Exiting the European Union: Meaningful Vote

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Tuesday 11th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell), but I shall try to confine my remarks to the issue on the Order Paper, rather than the more general debate on the merit of the Government’s deal.

I supported this debate because I happen to agree that what happened yesterday was essentially pretty unprecedented. We have a deal before this House, and this House was in the middle of considering it. The terms under which the EU withdrawal Act passed through the House were an absolute and clear undertaking by the Government that Parliament would be involved at every stage, and that as soon as the deal had been reached it would be brought expeditiously to us—indeed, so much so that some people wondered if it might not appear in the House almost too early, before we had the opportunity to consider it properly. We were in the middle of that consideration.

I fully appreciate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister’s difficulty. If by going away and speaking to our European partners she will be a position to achieve some change to the deal that she can properly bring before the House, I can understand why she may have wished to interrupt its consideration. But I really do worry about the implications, because although I listened carefully to my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office, the Government appear to have given themselves very considerable latitude as to when this business might return to us. If it is clear by Monday of next week that the Prime Minister has not changed the terms of the treaty, I would expect that this House’s consideration of the business ought to resume at once, because it is not in the national interest that we should be prevented from expressing our view on the deal as soon as possible. That is my principal concern.

I was reassured by some of the things I heard this afternoon about the Government’s intentions, but it would simply not be acceptable for the debate to resume on 19 January. I just wanted to make that point, because it seems to be key.

[Chris Bryant]

I wonder whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman has heard the view expressed by some Government Whips that if the Prime Minister has not really got anything out of this week, there would be no point in Parliament sitting next week at all, and that the Government would therefore announce on Thursday that we were not going to sit next week. He will of course be aware that we would have to have a vote on that.

[Mr Grieve]

I am quite clear that the urgency of the situation that we face, and the divisions both in the country and within this House make it imperative that this House should be able to pronounce on the deal that the Government bring forward.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

No, I wish to conclude.

In those circumstances, there is an issue that I cannot ignore. As the House will have noticed this afternoon, a statement was sent by the Secretary of State that will become a written ministerial statement tomorrow. The first part of it deals with the position of the Speaker and, if I may put it like this, the piquancy of this is that having on the one hand said that an unamendable motion to note is an unamendable motion to note in a statute, the fact is that it really has absolutely no force at all. The reality is that it is part of the Standing Orders of this House, and it is not open to any interpretation in any court and, ultimately, it will be entirely your responsibility, Mr Speaker, to decide what can or should not be treated as a neutral terms motion. Actually, the statement highlights the fact that, although this debate has been about trying to provide assurance—not just in this House, but to many members of the public outside who are worried about the end of this process and what might happen—the truth is that the assurance does not lie in the words of the statute, except in so far as the statute is the word of the Government. The assurance lies in the hands of this House and, in the first part of the statement, in the power of the Speaker.

I then insisted that a second piece be put into the statement, which I will read out. If I may say so, this ought to be blindingly obvious, but it says:

“The Government recognises that it is open for Ministers and members of the House of Commons to table motions on and debate matters of concern and that, as is the convention, parliamentary time will be provided for this.”

If this House chooses to debate matters, including matters on which it may wish to have multiple motions, the reality is that if we wish to exert our power to do that, we can. In the circumstances that might follow a “no deal”, which would undoubtedly be one of the biggest political crises in modern British history, if the House wishes to speak with one voice, or indeed with multiple voices, the House has the power to do so.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The bit I do not understand is that many motions have been carried by this House in the past few years—motions tabled by the Backbench Business Committee, by the Opposition and by ordinary Members—but the Government have just let them go through and then completely ignored them. The only thing that has legislative effect is legislation. That is why we must have a meaningful vote, not a pretend one.

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is right, but if the Government were to concede to the amendment, as drafted in the Lords, for an amendable motion, the House must understand that the Government could ignore it. I can assure the House that it would not be enforceable in any court of law—[Interruption.] No, that really must be understood. It could not be enforceable in any court of law, because that would entirely undermine the rights and privileges of this place. It would be for us to enforce it. Of course, the ultimate sanction that this House has is a motion of no confidence but, short of that, there are other means by which the House can in fact bring its clear view to bear on the Government.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Tuesday 12th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. Obviously, the House will have to make up its mind about how it wishes to proceed, but, as I have said, there must be a proper understanding of the disquiet that is felt on both sides of the House.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I know that the Solicitor General has spoken in good faith, but would it not be best for those discussions to take place in a forthright way, for us to vote with their lordships for their lordships’ amendment and for the Government to return to the matter in the House of Lords after the discussions?

