US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement

David Lidington Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Sir Roger. I congratulate the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on securing this debate on the mutual defence agreement, which has spread out to consider wider aspects of this country’s nuclear defence policy.

It is noticeable that the debate has been conducted by Members on all sides with a degree of seriousness appropriate to the grave subject that we are debating. I am with the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) in saying that whatever side of the argument any of us stands on—whether for or against the UK maintaining a nuclear deterrent—we are in no doubt about the consequences of nuclear warfare. All of us have seen or read about the impact on people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. We have also seen the impact of nuclear testing in some of the cases that the hon. Member for Islington North described.

I take the view, along with my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East, that there remains a need for a United Kingdom nuclear deterrent. Although the cold war has ended, significant nuclear capabilities and risks remain. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. Substantial nuclear arsenals still exist. The number of nuclear armed states in the world has increased, and there is a significant risk of new nuclear armed states emerging. Moreover, several of the countries that have nuclear weapons, or are trying to acquire them, are in tense and unstable regions. There is the potential for a new nuclear threat to emerge or re-emerge.

This country’s strategic deterrent is therefore as relevant today as it has ever been. It remains the ultimate guarantee of our security and sovereignty, and a necessary insurance in an uncertain world. I want to be clear, as successive Governments of this country have been, that the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons are not designed or intended for military use during conflicts. Their objective is to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail, and acts of aggression against our vital interests that could not be countered by any other means. Successive Governments have been clear that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might be contemplated are of the most extreme kind.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The Minister mentioned the non-proliferation treaty. It is specifically designed to prevent, as the name suggests, nuclear armed proliferation. Is he content about, or has he had legal advice on, provision for nuclear information to be shared by the USA with Britain? That is extrajudicial for both countries and therefore appears to be at odds with the terms of the non-proliferation treaty, which is designed to stop proliferation, rather than encourage it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will address the issue of the non-proliferation treaty and the bearing it has on the MDA later. I pay tribute to him. He has always, in all his years in the House, taken an absolutely consistent and coherent approach in opposing this country’s deterrent and wanting to see immediate and universal nuclear disarmament. The right hon. Member for Warley, my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East and I believe that this country’s deterrent remains necessary and important. There is no case for saying that the United Kingdom ought to have an independent nuclear deterrent, but one that was less effective and therefore of less deterrent value than the system of continuous submarine patrols that we have. That point was made more than once in this debate, but I will not pursue it further in the absence of those advocating that policy course.

I referred a moment ago to our alliance on continuous at-sea submarine patrols, and it is worth paying tribute to the fact that for more than 45 years, for every minute of every day, the Royal Navy has successfully operated such patrols, ensuring the safety and security of this country. I hope that the whole House would join me, whatever our views on the need for a nuclear deterrent, in paying tribute to the dedication of the men and women of the Royal Navy, including the crews and support staff and their families. Many of those servicemen and women are away from home for long periods, and their dedication and commitment are fundamental to the success of the United Kingdom’s deterrent operation.

While the international security environment continues to require the UK to maintain a nuclear deterrent, we have an obvious responsibility to maintain the safety, security and reliability of all its elements, including through the replacement and updating of parts of the system as they reach the end of their operational life. The mutual defence agreement has enabled us to collaborate with the United States to ensure that we are able to do that to the highest possible technical standards. The MDA underpins all nuclear defence co-operation between the UK and the US. That co-operation has been of considerable mutual benefit, allowing the United Kingdom to reduce costs significantly while maintaining an operationally independent deterrent. It is in the national defence and security interests of the UK and the US, as well as in this country’s economic interests, for the MDA to continue.

Questions have been posed about the independence of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent and whether that independence is in practice meaningful, given the MDA and our close collaboration on defence matters with the United States. I want to be absolutely clear that this country’s nuclear deterrent is and always has been operationally independent. The command and control systems involved are UK-owned and controlled. Decision making and use of the Trident system remain entirely sovereign to the United Kingdom. Only the Prime Minister can authorise the employment of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, and there are no technical means by which the United States could negate or override a prime ministerial instruction.

