(7 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I will certainly put that suggestion to officials. My view would be that pre-suspension of the Assembly is the place we are at, and although there has been a change of a leader, I am not sure that we have had any signal that it has gone backwards. The date of 2 March gives me some good hope. I have never known the other place move at the speed of light, so I hope we shall have time to make sure that this gets through.
Finally, this group includes two proposals concerning unexplained wealth orders: new clause 5, in the name of a number of the officers of the all-party parliamentary groups on anti-corruption and responsible tax, and Opposition amendment 1. I will allow hon. Members the opportunity to speak to those amendments and will respond to them in my closing remarks.
The Opposition support the spirit of the Bill and broadly support this group of amendments. We welcome new provisions to prosecute those professionals who fail to prevent tax evasion, as well as welcoming unexplained wealth orders, under which assets can be seized if owners are unable to explain how they were funded. We, of course, support the Government’s effort to tighten up state powers against white-collar crime, but we have concerns that they are squandering the opportunity that the Bill provides to stamp out the everyday corruption of the super-rich who are getting a free ride at the expense of the wider society, thereby fuelling inequality.
Another problem is that, amid the Government’s cuts to public services, the Bill could be very difficult to enforce. Although I understand the giving of new powers to HMRC, are the Government not concerned about how HMRC will carry out its new duties? Given that the coalition Government decimated HMRC’s budgets by £100 million and that HMRC is set to lose 137 of its offices by 2027, there seems little point in creating laws that cannot be enforced—unless, of course, it is to give the impression that the Government are doing something. This, I fear, is a theme that has sadly run through our proceedings on the Bill so far.
We Opposition Members argue that it is crucial for the agencies involved in civil recovery powers to have sufficient resources to do their jobs properly. We therefore request a distinct and clear annual report that details the resources allocated to the agencies that are concerned solely with the task of carrying out these recovery powers.
In previous stages, the Government objected on the grounds that the asset recovery incentivisation scheme would allow frontline agencies to keep 100% of what they recover, but this argument is seriously flawed. In theory, yes, the agencies could retain the total value recovered, but as the Public Accounts Committee made clear in its progress review of confiscation orders and as the Home Affairs Select Committee made clear in its review of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, these agencies’ recovery rates have been typically poor. Consequently, it remains to be seen how these agencies will improve their rate of recovery to benefit from the new incentivisation scheme.
Another reason that the Government gave is that anyone who wanted to find out this information could in theory obtain it by going to a number of different sources. Yet again, this is flawed. We previously argued for a detailed reporting of resources, specifically for these agencies, in the exercise of the powers laid down in the Bill and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The Government have already blocked a number of measures that Labour has proposed to make this a meaningful and effective Bill. We proposed a corporate probation order. If a company was found to have committed a failure to prevent offence, it would have been subject to an independent review of its compliance procedures and it would have had to pay the full costs of such a review. This was coupled with allowing for the removal of directors from companies who failed to ensure that proper procedures were in place to prevent UK and foreign tax evasion offences from taking place. The Government believed that this was unnecessary because UK law could already deal with such cases of negligence. Although there may be a case for some UK law to be used to a similar effect, it would not be an identical effect.
While there is an implied threat to the EU that the Government could change the UK’s economic model into one of a tax haven, there is a strong case for legislation to protect both UK citizens and citizens from around the world. With the potential for a race to the bottom and the destruction of workers’ rights and the slashing of corporation tax, it could be argued that a Brexiteer Government would foster an environment where tax evasion was implicitly encouraged.
As my colleagues have said, and will no doubt say again, the Bill must do more to tackle the deeply entrenched and extraordinarily costly phenomenon of tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is, in effect, living to the letter of the law, but not in the spirit of the law. Repeated investigations of companies that sail close to the wind but know that they have bought the lawyers and accountants to make their tax abuse legal is both very frustrating and extremely costly. As the UK general anti-abuse rules show, there are ways to minimise the risk of corporate abuse of the tax system, and these should be absorbed into the Bill.