[Mr Grieve]

I fear not. I think the reality is that if we accept the Lords amendment, that will be the end of the matter. That is the problem that we face in this House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

There is no doubt that some of the problems we have are not going to be helpful in our negotiation. Equally, it is right to say that the more we can have mature, considered and sensible debate in this House, the more we improve our ability to negotiate with our EU partners.

I have tabled a number of amendments. As with all amendments, some are multiple choice—we have to do this in this House, because it is how we go about looking at and examining legislation—and some are probing amendments. Some are, in my view, more important than others. I tabled the one that hon. Gentleman highlights because the Government did not really explain that they wanted multiple exit dates. I wanted to tease out why and to suggest that one exit date might be better because of the consequences for the use of Henry VIII powers thereafter, but there might actually be a justification for what the Government are doing. All that needs to be worked through in the legislation, and that is what I have sought to do.

I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that over past weeks we have had some really sensible, constructive discussions on some of the areas covered by the amendments that I have tabled. I hope very much indeed that we can achieve some degree of consensus, in which case some of the amendments, whether on triage or the way we treat retained EU law, might not be required. I do not wish to get diverted into all that; I shall come back to it in later debates. The trouble is—I repeat this—that it all gets marred by events such as those last Friday, when extraordinary amendments are suddenly magicked out of the blue that simply do not make any sense at all.

When I read the amendments and those consequential on them, which I must say I saw only this morning, I saw another problem: as has already been highlighted, one of the consequentials seemed to me to totally undermine the purpose of the main amendment, to the point where the conspiracy theorist in me made me think it was a sort of double deceit or double bluff—that it was intended in some way to give the impression to some of my right hon. and hon. Friends who really worry about this that they were being offered this tablet of stone on our departure, but it was in fact teasingly capable of being shifted. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General sent me a text earlier that said that I was mistaken and that that was not the intention—that it was the very reverse.

I am not a parliamentary draftsman, and I know that there are always different ways in which an amendment to a statute can be read. I remain of the view, though, that the wording is very peculiar indeed if the intention is to exclude the possibility of playing around with the exit date, which is being offered as a talisman. I must say to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General that I did naughtily begin to wonder whether in fact the parliamentary draftsman was so appalled at the folly of what the Government were doing that he had sneakily altered amendment 383 to try to offer them a lifeline in case they came to regret what they had done. I am sure that that is being very unfair to the parliamentary draftsman, whom I know always does what is requested of him or her.

[Chris Bryant]

The tendency of any Government, especially when they have such a major project on their hands, is always to try to manage the project and to manage Parliament. Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman discovered over recent weeks that the sad truth of the matter is that there is a consensus in the House that embraces all those on the Opposition Benches and a significant number of Government Back Benchers? It actually embraces half the Government—I can see at least three, possibly four, Ministers sitting on the Front Bench who would sign up to his amendment. Would not it be far more rational for the Government simply to calm down about this process and try to establish a consensus that can carry the country forward?

[Mr Grieve]

I endorse what the hon. Gentleman says. That is precisely what I wanted to start suggesting to Ministers. There are a number of key areas in this debate this afternoon. The first is the recognition, belated but nevertheless I am grateful for it, that leaving the EU requires statutory authority from this House to make it part of the rule of the law of our land. It is a very important principle. Indeed, I detect that the Government also recognise that if, at some point in the future, we get beyond transition we will probably need another statute to alter the law of our land for any final agreement that we have with our EU partners. We will have to take it in a measured way, and the Government will have to accept that Parliament, being sovereign, must, at the end of the day, have the ability to support or reject this. There is no way around that.

Of course there are the hypothetical questions, such as “Well, there might be nothing to reject because we might be falling out of the European Union with no agreement.” Indeed, yes, but we will discover that when the time comes. In the meantime, the Government must get on with their negotiation, and we can carry on scrutinising them on that. At the end, we want a statute. That statute—I think that this has been acknowledged by the Secretary of State—has got to come before we leave.