It is true that through the MDA we have been able to take advantage of some American know-how, and of a certain amount of American material. We would have been able to provide that for ourselves, but creating an entirely indigenous source of such material, equipment and know-how would have given rise to significant additional expense. It has seemed to Labour and Conservative Governments alike over the years to be common sense to work with the United States to take advantage of its capacity in those areas of nuclear expertise to our mutual advantage, rather than incurring the extra costs ourselves when that was not necessary for the independence and capability of our nuclear deterrent. We have some procurement dependence on the US for certain non-nuclear aspects of the system, but we choose not to manufacture those indigenously because of the economic benefits of working with our closest ally.

[Mr David Amess in the Chair]

On the important question of the relationship between the mutual defence agreement and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, there have been claims in this debate and at other times that the MDA is at odds with our commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, and incompatible with the commitments we have made under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, particularly those in articles I and VI. The United Kingdom is a leading nation in securing progress in nuclear disarmament, and we should be proud of our record. We have steadily reduced the size of our nuclear forces by well over half since our cold war peak. Our nuclear arsenal is almost certainly the smallest of any of the five states recognised as nuclear weapons states under the NPT.

Our forces peaked in the late 1970s with a total of some 460 warheads of various types and delivery systems. In May 2010, the Prime Minister announced that the figure would continue to be reduced to no more than 120 operationally available warheads, with an entire stockpile of no more that 180 warheads by the mid-2020s. That reduction is already under way. The Government have also announced that we will cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads onboard each deployed submarine from 48 to 40, while reducing the number of operational Trident missiles on each submarine to eight. Those changes have already been completed on at least one of the vessels.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

May I take the Minister back to my question about the compatibility of the MDA, which is now amended and includes the observation of dangers of proliferation elsewhere in the world, with the original and current objective of the NPT, which is the non-proliferation of nuclear know-how or technology between states? Britain and the USA are not one state. As the Minister reminded us, they are both sovereign, independent nations, so the transfer of nuclear technology from one to the other is surely in breach of the NPT.

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Gentleman takes me straight to the point that I was about to make about article I of the NPT, which touches on the transfer of nuclear weapons and devices between countries. The Government regard the MDA as compliant with our obligations under article I for three reasons.

First, nuclear devices or weapons are not transferred to the United Kingdom under the terms of the MDA. As I described earlier, what we receive under the MDA is a certain amount of nuclear technological know-how and some non-lethal elements, such as propulsion systems, that are not prohibited under article I.

Secondly, article V of the original mutual defence agreement—not including the amendments—quite explicitly states that the transfer of nuclear weapons is not permitted.

Thirdly, article I of the NPT refers in particular to transfers from the recognised nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states. However, the MDA refers to transfers of things other than nuclear weapons or devices from one nuclear weapons state to another, both of which are party to the NPT. I think that that answers the challenge that the MDA is in some way incompatible with article I of the NPT.

The other criticism made is that the mutual defence agreement is at odds with the obligation that we and the other four recognised nuclear weapons states have under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty to work towards multilateral disarmament. I have already described how the United Kingdom has significantly brought down its nuclear arsenal as a contribution to multilateral nuclear disarmament, but we have also been active and continue to be active in a range of multilateral disarmament initiatives.

We remain a strong supporter of the NPT. We signed and ratified the comprehensive test ban treaty as long ago as the 1990s and remain a strong supporter of the treaty both financially and technically, operating our own voluntary moratorium on testing pending the treaty coming into effect. We actively urge the remaining states that have not yet ratified the treaty to do so. We want an early start of negotiations in Geneva on the fissile material cut-off treaty and are an active member of the group of governmental experts that is working on those negotiations, which are currently blocked not by the United Kingdom or any of the recognised nuclear weapons states, but by Pakistan for national reasons.

