Flooding (Somerset)

Debate between David Heath and Ian Liddell-Grainger

Wednesday 2nd July 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr Heath]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that was why I called for today’s debate, which is perhaps unseasonable. Now is the time not only when work must happen in Somerset, which it is, but when decisions must be taken that will affect the situation for years to come. That is what I want the Minister to respond to.

I will briefly touch on the background, because we cannot escape the fact that elements of the Somerset flooding were avoidable. We expect flooding on the levels; it is a normal state of affairs. This occasion, however, was unprecedented due not only to the extreme weather conditions, but to now widely acknowledged policy mistakes. I have drawn attention to two glaring errors many times over the years, but they now have a common subscription. First, the landscape is artificial and does not maintain itself. Every drop of water that needs to be pumped away from the fields and the communities in the area must be pumped uphill into rivers that are higher than the surrounding landscape. People forget that and talk nonsense about natural drainage and flood plains when such drainage will never happen. The land is effectively reclaimed. It is land from the great mere of Somerset. Unless the water is pumped, drainage will not happen.

Secondly, an environmental heresy was allowed to develop for far too long at senior levels in the Environment Agency. It was assumed that the environmental benefit of the area was in the watercourses rather than in the land in between, which meant that what are essentially canals were being artificially preserved at the expense of the quite invaluable flora and fauna. I hope that that is now a thing of the past.

What is on the list of things to be done and how have we been managing? There have obviously been immediate acts of recovery and restitution. I understand that farm funding is considerably undersubscribed, but the Minister might be able to provide an up-to-date assessment of whether the funding has reached the farmers who need it. I also wish to add one caveat: we have not to date seen huge damage to orchards, but it is possible that it will appear later on. If we need to come back to the Department, I hope the Minister will be sympathetic if orchards have lost tree stock.

Dredging is now happening. There has been a lot of local cynicism as to whether it has been done sufficiently quickly and properly, and whether lip service has been paid, but I am satisfied that genuine dredging is taking place along the identified stretch. After a slow beginning, it is starting to catch up, and I think six crews are now at work. What a pity it is that we do not have the equipment that was given away or sold for peanuts many years ago. Nevertheless, the relevant area has been reconstituted and we have the hard-standings that enable the dredging machines to do their work. Will the Minister update us as to when he expects the initial tranche of dredging to be completed?

Increasing the capacity of watercourses will not satisfy local people, however. We accept the argument that increasing capacity is the most effective use of early funds, but I am conscious of the fact that the upper reaches of the Parrett were also severely flooded. Around Langport, Muchelney and Martock, there are bottlenecks that need addressing. Are we able to increase capacity under the bridge at Great Bow wharf at Langport? There are also plans to widen and deepen the Sowy diversion stream to provide extra capacity, which is a sensible idea that I would like to see happen, but it needs to be properly planned. We need to consider the potential consequences for other communities and reassure them that they will not be adversely affected by the Sowy being used to a greater extent. That issue would be particularly apparent at Beer Wall, which is where my constituency adjoins that of Bridgwater and West Somerset, and Aller Drove, which saw unprecedented flooding. Aller does not normally flood, but this time it did. I think that there was a miscalculation and that someone made a mistake in lowering the level of the river wall. Those calculations have to be right. As we use the Sowy, we must be sure that adverse effects are not happening elsewhere.

[Mr Ian Liddell-Grainger (Bridgwater and West Somerset) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making some good points about the Sowy. The Minister is aware that part of the Sowy development must include the barrage or the sluice—whatever we want to call it—below Bridgwater, which would complement what my hon. Friend is discussing. Will the Minister also consider ensuring that the scheme goes into the autumn statement? We need money for the Sowy and for the barrage, but it can come only from central Government. Does my hon. Friend think that that may be a way forward?

[Mr Heath]

I most certainly do agree, because that was going to be the principal point—

[Mr Liddell-Grainger]

I am so sorry.

[Mr Heath]

We are at one on the issue. This is the big ask. This is what we need from the Minister. I know that he will not answer today, because he is not in a position to do so, but this is the most important demand.

Purely local schemes to alleviate flooding are also needed. Thorney is a tiny village—a hamlet—that is now rather curiously described as two different places for the purposes of flooding, because it floods separately at two ends, so we now have Thorney north and south, or greater and lesser—I am not quite sure how to describe the two ends of the village. A bund of some kind—a way to stop the water coming in—would be effective, however. That is a relatively low-cost solution and one that is being considered. I want an assurance that it actually will be built to protect the people of Thorney.

Similarly, we need to look at Muchelney Ham, a small part of Muchelney that was subjected to flooding. We also need to examine the highways situation, where the county council will be taking the lead.

I think we all agree that it is extraordinary in this day and age to have a village such as Muchelney completely cut off for week after week. We must establish at least one way to get in and out. Feasibility studies are being carried out as to whether it should be the Drayton road or whether there is a better alternative, but something must be done to ensure that people can get in and out of the village.

Managing Flood Risk

Debate between David Heath and Ian Liddell-Grainger

Monday 3rd March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Liddell-Grainger]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. This year, we managed to shut the main railway line and the A303, and water was lapping against parts of the M5. We really could have stopped tourism in most of the west country. I am glad that that did not happen; it is obviously good news.

[Mr Heath]

I have worked closely with the hon. Gentleman in this exercise. He will agree that the elements that we need from the Government are, first, the initial dredging; secondly, the commitment to build a sluice, or barrage, across the Parrett; thirdly, a funding mechanism for local IDBs or local authorities to fund the maintenance; and fourthly, the long-term management of the whole river catchment area—something that we knew back in the 1980s and ’90s, when we were working on it, but it was forgotten.

[Mr Liddell-Grainger]

My hon. Friend knows better than I do—he is a Somerset man; I am a usurper from Scotland—that this is an absolute tale of disgrace and woe. It is appalling, and not just one Government are involved; it goes back through many Governments, and it has been an absolute disaster. But he is right: we must sort out the pumps, the rhynes—ditches—the bunds and the dams. We must do this now. Unless this happens quickly, we will be back here, probably next year, with the Opposition asking, “What on earth did you get wrong?” It happened last year; it happened in 2000; it will happen again.

The most difficult thing that we must face is that, basically, everyone thought that Somerset was shut. We had half-term; tourism died completely. That affected the west country because everyone thought that the railway was shut and no one could get through. Therefore, we ended up costing the economy millions.