Iranian Nuclear Programme

Debate between Dan Poulter and David Lidington

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Lidington]

I want to say a little bit more about access in a few moments, but to answer my hon. Friend directly, questions about access and verification lie at the heart of the detailed negotiations going on today. Unless we and our partners are satisfied that the IAEA will have the access that it believes it needs, there will not be a final agreement.

[Dr Poulter]

My right hon. Friend’s considered, helpful response is shedding perhaps greater light on the issues than we had in the previous debate. On access, is it not difficult to understand what is being negotiated if there has not been transparency about exactly what the situation is on the ground and what access there is to the scientists? Should there not be some level of access first, before the final details of the negotiation are put to bed?

[Mr Lidington]

I promise my hon. Friend that I will come to the point he raised on access to scientists a little later in my remarks. All the questions about access and the sequencing of access are precisely the subject of the negotiations that Foreign Ministers are pursuing this afternoon in Vienna.

So far as sanctions are concerned, the position under Lausanne is that once the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all the agreed actions on its nuclear programme—and only at that point—Iran will receive phased sanctions relief, including comprehensive relief from economic and financial sanctions. The interim plan provides for proliferation-related measures to remain in place until the international community has confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme. Importantly, Iran will remain bound by its non-proliferation treaty obligations both during and after a deal. We will not hesitate to take action, including through the re-imposition of sanctions, if Iran at any time violates its obligations under a comprehensive deal. To respond to the shadow Minister, one thing we and our partners are discussing is how to devise the mechanism for the snapback of sanctions in the event that Iran breaks from the terms of a deal that it has agreed. Obviously any final agreement will contain far more detail than I am able to set out today, but we are confident that a deal within the Lausanne framework will achieve what we set out to do.

Turning to some of the questions raised in the debate, the hon. Member for Dudley North asked about the joint committee. The joint committee mechanism would be set up only in the wake of a deal. It would be a format within which issues relating to the implementation of the agreement could be discussed by all parties together. It would be a deliberative forum. The political reality is that Iran would be present along with the six negotiating partners. One may want to be very pessimistic and say that the six will not be able to maintain solidarity. So far, there has been a very good working relationship among the three EU members, the United States, Russia and China, but were something to go wrong, it would remain the reality that the three European countries and the United States would constitute a majority on the joint committee.

On access, it is essential that the IAEA is able as part of any agreement to verify all of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments, including through access to relevant locations. That must include robust monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities and how it implements the additional protocol, which it will need to sign up to once again as part of any agreement. Under a comprehensive agreement, Iran, by implementing the additional protocol to the NPT, will provide the IAEA with substantial access to its declared nuclear facilities. Also, under the additional protocol the IAEA can request access to any location in Iran that it chooses, including non-declared and military sites. For a comprehensive agreement to be credible, we will need to ensure that the IAEA can obtain that access. It needs to be more than just words on paper. The detail of how we can ensure confidence in the IAEA having the access it believes it needs is central to the ongoing negotiations.

If Iran implements the additional protocol, the IAEA will have additional rights to information on and access to the entire Iranian fuel cycle, including uranium mines and some parts of the centrifuge production process. That will clearly give the IAEA a better understanding of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and make the diversion of nuclear materials more difficult than it has been.

The question on access to scientists, which was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich, relates to what is sometimes termed the possible military dimension of Iran’s programme. The IAEA is keen to see that addressed. The six and Iran agree that the resolution of outstanding issues remains essential, particularly those related to the possible military dimensions, or PMD, of the Iranian nuclear programme. The completion of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns over PMD will constitute one of the set of “key nuclear-related actions” that Iran must complete following agreement at Lausanne of the joint comprehensive plan of action. The IAEA director-general has been careful to separate the talks taking place under the framework for co-operation signed by the IAEA and Iran on 11 November 2013 from the E3+3 process. He has said that he hoped they would be mutually beneficial, and we continue to share that view.

