European Agenda on Migration

David Lidington Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

The question of the “European Agenda on Migration” and the action plan appear in a motion which we had to urge the Government to split from the previous one. Although there are some differences between them, in practice there are also some important similarities, as the Minister said at the beginning of his speech. However, a number of issues relating to this motion are of grave concern. I remind the Minister that, in his explanatory memorandum on the communications—this was some time ago, but I do not want to go through all that again—he said that the Commission had failed to

“present the correct set of policies to address the problems that Europe is currently facing in the Mediterranean and from mother migratory pressures”.

I am sure that he will understand my asking this question, which is pretty obvious: what are the correct policies, if this is the wrong one?

The Commission considers that the asylum system in the European Union, and the operation of the Dublin rules, are regarded as being “fundamentally unfair”. Let me ask another question. Is the Dublin system broken —and, given the behaviour of the German Chancellor, it appears to me that it is—or can it be repaired? If so, do the Government want it to be repaired? What changes do they want to be made when the Dublin rules are reviewed next year?

The Government have already made it clear that they favour a policy of resettlement—and I thoroughly support them in that respect—rather than relocation. Those words tend to be used rather freely, but resettlement is quite different from relocation. Relocation applies to individuals who are already in the European Union, who have applied for asylum in a front-line member state, and who are presumed, on the basis of their nationality, to be very likely to qualify for international protection. Resettlement, on the other hand, applies to those outside the EU who are admitted from their country of origin or from camps neighbouring conflict areas. Member states have collectively agreed to resettle 22,504 individuals from outside the EU in 2015 on the basis that they are in need of international protection. I have to say that, although that is the assertion, regrettably serious questions have to be raised about the nature of some of the people who claim to be in need of international protection. Many no doubt justify receiving protection, but I then move on to the United Nations convention—the 1951 Geneva convention—and the breadth of the definition that is applied, and my concern is that what we really need is a re-evaluation of the definitions of what is a refugee, what is a migrant and what is an asylum seeker.

I have to say that at the meeting I referred to in the previous debate which took place in Rome only last Friday, at which all the Chairmen of the relevant Select Committees were present, there was in fact an endorsement of my proposal, which I have been putting to various international and EU meetings over the past four months, for a review of these definitions. These definitions have been expanded even from 1951 and now cover so many different areas and types of people that it is extremely difficult to imagine whether any reasonable basis for a refusal to relocate them can be pursued.

We have already heard about the very few—about 100, I think—who have been relocated. The reason for that is part of the problem, which I will come on to in a moment: the charter of fundamental rights, which is applied in this instance and also for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. I know that people feel very strongly about this on both sides of the equation, and we have agreed that we would repeal the Human Rights Act, but in my judgment the depth of the analysis of the charter needs to be greatly improved. People who are claiming asylum can fall back on these international conventions in a way that creates a blockage of the legal system and the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the human rights legislation, whether in respect of the charter or the European convention on human rights. There is therefore an increasing statistical and legal problem which is that more and more people are claiming asylum and, effectively, being granted it. I am not saying there are not many cases where that is justified, but I am saying that I think the definitions are so wide that this is becoming a very difficult problem and is not in fact going to lead to any serious policy of returns or deportations.

The Government have underlined the importance of breaking the economic model that encourages criminals to put people in harm’s way at sea, and that has to be highly commended. There are certainly advantages to the effectiveness of Operation Sophia, which has been well supported by the United Kingdom. The trouble is that with many traffickers and smugglers the problems exceed the capacity to deal with them. How effective does the Minister believe Operation Sophia has been because of the absence of an internationally recognised Government in Libya?

I now turn to the question of the extent to which we have entered into a sensible arrangement with Turkey. Turkey and the EU have signed a deal to give Turkey fast-track visa privileges in return for £3 billion-worth of aid and, I believe, the prospect of continuing financial support. There is also the prospect of a revitalised EU membership in return for a commitment to a migration action plan. I am profoundly cynical about this arrangement. I think it is based on giving money, almost in the nature of a bribe to Turkey. From what I have been hearing—and certainly from a meeting I attended very recently—the authorities in Turkey have been by no means diligent in enforcing the arrangements that are supposed to have been in place. The fact that so many people are making their way through the continent of Europe northwards towards Germany, causing an enormous amount of disruption, owes a great deal to the inefficiency with which I believe Turkey has been behaving recently.

