National Resilience

Debate between David Reed and Adrian Ramsay

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[David Reed]

There must have been a leak, because I am going to come on to that paragraph straight away.

Beyond the issue of funding, the obvious question that flows from this is who in Government should take the lead in having that conversation with the public about the panoply of threats that we face. That leads to the central argument of this debate: is the British state structured to deal effectively with them? I accept that the machinery of government is a surefire way to send those in this Chamber to sleep, but it is central to the direction of travel we must take.

I was waiting with bated breath to see who the Government would send to respond to the debate this evening, because logic would dictate that the Minister responding should come from the Department that the Prime Minister has charged with leading the national conversation on resilience. Here lies the first problem. The Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office. His portfolio is broad, but it clearly does not cover anywhere near the full range of threats set out in the Government’s own definition of national resilience.

The Cabinet Office has a resilience directorate, which does important work co-ordinating civil contingency planning, crisis management and emergency response across national and local levels. I would not diminish the work that it does for a moment, but let us consider its design: a directorate for preparedness and a Cobra unit for crisis response. Risk and response. Notice what is missing. There is machinery to assess the threat and machinery to manage the emergency, but nowhere is anyone charged with turning to the public and saying, “Here is the threat we face, here is your part in it, and here is what is being done in your name.” The national conversation that we need therefore finds no natural home. It does not emanate from the directorates whose remit is risk and response; nor has the Ministry of Defence acted on the strategic defence review’s own call for a national conversation on defence and resilience.

The result is a system in which responsibility is spread so thinly that no single Minister owns the problem. The danger of that is not merely administrative tidiness but that when a crisis strikes, command and control will fracture at precisely the moment it must hold. For example, the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—which hands the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology sweeping new powers to direct critical entities—illustrates the trend rather than reversing it. Individual Departments are accruing resilience powers of their own, with each cooking up policies to support their own patch. A whistle must be blown on this approach, because we risk spreading responsibility through legislation so thinly that no one truly understands where it lies.

When I speak to civil servants—all of whom want to see a stronger and safer country—I notice that the word “resilience” has itself become something of a buzzword, a phrase to attach to a business case to secure a bigger departmental budget. That is a sign of a system without a clear centre of gravity, not of one that is working. That led me to research in depth how our near neighbours have approached this problem—countries with national stories like our own and populations whose memories of insecurity have faded, just as ours have.

The clearest exemplar I found is Denmark. The Danes have grasped something that we have not yet acted upon: in an age of interconnected threats—where cyber-attacks become supply shocks become public-safety emergencies—danger no longer respects departmental boundaries. For decades they had run, as we still do, on a principle of sectoral responsibility—each Department minding risk in its own lane. They concluded that a system in which everyone is responsible is one in which, in practice, no one is.

In August 2024, the Danes acted, creating a dedicated ministry of resilience and preparedness, the first of its kind in the region, with a Cabinet Minister in charge. Within months, they established a resilience agency beneath it, drawing scattered functions into one organisation—one ministry, one Cabinet Minister, one clear line of accountability.

If truth be told, it is too early to say with certainty whether the model delivers the better outcomes that the Danes expect. The real test will come in the next crisis, not the last reorganisation. But the logic is sound because the alternative—broadly what we have—is a system where resilience is everyone’s second priority and nobody’s first. As someone who wants to see a smaller and sharper state, the answer is not a new layer of governance, but collapsing many duplicated ones into a single, accountable home. It is an idea that the Government should actively investigate.

I have also been struck by how our Danish and Dutch friends have begun to share the responsibility for resilience with their citizens, reinforcing civic duty in a far more deliberate way than we do here in the UK. Both have started speaking plainly to their people about preparedness and, strikingly, they tell them much the same thing: “Be ready to look after yourself for three days, or 72 hours.” The Dutch Government now tell every household to hold enough to manage for 72 hours in the event of war, a cyber-attack or a major disaster—things such as water, food, medication, a battery radio, some cash and key documents. They did not merely issue advice; they delivered a printed survival guide to every door and published it online in dozens of languages. Its message was carefully chosen, and the aim, Ministers said, is not to frighten people but to prepare them, because those who think through the first 72 hours of a crisis feel safer, not more fearful. The campaign’s slogan is simple: “Think Ahead”.

Denmark’s advice is almost identical, and the reasoning is the same: if ordinary people can get through the first three days, the authorities can concentrate on those who cannot. Denmark sent that guidance to every adult through its secure Government messaging system and placed 300,000 printed copies in libraries and public offices. It does not shy away from naming why, either. Its Defence Minister told Danes plainly that they and their allies face hybrid war and that each of us should prepare to be without power, water or shops for a short while. In both countries, the principle is the same: resilience is not something the state can simply hand to its people; it is a habit that the public must share in.

[Adrian Ramsay (Waveney Valley) (Green)]

I thank the hon. Member for bringing this debate and in particular for his focus on the need for cross-Government action and to address the range of threats we face. Does he agree that as part of the resilience planning, addressing the risks attached to climate breakdown and nature collapse are absolutely central? On his point about transparency, does he agree that the two suppressed reports from the Joint Intelligence Committee and from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ futures team need to be made available if the Government and Members across parties are to work clearly to address these issues and inform the public?

[David Reed]

The hon. Member raises an important point. For anyone who understands the science and sees the effects globally, climate change is happening, the planet is warming up, and we will all feel the effects of a heating planet. What that does to our critical national infrastructure, to businesses and how they operate, and to our energy systems will be profound, and it is something that I do not think we talk about enough. We talked about it a great deal a few years ago, but it sort of slid off the agenda. However, I also understand the challenges that the Government are facing at the moment: there are international threats, which seem to be conjoining, and climate change seems to be a further away problem. I understand the issues, and I hope the Minister can draw that subject in to show the interconnection of threats and how we will deal with them.

The uncomfortable part is that in terms of national messaging Britain has said and tried to do the same thing, but we say the words without a plan behind them, the public get alarmed, the moment passes, and nothing changes. Denmark and the Netherlands said those words and built them into the life of the nation, and that, in a sentence, is the difference between talking about resilience and doing it.

Let me close with three concrete asks of the Government. First, will the Minister confirm whether any Department or Minister has been formally charged with delivering the national conversation on resilience called for by the strategic defence review? If not, that gap must be filled—I think we would all agree on that. Secondly, will the Government commission a review, led from the centre, into whether the current dispersal of resilience responsibilities across Whitehall is fit for purpose, with the Danish and Dutch models considered explicitly? Thirdly, will the Government speak plainly to the British public about the threats we face, and back those words with a sustained public preparedness campaign, not a single statement that fades within a week, but a message built into the life of the nation?

I return to the statement that is made repeatedly in this House, which is that the first duty of any Government is the defence of the realm. Meeting that duty requires a state that is structured to lead, and a public who are prepared to follow. We are not yet that country, but I have faith we can be.