That then brings us to a critical issue in this debate. The best point made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State yesterday was that, whereas moving into transition is a qualified majority decision, getting an extension to article 50 requires unanimity. Therefore, the Government may be living with legitimate anxiety that there could be circumstances in which, running up to the wire, there could be difficulty implementing the whole thing by statute. I personally think that that seems inherently improbable, because, on the face of it, if our partners agree a deal with us, why would they then decide to pull the rug from under our feet in such an extraordinary fashion—I know that they talk about “perfidious Albion”, and we probably think that they are all garlic eaters—to tell us that we cannot have an extension to article 50 for the necessary two or three months to take through our statutory processes while they have to take their processes through the EU Parliament?

Wilson Doctrine

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

Of course, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is perfectly possible that changes have been made previously, but we cannot judge that. All we can judge is the decision of the IPT, which has been able to review substantially more evidence than this House would ever be able to review and concluded that “changes in the Doctrine” have resulted in its operation as it is now. I suspect that it would be impossible for us ever to know whether changes were made prior to this Government taking office, but we certainly know that the doctrine as previously espoused by every Prime Minister since Wilson is not that which is in operation under the present Home Secretary. In other words, the Wilson doctrine has no legal effect. It is no longer in force. It is no more than a self-denying ordinance that could easily be rescinded and has already been ignored, all without notifying Parliament.

It is clear that the situation is unsatisfactory and I believe that it is time that the Government were straight with the House, so let me ask the Home Secretary some simple questions. What did she mean when she said that the Wilson doctrine “obviously” applies to parliamentarians? Will she now finally admit that the Wilson doctrine is no longer? Will she tell us when she resolved to change the Wilson doctrine? Was there any discussion of these changes at Cabinet, as notified in the IPT judgment? Will she tell us how often warrants have been issued for the targeted interception of parliamentarians’ communications? Has she issued such warrants herself, and did she have any direct correspondence with the Prime Minister about this?

Let me be clear that I am not calling for individual warrants or interceptions to be identified. It is a long-standing policy of both parties of government that we will not comment on individual applications for interception. Indeed, it is an offence under RIPA to reveal that information. Neither do we want the operational security of ongoing investigations to be undermined, but we need to know the truth about whether parliamentarians have been spied on, and on what authority that happened.

Let me end by laying out the parameters for a possible new Wilson doctrine. First, there may be situations when it is necessary for a parliamentarian’s communications to be intercepted in the interests of securing the nation and preventing serious criminality. MPs cannot ever be above the law, but our democracy cannot function properly without the freedom of MPs to communicate with their constituents, whistleblowers, or the wider public without fear of interception. Just as, in the interests of a free press and a sound justice system, journalists and lawyers are granted enhanced protection from warranted surveillance, the legal presumption should be that parliamentarians are not to be targeted, nor their metadata interrogated, without good cause. That means that, as the Anderson report of the investigatory powers review, “A Question of Trust”, concluded, a judge, not a politician, should make the decision on a warrant. It means that the bar for granting a warrant should be high. Agencies should be required to show due cause and specific suspicion of serious criminality.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

Of course I give way to the former Attorney-General.

[Mr Grieve]

Perhaps I might intervene briefly in my position as chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Committee takes a close interest in privacy and security, and published a report in March. We will continue to take a close interest in these matters, particularly when the Home Office publishes the draft investigatory powers Bill. I would like to assure him that when we do so, we will look at the terms of heightened protection for certain categories of profession, such as lawyers, journalists and doctors. I expect that the Committee will consider whether additional protection should be afforded to MPs’ communications in the light what is in the draft Bill and this debate.

[Chris Bryant]

That was a helpful intervention. In the official guidance, due consideration is given to lawyers in regard to privileged material. Due regard, as provided for in the European convention on human rights, is given to journalists and the protection of their sources. The guidance includes doctors, but it also refers to ministers of religion, and I have some anxiety about the direction we may be taking. There is a perfectly legitimate debate to be had about what separate categories there might be. I am glad that the Committee will look at precisely how MPs—and, I presume, other parliamentarians —will be treated in the draft Bill, which we will need plenty of time to consider. Last year, we had one day in the House to consider some of the most important matters of personal freedom and liberty, which was wholly inappropriate. The clock is ticking on the High Court ruling, which the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden won earlier this year, so I hope that the Government will move speedily with their draft Bill.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to be able to participate in the debate. At the outset, I should say that I welcome my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary introducing the Bill. I entirely agree with her that the House needs continuously to address the challenge and threat that terrorism poses to us. Some people think that the threat is exaggerated, but from my time as Attorney-General—I had to see some of the background briefings, and sometimes to consider cases relating to individuals who had gone abroad, particularly to Syria and Iraq—I have no doubt that she is absolutely accurate in her description of the real threat they pose to us.

