Continuous At-Sea Deterrent
Debate between Caroline Lucas and Julian Lewis(5 years, 8 months ago)
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Caroline Lucas
If the right hon. Gentleman really thinks that 122 countries around the world are engaging in gesture politics, I would suggest to him that it is perhaps more a gesture from him than it is from them. I believe in Britain taking a leadership role. Perhaps he does not. The constant sitting back and waiting for something else to happen—doing the wrong thing—would frankly be unconscionable.
It is very easy to characterise those of us who are against nuclear weapons as somehow not living in the real world, so perhaps I could just remind the House that there are plenty of people within the military world who do not think that nuclear weapons are a useful tool going forward. Back in 2014, senior political and diplomatic figures—including people such as the former Conservative Foreign Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Defence Secretary Des Browne and former Foreign Secretary Lord Owen—came together with very high-ranking military personnel to say that they believe that the risks posed by nuclear weapons and the international dynamics that could lead to nuclear weapons being used are being underestimated and that those risks are insufficiently understood by world leaders.
The Government’s main argument for replacing Trident appears to be that it is the ultimate insurance in an uncertain world. I argue that they fail to acknowledge that it is our very possession of nuclear weapons that is making that world more uncertain. Nor have the advocates of nuclear weapons ever explained why, if Trident is so vital to protecting us, that is not also the case for every other country in the world. The Secretary of State did not answer me at the beginning of this debate—it seems a long time ago now—when I put it to him that we have no moral arguments to put to other countries to ask them not to acquire nuclear weapons if we ourselves are not only keeping them but upgrading them. I put it to him again that a world in which every country is striving for, and potentially achieving, nuclear weapons would be an awful lot more dangerous than the world we have today.
Dr Julian Lewis
Let me try this question again. If we were to give up our nuclear weapons, which other countries that possess nuclear weapons would follow suit? Does the hon. Lady know how many nuclear warheads have been reduced as a result of us reducing our nuclear warhead totals unilaterally? The answer is a big fat zero.
Caroline Lucas
That is why one needs international processes such as the UN treaty that I have described, which is supported by 122 countries, to make that happen. Although I am personally in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, that is not the case that I am making this afternoon. I am moving one step towards people such as hon. Members like himself—or right hon. Members like himself, perhaps, I cannot really remember—who I completely understand are never going to be persuaded by unilateral nuclear disarmament, but who I hope might be willing to engage in a serious argument about multilateral nuclear disarmament.
So far there has been very little recognition in this debate of the fact that nuclear weapons systems are themselves fallible. According to a shocking report by Chatham House, there have been 13 incidents since 1962 in which nuclear weapons have very nearly been launched. One of the most dramatic, in 1983, was when Stanislav Petrov, the duty officer in a Soviet nuclear war early-warning centre, found his system warning of the launch of five US missiles. After a few moments of agonising, he judged it, thankfully and correctly, to be a false alarm. If he had reached a different conclusion and passed the information up the control chain, that could have triggered the firing of nuclear missiles from Russia.
UK's Nuclear Deterrent
Debate between Caroline Lucas and Julian Lewis(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)
Today’s vote and our decision about Trident are at the heart of what kind of future we want for ourselves and our children. However, it is also about the hard evidence and what we mean by safety in an uncertain and changing world.
The theory that having nuclear weapons makes us safer is entirely unproven, and nor can it be proven. As David Krieger from Waging Peace writes:
“In logic, one cannot prove a negative, that is, that doing something causes something else not to happen. That a nuclear attack has not happened may be a result of any number of other factors, or simply of exceptional good fortune.”
Indeed, many military experts argue that, in fact, nuclear weapons make us less safe, primarily because their very existence increases the likelihood that they will be used and contributes to the amount of nuclear material circulating around the world.
Back in 2014, senior military, political and diplomatic figures, including former Conservative Foreign Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Defence Secretary Des Browne and former Foreign Secretary Lord Owen, came together with the explicit aim of
“shining a light on the risks posed by nuclear weapons.”
They said:
“We believe the risks posed by nuclear weapons and the international dynamics that could lead to nuclear weapons being used are underestimated or insufficiently understood by world leaders.”
The Government’s main argument for replacing Trident appears to be that it is the ultimate insurance in an uncertain world, but what they fail to acknowledge is that our possession of nuclear weapons in contravention of the non-proliferation treaty is exacerbating that uncertainty—it is leading to the very scenario that it is designed to avoid.
