Renters' Rights Bill (Seventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateCarla Denyer
Main Page: Carla Denyer (Green Party - Bristol Central)Department Debates - View all Carla Denyer's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(2 days, 5 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt has just occurred to me that the same question might apply to houses in multiple occupation, in areas where section 4 is applied. When the Minister looks into it, will he include that as well?
I am more than happy to include that in my correspondence with the Committee.
I share the Minister’s view of the amendment. We note the evidence that the vast majority of the MOD estate already meets the decent homes standard. The previous Government acted to apply the decent homes standard to the MOD estate in 2016 and, as far as I am aware, the commitment given by the previous Minister, Jacob Young, remains the Government’s position unless we hear otherwise. However, the amendment highlights a significant issue across Government: the NHS has a significant residential estate for the accommodation of nurses and doctors on hospital sites, and the Home Office also has a significant estate.
As the Minister outlined, because it broadly falls within the private rented sector, the vast majority of asylum accommodation is likely to come within the purview of the Bill by one means or another—and the decent homes standard applies to it anyway. There are a couple of issues that arise in respect of that. One is the way in which that standard will interact with unregulated children’s homes. As part of the care leaving pathway under the Care Act 2014, local authorities have a duty to secure accommodation, which is designed to provide an element of support for a young person preparing to move towards adulthood.
In many cases, because of the need for that support, but also due to that young person’s age, the home falls outside the regulation of Ofsted, which normally conducts inspections of regulated children’s homes. We have known for some time that the Department for Education is looking at issues that have arisen from time to time with the standard and quality of that accommodation. It would be helpful to understand how the decent homes standard may be applied, or whether there is separate action within the remit of the Department for Education—which has made announcements about this—that is designed to address the issue.
Finally, I welcome what the Minister said about temporary accommodation—that there is a degree of discretion, but that the aim is to bring the temporary accommodation estate within the remit of the decent homes standard. One of the challenges is around the homelessness duty introduced by the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. Many local authorities will have a conversation with a homeless household about that household or individual securing for themselves private rented accommodation. Sometimes the quality of that accommodation is not good, particularly in areas with high demand for it.
With that, I return to the subject of temporary structures, such as caravans, chalets and things like that, which are sometimes on authorised sites with planning consent, but sometimes not. We simply want an assurance that, where individuals access accommodation through that route—where the local authority is paying or subsiding the rent to prevent homelessness—but the structure is unlikely to meet the decent homes standard from the outset, there will be an appropriate enforcement mechanism or at least clarity, so that, in a sector with the highest satisfaction rate but also the most egregious outliers, the most vulnerable and marginalised people can enforce their rights.
I rise to support amendment 72, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, who made a compelling case for the need to provide adequate housing for those who serve us in the armed forces. I want to pick up on the reassurance that the Minister attempted to offer us on the existing regulatory regime for asylum accommodation, which he believes is sufficient. There is a two-word answer to whether it is sufficient: Bibby Stockholm. Would the Bibby Stockholm meet the decent homes standard? No, it clearly would not, and the Bill is an opportunity to fix that.
I will respond briefly, partly because a number of the issues raised are outside my ministerial responsibility. I commit to replying in writing to the points raised in relation to the responsibilities of the Home Office and the Department for Education, to give the Committee more clarity. Some of those details will come out when we consult. Everyone is assuming that we are talking about the decent homes standard as if it exists—it does not exist. We need to consult on what those specific standards will be and introduce the regulations.
The powers we have given ourselves in the measures will ensure that the standard can be extended to temporary accommodation, and to other types of housing provision where needed. I will happily come back on the point that the hon. Member for Bristol Central raised about the provision of asylum accommodation.
These provisions deal with financial penalties. Schedule 5 sets out the process for a local housing authority to impose a financial penalty on a person and applies to clauses 39, 56, 64 and 89. Foremost, schedule 5 stipulates that, before imposing a financial penalty, a local housing authority must issue a notice of intent setting out its reasons for issuing the fine. Landlords then have 28 days to make written representations to the local authority—I have discussed this point outside of Committee with the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham. Following that period of representations, the local authority must decide whether to impose a penalty. If it decides to issue a penalty, the local housing authority must then issue a final notice detailing the fine to be paid by the landlords, who will be able to appeal a decision to impose a penalty or the amount of the penalty by bringing an appeal to the first-tier tribunal within 28 days. The process in the schedule follows the precedent of the Tenant Fees Act 2019 and is similar to the process in the Housing and Planning Act 2016.
