Anglo-Russian Relations

Debate between Daniel Kawczynski and John Baron

Wednesday 4th May 2016 Westminster Hall

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Anglo-Russian relations.

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I called this debate because I am very concerned about the growing anti-Russian sentiment in the House of Commons. Even for having called for the debate, a senior member of the Government today called me “Comrade Kawczynski”. I have been accused of being an apologist for President Putin and criticised for even daring to raise this subject, so I have prepared a personal statement, which I hope you will allow me to make, Mr Davies.

Of all the Members of this House, I have deep and personal reasons to dislike and distrust Russia and its actions. As many hon. Members know, I am of Polish heritage. Poland suffered terribly at the hands of the former Soviet Union, and like so many Polish families, mine was no exception in experiencing that suffering. My grandfather was a successful landowner and farmer whose life was ruined by the interference of the Soviet system, which was often brutally unfair, corrupt and flawed. It would be easy to cling to prejudice and allow it to colour my view of the world today, yet as a British citizen and a proud Member of this House it is my job and my duty to argue strongly in favour of what I believe will best serve Britain’s long-term security, stability and prosperity, even if that means encouraging détente and dialogue with a country that was born out of the remnants of the oppressive regime that so crippled my grandfather in Poland.

I could not go back to Poland to begin with, because of martial law in the Soviet-imposed regime and what was happening in Poland, but when I first went back in 1983 and met my grandfather, he spoke to me at great length about what it was like living under communism. He spoke about the oppression during the second world war from the Soviets and the Russians. He died in 1986—just three years before the fall of communism—but before he died, he said to me, “I will never see the end of communism, but you will.” He knew that the financially illiterate and politically Orwellian system that the Soviets had imposed on us was completely incompatible with the human spirit and soul.

When I think of the period in which my grandfather died, during those early years of détente, I think of the extraordinary lengths Reagan went to to meet Andrei Gromyko in 1984; I think of how Margaret Thatcher met Gorbachev for the first time in December 1984, despite all the difficulties that we had at that time with the Soviet Union—it was still in Afghanistan and was posing a huge threat to our country. It saddens me that today there does not appear to be the same level of good will and determination among our Government Ministers to engage in the same way with the Russian Administration.

There is a one-sided debate, and it is all negative towards Russia. My experience over the past 11 years—you and I have been in the House for the same amount of time, Mr Davies—is that when we do not have proper debates in this House, that is when tactical and strategic errors are made. That is why it is so important that we debate this issue.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. May I suggest another reason why we do not understand Russia well enough? It is that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office needs greater resources to better understand events on the ground generally. It is a known fact, now widely recognised, that there were, for example, no Crimea experts in the FCO at the time of the Russian intervention in Crimea. Since the end of the cold war, the FCO has continuously wound down its Russian coverage. Does he agree that that needs to be put right, so that we understand events on the ground better, including the complexity that is Russia?

[Daniel Kawczynski]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. It is a privilege to serve with him on the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. I very much hope that the report that we are starting on Anglo-Russian relations will delve deeper into some of the shortcomings and lack of resources available to the Foreign Office to understand Russia and our engagement with it better.

The FCO and the Spending Review 2015

Debate between Daniel Kawczynski and John Baron

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I made the mistake of not finishing my sentence; next time I will finish it. I was about to say that my examples included Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and, I would suggest, Syria. In Iraq, there can be no doubt that we went to war on a false premise: there were no WMD. We were all deceived; the job of Chilcot is to determine whether No. 10 intentionally deceived us.

On Afghanistan, I supported the initial deployment in 2001 to rid the country of al-Qaeda, and there is strong evidence to suggest that we succeeded in that objective in the very early years. Where it went disastrously wrong—this takes us back to the fact that we did not fully understand events on the ground—was when we allowed the mission to morph into nation-building. We went into Helmand without fully realising what it involved, and we certainly under-resourced our operations, which was a bad mistake.

In Libya, we knocked down the door—that was the relatively easy bit—but the country has turned out to be a complete and utter shambles, in part because we failed to understand that the opposition to Gaddafi would splinter into 100-plus groups with different objectives. Law and order has been non-existent in Libya ever since, which has led to more bloodshed and a vicious civil war.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

At this juncture, with my hon. Friend referring to Libya, I must interject that he was the only Conservative Member of Parliament to speak out against that British military involvement at the time. If I recall correctly from his speeches from that time, he put some prescient and important questions to the Government, in respect of which hindsight has proved him to have been correct.

My hon. Friend referred to the small number of people who make foreign policy in this country. Does he agree that in advance of British military intervention overseas, as in the case of Libya, there might need to be in future a greater period of engagement and deliberation for those such as my hon. Friend who do not fully support such actions, so that these problems can be avoided?

