Parliamentary Reform

Debate between Chris Bryant and Michael Meacher

Thursday 3rd February 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) on securing this important debate on parliamentary reform. The subject cries out for discussion and debate. She focused largely on the admittedly archaic procedures of this place, but I want to concentrate on power and accountability. I shall try to be brief.

At the nadir of the expenses scandal, it was finally agreed by all three political parties that the rock-bottom reputation of Parliament could best be salvaged by a new, forceful, democratic role for Parliament and an effective scrutinising and decision-making Chamber for the nation’s business. The Wright Committee—the Committee on Reform of the House of Commons—was set up. It was given little time but it reached its conclusions in rapid order and produced an excellent, well-argued report which ushered in two important changes, as we all know.

The first was the Backbench Business Committee, which has been successful under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Derbyshire (Natascha Engel). It wrested some limited control of the parliamentary agenda from the Executive, which had monopolised it for decades, although—I say this in the presence of the Leader of the House, whom we are glad to see here—we look to the conclusion of that process by the setting up of a House business committee at an early stage. The other important change was to secure the election, as opposed to the selection by Whips, of the Chairs of Select Committees who, as we all know, are by far the most effective mechanism for holding Ministers to account. Both innovations have worked extremely well.

However, valuable as those reforms are, they scarcely begin to redress the balance of power that has subordinated Parliament over the past several decades. Its power has drained away through the increasing concentration of power in No. 10. It continually seeps away to Brussels as the European Union mandate spreads ever wider, and the judiciary increasingly encroaches on the parliamentary prerogative, presumably prompted by the judges’ view that if Parliament cannot hold the Executive to account, they will.

A parliamentary revival needs to be tackled at several levels. At one level, we drastically have to overhaul our existing procedures. I want to give a few examples. Bills in Committee—the stage at which they should be seriously scrutinised—can often emerge after dozens if not hundreds of hours of scrutiny with minimal changes. I have even known them to emerge with no change. Why? Because a Whip-chosen majority of the governing party can simply block amendments. We should look at the Scottish system in which Bills no longer go to a Standing Committee but to the appropriate Select Committee, which has a track record of expertise. Of course, that would require considerable strengthening of Select Committees in terms of resources, the number of Sub-Committees and also time, but it would be a serious and much better alternative.

Report is the one stage at which Members of this House can make important changes to Bills through votes of the whole House. One abuse is that the Government can all too easily prevent later amendments. Of course, amendments are often not wanted by Governments—that is hardly surprising—and they can ensure that they are not even reached by talking out earlier amendments. One recent example of that, of course, is the European Union Bill, but there are many others.

Another problem, which has been mentioned, is not the fault of either the Whips or the Government but of Members. How many Members vote at the suggestion of their Whips as they approach the lobby without actually knowing what they are voting on? It is a serious abuse, and one of the reasons it is problematic is that most people cannot understand what the amendment is actually about. I have had that experience many times when looking at the amendment paper. A proposal, which I believe has the support of the Government, is that there should be a short explanation—two or three lines, for example—of the purpose and nature of every amendment on Report so that people can more easily make a judgment.

[Chris Bryant]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Meacher]

I realise that many people wish to speak, but I shall give way very briefly.

[Chris Bryant]

When a knife or a guillotine come in, the Government Whips are happy for amendments to be talked out because they know that the rules of the House specify that the Government amendment will still be taken. If we were to abolish that rule, some of their power over time would disappear.

[Mr Meacher]

That is a fair point, and I entirely agree. I do not have time to suggest ways of dealing with all the problems, which are extensive. This House is meant to be a serious, scrutinising body, but it simply is not so at present.

The third issue that I wish to raise briefly is about the public, who are involved in this—their lives are controlled by the Bills that we put through. There should be a pre-legislative stage for Bills at which outside experts can be brought in to give detailed evidence, and where members of the public and, indeed—I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey)—Members of Parliament have an opportunity to make representations.

That is all about existing procedures. I want to say something very quickly about a further range of reforms whereby Parliament could and should assert its authority as the elected voice of the people. On matters of overriding national importance—the obvious example of the past decade was the Iraq war; it took 15 months before this House even had a debate on it—Parliament should have the right to set up its own commissions of inquiry and not simply depend on the Executive or No. 10 to do so, because, of course, it is usually their actions that are the subject of the investigation. That is not a particularly novel suggestion or innovative proposal—it is exactly what our Victorian predecessors did quite regularly.

Secondly, when committees of inquiry are set up by the Prime Minister, which will probably remain the normal practice, the House should be empowered to scrutinise the terms of reference and approve the appointment of the chair and members of those bodies, because the choice of personnel and the terms of reference can significantly skew the final report in a particular direction. Many of us know that all too well.

Thirdly, on patronage, Select Committees should routinely carry out confirmation hearings. Again, there is nothing original about that—that is exactly what happens and has happened for years in the United States Congress. That should be done, obviously, for persons who are appointed to leading quango posts but also, perhaps, for some ministerial appointments. People from outside who have never been elected to Parliament are brought in by Prime Ministers and suddenly appointed to important posts. Parliament has a right to call them for examination, and to vote to approve their appointment at the end.

Fourthly, there are often obscure and complex legal issues in many of these matters. Parliament should be served by its own legal counsel if it is to be an effective check on Executive power.

I will make three further quick points. One is the control of expenditure, since the annual Government expenditure of £650 billion is a key exercise of power. Parliament should establish a framework for the contemporaneous monitoring and cross-examination of major expenditure programmes—not just the ex post facto examination by the Public Accounts Committee, though that is valuable and I would want to keep it. It should be aided by a cadre of expert external advisers. Whether that is done through Select Committees—which might be the best way—or through a new specialist estimates Committee, is for discussion. The allocation of huge quantities of public money and the whole question of value for money are of legitimate interest to Parliament, at the time that the decisions are still in the making.

Secondly, professional lobbyists are a very serious issue. They have now hugely increased their influence over the political process. Parliament should require that a public register is kept, including the scope of their activities, their source of funding and their meeting with Ministers. If there is to be the transparency that democracy demands, that murky area needs to be cleaned up.

Thirdly, several hon. Members mentioned petitions. I agree that where a very high—and the bar should be high—threshold number of electors have signed a petition, there is a case for saying that it should be debated and voted on in the House. We need a new constitutional settlement if we are to get off our knees and be an effective check on Executive power. Many of those proposals, as well as others, need to be looked at seriously.