Libya

Crispin Blunt Excerpts

Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his response. Let me join in his praise of UN Special Representative Martin Kobler—it was remiss of me not to give that praise myself—who is an absolute dynamo. Since he was appointed, he has literally been shuttling between the parties, groups and power brokers in Libya. It is very much due to his energy and effort that we have got where we are today.

There is a Government of national unity, but we should be clear about Libya’s historical context: it is a country that has traditionally had a high degree of devolution in its governance structure, which is often held together by a strong man at the centre. We now need to find a new model, under which the Government of national accord will be a national umbrella organisation, but Prime Minister Sarraj has made it clear that that will work only if municipalities are empowered and prepared to take on a significant degree of devolution. A devolved model is the only model that will work.

I also need to make it clear that the Libyan Government are in a very early stage of operation. At the moment, the Prime Minister and his Ministers are sitting in a naval base, physically separated from the civil servants who could support them. Yesterday, they retook operational control of three Ministries, which is a good step forward, but it will only be as they are able to re-enter the Ministries and regain working contact with civil servants that they can start to do some of the detailed work. That situation underpins and shapes my answers to some of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions, because he is absolutely right that the GNA can succeed only with the support and consent of the various factions in Libya.

Let me say one other thing by way of scene-setting. When I went to Tripoli yesterday, I was expecting to find the Government incarcerated in a heavily fortified military base, defending against all comers, but that is not the situation. The base is relatively lightly defended, and it was clear that the Prime Minister’s ability to operate there is based on the consent and acquiescence of the militias operating in that part of the capital. He is acutely conscious of the need to build a bottom-up consensus around his activities.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the European Union. I returned from Tripoli to Luxembourg last night, where there was a discussion at 28, including Defence Minister colleagues, about future support to Libya, looking at the possibility of extending Operation Sophia in a counter-migration role. No decisions were taken, but the matter is clearly high on the European Union’s agenda. The key will be to develop a package that also addresses Libyan top priorities. The Libyans are focused on migration, but it is in all honesty not their top priority. We have to create an environment in which delivering on Europe’s top priorities also addresses those of the Libyan people.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about a UN Security Council resolution. I have not heard anyone suggest that there is an immediate need for a further resolution. The next moves at the UN will be the granting of some exemptions to the arms embargo, and possibly the unfreezing of some assets to allow the Government to function properly.

The House would of course be consulted were the UK Government to decide at any point that they wanted to insert ground forces, or any forces, in Libya in a combat role. We do not envisage that happening in the current circumstances.

The right hon. Gentleman referred to the situation in which a training deployment is contemplated, and asked me whether we would seek the House’s approval for a training deployment. I should be clear that it is a question not of approval, but of consulting the House and allowing it to express an opinion through a vote, and the history of the past three years shows that the Government will take great notice of that. However, that would not be the case in the event of a training deployment. We have training deployments around the world. In fact, my Ministry of Defence colleagues informed me just before I came to the House that we currently have 16 permanent training deployments. It is not appropriate for the House to be consulted on such a deployment as if it were a combat deployment.

Did the Libyan Prime Minister ask for training support? Not explicitly, but he did indicate that the Libyan Government may well ask the international community for some form of support as they develop their plans. I gained the personal impression that his instinct is very much at the lighter end of the scale. He clearly does not want to be seen to be dependent on foreign support and wants to do as much as possible internally, using Libyan capabilities. Of course, if there is any question of training, we would want to look at the options for training outside Libya, as well as the permissibility of training inside Libya.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement and last night’s European Council conclusions on Libya. The sanctioning of the Speaker of the House of Representatives is welcome, as he has been a particular obstacle to the formation of the GNA. Also welcome is the commitment that the EU—and, I therefore assume, the British—contribution will be coherent and co-ordinated with other international support under the overall co-ordination of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. A coherent British contribution will be easier with the consent and understanding of this House. It might need to include, for example, airstrikes on Daesh targets in addition to the training mission to which he alludes.

I counsel the Foreign Secretary that he is dancing on pretty thin ice when it comes to differentiating between a training mission in a combat zone and other missions, and when he talks about not seeking to carry this House’s approval. I notice the language he has used in talking about being away from the frontline of operations. I wonder whether he can say anything more about that. I urge him to continue to try to carry this House with him.