Nor have the advocates of nuclear weapons ever explained why, if Trident is so vital to protecting us, that is not also the case for every other country in the world. How can we possibly try to deny other countries the right to acquire nuclear weapons if we are upgrading our own nuclear weapons? Do proponents of Trident renewal genuinely believe that a world where all countries have nuclear weapons would be safer than the one we live in today?
Such immunity to reason means that there is a blinkered approach to the heightened risk of accidents or threats to UK nuclear weapons, whether that is in Scotland, at the Faslane and Coulport bases, or in England, at AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield, or whether it is in relation to the nuclear warhead convoys taken out on our public roads, such as the M4 and the M25—indeed, some were seen on the M74 just a few weeks ago—and which go through small villages, sometimes up to a dozen times a year.
There is also little recognition of the fact that nuclear weapons systems are themselves fallible. According to a quite shocking report by Chatham House, there have been 13 incidents since 1962 in which nuclear weapons have nearly been launched. One of the most dramatic, in 1983, was when Stanislav Petrov—the duty officer in a Soviet nuclear war early-warning centre—found his system warning of the launch of five US missiles. After a few moments of agonising, he judged it—correctly—to be a false alarm. However, if he had reached a different conclusion and passed the information up the control chain, it could have triggered the firing of nuclear missiles by Russia.
People say that we cannot uninvent things that have been invented, but biological weapons were banned in 1972, chemical weapons in 1993, landmines in 1997 and cluster munitions in 2008. If the political will is there, it can be done.
Caroline Lucas
No.
Right now, around 130 countries have endorsed a UN motion calling for a global ban treaty on nuclear weapons. Negotiations for that global ban treaty may begin next year, but this Government are holding out and refusing to engage with multilateral UN processes to secure a nuclear-free world. The Government therefore have no credibility when they say they are seriously working for a nuclear-free world. In an increasingly interconnected world, where our security is deeply linked to the security of those around us, and where we need to be gradually doing the slow and hard work of disarming, the Government’s response is the wrong one, and it takes us backwards. By voting to renew Trident, we are sending a signal that power by any means is necessary—
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Debate between Caroline Lucas and Julian Lewis(10 years ago)
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Dr Lewis
Indeed. It is certainly true that, for obvious reasons, many of these journeys are undertaken in conditions of great secrecy. I cannot help interjecting one of my concerns—I have to be careful not to step into judicial areas and I make no reference to any particular recent case even though there might have just been one—which is about judges who take the view that they want to set exemplary and terribly harsh sentences on people who have come back when we do not know whether they have done anything while overseas other than commit the crime of going overseas to fight in the conflict. Handing out a sentence that would be commensurate with the sort of sentence someone would get in this country if they have committed manslaughter and taken a life, must be a huge discouragement to members in these communities—mothers, for example—to co-operate with the authorities when they are trying to get their sons back and when there is no reason to believe that their sons have any evil intent to carry out terrorism on their return. That is why we sometimes feel there is a need for greater co-ordination and that the issues should not be managed within just one Department. We should try to work out an integrated strategy.
Let me return to the point about counter-propaganda. I learned this lesson many years ago in an entirely different context—in fact, in several different contexts where time and again one would see extremist minorities hijacking moderate majorities and purporting to speak in their name. Where that sort of thing was going on repeatedly, it was almost like trench warfare or a battle of attrition. In those days, such battles would be carried out in the letters columns of the newspapers. A particular organisation or cause might get report after report in the media—and nobody would be answering. The way to deal with it then was to ensure that every report was followed by another report—or, alternatively, a critical letter in the press—so that eventually the radicalisers and the counter-radicalisers would be neutralised, and the wider community would say “We are sick of all this bickering—why don’t both of you just shut up and stop?”
We are not talking about some idealised situation in which we shall be able to let down our guard because there will never again be a small number of people who are willing to try to carry out terrorist acts at the end of the process. We are talking about a wider threat: the danger that, however effective we are in catching terrorists at the end of the conveyor belt that leads to their crimes, there will always be plenty more being fed on to the beginning of the conveyor belt by people who, shall we say, have a certain strategic grasp of what they are trying to achieve.