[Mr Baron]

I thank my hon. Friend and fellow Select Committee member for his kind words. I agree: there does need to be more time for reflection on these issues. I would also suggest that we need greater investment in the FCO. We need greater expertise and analytical skills because we need to make sure that we have analysed a situation correctly. Our system of government performs better when we have a well-informed Executive being questioned by the legislature.

What we have seen is a series of errors through which it has become increasingly evident that the Executive do not have that expertise to hand. That is one reason why the legislature has raised the bar on military intervention—because it has lacked the trust in the Executive to make their case, analyse a situation correctly and make sound recommendations. Once that trust is lost, the legislature will raise the bar when it comes to military intervention, as we have seen.

Let me return to some of the other errors that we have made. I suggest that there were errors in Syria. The Government line that we did not intervene early enough on behalf of the rebels, which accounts for the mess that is evident there now, is simply not correct. The Government’s intention was to arm the rebels in the hope that they could keep the weapons confined to the “good” rebels and not allow them to spread to the “bad” rebels—in other words, to track and trace the weapons. Anybody who knows anything about the region, or who has visited the country or travelled through it, should know that everything is tradeable in the bazaar. Also, given that the situation was so fast moving, the idea that we could have stopped the rebels from falling into the hands of al-Qaeda, al-Nusra or other extremists was pure make-believe.

Then, within a couple of years, the Government, having been stopped by the House from intervening in a key vote in 2013, again proposed to intervene—but against the rebels. I would not be so unkind as to suggest that we swapped sides in a civil war within two years, but to the general public, it damn well nearly looks like that. It well illustrates how we have failed to analyse the situation correctly.

In the brief time left to me, I would argue that in many respects our interventions have been a distraction. I, for one—like many Members on both sides; some are in their places today—have long advocated the need to spend more on defence. The military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and indeed Syria have perhaps distracted us from the greater threat of nation states, not necessarily friendly to the west, re-arming and reasserting their power and influence. One thinks immediately of Russia and China, but there are others as well.

To those who suggest that the straits of Hormuz or the South China seas are far away and of little significance to us, I say that a country based to such an extent on maritime trade—about 90% of our trade comes by sea—would certainly know about it if those straits or seas were ever blocked. My suggestion is that we have been distracted and that that is partly a function of the fact that we are not investing enough in what I call our ears and eyes—in other words, our ability to understand what is happening out there.

We must have a margin of safety or comfort as regards our capability, because no one can confidently predict where the next trouble spot is going to be. History is littered with examples of our facing the wrong way. I suggest that without that margin of comfort, that margin of safety, in our analytical capability, we may well be caught short again if we have not made the necessary investment. I suggest that, without that investment, we make expensive mistakes—indeed, we have made them—and that it is therefore a false economy to talk about savings, particularly when the budget is so small relative to Government expenditure generally. If I may take the point to the extreme, avoiding unnecessary conflict is vastly cheaper than committing ourselves to conflict that is costly in terms of both lives and treasure.

We often talk about hard power in the House, but perhaps we do not talk enough about soft power, which is increasingly important. In the present information age, those who win the argument will be just as important as those who win the conflict. This is about a battle of ideas, a battle of ideologies. It is about persuading others to want what we want, rather than just rattling the sabre, which—as we have seen so many times in our recent history—can often be counterproductive. We do not attach enough importance to soft power in this country, certainly not when it comes to the making of foreign policy.

There are clear examples of our putting our soft power capability at risk. Past cuts to the BBC World Service have hindered our ability to reach out to people; the World Service budget has been transferred from the FCO’s ambit, but that was one example before the transfer.

An example that currently sits in the FCO is the British Council. That venerable organisation is doing tremendous work in spreading the word, encouraging people to want what we want, providing an educational service, and trying to bring peoples together to improve understanding for the benefit of all concerned, but what are we doing? We are making cuts there. What is the British Council having to do as a result? It is having to become even more commercial in trying to make up for those cuts.

Members may think that a 10% cut is very little, but given that 10% is sometimes the profit margin, the British Council must achieve a 100% increase in its revenue when engaging in commercial activities to make up for that cut. We, as a country, must think again about short-sightedness of that kind, because it is not serving us well—and, I would argue, not serving the international community well.

We need to ensure that our ears and eyes are working, because when they are not, we tend to make expensive mistakes in the world. The fact that we have not properly funded our analytical skills and our capabilities, and have not been as well-sighted as we should have been, has certainly contributed—although it has not been the only reason—to a series of errors that have proved exceedingly costly in lives first and foremost, but also in terms of treasure. That brings me back to the point about false economies. It is a false economy to make cuts in our ears and eyes—our Foreign and Commonwealth Office capabilities—if, as a result, we then blunder into interventions that cost us dearly in lives and treasure.

I am pleased to see that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe is present. Through him, I urge the Government to increase expenditure on the FCO in real terms. We will be better sighted for it, and will make fewer costly errors.