Defence and Cyber-security

Debate between Dai Havard and Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Havard]

The short answer is yes. The other aspect is who can be engaged to help to do such things. As the hon. Gentleman, who is on the Defence Committee, will know, the structuring of things to ensure a reserve capability is hugely important. The way in which the process is being put together is correct; there will be no monopoly on understanding in the areas we are discussing. We need as good a collaboration as possible. The delivery of the processes will not always be remote. Intelligence and knowing what is happening, where and with whom will be crucial. I shall come to that later.

The other question that comes up is about the law—I mentioned legitimacy earlier. I am helping to lead a sub-study in the Defence Committee of the military and the law. That is coloured, obviously, by Supreme Court decisions, individual cases and all the rest of it. The issue raises questions about international law, humanitarian law, extra-territorial jurisdiction and other things. An argument is being put that says, “We don’t need anything to be separate. This is a different domain, but all the current legal constructs are good enough and we do not need anything different.” I come back to my earlier point. We need to be clear about doctrine. In large part, our doctrine is public. Some, however, may not be as public as we would like, but we need to be clear about how we do things.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

We seem to accept that cyber can be not just defensive, but offensive—we can use it offensively. Does my hon. Friend think that our domestic legal structure is sufficient to deal with cyber as an offensive weapon and to contain the power of the Executive to apply that weapon?

[Mr Havard]

I do not know, but in the sense that I think I do know, I think that our legal structure is not sufficient and needs revision. I may be wrong, but that debate has to take place and people more qualified than I am need to comment.

It is interesting to note where our allies are. The United States has and has not made all sorts of declarations. If we believe The New York Times, there was a secret legal review that concluded:

“US military forces could legally launch an attack on digital infrastructure located in a foreign country if it found evidence of a threat against its own systems”.

A rules of engagement debate then starts. That is the other difficult bit—we will have to have rules of engagement for such activity. The more we discuss legitimacy in law for these things, the better. If we do not have such a discussion, the issue will be forced on us. That is what we are seeing now in a lot of other areas, so we should structure how we wish to have the debate rather than having a structure imposed on us.

Proportionality is at the guts of the whole business of international law, human rights and legitimacy. We have to show that proportionality is there and that we have mechanisms and systems to ensure that it is. Simply claiming that it is there will not be good enough.

We are not on our own. We need to be joined up not only internally within the United Kingdom, but internationally. We do not have time to go fully into this now, but it is interesting to see Russia’s current adventures in Ukraine. In September 2011, Russia and China said to a UN group that they wanted a code of conduct for cyberspace that would include requirements for co-operation in

“curbing dissemination of information which incites terrorism, secessionism, extremism or undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment”.

Well, there we are—now we know. Translating that into current events will tell us a lot. That proposed code of conduct was about closing things down and giving legitimacy to the avoidance of dissent and to having systems that are less rather than more open. How we collaborate in this area will be important.

When he was Secretary of Defence in America, Bob Gates said that he could protect .mil, .gov, .org or .com, but that as the protection systems were put in, the public might not like what they saw on .com. That debate is not only to do with defence, but defence has a place in it. Whether there should be a code of conduct and the international arrangements are problematic issues, but there is a growing urgency around them.

At the end of the day, the issue can be about the collection of raw information and the sending of viruses to blow up particular equipment. That is the geeky stuff—the weaponisation and the sexy stuff that the press love. However, at the end of the day, those and other actions are only as good as the intelligence that exists to put them into effect. One area of investment that must not be lost in the question of cyber-issues is defence intelligence. In my opinion, we have the best intelligence analysts and they need to be developed.

We can collect the raw information, but if we do not understand it we will go nowhere with it and make the wrong decision. Investment discussions should please not just be about technical toys, GCHQ and all the stuff about weapons; they should also be about intelligence analysts. Let us protect the capability. The issue is about a whole force, but also about a whole community. Those people are vital in that community and investment also needs to go to them.