Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Debate between Charles Walker and Nadhim Zahawi

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Nadhim Zahawi (Stratford-on-Avon) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and my co-chairmanship of the all-party group on the Kurdistan region in Iraq and vice-chairmanship of the all-party group on Iraq.

[Mr Charles Walker (Broxbourne) (Con)]

May I just thank the hon. Gentleman for his sterling work in those areas?

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am most grateful—and my head will not get through the double-doors if my hon. Friend carries on like that.

From Mosul to Raqqa, ISIL, at its root, has filled a void, both literally, in terms of governance, and philosophically, in terms of leadership. Here, it has thrived, and while it is our indisputable enemy—a primary security threat to our interests at home and abroad, as we have heard from many Members—a narrow focus on the tactical military solutions for defeating ISIL ignores the fact that the inherent problem is, at its heart, strategic.

We have heard a lot about the need for an inclusive political settlement in Iraq, but what does this really look like? We have been there before. During the Petraeus surge in 2007 we successfully mobilized Sunni tribes to purge al-Qaeda from their midst, but then we abandoned them to Nouri al-Malaki’s extreme sectarianism. How can we support Prime Minister Abadi to make things different this time around? While it is critical that “power sharing” no longer means the carving up of Government ministries into de facto sectarian fiefdoms, as happened under Maliki, or the centralisation of control in Baghdad—again, as Malaki did—ultimately the structure of governance has to give the Sunni tribes, the people on the ground, a personal investment in how they live. The new Cabinet has six new Sunni Ministers—possibly seven, including the Defence Minister—but do they truly represent wider constituencies of Sunnis? We must be mindful that the same faces keep reappearing.

It was positive to hear last night’s announcement of the formation of national guard units that will allow communities to secure their local areas. Such functional federalism and empowerment will be vital in reducing the lure of ISIL. Prime Minister Abadi must go further, however. He must consider having greater local autonomy and a fair political settlement that addresses the constitutional issues that have plagued Iraq since 2005. He must consider revenue sharing, a hydrocarbon law and a referendum on the disputed territories—including, of course, Kirkuk. Given former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s legacy, restoring trust will not be easy or quick, but if Prime Minister Abadi can bring about a genuinely inclusive political settlement with the Kurds and the Sunnis, half the battle will already have been won. Without such a settlement, however, a unified Iraq will be an impossibility.

We must also recognize that ISIL cannot be defeated in Iraq alone. Syria, the regional safe haven for ISIL over the past three years, is the centre of gravity in this conflict, and it is there that a new push for peace is vital. Having said that, there are ways to do that and ways not to do it, and I can assure the House that aligning with Assad is most certainly not the way to do it. As in Iraq, the solution will be a new inclusive Government who ultimately reduce the appeal of Sunni extremism and who protect minorities, including the Alawites, the Kurds and the Christians of Syria.

To achieve that, the regional actors—including, dare I say it, Iran—must take the lead. We are all aware of the roles that different middle eastern countries have played in directly fuelling conflicts in the region, but the threat posed by ISIL and the unprecedented extent of shared interests between once-mortal enemies can only reinforce the need for the region to move beyond the zero-sum politics that have characterised it for so long. The motivations and limitations of the regional actors will no doubt determine the role that they play in the push-back against this poisonous ideology, but play a role they must. That is not to say that we should not be front and centre in helping them along. Undoubtedly the region looks to us, and to the United States, for leadership and delivery. Twenty years on, John Major is still held in the highest esteem by the Shi’a community and the Kurds for creating the safe haven policy and the no-fly zones.

Crucially, we must act with realism and humility. We must do all we can to support the delicate diplomacy needed to bring in regional partners without alienating others, and to facilitate Iranian and Saudi co-operation with a nuanced understanding of the dynamics and stakes involved.