I thank the Committee for its patience in listening to my speech. As I said earlier, the sort of counter-campaigning that needs to be done on the issue of extremist ideology is, in a sense, demonstrated by the fact that we have to keep returning to this subject until the House gets sick of hearing from us, and the Government decide that the line of least resistance is to toughen up the legislation and create an agency that will be able to supervise, co-ordinate and resource the efforts of moderates in our Muslim community to ensure that their own communities are not hijacked by the barbarians.
Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)
I want to say a little about new clause 12, which I tabled. I believe that there is strong evidence from countries that are already investing in deradicalisation programmes that they are effective, and I think that we need to look more closely at those programmes—as well as counter-radicalisation programmes—and learn from them.
Let me make it clear at the outset that none of the programmes is a substitute for effective counter-terrorism legislation. They are, however, an important tool that we can and, I believe, should be using to better effect in tackling terrorism. They acknowledge that someone becomes radicalised for a reason, and suggest that therefore, in principle, that person can be deradicalised.
Members who were in the Chamber yesterday may have heard me read the words of Abubaker Deghayes, a Brighton man whose two sons were recently killed while fighting in Syria. He warned:
“The strategy you are using with our sons does not work. You are criminalising them just out of the fear they might become a threat to this country.
Do not push them to be radicalised, used by groups like Isis who are out for revenge and thirst for blood.”
He feels passionately about the need not simply to take urgent, effective action to curtail suspected terrorists, not simply to wash our hands of those who may have become radicalised, and not simply to generalise about who people of this kind are. He believes that we need to understand more about who they are, and why they have become radicalised.
I met Abubaker Deghayes, the father. I met his solicitor, Gareth Peirce, and I met campaigners from organisations such as Cage UK. All of them have a wealth of experience related to the impact of counter-terrorism legislation, and all of them paid tribute to the difference that deradicalisation programmes can make. I hope to host a parliamentary meeting early in the new year, before the House of Lords debates the Bill, in order to give colleagues an opportunity to hear from a range of experts, including police officers, who are engaged in such programmes in other European Union member states.
Before I say any more, it might be helpful if I defined my terms. In doing so, I shall refer to a very useful paper published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, which has conducted a comparative evaluation of counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. It describes deradicalisation programmes as those that are
“generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.”
That is notably distinct from programmes such as Prevent, which are concerned more with counter-radicalisation, which the Institute for Strategic Dialogue defines as
“a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.”
Caroline Lucas
I completely agree with the right hon. Lady. I have seen and been part of some of those extraordinary community engagement processes. The drama in particular has a huge role to play. I come back now to the wider context. I am simply reporting to her what young people have said to me, which is that when they hear the Prevent programme being talked about and the kind of language and rhetoric that get used when we are talking in the abstract it feels to them as if this is something that is stigmatising and off-putting. They feel as if they are the problem. The programme does not seem to be the most conducive thing to engage them, even though when they get to it, they might find that it is something as constructive and as community based as she describes.
Dr Julian Lewis
There is a vast difference between stigmatising individuals who are at risk, which is not proposed, and stigmatising a barbaric ideology, because the idea is to save individuals from being sucked into the ideology.
Caroline Lucas
I think that I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. There are problems with the way he describes things in a black and white way. Of course I would be the first to say that we are seeing barbaric acts, which are part of a barbaric ideology. But to continue to use that language is not helpful when we are talking about young people. There are young people who have got mixed up in this in an ignorant way. I am not trying to excuse what they have done; I am just trying to understand it. If we think in terms of barbaric ideologies, that suggests someone who has spent an awful lot of time becoming involved in this, understanding it, knowing it and thinking of themselves as ideologues rather than as people who may have mental health problems, who may be excluded, who have faced massive racism in their lives and who have ended up in a very unfortunate position for a huge number of reasons that are not necessarily helpfully described when we talk about a barbaric ideology.
Dr Lewis
The hon. Lady is very kind. This will be my last intervention, so she has an open goal after that. I simply say that nobody hesitates to describe Nazi ideology and communist ideology in terms of their barbaric nature. If we are to succeed in saving people from being drawn into this form of barbarism, we have to get it into the same category, because, fundamentally, it comes from the same drawer of ideologies.