In addition to that, without getting into the foreign policy and defence implications, Turkey has been at loggerheads with Russia, and that is a severe complication in relation to concerted action in Syria. Turkey is also profoundly committed to dealing, as it sees it, with the Kurds. That is probably more important to Turkey than anything else in this context, and that is also an obstacle to a coherent policy. I am therefore profoundly cynical about exactly how the Turkey deal will operate.

In terms of these fast-track visa privileges and its desire to come into the EU, we have to bear in mind that there are 78 million people in Turkey already, and I am told that that is increasing at something like the rate of about 1 million every 18 months. As the population expands, Turkish engagement with the EU and people coming over here will increase exponentially.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I hope my hon. Friend will acknowledge that the discussions about possible future visa liberalisation involve the Schengen countries; they do not involve those EU member states that are not part of Schengen.

[Sir William Cash]

Unfortunately, the Minister was not here when I spent a little time talking about the Schengen aspect of this in a previous debate. I believe that the current proposals, which increase the range of the border issue to external borders and include Schengen, will burst. This is not going to work. There is not the money to pay for it. The failure rate of Frontex is evident. I believe that the arrangement will not work in future, and the fact that we are not a member of Schengen will not alter the pressures of the kind we have witnessed recently that come as a result of people entering the Schengen area and, having acquired a passport and EU citizenship, making their way through the whole of the EU.

I accept that Schengen is not, for the moment at any rate, part of the UK’s bailiwick, but the pressures that are now beginning to grow are increasing the necessity for us to leave the EU, because, from what I have been hearing from other member states, Schengen is becoming a potent force towards a greater degree of emphasis on political union. It is a most remarkable state of affairs. The Minister for Europe was not here earlier, and I see him puzzling over what I am saying, but I say emphatically that the Schengen agreement is not only under review but already being broken by a series of countries. However, there is an enormous desire to make it work even more effectively. As it does so, the pressures for political union within the Schengen area will tend to increase.

Before I turn to the 1951 UN convention and the EU charter of fundamental rights, I want an answer to the question that I put to the Minister for Immigration earlier about how much, if at all, the United Kingdom is liable to contribute to the EU border force. Is it true that we will contribute £150 million?

2014 JHA Opt-out Decision

David Lidington Excerpts

Monday 15th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Reckless]

So his remarks were also very well prepared, for which I give him credit.

Earlier, the Home Secretary responded to me on the issue of whether the opt-ins under the justice and home affairs provisions—if indeed we have opt-ins now—would trigger a referendum. She shared her view that they would not, but she did not give reasons and I do not believe she spoke to the specifics of the point. The European Union Act 2011 was ably taken through the House by the Minister for Europe, whom I am delighted to see in his place—he may be able to correct or assist me, or perhaps share some of the Government’s legal insight, which has eluded me to date on this issue. Section 4(1) deals with triggers for a referendum, and paragraph (i) refers to

“the conferring on an EU institution or body of power to impose a requirement or obligation on the United Kingdom”.

An even clearer trigger is section 4(1)(j), which refers to

“the conferring on an EU institution or body of new or extended power to impose sanctions on the United Kingdom”.

It strikes me that with those opt-ins, the Commission would have the right to enforcement action, and the European Court of Justice potentially to deliver fines.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

My hon. Friend was right to read out those paragraphs of section 4(1) of the 2011 Act, but as its title makes clear, that section refers to “Cases where treaty or Article 48(6) decision attracts a referendum”. The decision we are debating this evening, which stems from specific provisions to the Lisbon treaty, is neither a treaty change nor an article 48(6) decision, and it therefore falls outwith the scope of section 4 of the 2011 Act.

[Mark Reckless]

I am not sure whether I have understood the Minister, but section 4(1) is of course subject to subsection (4), which states:

“A treaty or Article 48(6) decision does not fall within this section merely because it involves one or more of the following: the codification of practice…; the making of any provision that applies only to member States other than the United Kingdom; in the case of a treaty, the accession of a new member State.”

Subsection 4(4) does not appear to be triggered in this case.

[Mr Lidington]

I am sorry to intervene again on my hon. Friend, but the point I was seeking to make—I apologise if I was not sufficiently clear—was that this decision on the justice and home affairs 2014 measures is not the product of an initiative brought forward under article 48(6) of the European treaties. Article 48(6) provides for the simplified revision procedure of the European Union treaties; this is not a revision of the Lisbon treaty.