Spain, Canada and Australia each have a single agency responsible for supervising and enforcing anti-money laundering regulations—Britain has 22. Worse still, according to Transparency International UK, 15 of these 22 supervisors also lobby on behalf of the interests of their sector, creating clear conflicts of interest and a system inefficient to its core. The Government raised this problem in their action plan that preceded the Bill, but they were not concerned enough to convert this into proposed legislation. The system needs reform and the Bill needs to reflect this. Unless the Government accept all these concerns and indeed all the changes suggested in the Opposition amendments, the Bill is likely to fail on the intention to clean up money laundering and tax evasion.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe hon. Gentleman poses an interesting question. Unexplained wealth orders are linked to serious and organised crime. Although, inevitably, some serious criminals make below £100,000, that was thought to be a useful threshold, and that is where we should look as a starting point. There will be concerns among Members that Aunt Bessie’s £25,000 appearing in someone’s bank account may trigger something like an unexplained wealth order, and we wanted the wealth threshold to be significant enough to ensure that there was a link between serious crime and the recovery of assets being triggered. I know that some people wanted that threshold to be higher than £100,000 and some people wanted it to be lower. As the Minister, my job is to try to get it in the right place, but I would welcome his suggestions on whether it should be, say, £59,000 or £105,000. It could be like “Bullseye”.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alan. Is there a mechanism for recognising regular, ongoing transactions that are close to but always under £100,000? Will that trigger any red flashing warning lights that there may be illegal activity?
The cumulative wealth would of course build up. I am happy to be persuaded by the Committee about the threshold. The reality is that, given the vast number of people involved with organised crime groups across the threat picture and the staggering wealth of some of them, we will be lucky to get to £100,000. We will be going for people worth £20 million, £30 million or £40 million and all the way down. It would chill people’s bones to realise how some of the people who live among us make their money out of crime and launder that money. The bottom line is the number of those individuals. That is why we chose £100,000, but hon. Members may want to make a persuasive argument otherwise. Cumulative wealth is certainly an issue. I was in the north-east of England the other day and met an individual who is unemployed but has well over £400,000 in their bank account. I am looking forward to knocking on that person’s door.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway for his amendment, which was set out in his party’s manifesto for this year’s Scottish Parliament elections. The Government take this issue seriously, as do the Scottish Nationalist party and the Scottish Government.
As we have heard, to avoid detection, criminals use a range of means to transfer value among themselves. Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors—particularly those operating in Scotland—have made us aware of criminals’ use of gaming vouchers and casino chips to do that. There has been media coverage of drug dealers using fixed odds betting terminals to convert cash obtained from street drug dealing into vouchers issued by those machines. Those vouchers can either be converted into cash at the bookmaker, thus laundering the funds, or transferred to another person to pay the drug dealer’s debts.
The Proceeds of Crime Act contains provisions that enable law enforcement agencies to seize cash, but those provisions do not extend to the type of criminal tactic that I have just described, so clauses 12 and 13 seek to allow those agencies to freeze, seize and seek forfeiture of illicit funds held in bank accounts and other forms of criminal property used to transfer value. It has always been the Government’s intention to include gambling vouchers and casino chips in those provisions, as I made clear on Second Reading. When the Bill was introduced, we were still looking at the best way of achieving that in legislation, but I tabled new clause 10 on Monday—I apologise for doing so at the beginning of the Committee stage and not giving hon. Members more time to look at it—which will add gambling vouchers and casino chips to the definition of cash in the Proceeds of Crime Act and allow law enforcement agencies to seize those items on the same basis as they can seize cash, where their individual or aggregate value is more than £1,000.
Officers will have to demonstrate to a court that they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that vouchers or casino chips are either proceeds of crime or intended for use in unlawful conduct. That is an important safeguard that we apply to all forms of seizure. Law enforcement agencies will need to show why they seek the detention of the property, and will be able to seek administrative forfeiture of vouchers or tokens, or the agreement of a court. In all cases, an individual who believes that such vouchers or tokens are theirs legitimately will be able to challenge their detention or forfeiture.
I turn to the hon. Gentleman’s point and why we have used the term “gaming vouchers” rather than “betting slips”. In discussions with law enforcement agencies, we have identified that there is a major concern about the laundering of proceeds of crime through machines that provide a guaranteed return if they are played in a certain way. Those machines produce pay-out vouchers with a value that can then be cashed in. Betting slips, such as those used for horse racing, are used for betting with no guaranteed return and, therefore, are much more risky for use in money laundering.
However, once the points had been raised by the hon. Gentleman, I asked officials to examine whether there is potential to extend the Bill to ensure that we cover betting slips as well. As someone who likes the horses and knows his way round a losing—rather than a winning —bet, I understand that the ability to exploit that type of bet could potentially lead to such money laundering.
