Investigatory Powers Bill

David Winnick Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)]

I shall come on in a few moments to some of the points raised by the right hon. Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson). Let me say, however, that I am deeply disappointed with the Bill, which does not even attempt a broad consensus outside this place on the balance between measures to protect the country from terrorism and those protecting the privacy at the same time of the overwhelming majority of citizens. I am not one of those who in any way minimises the continuing threats from terrorism. I well remember the atrocities of 7/7 and I know, as we all do, what happened over the weekend on the Ivory Coast, when a five-year-old lad was put to death by the terrorists. The boy was begging for his life, but it was no use. I am as aware as anyone of the murderous nature of the terrorist threats we face, and have no desire to minimise it in any way whatever.

One would have hoped that, with existing legislation due to lapse, any new measure would be of a different kind from what we have today—less severe and less comprehensive in many respects than some of the Bill’s clauses, which in my view are bound to be controversial and will remain so if the Bill becomes law.

The right hon. Member for North Shropshire was not happy about the judicial process involved, but I take the opposite view. If these measures are indeed going to be brought in, all the more reason for some judicial involvement. That would make it better than it otherwise would be. My criticism—again, it is very different from his—relates to the extent to which the judicial commissioners are likely to be able to probe the case for the warrant that the Home Secretary wants to be issued. It seems more likely to me that a judicial commissioner will merely have to be satisfied that all the necessary processes have been pursued. To what extent would a commissioner dealing with a case in which a warrant had been applied for be able to hear counter-arguments?

If I were asked what I considered to be the most objectionable aspect of the Bill, and why I could never vote for it in any circumstances, I would cite clauses 78 and 79, which require the retention of communication data—and internet connection records of all kinds—for up to 12 months. Let us be perfectly clear about that. Let us have no illusions about it. Is it really desirable to retain, for that period, information relating to those who are not suspected of any criminal activity, and who, needless to say, constitute the overwhelming majority? Does anyone really believe that that will help the fight against terrorism? It could rather be argued that, by its very nature and given its controversial aspects, it is likely to be more counterproductive than helpful. If those clauses do not undermine privacy, I can only say that the very word “privacy” loses all meaning. Notwithstanding all the denials from Ministers, I would describe this as snooping on a massive scale, although we have been reassured that the actual content will not be looked at.

Mention has been made of the powers that will be given to what are described as “relevant public authorities”—not just the security authorities—to obtain communication data. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) and other Labour Members have rightly pointed out that that could be used against trade unions. The 10 purposes for which data can be required include “public safety”, “financial stability” and

“the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

All those purposes could be used against trade unions in industrial relations cases. Labour Members should be, and are, very much on their guard, and I trust that those provisions will be examined in great detail in Committee.

The Joint Committee made some helpful recommendations relating to bulk personal dataset warrants, which, if put into effect, will improve the Bill. Following the Edward Snowden revelations, about which there was a great deal of fuss, the United States Senate took steps to restrict the collection of bulk communications except when there was a reasonable suspicion of association with international terrorism. The Bill is, essentially, doing the reverse—and the United States would have been unlikely to take measures to restrict those communications had it not been for Edward Snowden’s revelations.

Bill Binney, a former technical director of the United States National Security Agency—presumably he is not one of the usual suspects, and should know what he is talking about—has argued in articles, and in a letter published in The Times on 1 March, that bulk collection simply does not work. Scanning every single person’s communications, he says, simply overloads the scanner with data and false targets. What is really needed—and this is pretty obvious—is an emphasis on target suspects and their social networks.

We are being told today that the Bill is absolutely essential, and that if we want to combat terrorism, the way to do it is to pass this legislation. I am reminded, however, that following 7/7, we were told that it was absolutely essential to have 90 days, and later 42 days, of pre-charge detention and that unless we passed legislation to that effect, the country would be greatly threatened. Those of us who opposed it were accused of undermining security. Today, no one on either Front Bench would dream of recommending 90 or 42 days of pre-charge detention.

So this is just a warning that we should be very careful about giving away powers that it would be very difficult to take back. I said at the beginning of my speech that I was not persuaded that this legislation was justified. I think it is wrong and disproportionate, and I hope that if it is to become law, it will be substantially amended.