Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, given General Sir Richard Barrons' evidence to the Defence Committee on 7 July 2026 that expenditure under the 1.5% of GDP NATO resilience target has not funded the security of military airbases, the condition of military ports, NHS mass casualty capacity, or mobilisation and forward-basing stock, why his Department did not prioritise these areas.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The UK has met the NATO 1.5% commitment on security and resilience, reflecting investment across civil-military capability, resilience, industrial capacity, stockpiles and support to partners.
Under the NATO definition, investment in defence infrastructure and capabilities is core defence spend. The Defence Investment Plan has set out investments over the next 10 years, including £51 billion earmarked for the Defence estate; modernising critical airbase and airfield capabilities and delivering the biggest naval upgrade for 45 years.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what definition his Department is using of expenditure that qualifies as resilience and security spending for the purposes of the Government's commitment to spend 1.5% of GDP on this by 2035.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
I refer the hon. Member to the response my Rt Hon. Friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury provided to Question 17649 of 9 July 2026.
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-07-09/17649
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what contingency arrangements are in place to maintain police communications in the event of a failure of the Emergency Services Network or wider telecommunications infrastructure.
Answered by Sarah Jones - Minister of State (Home Office)
The Emergency Services Network (ESN) is designed as a mission-critical communications service, with resilience built into its end-to-end architecture, governance and operational arrangements. It will provide police and other emergency services with priority and pre-emption over ordinary commercial mobile traffic, helping to maintain emergency communications during periods of network congestion or major incidents.
ESN has contracted for high levels of service availability and is working with delivery partners and cross-government resilience forums to ensure that ESN can withstand and recover from incidents affecting power, telecommunications and other supporting infrastructure.
Where telecommunications capacity is reduced, ESN users will be prioritised over commercial users. ESN resilience planning also includes enhanced coverage, resilient transmission, use of satellite connectivity for some remote sites, deployable coverage where appropriate, and contingency planning for severe weather and power disruption, including the deployment of at least 2000 additional generators for power outages. If, despite these measures, ESN coverage is unavailable in a particular area, users will be able to communicate using Tetra Direct Mode Operation, which does not rely on network coverage.
The Home Office has undertaken, and will continue to undertake, testing and risk assessment as ESN is developed and implemented. For security and operational reasons, it would not be appropriate to disclose detailed contingency arrangements or specific technical mitigations.
Additionally, individual police forces and emergency service organisations also maintain their own business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements for scenarios affecting communications infrastructure.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment her Department has made of the capacity of the police mutual aid system to respond to simultaneous civil disorder in multiple police force areas.
Answered by Sarah Jones - Minister of State (Home Office)
We are committed to ensuring the police have the capabilities needed to respond to violent disorder wherever it occurs.
Following the Summer 2024 disorder, His Majesty’s Inspectorate for Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services identified gaps in central public order mobilisation capability. It is important that we learn the lessons from the most significant public disorder in more than a decade.
We have delivered a package via the Police Reform White Paper to strengthen the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and National Police Coordination Centre’s (NPoCC) intelligence, investigation, and co-ordination capabilities. This will equip police forces to respond rapidly to the needs of the communities they serve, enabling them to react in real-time to incidents and emergencies.
The Police Reform White Paper outlines that the National Police Service will have capabilities to direct and coordinate resources where disorder is widespread; ensure national mobilisation is more efficient and effective; and strengthen command, control, and strategic oversight across forces.
We continue to work closely with the NPoCC to ensure mutual aid arrangements can be mobilised effectively when required.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what training or exercises to prepare for civil unrest arising from a major national crisis have been conducted in the last 12 months, broken down by (a) police force and (b) number of exercises.
Answered by Sarah Jones - Minister of State (Home Office)
The College of Policing is responsible for providing guidance and training to police. Whilst the police are operationally independent, this government is committed to ensuring the police have the capabilities needed to respond to violent disorder wherever it occurs. The disorder seen in Summer 2024 highlighted the importance of ensuring that policing has the capability to respond effectively to large-scale public order incidents. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services subsequently identified shortcomings in central public order mobilisation arrangements. It is right that we take forward the lessons from the most significant period of public disorder in over a decade.
As part of the Police Reform White Paper, we have introduced measures to enhance the intelligence, investigative and coordination functions of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC). These improvements will support forces in responding swiftly and effectively to emerging incidents and operational demands, helping them to better protect and serve their communities.
The White Paper sets out plans for the National Police Service to strengthen the way resources are coordinated during periods of widespread disorder, improve the effectiveness of national mobilisation arrangements, and enhance command, control and strategic oversight across policing.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what specific items of expenditure have been counted towards the Government's claim to have met the NATO target of spending 1.5% of GDP on resilience-related investment.
Answered by Angela Eagle - Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
The UK has met NATO’s 1.5% defence and security-related spending target, as defined by NATO. NATO’s definition sets out that spend should be to protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation and strengthen our defence industrial base.
Given this definition, contributions came from a number of departments. All spending captured as part of the 1.5% is determined through the Spending Review and set out to Parliament via the Estimates process in the usual way.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, whether (a) his and (b) any other Department has identified any (i) state, (ii) state-linked and (iii) state-sponsored entity as (A) partially and (B) wholly responsible for the August 2025 to September 2025 cyber attack on Jaguar Land Rover.
Answered by Angela Eagle - Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
The Government does not routinely comment on ongoing investigations or operational activity.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Department for Work and Pensions:
To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, how many veterans with amputations or other permanent injuries were reassessed for disability-related benefits in each of the last three years.
Answered by Stephen Timms - Minister of State (Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government) (Equalities)
The information could only be provided at disproportionate cost.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he has made an assessment of the adequacy of recognition of chronic pain conditions within Armed Forces compensation schemes.
Answered by Calvin Bailey - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for Veterans and People)
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 17 June 2026 to Question 9408 to the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade).
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-06-12/9408.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government:
To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what proportion of local authorities in England have an up-to-date community risk register and emergency plan.
Answered by Samantha Dixon
As of July 2026, all of the 38 Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England have a Community Risk Register currently in place, of which 21 were reviewed and updated within the past 2 years and 17 are currently under review or due to be reviewed.
LRFs, established under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, are based on police force boundaries and bring together emergency services, local authorities, health partners and other responder organisations. The 38 LRFs in England are responsible for producing Community Risk Registers and developing and maintaining multi-agency emergency plans, which collectively cover all local authorities in England. Local authorities participate as core partners in these arrangements.
Community Risk Registers are public-facing risk assessments produced by LRFs. They identify the most significant risks facing a local area and draw on the National Risk Register, guidance produced by the Cabinet Office and local expertise to inform emergency planning and preparedness.