Caroline Lucas
I have no problem with talking about barbaric ideology or about actions that are barbaric, but if we frame the whole debate in those terms, we do not get any closer to being able to understand why some young people are getting more and more attracted to going out to take part in wars in Syria. We certainly do not get any closer to understanding how we can get them back safely and deradicalise them. All of us share that as the overriding priority. What we want to do is to keep our country safe by trying to ensure that people who get involved in this kind of activity are prevented from doing it in the first place and by deradicalising them if and when it happens. I am simply arguing about the best way to reach out to those people. I am not sure that what the hon. Gentleman is describing is the best way to do so.
Justice and Security Bill [Lords]
Debate between Caroline Lucas and Julian Lewis(11 years, 9 months ago)
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Dr Julian Lewis
I shall be brief. On amendment 73, in the light of the undertaking given by the Minister to my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) that the publication issues will be addressed in the memorandum of understanding, I am say on behalf of colleagues that we do not propose to press that amendment.
On the question of taking evidence on oath, I think I speak for colleagues on the Committee in saying that we are entirely happy with what the Government propose. On the use of the word “voluntary”, I can only re-emphasise what has been said by many other colleagues. The Minister endeavoured to explain to the House why this applies only to that part of our duties that relate to operational matters. All I can say to him and to the Government is that we will be spending an awful lot of our time trying to fend off critics who, wilfully or otherwise, choose to interpret the presence of the word “voluntarily” on the face of the Bill as implying that we do not have the ability to force the agencies to comply with our requests, when in most cases we do. There must be a simpler and less emotive term that can be used to express the same purpose, without leaving us open to such unjustified criticism.
On the question of privilege, I am still concerned, as are the Opposition, that sufficient measures have not been taken to empower the Committee and protect the Committee to anything like the same extent. For example, when the Committee discusses people’s possible involvement in serious criminal activity, could we end up in a situation in which some of our proceedings that involve statements —not from witnesses, but from Committee members—that in the ordinary course of events might be regarded as defamatory may result in court proceedings being taken against members in a way that would not be possible with members of a Select Committee in analogous circumstances? If we could end up in such a situation, the Government need to consider that problem very seriously indeed and do something about it at a later stage. I hope that the Minister will refer to that in his closing remarks.
On the question of pre-appointment hearings, I do not believe that the Committee has taken a corporate view as such, but one point must be made, and made strongly: this would add to the work load of the Committee’s staff. The Committee, as has been made crystal clear today, is already grotesquely understaffed by comparison with comparable committees and organisations in this country and in Europe. Therefore, were we to take on that further burden, we would definitely need better proposals for resourcing it than those that are currently ready.
The Opposition are quite right to resist amendment 71, because individual complaints against the agencies, such as that involving Binyam Mohamed, are not the responsibility of the ISC; they fall within the statutory remit of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is the correct body to deal with such matters.
Finally, on the question of the Osmotherly rules, I am glad that the matter will be dealt with one way or another. We would prefer it to be set out in the Bill, but otherwise in the memorandum of understanding, because the ISC frequently needs access to the papers of a previous Administration, for example, or has to deal with matters that are sub judice, and we cannot row backwards from that situation. Subject to those comments, we are very pleased with the progress the Bill has made thus far.
Caroline Lucas
Amendment 71 seeks to provide some form of recourse for people who have been defamed by the UK security services and to ensure that part of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit is to investigate such claims and, where necessary, ensure that they are corrected. I listened with interest to what the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said about this not necessarily being the right forum. I am happy to be advised on that, but right now it feels that there is no appropriate forum. The situation of Shaker Aamer, for example, which I will set out in more detail shortly, demonstrates that. If the hon. Gentleman can enlighten me on how we can make existing forums work more effectively, for example in this case, I would be very interested to hear what he has to say.
The ability of the security services effectively to say what they like about anyone, often resulting in serious consequences for the individual concerned, is at present largely unchecked. As John Cooper QC said in a legal opinion on precisely that issue, the security services are “presently allowed to literally say what they will to achieve their own ends, whether or not those ends are legal, democratic or in accordance with the rule of law. In addition to this, those who indulge in these activities are completely unaccountable to the citizen, to the Government, and even to a quasi-regulator or body charged with their oversight, such as the ISC. What is more, the victims of such defamation are likely to be the most vulnerable individuals, most likely detained under the most restrictive of circumstances. In essence, they are prisoners defamed by their controllers and captors. That is neither right, nor acceptable.”
