Royal Mail

Chuka Umunna Excerpts

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Chuka Umunna (Streatham) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to make a statement on the price at which Royal Mail was privatised last year, in the light of the National Audit Office’s report, out today.

[The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable)]

The National Audit Office has today published its report on the Royal Mail sale of shares. The report confirms that we achieved our primary objective of securing a sale of shares, allowing Royal Mail to access the private capital it needs to invest and thrive. As a result the taxpayer now faces reduced risk of having to provide financial support to the universal postal service.

It was right that we took a cautious and measured approach to the sale. That approach was taken in the light of our primary objective, and reflects the considerable risks we faced due to industrial relations and challenging market conditions.

The price range for the shares was set following a comprehensive programme of engagement with over 500 potential investors and was benchmarked against valuations of comparable postal companies. I am clear that this was the correct approach to secure a successful transaction.

A more aggressive approach to pricing would have introduced significantly greater risk. The advice that we received in this respect was unambiguous. There was no confidence that a sufficient number of buyers would offer a significantly higher price. A failed transaction and the retention of Royal Mail in public ownership would have been a very poor outcome for the taxpayer, as the NAO report confirms.

Achieving taxpayer value is about securing both short-term and long-term benefits. In the short term, we have delivered a successful transaction, which raised £2 billion for the Exchequer, enabled over 690,000 members of the public to buy Royal Mail shares and put in place the largest employee share scheme of any privatisation in nearly 30 years. In the long term, we have reduced the ongoing risks to the taxpayer by putting Royal Mail in a position where it can operate commercially and finance its own funds if needed. In doing so, as the NAO confirms, we have achieved our key objectives.

The sale of shares in Royal Mail has delivered on our commitment to protect the universal postal service and safeguard vital services for the taxpayer.

[Mr Umunna]

Mr Speaker, you know it is April fool’s day when a report is published by the National Audit Office saying that

“the Department…could have achieved better value for the taxpayer”

but Ministers go out to the media, and come to this House, to declare their privatisation a success. They must think we are all fools. What planet are they living on?

There are no two ways about this: the report delivers a damning verdict on the Government’s botched privatisation, which has left the taxpayer disgracefully short-changed to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds. Let us be clear: the issue was not whether they would be able to sell all the shares—one can usually flog off something for a knock-down price—but whether, in so doing, they secured best value for the taxpayer. They have sought to hide behind the advice they received from the bankers, who made millions out of the deal. Will the Secretary of State confirm that those advisers acted within “inflexible” constraints set by Ministers to achieve a sale as soon as possible in this Parliament? Had they waited for the markets to settle and for further years’ profits to be delivered, they could have achieved a better price. Secondly, is it not the case that having judged that Royal Mail’s profits were doomed to decline, far from making an objective judgment, they simply refused to entertain the notion that it could succeed in public hands, although the financial results for the last financial year showed a trebling of profits?

Finally, we were promised that the Secretary of State would secure a long-term and supportive shareholder base, but the opposite has turned out to be true. Will he confirm that the 17 supposed long-term investors he prioritised had sold almost half the shares allocated to them within weeks and that hedge funds now make up a large number of the shareholder list?

The Secretary of State dismissed claims that a cherished national institution was being sold off on the cheap as “froth”. The truth is that this has been a first-class disaster for the taxpayer and those he once referred to as “spivs and gamblers” are laughing all the way to the bank. The very least he can do today is apologise.

[Vince Cable]

The last thing I intend to do is apologise. What I do intend to do is refer to what the report actually said, as opposed to the spinning and froth that is being generated around it. Let me read again the report’s initial conclusion on value for money:

“By floating Royal Mail on the Stock Exchange the Department achieved its key objectives of introducing private capital and commercial disciplines. Given Royal Mail’s prospects and prudent initial capital structure it is now less likely that the taxpayer will have to provide public support for the universal postal service.”

That is what it actually said.

Let me address the criticisms, if that is what they were. The first was that the Department was cautious, but I would have thought that caution in this context had a lot to commend it. The reason the Department was cautious was the very real risk that the floatation could fail. The choice we faced was: had the floatation failed, it would have remained in public ownership and, despite the hon. Gentleman’s preference for keeping it in public ownership, the valuation placed on it continuing in public ownership was about £1 billion. That was not disputed by the National Audit Office. The alternative—the floatation which happened—resulted in a value for the taxpayer of £2 billion in cash and £1.5 billion in continued value of the retained sale. There was a choice between the £3.5 billion that resulted from the privatisation and the £1 billion had it failed, so it is absolutely right and sensible that we were cautious.

The hon. Gentleman made the point that there was a lack of flexibility in the initial public offering system. Indeed, the National Audit Office makes that point: there was a lack of flexibility. The question, therefore, is: were there any alternatives? Could this have been done in a different way? The Government could have eliminated the retail investors and had more flexibility over price at the time of sale, but as it happens one of the successes of the privatisation is the fact that 670,000 investors now have shares.

The other way of selling Royal Mail would have been through a trade sale, and of course we looked at that as an option. One of the reasons we did not pursue it was that we looked at the history of privatisation under the Labour Government. and there was one very good example of what happens when a trade sale is pursued: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the NAO report on the privatisation of QinetiQ. What happens with the supposed flexibility of a trade sale—[Interruption.]