Iran will need to address the IAEA’s concerns about the possible military dimensions of its programme, regardless of the outcome of the E3+3 talks and any joint comprehensive plan of action. We note and are disappointed by the extremely limited progress on PMD reported by the IAEA in its board report of 29 May. We continue to give our full support to the IAEA, which has continued to engage with Iran at short notice and has tried to demonstrate maximum flexibility on what it sees as the essential need to get to the bottom of the PMD question.

Concerns were expressed about whether a time-limited agreement could be a problem, because Iran might just massively expand its nuclear programme once the period of the agreement expired. The key point to make is that a comprehensive deal would lead to significantly increased transparency, in particular through the implementation of the additional protocol and modified code 3.1, and those measures do not expire at the end of any deal; they are permanent and will ensure that Iran’s programme remains transparent and subject to verification by the IAEA, providing reassurance to the international community about the peaceful nature of that programme. Iran remains bound by its NPT obligations during and after any deal. The deal is attractive to Iran because of the huge economic benefits it would bring, and that gives it a significant incentive to keep its nuclear programme exclusively peaceful. I said that we will not hesitate to take action, including through the reimposition of sanctions, if Iran violates its NPT obligations at any time. Our hope is that the implementation of a comprehensive agreement, with all the benefits that that would bring to the people of Iran, would mean that the Iranian Government would not wish to take such a step.

A nuclear deal would also make a significant contribution to regional stability. It goes without saying that the alternatives to a diplomatic settlement are a nuclear-armed Iran or a military confrontation aimed at stopping its nuclear programmes. Those would be terrible outcomes for the region at large. If Iran had or was believed to have nuclear weapons, the risk of a nuclear arms race in the middle east would be serious indeed. By contrast, a deal that ensured that the Iranian programme was exclusively peaceful would have a significant positive regional impact. Improved trust and confidence could go a long way in easing the tensions of a volatile and dangerous region.

At the same time, we completely understand that Israel and our partners in the Gulf have concerns. To them we say, as we have said consistently: we do not want and will not do a bad deal. We will only do a deal that provides assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme. Securing such a deal, if it is indeed attainable, is inherently better than the alternatives.

Our relationships with our partners in the region—our commitment to talking to them and keeping them up to date with our views and the progress of the talks—will remain. We will not turn a blind eye to Iran’s destabilising actions in the region, but we will work with both our partners and Iran to support and encourage in the Iranian Government a more constructive regional attitude. By reaching a nuclear deal, Iran can start to show willing, and it can show us that it is willing to work towards solutions to regional challenges.

On the bilateral relationship, a comprehensive deal would bring potential benefits to the UK as well as to Iran. If—I say “if”—Iran not only strikes a deal but adheres to its commitments and so sanctions are lifted, the Government will help British business in whatever way they can to take advantage of the resulting opportunities and to promote trade and investment between the two countries. A functioning British embassy in Tehran would be an important part of the Government’s role. We have been clear from the start that the reopening of our embassy is not dependent on a nuclear agreement, and we remain committed to reopening it as soon as we have resolved some outstanding issues relating to the practical functioning of the mission.

Sending our diplomats back to Tehran would not, however, mean setting aside all differences with Iran. We continue to disagree on a number of core topics, not least Iran’s record on human rights and approach to regional stability. Nevertheless, an embassy in Tehran would allow us to engage the Government and people of Iran on a full spectrum of issues, just as we do in many other countries around the world with whose Governments we also have profound disagreements. Increased dialogue is in our mutual interests and the only way to move forward.

We have the opportunity to settle one of the most complex foreign policy problems of our time. To have got even this far is a remarkable achievement and a testament to the dedication, perseverance and creativity of diplomats and officials from all sides, including Iran. It demonstrates what can be achieved when we allow the time and space to settle differences through diplomatic means. There is an historic opportunity for Iran, the region and the international community, but we cannot and will not make a deal at any price. An agreement is worth having only if it delivers our key objective of ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme can only ever be peaceful, and it must deliver that outcome in a credible, verifiable way.

We face some difficult discussions in the coming hours and days, and, whatever the outcome in Vienna, we will continue to have our differences with Iran on regional issues and human rights. However, a deal within the parameters agreed in Lausanne remains the best way to secure the assurances we seek on Iran’s nuclear programme—the best way for Britain, the region and the global community.