With that in mind, I do not intend to take up much of the House’s time on my broad welcome of the legislation. Although the House will want to look in detail at the proposals on TPIMs and data retention, which is undoubtedly important, and the measures on preventing people from being drawn into terrorism, there is no doubt in my mind that they make good sense.

However, I hope to take a little of the House’s time this evening to talk about chapter 2, on temporary exclusion from the United Kingdom; I have flagged up my concerns on how the House should best proceed on that in a question to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. It is a fundamental principle of the common law in this country that an individual, unconvicted—the presumption of innocence applies—should be free to reside in his own land. The principle of exile, as a judicial or even an administrative tool, has not been tolerated in this country since the late 17th century. It is certainly no part of our criminal justice panoply, and certainly not part of administrative provisions or powers given to the state.

[Chris Bryant]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Grieve]

I shall make a bit of progress.

Therefore, when we consider the question of temporary exclusion from the United Kingdom, we must bear it in mind that what is proposed, even if exclusion is on a temporary basis, is a draconian and unusual power being taken by the state. The point has been made that the proposal could be in breach of our international legal obligations by rendering a person stateless.

That is a separate consideration, and I know the Home Secretary has had it in mind in introducing the legislation, but I come back to the more fundamental point about the common law right. The point is often well made that as Parliament is sovereign, it can exclude the common law whenever it likes, but the fact is that the more fundamental the common law principle, the more careful we should be before excluding it. I simply say to my right hon. Friend that this is one of those common law rights that I regard as being of a fundamental character.

If I move on from that to consider what is proposed, I am pleased to note that it seems to me that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has given careful consideration to the issue. The temporary exclusion orders, which she has put forward, appear to be of a character such that she accepts she must issue a permit within a reasonable time after a person makes the application. The process therefore is—in my view, correctly —one of managed return: a return that provides reassurance that the state, which has to protect citizens here, knows of the returnee coming back to this country and, furthermore, provides opportunities, if necessary for the state to impose conditions on that individual after they have come back.

I have to say to my right hon. Friend that what has intrigued me in reading the Bill is the relationship between that and the TPIMs the Bill seeks to enhance in a number of perfectly legitimate and sensible ways. As she will know, the TPIM is also a serious interference in the liberty of the subject, and is therefore provided with a number of safeguards and protections in how it operates. The principal one is that although the Home Secretary instigates the application for a TPIM, the process has to be initiated through the High Court. There are some circumstances, however, in which that can be bypassed in the event of an emergency, and permission sought retrospectively.

The obligations after return to the United Kingdom, in clause 8, appear—the Minister may be able to help us when he comes to sum up—to be in large measure identical to those one might expect a TPIM to include, although there may be some differences, in which case it would be useful to have some clarification. Of course, the principal difference, as far as I can make out, is that this process does not have to be instigated by an application to the High Court; it is simply done on the basis of the Home Secretary concluding that she has reasonable grounds for requiring this process to take place.

I have to say to my right hon. Friend that I will be interested, in the course of the debate during the passage of the Bill, to understand why we should introduce two separate regimes of this kind. We know that, in respect of TPIMs, she has been broadly satisfied with the way they have been operating, even though she wishes to expand some of their scope. That is, I think, supported on both sides of the House. After all, if an individual is located in Iraq or Syria, or has crossed the border into Turkey and has indicated a desire to return when my right hon. Friend has removed his or her passport, the one thing one probably has as a result of this legislation is a short period of leisure—the reasonable period where the application is being made—for, if necessary, the process of a TPIM, or a TPIM which applies to a returnee, to be instigated through the High Court. I am a little mystified as to why we should simply resort to a judicial review process, which, although I accept it may comply with our international legal obligations and also the principles of due process, is nevertheless by its nature likely to be more ponderous and cumbersome, and would not allow the High Court to be seized of this matter at an earlier opportunity.

I say to my right hon. Friend that this is a matter on which we need to spend a bit of time during the passage of the Bill, to see whether in fact the two ways of approaching this are justified. Beyond that, I want to emphasise that the principle of the managed return seems to me eminently sensible, and my right hon. Friend has my support on it. The House will of course also want to look at some of the other issues that may apply to the details in respect of this scheme.

