Wilson Doctrine

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I start by paying tribute to the many Members who have raised the issue of the Wilson doctrine over many years. There are many of them and it would be invidious to leave any out if I were to try to name them all, but I pay tribute in particular to the indefatigability of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the hon. Members for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) and for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) and, of course, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), whom I congratulate on securing this important emergency debate. There has been a strong sense of common cause here. Contributions from all parts of the House have been very much in accord on the kind of principle we want to see in the future, the fact that we are not putting ourselves above the law, and the fact that this is about securing the confidentiality of our constituents—whistleblowers and so on—and is not about making a special case for MPs per se.

The Cabinet Office response to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruling was that MPs’ communications were not “improperly intercepted” and that

“all activity has been within the law.”

That is true, but I suggest that it misses the point, which is that the activity that MPs have been repeatedly told was not possible because of the Wilson doctrine has in fact been taking place and constitutes a grave breach of our constituents’ privacy. MPs have been misled about the level of protection afforded by the Wilson doctrine and we need legislation that provides a proper framework for future decisions.

The Home Office has responded to the IPT judgment by reiterating that under RIPA the security agencies must apply for a section 8(1) warrant if they want to target a parliamentarian. This is also true, but it also misses the point. GCHQ and MI5 routinely undertake the generic and indiscriminate trawling of everyone’s data to garner what is called metadata. The Wilson doctrine does not prevent communication between MPs and their constituents, whistleblowers, campaigners or journalists from being captured in this kind of trawl. All it does is stop MPs’ names, for example, being used at the next stage of the process when the security services search that metadata. So they could not search for my name, or indeed the name of any other MP, but that does not prevent them from looking at communications highlighted by a search on another term that could still lead them in exactly the direction they wish to go.

As we now know, while the secret services have guidelines intended to enact the spirit of the Wilson doctrine when they make decisions about accessing analysed data gathered in this way, this is not legally enforceable. The IPT judgment refers to previously unpublished guidance issued to the security and intelligence services on the doctrine. The guidance states that, when considering a warrant application to which the Wilson doctrine would apply, the relevant Secretary of State must consult the Prime Minister, via the Cabinet Secretary. The guidance states, and the IPT agreed, that the doctrine only applies to the direct interception of parliamentarians’ communications under section 8(1) of RIPA, and not indirect or incidental interception under section 8(4) of RIPA. Therefore the guidance as quoted does not provide for a procedure to be followed in the event that an MP’s details came up in relation to a targeted search on something else.

Parliamentarians’ communications are not referenced in RIPA and the IPT judgment seems to assume that this means that the Act therefore overrides the Wilson doctrine. I was not a Member of the Parliament when RIPA was passed but many colleagues here today were and perhaps they, understandably, did not seek to amend the Act to refer to their communications because they believed they were already exempted thanks to Wilson.

The judgment casts serious doubt over repeated assurances from successive Governments that MPs are not being subjected to state surveillance or interception. At best, it appears that the Prime Minister, as recently as 11 September 2015, was unaware of the exact status of the doctrine and ignorant of its application. At worst, he may have been deliberately ambiguous in order to lull MPs into a false sense of security. In this I echo the words of the Government’s own lawyer, who described previous ministerial statements on the Wilson doctrine as

“ambiguity at best whether deliberate or otherwise”.

What is unambiguous is that any change in the doctrine’s scope should have been notified to Parliament, in terms, by the Prime Minister. If the Executive have instead unilaterally rescinded the doctrine without notifying Parliament, that represents what Liberty calls

“a significant, constitutional breach of trust between the Executive and sovereign Parliament to which it must answer”.

Consistent with the absence of any reference to parliamentarians’ communications in RIPA, the interception of communications code of practice, published in 2002, approved by Parliament and in force until earlier this year, is similarly silent on the subject. But its replacement, the draft interception of communications code of practice, published in February 2015, does refer to the potential for parliamentarians’ communications to be intercepted. It has not yet been put before or approved by Parliament, but this change of tack suggests a conscious change of policy and, again, it is unacceptable that MPs have not been properly informed—and, indeed, have actually been issued with ongoing reassurances that the Wilson doctrine protects them. The one exception to this was a comment made by the Home Secretary during the debate on the data retention and investigatory powers last summer, which other Members have already referenced, in which she said:

“Obviously, the Wilson doctrine applies to parliamentarians. It does not absolutely exclude the use of these powers against parliamentarians, but it sets certain requirements for those powers to be used in relation to a parliamentarian. It is not the case that parliamentarians are excluded and nobody else in the country is, but there is a certain set of rules and protocols that have to be met if there is a requirement to use any of these powers against a parliamentarian.—[Official Report, 15 July 2014; Vol. 584, c. 713.]

