Energy Price Freeze
Debate between David Anderson and Alan Whitehead
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
Perhaps the best thing we can do this afternoon is to shoot a number of canards standing in the way of grasping the central issue of how to reset the market in such a way that it will work in favour of consumers and customers instead of against customers’ interests. Frankly, saying that proposals to reset the market will lead to a deterioration in investment prospects or a loss of market value that will prevent people from investing is the first and one of the biggest of such canards.
A substantial amount of investment is needed, but it cannot be judged on the basis of the interests of integrated utility management; it will come from companies investing in the wires, in smart meters and in new forms of generation that are independent of the utilities. Indeed, the balance sheet of the big six suggests that not a very high proportion of that £100 billion-plus investment is likely to come from them in any event. It appears that the factors relating to the investment will be manifold, and will not necessarily be related to the fortunes of the big six.
To say that resetting the market will cause it to work in a terrible way in the future is effectively to say that breaking up what is currently a seriously dysfunctional system will lead to problems. That strikes me as a counsel of despair not just where the market is concerned, but where consumers are concerned, and it is, perhaps, the second big canard to be shot. It is claimed that the Energy Bill will put a number of things right, and it will, but what it will not put right is the malfunctioning of the market. What is extraordinary about the Bill—as with the energy reform White Paper that preceded it—is that the one thing it does not do is reform the energy market. It lets the market carry on just as it has in the past, and we know that the market is seriously dysfunctional.
Bilateral trade that rolls down the curve conceals a considerable amount of what is actually going on. One might think, for example, that there is a relationship between the 24% profit that is made by generators overall and the 5% that is made by retailers, because one sells to the other, and one might therefore wonder where the missing money in the middle is going. In fact, much of it is going to people who are trading with themselves and “netting off” so that their trades do not appear as trades at all, or even creating trades close to gate closure in order to balance the two sides of the operation of an integrated company.
We know that the energy market is pretty dysfunctional, and we know that it needs to be reformed. The question is, can we reform it by simply continuing with business as usual and hoping that Ofgem will continue to produce documents that aim to introduce a little more transparency to a market that, by definition, is largely not transparent, or should we do more to reset the market in favour of customers?
Mr David Anderson (Blaydon) (Lab)
I apologise for not being in the Chamber earlier, Madam Deputy Speaker. I was at a Select Committee meeting.
As always, my hon. Friend is speaking very knowledgeably, and he is making a good point about the dysfunctionality of the energy market. When, 25 years ago, it was first suggested that the market should be privatised, we were told that one of the key reasons for privatising it was that the risk would be transferred from the Government—from the public purse—to the private sector. Is not the truth that, in the last 25 years, the risk has been transferred from the Government to the private sector, and thence to the customer? The customer bears the risk whatever happens.
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend is right. The market tends eventually to land its risk, its transfer arrangements and its outcomes squarely on customers’ bills. The point about a price freeze is that it must be seen in the context of the other measures that it is being suggested should accompany it as a way of securing a pause while the market is reset.