On the seizure of passports, the point needs to be made that a passport is not actually a right to come into the United Kingdom. I say that because we have discussed it in the terms of the matter I have just been talking about. Ultimately, the issue of a passport is a prerogative power. It is, in some ways, vouching for the person concerned. There are many reasons why my right hon. Friend may rightly remove somebody’s passport, either before they leave the United Kingdom or when they are abroad. However, I raise the following issue. We are progressively giving more and more summary powers to seize passports. There is nothing wrong in that, if, for example, it is preventing people from leaving the country when there are good grounds for considering whether they are going to commit, or are likely to commit, an act of terrorism, but it increasingly raises the likelihood of travel documents and passports being seized when it might turn out subsequently on examination that there was no justification.

The memorandum, properly prepared and passed off—I am sure—by the Law Officers before being issued, makes the point that taking passports interferes with article 8 rights. It must therefore raise the possibility of individuals who can show that their passports were wrongly taken making a claim for compensation. As far as I am aware, no issues of compensation have hitherto arisen from passport seizure. I appreciate that it might be different were it done maliciously, but I am talking not about malice but about errors made at the time the passport was removed.

During the passage of the Bill, I hope that my right hon. Friend and other colleagues on the Front Bench will think about the likely consequences, which might often be financial, of increasing powers of passport removal. I do not think that where there are reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in terrorism an individual has a right to compensation, but unfortunately there might be instances of people being targeted when they have no involvement in terrorism.

Ultimately—I have said this previously in the House, but it is worth saying again—we are engaged in a values battle. We will not stop terrorism or prevent young people from going to participate in terrorism by whatever methods of law we pass in this House, however draconian they might be; we will stop this phenomenon when we can persuade people that the virtues of our society, which are many, despite some of its drawbacks, are very considerable and that its values should be respected. For that reason, when we enact such legislation, we must have it in mind that we do not, as an unintended consequence, create the very resentments that are likely to fuel terrorism in the future.

Listening to the shadow Home Secretary, I was reminded that I have said that previously—over 90-day and 42-day pre-charge detention, both of which, I might add, were far more draconian attempts at interfering with the liberty of the subject than anything my right hon. Friend is doing in this measure, which I know she has brought forward with a prudent eye to the issues I have raised. On that basis, I welcome the Bill, but I hope that the matters I have touched on will be given serious thought.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Tuesday 11th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

Generally speaking, they are banned from returning to the United Kingdom, at least for a period of time. It depends on the nature of the offence: in some cases, the offence will be an immigration offence and may lead to a ban for a period of time; a serious criminal offence is likely to lead to a ban for ever.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Last week, the Government introduced a new provision in the Immigration Bill allowing the Home Secretary to remove the British citizenship of people from other countries who have been naturalised. In cases where the individual is resident in this country, what will happen to them? Will they be banished from the realm? Will they be exiled, and if so, where to?

[The Attorney-General]

I think the hon. Gentleman has taken a slightly simplistic view. The measure passed by the House returns us to the status quo ante 2006, which allows for such a power to be exercised by the Home Secretary. Obviously, if that power is to be exercised it has to be exercised bearing in mind, first, whether the person may obtain another nationality, and secondly, whether they can be deported. A number of criteria can be brought into play before a decision is made on such a case.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I am not in a position to give my hon. Friend a precise date. What I suggest, as he will appreciate that the issue is outside my departmental area, is that I write to him when I have ascertained whether we have further detailed information on it.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Surely we are going to get many more convictions only if there is much more effective co-operation between prosecutors and police in this country and elsewhere. Given that many such gangs are elsewhere in the European Union, is not the European arrest warrant a vital part of the necessary armoury? Will the Attorney-General tell his Back Benchers that he is not going to step outside the European arrest warrant, even if they want to do so?

[The Attorney-General]

I have no doubt at all that mechanisms for co-operation throughout the European Union and, indeed, elsewhere can be very useful in the apprehension of criminals, particularly in this field. How that should best be carried out is, if I may say to the hon. Gentleman, ultimately I suppose a matter for this House, if it ever comes up for review.

Phone Hacking

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

I was going to make that point myself.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I give way to the Attorney-General, in the hope that he will make the same point as well.

