Gleision Mine

Debate between David Anderson and Lord Hain

Wednesday 26th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr Hain]

My hon. Friend speaks with great authority as a former leader of the National Union of Mineworkers. The coroner’s inquest was convened and then adjourned, and has never been completed, which has left unanswered questions.

The Gleision tragedy was a chilling reminder of a death-strewn mining era long thought consigned to history, and of the fact that short-cut attitudes to health and safety can be fatal. It also revealed how erosion of the Mines Rescue Service could create greater tragedies in the future if we fail to address the formidable budget challenges that that key agency faces if it is to maintain its long and dedicated record on mining.

The first lesson is that employers must be responsible for their employees in a way that was obviously not the case at Gleision. Throughout its recent life, it seems there was illegal mining at Gleision, certainly in the decade prior to 2011. At the trial, Mr Justice Wyn Williams said that successive managers had read into health and safety regulations what suited their needs, failing to co-operate sufficiently with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of mines. Despite this, the mines inspectors confirmed that the mine plan from which the manager and the four men were working, even as they detonated that fatal blast, was accurate. The inspectors checked during the official investigation after the tragedy and found that, although Gleision had not been inspected in the 16 months prior to the accident—an attempt to do so had been foiled by bad weather—the survey conducted two months before in July 2011 by mines surveyor John Brosnan was up to date and sufficiently accurate.

Of course, the Management and Administration of Safety and Health at Mines Regulations 1993 made it incumbent on the mine manager or owner to inform the mines inspectorate of any major changes in working plans underground. The inspectorate relies on the mutual co-operation of the mine manager and mine owner to alert to changes in the faces that they seam, and it is more than likely that multiple Gleision managers before Malcolm Fyfield had failed to do that adequately and properly.

The entire legal framework of health and safety at work in Britain is sensibly based on a self-policing model, relying on companies and their executives to comply with and guarantee safety standards by keeping risk as low as reasonably practicable. It is clear to me that in the events leading up to the tragedy the regulations were not complied with. However, the most frustrating question, and the one that haunts us all, is: why were the four miners there facing death in the first place?

The day after the tragedy, having been escorted from Rhos community centre up the mountain to stand at the mine entrance amid rescue workers and police, the mines inspector showed me the same mine plan from which Fyfield and the men were working. It showed clearly that they were mining directly towards an area in the old mine workings marked “Old Central Workings and Underground Water”. I have the mine plan here. The mines inspector expressed his surprise at this, and there is still no explanation for why the decision to take that risk was made.

The exact source of the water—whether it was in the area marked on the plan I saw, only a few metres from where the men fatefully detonated their explosion, or somewhere else nearby—was hotly disputed during the trial. The fact remains that the water was indeed there, exactly as marked on the mine plan, and that it killed them. Mines inspectors investigating the accident afterwards confirmed that its presence coincided with markings on the plan I saw. Indeed, they were able to see the high tide mark previously reached by the water that subsequently raged torrentially through the breach.

[Mr David Anderson (Blaydon) (Lab)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on bringing this sad debate to the Chamber today. Is it true that this is not a one-off, and that some of the regulations on water ingress into mines were developed because of tragedies such as this? There was one in the 1970s at Houghton Main in Yorkshire, when exactly the same discussions took place. That is one reason why the need to map out where water lay was built into the inspection regimes. That is why it is clear that plans should be checked regularly, and not just cast to one side.

[Mr Hain]

I agree with my hon. Friend. He also speaks with great authority as a former miner.

Mr Fyfield, who was the mines manager, is highly respected and experienced. He told the court that he went into the old workings to check for the presence of water marked on the plan and found none. Somehow, there was a catastrophic misjudgment. The water was indeed there, and it nearly killed him, just as it killed the four miners. Built into the regulations is a statutory procedure that could have prevented all this. A precautions against inrush scheme would surely have given the men an indication of the presence of the water. There can be no question but that it should have been implemented, because the Mines (Precautions Against Inrushes) Regulations 1979 demand that if miners are moving towards a suspected hazard, a PAI scheme be created.

These were all experienced miners, led by an expert and experienced mine manager, yet the Health and Safety Executive has not yet explained—neither has the trial evidence nor the verdict—why those crucial regulations were not followed. Whether motivated by cost-cutting, or simply the result of a cataclysmically mistaken judgment, the decision was taken to blast too close to the water, and four men died as a consequence, the manager only narrowly escaping, emerging so bloodied, severely injured and traumatised that he needed intensive hospital care to get back on his feet.

In 2011, the mines safety expert Dave Feickert claimed that it was possible to have a no-fatality mining industry in the UK, such was the strength of HSE regulations, yet at Gleision, those were ignored. In my view, that is the truth that should have been established by the trial and never was. Although the verdict is the verdict, it delivered neither justice nor accountability to the victims of the tragedy and their families. They have all been failed by the justice system and by the absence of a full coroner’s inquest. It was only through the immense efforts of the fantastic Mines Rescue Service, together with Walter Energy and the Unity mine, close to Gleision in the Neath valley, and which, unlike now, were fully operating at the time, that the bodies were recovered and the accident could be fully investigated.

