power by the Secretary of State. It has been suggested that it may be an emergency power and that the courts are too slow. I think that it is the other way round. If British jihadis come back to this country after being up to no good in Syria, or wherever they may have been, it is hardly an emergency power. A wider argument could be that we are locking the stable door after the horse has bolted, but it is certainly not an emergency power in that sense, although of course we want to keep track of the individuals who are returning home.
I do not buy the argument that the courts would be too slow. In practical terms, of course, the individual could be barred from returning until the court had given due consideration to the application by either the Secretary of State or the individual concerned. I do not entirely understand either the public safety argument or the emergency argument against some form of judicial oversight.
The second point has been made about judicial review, but that is clearly about process rather than the substance relating to an individual case. Notwithstanding the proliferation of judicial review claims—which the Government are rightly trying to curtail—I do not think that judicial review will provide an adequate judicial check on the exercise of state power of this nature, given how intrusive it is in relation to the rights of the individual citizen.
Let me make one broader contextual point about the power and the amendments. Hundreds of British jihadis are coming home from abroad following some form of involvement in foreign conflicts and thousands of individuals are under the radar of M15. However, according to the Home Office’s annual update, released in March 2014, the number of people convicted of terrorism offences under terrorism legislation, or wider legislation, dropped from what was a pretty meagre 54 in 2006-07 to 27 in 20013-14.
The real hole in the Bill is the gaping gap in our ability to enforce the law, and that is true of successive Governments across the board. We have a huge, broad criminal base, and we have very wide powers, but what is missing from the Bill, and, to some extent, from in the debate, is a reference to measures—not necessarily legislative to improve law enforcement. We seem constantly to legislate, although not necessarily hyperactively: I think that a great deal of consideration has gone into the Bill. The elephant in the room is our inability to enforce the laws that we already have. I do not subscribe to the view that there is a zero-sum game between liberty and security. The justice system is a powerful tool in the fight against terror and should not always be viewed as some sort of heavy, onerous baggage that is weighing us down.
I hope that the Minister’s clarification of the compromise changes that are likely to be forthcoming in the Lords will be sufficient to enable me either to abstain or to vote with the Government if the new clause is pushed to a vote.