[The Attorney-General]

The hon. Gentleman has taken the wind out of my sails in one respect. I was going to agree with him that it was possible to set up an inquiry. However, I am sure he will appreciate that it becomes extremely difficult for an inquiry to take any evidence while criminal proceedings may still be taking place. That is obviously one reason why the Gibson inquiry has not yet begun its work, which it was hoped would start at the end of last year. I certainly note the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the possibility of setting up an inquiry, but it may not make much progress until the criminal investigations are over.

[Chris Bryant]

I am grateful to the Attorney-General for the way in which he has expressed himself. That is, in fact, a big concession. I think it important for us to make progress, not least because I think that the police themselves would like the sword of Damocles to hang over their necks, so that they know they must proceed and proceed apace. Also, when it comes to an inquiry—especially in this case—they sometimes have to look through the historiography of all the different documentation, and it is important to ensure that that is garnered now, privately.

I see no reason—other than a lack of will, or fear of what it might unveil—for the Government not to set up an inquiry, establish its terms of reference, and appoint its membership immediately.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I have no doubt that that factor, along with every single representation made by Members of this House on how they think the inquiry or inquiries should be conducted, can be taken into account.

[Chris Bryant]

The Attorney-General is absolutely right to say that it is not a matter for the Secretary of State but for Ofcom to decide whether somebody is a fit and proper person, but the whole point is that Ofcom can have no chance to do so unless there is a pause in the Secretary of State’s decision. We need a pause so that Ofcom can come to a conclusion at the end of the police investigation.

[The Attorney-General]

It is a matter that I am very happy to go away and check, but I think the hon. Gentleman might be mistaken. I think that in fact Ofcom could intervene at any stage if it were to conclude that somebody was not a fit and proper person to hold a broadcasting licence. As these matters can be complex and I would not wish in any way to mislead the House, I would be happy to go away and check that point and to write to the hon. Gentleman about it.

[The Attorney-General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend and that confirms what I already thought. Of course, that will not prevent me from going away and triple-checking the matter before I write to the hon. Member for Rhondda about it.

I am conscious that I ought to make progress and I want to allow time for debate. Because of my rather limited ability to comment on many of the allegations made, I was going to remind the House of some of the history of this matter. The House will be aware that these problems originated in November 2005 when the Metropolitan police were contacted by the royal household with concerns that voicemails relating to members of the royal family had been intercepted—

[Chris Bryant]

We know all this.

[The Attorney-General]

The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that he knows all this. He might know all of it, but it is worth reminding the House of some of the salient facts of the inquiry if we are to have an informed debate. I apologise to him if he feels that it is otiose.

In those circumstances, the arrests of Glenn Mulcaire and Clive Goodman took place in August 2006 for unlawful interception of phone messages. Searching Mulcaire’s business premises, police uncovered further evidence of interception relating to a number of other individuals not related to the royal household. As the hon. Member for Rhondda, if not the House, will be aware, Mulcaire and Goodman pleaded guilty— Goodman only to the charges relating to the royal family and Mulcaire to five further counts relating to individuals in the public eye—and were sentenced in January 2007 to four months and six months in prison respectively. It is worth bearing in mind that although I know of the hon. Gentleman’s interest in the matter, after January 2007 matters remained essentially quiet until July 2009, when the media reported fresh allegations relating to further cases of phone hacking.

The Crown Prosecution Service reviewed the material provided to it by the police in order to satisfy itself that appropriate actions had been taken in respect of the material. The CPS was satisfied that the prosecution approach to charging and prosecution was proper and that it would not be appropriate to reopen the cases against Mr Goodman and Mr Mulcaire. It also concluded that any new information should be reported to the police for further investigation.

Voting by Prisoners

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I appreciate that that is what my hon. Friend and many others believe the issue for debate to be. I recognise that it is going to be a major topic for debate this afternoon, but, if he will forgive me, I will suggest that hon. Members might also wish to focus on why they consider the current ban, or some variant of it, to be reasonable and proportionate in our own national context. It was the absence of debate on that issue that appeared to make the Court take the view that our ban was indiscriminate—

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Really?

[The Attorney-General]

Well, it was one of the reasons it took that view.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

I would have to check that position. My understanding was—it might be incorrect—that the Irish Government provided a postal voting system.

[Chris Bryant]

Is it not an irony that prisoners in Britain had the vote for a while, but were unable to register and therefore were unable to exercise their right to vote?