Again, as other Members have said, if there has been a material change, as it appears there has been, it is incumbent on the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister to proactively advise Parliament and detail the implications for our constituents and our wider work. This is not about asking for special privileges for MPs; on the contrary.

I have also been campaigning for nobody to be subjected to mass surveillance. As Amnesty International puts it helpfully: surveillance of communications in any form—from the initial interception itself to access, and further use, whether of content or metadata—is an interference with a range of human rights. Those include the rights to privacy and freedom of expression.

To avoid that interference amounting to an actual violation of rights, it must be lawful, necessary and proportionate. UK law and practice around communications surveillance currently fails not only the lawfulness test, but the necessity and proportionality requirements for non-abusive interference with basic rights. In this instance, it is about members of the public having confidence that their communications with MPs are not being spied upon, and that they can expect representation without their privacy being compromised. It is about trust and about our ability to undertake legitimate parliamentary duties without the security services monitoring us.

I would suggest, as Amnesty has done, that the logical conclusion the Government should be reaching in the wake of the IPT’s judgment is that, in order for surveillance to be both human rights compliant and in line with the Wilson doctrine, those authorising warrants—who should be independent entities—should ensure it is properly targeted at where there is a reasonable suspicion. In other words, there should be no indiscriminate bulk surveillance of anyone’s communications data.

I, too, agree that MPs should not be above the law. If there are grounds to suspect an MP or citizen of any wrongdoing, of course it should be permissible to target their communications for surveillance and interception, provided due process is followed. That is proportionate and appropriate. But it is also quantifiably different from the kind of bulk interceptions to which citizens are routinely being subjected and from which MPs were given the impression that they were exempt.

I want to thank you, Mr Speaker, for your ongoing willingness to facilitate transparency and accountability in respect of the Wilson doctrine. Last week, in the wake of the IPT judgment on the case brought by myself and Baroness Jenny Jones, I was given the green light to ask two written parliamentary questions that would not have been permissible 24 hours earlier—namely, to ask the Prime Minister what information he holds about MPs having had their communications surveilled and further, to ask him whether the Wilson doctrine has been consistently applied to my communications or whether those communications have also been surveilled. I urge other MPs to ask those same questions, as our constituents and other correspondents have a right to know whether they have been spied on. We also need answers to the following questions. Did the Government realise that the Wilson doctrine was not legally enforceable in advance of this ruling? Will the Prime Minister now come clean about how many MPs and their constituents have been surveilled?

The impending publication of the investigatory powers Bill will offer a key opportunity to ensure that the protections supposedly afforded by the Wilson doctrine are indeed properly enshrined in law. I am pleased that the Home Secretary has indicated that she will look at including a principle of that kind in the Bill, but I would be grateful if she could be even clearer when she speaks again in the debate and if she confirmed—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. May I gently say to the hon. Lady that I am sure her error is an inadvertent one? I do not think that the Home Secretary intends to speak again in the debate tonight, although the shadow Leader of the House might do so if there is time. Of course the Home Secretary is perfectly welcome to do so if there is time, but I do not think she intends to do so. However, I will leave the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) to her own devices.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am grateful for that clarification, Mr Speaker. I will therefore simply suggest that it would be helpful if the Home Secretary were to intervene on me to clarify that she will definitely include in that Bill the kind of principle that many of us have been describing tonight. I appreciate that she is still thinking about whether this should involve independent judicial approval, as I would suggest, a triple lock or some other mechanism. We would, however, like to hear a firm indication, as a result of this debate, that this issue will be properly addressed and that the hole that has been left as a result of the Wilson doctrine not being properly enforced will be filled by a measure in the new legislation.

All the Members who have spoken in the debate have agreed that this kind of legislation should extend to the devolved legislatures and Assemblies, and to the European Parliament. We do not yet live in a surveillance state, and MPs have a right to expect that their communications, and those of the individuals they have been democratically elected to represent, should not be routinely surveilled or intercepted.