I want to give a real-life example to help illustrate why I believe that this is so important. British resident Shaker Aamer, whose wife and children are British citizens and live in south London, has been held in Guantanamo for more than 11 years, despite having been cleared for release by both the Bush and Obama Administrations. The Foreign Secretary has raised the case with the US on several occasions, and the Foreign Office has made it clear that
“The government remains committed to securing Mr Aamer’s release and return to the UK.”
Given that the US has cleared him for release, a complicated process including multiple federal agencies, and the UK Government have made it clear that they want him to come home, one cannot help asking why Mr Aamer remains detained in Guantanamo, never having been charged or tried for any crimes. The conclusion that his US lawyer has reached is that Britain’s intelligence agencies have been defaming Mr Aamer to the US, passing on false information and accusing him of extremism, and that is what is holding up his release.
Mr Aamer is being deprived of his liberty on the basis of lies being told about him that he is unable to challenge. He has therefore begun defamation action against the security services—action that could be pushed into a secret court under part 2 of the Bill, leaving him once again unable to confront his accusers or to challenge the evidence used by the Government against him. I would argue that, at the very least, it is important that a duty be placed on the Intelligence and Security Committee fully to investigate such claims. That would not be a solution in itself, but it could provide some small measure of recourse for those such as Mr Aamer who find themselves in the gravest of positions as a result of information passed behind their back.
I will be very happy to hear if there are other ways of addressing this problem, but right now the advice that I am receiving from some of the legal people involved in the case is that they are not aware of any measure that would do so.
Caroline Lucas
I am not convinced that the Committee would be acting in a quasi-judicial role; I would share the right hon. Gentleman’s reservations were that to be so. I am honestly searching for a solution to the problem, and perhaps this is not the right one. However, I want to put on record the real concern that exists about the situation that Shaker Aamer finds himself in. If nothing else, I hope that if this is not the right route to take, Government Members will direct me towards the appropriate measures, because this case has been going on for very many years.
Dr Julian Lewis
I wish to be helpful to the hon. Lady, and I think that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is the body that she has in mind. All these tribunals, including those for communications issues and for complaints such as this one, are headed up by senior judges. I think she would find that they are a much more appropriate route. However, it is obviously very interesting to hear what she has to say about these worrying cases.
Caroline Lucas
In the interests of time, I will leave the matter there and pursue it via other avenues. I am grateful for the opportunity to have aired this really important case.
Nuclear Deterrent
Debate between Caroline Lucas and Julian Lewis(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Dr Lewis
Absolutely not. I am saying that those countries that do not have nuclear weapons already often have other reasons that make it difficult to defend their borders, whereas, fortunately, we find it easier to do so because of our physical separation from the continent.
The fourth argument is that our prominence as the principal ally of the United States, our strategic geographical position—to which I have just referred—and the fact that we are obviously the junior partner might tempt an aggressor to risk attacking us separately. Given the difficulties in overrunning the UK with conventional forces in comparison with our more vulnerable allies, an aggressor could be tempted to use one or more mass destruction weapons against us on the assumption that the United States would not respond on our behalf. Even if that assumption were false, the attacker would find out his mistake only when it was too late for all concerned. An independently controlled British nuclear deterrent massively reduces the prospect of such a fatal miscalculation.
The fifth of the military arguments is that no quantity of conventional forces can compensate for the military disadvantage that faces a non-nuclear country in a war against a nuclear-armed enemy. The atomic bombing of Japan is especially instructive—not only because the Emperor was forced to surrender, but also because of what might have happened under the reverse scenario. If Japan had developed atomic bombs in the summer of 1945 and the allies had not, a conventional allied invasion to end the war would have been out of the question.
Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)
I want to follow on from the question from the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) and press the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on the logic of his argument. How can it be right for us to claim that we should have nuclear weapons, yet lecture every other country against trying to acquire them? If we are saying that the UK depends on nuclear weapons to be safe, does it not logically follow that every other country has the right to make the same argument?
Dr Lewis
The answer to that is catered for by the point I made earlier: it is not the weapons we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that have them. I have no desire to lecture other democracies on whether or not they should have nuclear weapons, as that is a question for them and it is about whether they feel they can afford to do that. It does not bother me if democracies have nuclear weapons, but I do reserve the right to lecture dictatorships, and preferably to try to thwart, baulk and deter them from having such weapons, because they are the threat, not the weapons themselves.