High Court Judgment (John Downey)

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Thursday 27th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robertson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He is a valuable member of the Select Committee and I am grateful to him for his support on this and many other issues. The point he makes is correct. Not being a lawyer myself, I cannot make a judgment on whether that is normal. My suggestion is that perhaps it is not normal. I understood courts always to look at the facts before them, but in this case the court seems to have relied on this letter, which concentrated on the fact that the PSNI did not want to question Mr Downey. It said only that in the PSNI’s belief no other police force in the United Kingdom wanted to question him—it was not a categorical assurance. That letter, weak and flimsy though it may sound, seems to have taken on a greater importance because of the political process. I would be the first to say that it is very important that we do not unravel the peace process or undo the enormous achievements in Northern Ireland, but the rule of law applies here, as well as the separation of powers between the Executive, Parliament and the courts, which has to be observed. I suggest that all the inquiries have that as the central motivation behind their opening.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

I may be able to help my hon. Friend. The judgment in the Downey case speaks for itself, and one needs to read it. It is very straightforward in its language about the terms of what had happened and the impact that the judge felt it had on the fairness of any prosecutorial process. Beyond that, to pick up a point that was raised earlier, that judgment was considered with great care by the Crown Prosecution Service, using independent lawyers’ advice, and the CPS was clear that it was not possible to appeal against it. CPS staff came and explained that to me and, having listened carefully to what they had to say, I shared their view.

[Mr Robertson]

I am grateful to the Attorney-General for that clarification of the possibility of appealing in that case. That certainly was the advice that I received yesterday from an eminent QC—

[Mr Robertson]

My understanding from our discussions yesterday was that a stay cannot be appealed.

[The Attorney-General]

The decision of the judge was capable of being appealed. I hope I made that clear when I made my statement in February. It was possible to appeal against the decision but, for the reasons I have just given, the view was taken that it had no reasonable prospect of success.

[Mr Robertson]

I am again grateful to the Attorney-General for that clarification, although it is in some contradiction to the advice I received from Queen’s counsel yesterday. Perhaps this matter could be taken up further, but at this stage it is probably better to move on from the case.

[Mr Robertson]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and that is why the conflicting advice we have received has to be explored further. If a stay cannot be appealed, it cannot be appealed, but if—as the Attorney-General suggests—the issue is that there is no prospect of overturning the judgment, my view as a non-lawyer is that we should consider an appeal. It is extraordinary that a letter, which appears to be ambiguously worded, can take on greater importance than a charge of multiple murder. I do not know whether it is unique, but it is extremely unusual.

[The Attorney-General]

I rise again only to say that the decisions of the Crown Prosecution Service cannot be taken on a political basis. Indeed, insofar as I exercise functions in relation to the administration of justice, I have to ensure that those are not taken on a party-political or other political basis. It might often be convenient politically to do something, but if it is not justified on an objective consideration, it would be quite improper to do it.

[Mr Robertson]

I do not think that anyone would disagree with what the Attorney-General has just said. The problem is that the judgment in the Downey case appears to have taken the political situation into account, and that is what concerns everyone. Royal pardons appear to have been given, but I do not know what they were given for or which crimes were being overlooked. If that was not done on a political basis, I do not know what constitutes a political basis. The point that we are trying to make is that such decisions should be made on a legal basis, not a political basis.

The one good aspect is that the judgment has blown open the whole issue and drawn attention to what has been going on. The Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill was introduced in 2005, presumably because it was felt necessary to put the scheme on to a statutory basis, to give it a public airing or some respectability. It now seems that the scheme had been running since 1999, but it was six years before the Bill was introduced. The Bill was dropped, but the scheme continued. Was the scheme legitimate for all that time? If it was, why the need for the Bill?

As the right hon. Member for Belfast North said, the 1998 legislation—some of which I also voted against, for all sorts of reasons—addressed very unpalatable issues, but at least we could debate and vote on them publicly.