In addition, we currently chair the forum of the permanent five nuclear weapons states and will be hosting the next annual conference in London in February next year. The purpose of the P5 process is to build transparency and mutual confidence to make it possible for all nuclear weapons states to engage in further rounds of multilateral disarmament. At the same time, we lead an informal working group at the United Nations, discussing the UN’s role in future nuclear security work. This country therefore has a good record of active work on multilateral disarmament that sits perfectly well alongside the arrangements that we have with the United States under the MDA.

[Mr Spellar]

I thank the Minister for giving way, and I want to highlight the fact that these developments have taken place under Governments of both parties. To what extent can we support, encourage or stimulate the key discussions between the United States and Russia on their agreement, to which the agreements of the other nuclear states are secondary, although important?

[Mr Lidington]

First, I happily acknowledge that the multilateral disarmament work that I have described has taken place under Governments of both political colours.

Secondly, I agree completely with the right hon. Gentleman that the prime responsibility for leadership in multilateral nuclear disarmament must lie with the two biggest nuclear powers: the United States and Russia. We encouraged the talks that led towards the second strategic arms reduction treaty, which will impose limits for each party of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads from February 2018. We need to see that target fulfilled and would welcome and support its implementation.

One could make a similar point about the talks on an intermediate nuclear forces treaty. There was a bilateral US-Russia treaty back in 1988, but each side now accuses the other of breaching it. For reasons relating to Russia’s conduct in Ukraine, there has been a significant erosion of trust between the US and Russia. It will therefore not be easy to get talks between Washington and Moscow back on course, but I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is in the interests of all of us that Russia and the United States are able to rebuild a sufficient degree of trust for meaningful negotiations towards multilateral nuclear disarmament to take place.

I want it to be clear that the United Kingdom is not using the amendments to the mutual defence agreement to upgrade its system’s capabilities. There is no move to produce more usable weapons or change our nuclear posture or doctrine. The amendments to the MDA that we are technically debating this afternoon do not in any way provide for an upgrading of the capabilities of the Trident system. That is a decision for 2016.

The hon. Member for Islington North asked a couple of detailed questions about plutonium tests at Aldermaston and the relationship between the mutual defence agreement and the planned replacement of the Vanguard-class submarine fleet. The Atomic Weapons Establishment has conducted sealed hydrodynamic plutonium experiments, which are sub-critical, do not produce nuclear yield and are fully compliant with the non-proliferation treaty. The experiments were described in a published article in the journal Nature in February 2002. Aldermaston and its experiments are also, of course, fully in line with the commitments we have undertaken in agreeing and ratifying the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I am therefore advised that what has happened at Aldermaston is fully compliant with our international legal obligations.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Two points come from that. First, was the plutonium from the UK, or was it imported from the USA? Secondly, were the results shared with US scientists and military personnel, either at the time or after the experiments took place?

[Mr Lidington]

I hope the hon. Gentleman will understand if I say I will write to him after the debate to provide him with such detail as I can.

On the relationship between the renewal of the MDA and the 2016 main-gate decision, no submarines or reactors are being built before that decision. However, it is vital, as with any major programme of such complexity, to order certain items where there would be a delay in the programme if we were to wait until after main gate. Some of those transfers will take place under the MDA, but as I said earlier, transfers under the MDA do not include nuclear weapons or nuclear devices.

I hope hon. Members on both sides will recognise that the United Kingdom has been a leading nation on multilateral disarmament. However, successive Governments have also been clear that we will retain a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation makes that necessary.

We are a responsible nuclear weapons state. The mutual defence agreement helps to provide the maintenance and servicing required to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the system, and at a substantial reduction on the costs that would otherwise be incurred. It is fully compliant with our international obligations, it does not hinder the operational independence of the deterrent and it is a key aspect of our defence co-operation with our closest ally. It is clearly in the national interest of the United Kingdom and the United States to continue this co-operation, and the Government’s clear view is that the mutual defence agreement should be renewed.