(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend, because he makes an important umbrella point about the difficulties that could be encountered and that—dare I say it—could be exploited by clever lawyers. I often say that and I have to remind the House that, although I am not sure that I am clever, I must admit that I am of the legal profession. It is proper to concede that point against my profession, because lawyers will be instructed by local authorities that need to conserve their resources and will increasingly look to discharge their statutory duties, but to go no further. We have to avoid the scenario of families having to wait for provision while lawyers dance on the head of a pin over costly and unnecessary arguments.
I am grateful for the huge amount of work that the hon. Gentleman has done on this subject during the passage of the Bill and elsewhere. He is making a strong argument for a unified appeals process. There is strong logic, which has been pursued by the Minister and his predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Brent Central (Sarah Teather), for bringing the processes together so that families who are looking for support have one point of contact or one meeting to attend. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if the current tribunal process is not the right way to achieve that, the Government can continue to consider the matter as the evidence comes back from the pilot?
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for his kind remarks. He makes an important point about a common entry point for families. That is a good start, but more needs to be done to build on it. To be frank, it may not be necessary to do that through primary legislation and the rules of the tribunals might be used. That would be a matter for Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. I know my hon. Friend is liaising with counterparts in the Ministry of Justice on other matters that I shall come on to, and I sure he will also give this issue careful and anxious thought.
At the moment, clause 50(4)(a) allows
“other matters relating to EHC plans against which appeals may be brought;”
to be added to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. To be fair to my hon. Friend, there does seem to be a power within the Bill, but it would be wise to go just one furlong further and make it absolutely clear to the families we represent that simplicity is the order of the day when it comes to people’s rights to challenge decisions that—let us not forget this—will affect the life course of the young people we are dealing with.
Let me move on to a rather interesting—well, I hope so—and important matter. Having to admit to being a lawyer is not popular in this House, but words are important and if we change the meaning of something, once again the lawyers will jump all over it. In that spirit, let us consider amendment 39, which relates to the position of current case law, and the synthesis between health care provision, social care provision and education—a point that returns to the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael). The Government’s intention seems clear: they wish to replicate current case law when it comes to how local authorities judge their responsibility to make provision in that area. Clause 21 includes the words
“wholly or mainly for the purposes of education”,
and I share the concern that the words “wholly or mainly” set a different and higher threshold than is currently set out in case law. In the 1999 Bromley case, Lord Justice Sedley spoke about a case-by-case analysis of particular applications, rather than a general principle as seems to be suggested by the clause. We should therefore consider a spectrum or range of provision from purely medical to purely educational need. A large number of cases will fall inside that spectrum, bearing in mind the common and well-understood scenario that with a particular need often comes a co-morbid need—a special educational need will often be accompanied by a health need as well.