[The Attorney-General]

I have no doubt that at one time that was correct. Indeed, before 1870, large numbers of people did not have the right to vote in any case, which adds another complicating issue. I think we should look at the here and now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend makes a remarkably subtle and nuanced point, which is unusual for him. [Interruption.] I think he knows that I mean that in the kindest way. Following on from his point, I would add that the Court has been wrong to assert that we have a blanket ban in the UK. As has already been said by several speakers, we do not ban those on remand, or those who are in prison by virtue of contempt of court or for fines. It is therefore not a blanket ban, and I think the Court should have taken that into consideration.

I want now to refer briefly to the Government’s record, as they have hardly covered themselves in glory. [Interruption.] I was not going to make these points until the Attorney-General decided to attack the previous Labour Government; I had crossed these remarks out, but I have now decided to reinstate them.

In opposition, one Conservative right hon. and learned Member dismissed the idea of prisoners’ votes as “ludicrous” and said that

“it will bring the law into disrepute and many people will see it as making a mockery of justice”.

I think many people would agree. The right hon. and learned Member who said that was the current Attorney-General. He also said that

“there is no reason why our courts should be bound by Strasbourg Court jurisprudence”

and

“the obligation on the UK to respect Strasbourg Court adverse decisions, in a particular case to which it is a party, is an international treaty obligation and not a legally enforceable matter at all.”

I do not think that is quite what he said this afternoon.

[The Attorney-General]

I thought I had made the position clear. First, this Parliament is entirely sovereign in both Houses in the enactment of primary legislation and can resolve what it wants. Secondly, the Executive are bound by the ministerial code to observe their international treaty obligations that have been ratified.

[Chris Bryant]

That is not quite how the right hon. and learned Gentleman expressed it on the radio before the general election, but I just want to check this: is it still the Attorney-General’s legal advice that there is no need for Parliament to adhere to the treaty, the convention and the judgment of the Court? That seemed to be the point that he was making previously—I know the point that he is making about the Government’s requirement.

[The Attorney-General]

If I may say so, I think the hon. Gentleman has taken my comments slightly out of context in the following sense. The debate that was taking place, and which has often been a problem, is about conflating EU law and the EU with the Council of Europe. EU law, by virtue of the treaty of accession—

[The Attorney-General]

Yes, the European Communities Act 1972. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that. By virtue of the ’72 Act, EU law has direct application in this country, whereas the Council of Europe and European convention on human rights do not, except in so far as we incorporate that in the Human Rights Act 1998. That is the distinction.

[Chris Bryant]

Fine; I am glad that the Attorney-General has clarified that. Can he clarify one other point, too? The one element on which he has not given us any advice today—and if he has any legal advice, I would be grateful if he published it—is his interpretation of the wriggle room or margin of appreciation that is genuinely available to us. He seems to have suggested today that one area that was insisted on in Frodl v. Austria—namely that judges should have to be able to make an individual decision on each person for that to be valid—is no longer necessary for us, although that was in the ministerial statement issued by the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, on the day before we broke for Christmas. [Interruption.] The Attorney-General appears to be disagreeing with that, but it was in that ministerial statement.

I also want to know whether the Attorney-General has had legal advice on whether four years is necessary, or whether one could get away with less than that. Those of us who want to be able to do everything we can are keen to know the absolute minimum that the Government would have to do to comply.

[The Attorney-General]

The hon. Gentleman knows the conventions in government—one of which is that Law Officers’ advice, and whether it has been sought and what they have advised, is not published. I can say two things, however. First, I have sought to explain something of the legal framework. As for the questions about Greens and M.T. and Frodl, read on its own the Frodl judgment would suggest that judicial discretion was required. Subsequently however, Greens and M.T. does not appear to insist on judicial discretion. Judicial discretion appears to have particularly exercised people in this country, because they do not think the judges should necessarily make such a determination. In those circumstances, although the House might wish to look at judicial discretion issues—and it has been suggested that that might be a way of dealing with those who fell below a benchmark for normally being allowed to retain the vote—that is not necessary.

[Chris Bryant]

Again, I am grateful to the Attorney-General, as I agree with him; my reading of the Greens and M.T. case is wholly consistent with his in relation to judicial oversight. That was one of the questions that we raised in the debate in January, and I received responses from the Minister who took part in that debate only at 8.31 pm yesterday.