The Minister may be aware that I am the Chair of the all-party group on FOBTs. I have grave concerns about bookmakers not reporting unusual and excessive activity on B2 machines by people who would not normally have that kind of disposable income. Is the Minister satisfied that leaving it up to the betting industry to self-report is adequate?
If memory serves me right, the Gambling Commission has the power to carry out a range of investigations and to impose conditions on bookmakers. I hear the hon. Lady’s point loud and clear. I have the same concern in my part of the world in the north-west about whether bookmakers are properly regulated and carrying out their obligation to report suspicious bets, as they currently do under the law. That is more a question of whether we are doing enough to enforce the law. Existing laws are quite strong, though some bookies’ shops—I suspect, as she does—have a way to go. If criminals know that we can seize their FOBT print-outs, they might be less likely to stick their money in the FOBT in the first place. We have put provisions in the Bill because they are pretty canny. When POCA came in in 2002, they realised that we could seize cash, so off they went. They are pretty good at moving the cash. No doubt, one day we will be back again, maybe saying that they have used telephone cards or whatever, and we will have to adapt the legislation in time.
The Government’s amendment chooses to put the provision into POCA, as opposed to the route chosen by the Scottish Nationalist party, because we believe that these items are better placed in cash provisions, because they have no real use other than to be turned into cash. The listed items of moveable property have an intrinsic use as well as being a store of value, and they need to be dealt with under the provisions that we have introduced into the Bill.
The listed items of moveable property clause also contains detailed provision about dealing with non-severable property and competing joint-owner claims that are not relevant to gambling vouchers. As I said, we are considering this as part of the Treasury’s review of regulation under the change to the fourth anti-money laundering directive when it comes to self-reporting of suspicious activity and fixed odds betting. That is under review by the Treasury as well, so I hope everyone will get their collar felt if they do not comply with one directive or another.
I hope hon. Members will agree that that would achieve the results they were after and, accordingly, I invite them to withdraw their amendment.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ You quote the Panama papers, which was a significant leak, and there have been previous ones—Liechtenstein and others. The access that our law enforcement agencies will now get will be greater than the Panama papers. The Panama papers are not complete, and they are effectively within the control of the journalists in the sense that they were selectively leaked to them and then published. No one is able to get the full picture because we do not have open access to Panama, which is not a Crown dependency or an overseas territory; it is a place that Scotland had a bad relationship with a few hundred years ago.
What we are proposing, and what the Crown dependencies are giving our law enforcement access to, is the complete picture. In one sense, we will have a greater advantage than the Panama papers because our law enforcement agencies will be able to have full access to the full range automatically. Therefore, in one sense we are 90% there. As you said, we do not have the transparency bit, but the Government’s intention is to do that. We are doing it, first, by leadership. We are the first in the G20 to say it is our aspiration. The step that seems to be mooted is to impose the sovereign will of Parliament on them, but in 12 months we have gone 90% of the way.
Toby Quantrill: We are looking for a timeline. We must give time and support to moving in that direction and be clear about when we are going to reach it. The Panama papers demonstrated the power of making this information public, because the impact has been global. In countries all around the world, citizens have gained information about people often within their Government and judiciary, and they have been able to investigate, follow those leads and hold their Governments to account. That is the power of transparency. It should be full transparency, not just the bits and bobs. We should not have to rely on leaks to hold our Governments to account. That is the point we are making.
Q Have you ever heard of the Magnitsky clause?
Toby Quantrill: No.
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberFirst, we are investing in a new software programme for ActionFraud that will not only improve the analytics of crimes that are reported to it, but allow victims of fraud to track their cases in live time online. In response to my hon. Friend’s concern, I have also asked officials to look into how ActionFraud communicates with members of the public. I think it important to remember that these are victims, many of whom have done nothing wrong whatsoever and have been preyed upon by some of the worst people in society.
The Home Secretary will be aware of continuing concern about the historical conduct of South Yorkshire police. I understand that she is meeting members of the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign next week to discuss their call for a public inquiry. Is she also aware of the tragic case of Terry Coles, a Swansea City supporter, who was trampled to death by a police horse at a football match in 2000? Will she agree to look at the evidence, and accept that, unless we have the truth about all these past injustices, we shall not be able to restore trust in South Yorkshire police?