After the tragedy in 2011, in an open letter to the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, I warned of three things. The first was that without proper review, the Mines Rescue Service would risk becoming so chronically underfunded that it would be unable to provide the stellar service to Britain’s mines that, following coal privatisation, it was set up to in 1996. Secondly, I warned that were the current funding arrangements to continue, the cost to British mining of the MRS would become prohibitive, unless it was subsidised by Government. Thirdly, I stated that both those factors would combine to reduce and diminish the vital mutually co-operative spirit that is at the heart of the Mines Rescue Service and the coal industry in Britain, irreparably changing them for the worse.

The coal industry has changed a great deal in the three subsequent years. Faced with increasing international competition and dwindling profit margins, more coal mines in the UK have had to shut down. The Mines Rescue Service has been forced to change its funding structure in order to carry on providing a service to British mines while not having its viability impinged on too badly. However, under new regulations, the few remaining mines in Britain will no longer be obliged to pay a levy to the Mines Rescue Service, and instead will have a commercial relationship with a suitable provider should a disaster occur.

The MRS has evolved to become a successfully run enterprise able to diversify and rely on fees from its other work. In 1996, the MRS levy on each mine was able to cover its core costs, but the relentless closure of British mines since means that the coal levy now accounts for only 11% of the Mines Rescue Service budget, and even that is predicted to drop to 7% next year. That clearly impacts on the capability of the MRS to carry out its vital mines emergency service. Indeed, I strongly suspect that the MRS centre at Dinas in the Rhondda valley may have to be closed and its facilities transferred perhaps to Mansfield in England, because there are no longer sufficient south Wales mines to fund it.

Since 1996, the MRS has not received a penny of support from the Government. In the heyday of British Coal, it had the resources to deliver a universal rescue service. Even after privatisation, mines paid the levy because it did not affect their profitability. Instead, a mutually co-operative understanding ensured that aid would come if an accident occurred in a mine. The MRS scheme covered the costs of funding when it was called into action, and additional costs fell to the mine or to nearby mines.

For three weeks after the accident, when the Gleision mine was investigated, the HSE became responsible for keeping the mine open because Gleision’s owners, MNS Mining Ltd, could not afford to do so. Under normal circumstances, the costs of investigation and rescue would be placed on the mining business in question. However, the finances of MNS were so precarious that that was simply not feasible. Such a scenario had never been encountered before by the Health and Safety Executive and the mines inspectorate, and they deserve a great deal of credit for ensuring that a full investigation was carried out despite experiencing budget cuts, yet they should not have been put in that position.

Although the MRS has a team of core rescue specialists, it relies heavily on the mutual co-operation of other British mines, which provide their own men to aid the rescue effort, as well as equipment and resources. In 2011, as I said, those were provided by Walter Energy and Unity, two mining companies nearby in my constituency, and the unsung heroes of the disaster. However, the rescue effort was much more fragile than it appeared. The co-operative ethos, which is the foundation of the MRS, is based on a pooling of fiscal and technical resources in the event of an accident, and was built on the foundations provided by the Coal Board’s central fund, yet Gleision clearly exposed flaws in the mutual co-operation model that were not envisaged when the scheme was set up.

The financial costs of keeping the mine safely open to enable South Wales police and the HSE to investigate fell on the shoulders of the HSE together with Walter Energy and Unity, which were also sacrificing men and equipment to investigators, and this was a heavy burden. By Friday 16 September 2011, the day after the tragedy, Walter Energy alone had covered costs of £77,645 for the recovery and investigation, yet by December had still received no recompense. Last year, it laid off over 100 men, and the Aberpergwm pit has since been on care and maintenance, as has the Unity mine, both victims of the falling price of coal, yet they were both essential to the rescue effort.

As a result of all that, if there were ever to be a future Gleision-type accident, both a rescue and a full investigation might not be feasible. When I was the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions in 2007-08, the HSE’s budget was £215 million. By last year, it had been cut by £50 million, or a quarter, to £165 million. Unless the Government provide more money for mines rescue and the HSE, accidents in mining will be more frequent, as self-policing health and safety and self-funding rescue and investigation services are no longer viable or fit for purpose.

I was one of the many community leaders who, over those long hours, observed the heroic and dedicated efforts of mines rescue workers, supported by highly professional police officers, other emergency workers and mines inspectors. I am full of praise for all of them. None of us knew at the time that there was never a chance of rescuing the men who died, but at least their bodies were recovered, in dark, dangerous and filthy conditions. The families of Philip, David, Garry and Charles have conducted themselves with dignity and deserve enormous praise from all. They do not seek vengeance and scapegoats, and nor do I; all they have asked for is justice, but they have still not received that.

In his letter of January 2012, the Secretary of State assured me that lessons would be learned from the Gleision accident. We await the impending report by the Health and Safety Executive, and I trust it will not be constrained by the trial verdict, because if it is, the inspectors will not be able to reveal their professional conclusions, which I strongly suspect broadly coincide with mine.

The day of 15 September 2011 would have been an unremarkable day in the history of the Swansea valley had proper health and safety practice been followed. We still have no answers as to why Garry, Charles, Philip and David died, why they were heading straight for the water that killed them, and why no precautions against inrush scheme was implemented. The Gleision tragedy should not have happened; that is what makes it not simply a terrible accident, but a shocking, terrible scandal.