I reiterate that the Government have made various statements over the past few months. The Lord Chancellor made one yesterday on the radio, the relevant Minister made one in the House of Lords and the Minister who responded to the Adjournment debate in Westminster Hall made one then. Those statements have not been consistent with each other, but they have adverted to legal advice. It is the tradition of this House that when one relies on evidence, that evidence is published.

So what is the Government’s policy? What is the absolute minimum that they believe the UK has to deliver to meet its treaty obligations?

[Chris Bryant]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not mind if I do not give way, because others want to speak and I ought to be drawing my comments to a close.

Would it be sufficient for the Government to present proposals—[Interruption.] I would be grateful if the Attorney-General would listen, just briefly. Would it be sufficient for the Government to present proposals—introduce legislation—but for Parliament not to agree them? Would that, in some sense, satisfy the Court? What do the Government believe will happen if the House supports the motion this afternoon? How have the Government arrived at the compensation figure? Previously it has been said that £160 million-worth of compensation will be entailed, but I gather that last night the media were briefed that the compensation figure will be £143 million. I understand that that has been arrived at on the basis not of the Attorney-General’s legal advice, but of advice given to the Government by others. Will that be published? Can he explain how the compensation would be enforced, given that all applications for compensation to the county court should surely be struck out by dint of section 6(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which reinforces parliamentary sovereignty? Indeed, is there not a claim in the High Court today from the Treasury solicitor to that effect?

[The Attorney-General]

All I will say on the issue of compensation is that it is very difficult to know how much compensation might or might not have to be paid. Let us suppose that there were two elections in which the entirety of the sentenced population in the prison system were deprived of the right to vote and they were all to bring a claim. On the basis of there being about 73,000 people in the prison system in that category and on the basis that about £1,000 to £1,500 of compensation and costs might have to be paid, the hon. Gentleman will be able to start to work out what sort of total cost might be involved. Of course, lots of prisoners might decide not to bring a claim, so I must accept that all the Government can do is provide a reasonable guide of the potential for the matter to be very costly. The hon. Gentleman will have no difficulty acknowledging that when he does the calculation.

[Chris Bryant]

I note that the Attorney-General was referring to general elections, but of course it was stated in evidence last week to the Select Committee that the Scottish and Welsh elections in the next few weeks present a real problem. I accept that there are problems, but I wonder how anybody conceives that compensation payments would be enforced.

[The Attorney-General]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I will, of course, give way, but I am trying to end my speech.

[The Attorney-General]

I apologise for intervening, and the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I had to bring my remarks to a close earlier as I did not want to take up too much time. He rightly says that arguments were placed before the Select Committee by lawyers saying that they thought that the matter applied also to voting in devolved legislatures. That is not the Government’s view.

[Chris Bryant]

I am grateful to the Attorney-General for that. This is a Back-Bench debate and it provides an opportunity for the Government to take the temperature of the House without the intervention of a Whip. We believe that the Committee of Ministers, which is charged with ensuring the execution of the Court’s judgments, should take proper cognisance of a clear, un-whipped majority in this House. The Court should step away from insisting on its most draconian interpretation of the margin of appreciation available, not just to this country, but to others, as there is no one European standard on this matter. Indeed, many countries maintain a complete ban. Finally, any British Court considering compensation or action based on the Hirst judgment should also think twice before “impeaching or questioning” this proceeding in Parliament.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Chris Bryant

Tuesday 27th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

As I indicated a moment ago, the view of the Serious Fraud Office is that, on the basis of its submissions, it will have the necessary resources—including that £2 million—to do what is necessary in this area. It is worth remembering that the policy, which was commenced by the previous Government, was designed to limit the number of contested cases. For example, section 7 of the Act, which covers the failure by commercial organisations to prevent bribery, is intended to encourage commercial organisations to self-refer and co-operate. This is one of the reasons why it is hoped and expected that, in many cases, expenditure on major trial processes will not be necessary. The £2 million that has been identified is the Serious Fraud Office’s best assessment of what will be needed to take this policy forward.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

May I suggest one other area in which the Serious Fraud Office should do a bit more work? It relates to the suborning of police officers. We have only to read a couple of tabloid newspapers every day to see that newspapers and journalists pay police officers for stories, which constitutes suborning a police officer.

[The Attorney-General]

By its nature, the Serious Fraud Office is concerned principally with offences of serious fraud. I certainly think that suborning a police officer is an extremely serious offence, but it seems to me to be a matter that is more likely to lie with the Crown Prosecution Service.