Clause 99 applies the schedule 5 procedures and rules for imposing, appealing, recovering or applying the proceeds of a financial penalty related to the anti-discrimination provisions, rental bidding, landlord redress schemes and the private rented sector database. I commend the provisions to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 100
Rent repayment orders: liability of landlords and superior landlords
I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 100, page 120, line 9, leave out from “order)” to the end of line 12 and insert—
“—
(a) in subsection (1), omit “, beyond reasonable doubt,”;
(b) at the end of subsection (3), insert—
“(d) section 46A (where an order is made against more than one landlord or there has been a previous order”;
(c) after subsection (3), insert—
“(4) Where the application for a rent repayment order relates to an offence under sections 1(2), (3) or 3(A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, the First-tier Tribunal must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offence has been committed.
(5) Where the application for a rent repayment order relates to any other offence to which this Chapter applies, the First-tier Tribunal must be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the offence has been committed.”””
This amendment would apply the civil standard of proof for Rent Repayment Orders pursued on the basis of a Protection from Eviction Act 1977 offence.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 101 stand part.
The amendment is related to amendment 44, which I spoke to a few days ago, and to the serious issue of illegal evictions. Amendment 41 would apply the civil standard of proof for rent repayment orders, known as RROs, which are pursued on the basis of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 offence, known as PFEA—I apologise; there will be acronyms. RROs are extremely difficult for renters to bring under the PFEA offence, due to the criminal standard of proof. As the Minister himself pointed out in our discussions on illegal discrimination, it is notoriously difficult for tenants to prove landlords’ culpability to a criminal standard of proof.
As I understand it, RROs for PFEA offences require a landlord who has committed an offence listed in the 1977 legislation to repay rent that has been paid in respect of a tenancy or licence. RROs are brought in the first-tier property tribunal, often as compensation by self-represented applicants who seek to reclaim rent they have paid to their landlord. Importantly, legal aid is not available for RRO claims, so tenants are almost always on their own. Currently, RRO claims require a criminal standard of proof. That is inappropriate because an RRO is not a criminal prosecution. It does not follow criminal procedural rules, or result in a criminal sentence or a criminal record if the defendant is convicted. As things stand, PFEA RROs are an anomaly. A civil claim in a civil court for illegal eviction or harassment applies the civil standard, despite the fact that civil claims typically attract much higher penalties in the form of civil damages. It is therefore logical and consistent to apply the civil standard of proof to PFEA RROs, in line with the rest of civil law.
What is more, RROs are intended to be accessible to lay applicants, but although that may be so for licensing offences, it is far from the case for PFEA offences. Lay applicants—I would include myself in that category, because I would also make the following mistake—might understandably focus on proving one aspect of the offence, for example the locks being changed, rather than a separate part of the offence, for example by proving the intention of the landlord. To a non-lawyer, that might seem an insignificant distinction, but intention carries substantial legal weight.
Often, these offences are not just difficult but impossible to prove to a criminal standard. Often, if a landlord changes the locks, they do it when the tenant is not at home. Illegal eviction and harassment occur in the privacy of renters’ homes, often without witnesses or evidence. The criminal burden for PFEA RROs places an extra and often insurmountable burden on lay applicants to prove their case at tribunal. It has a chilling effect because it prevents many claims from being brought in the first place, as the evidence to meet that standard is simply not available. Under the current standard, therefore, renters cannot apply for RROs as they cannot prove their case beyond reasonable doubt, even when it is clear that an offence has occurred and that only the landlord would be motivated to commit it. That error weakens enforcement and access to justice, and it undermines the purpose of RRO legislation.
The incredibly low number of RROs and PFEA eviction offences demonstrates that the system is not working. Safer Renting—also known as Cambridge House—and the University of York have conducted research estimating that, over the two-year period from January 2021 to December 2022, there were at least 16,089 illegal evictions, and that number is almost certainly an undercount. Meanwhile, data gathered from the organisation Marks Out of Tenancy—founded in my constituency, as it happens—shows that in the same period, from 2021 to 2022, there were just 31 RROs in which a PFEA ground was successful. That is 31 out of more than 16,000. The system simply is not working.
I appreciate that the statistics that I have referred to might be explained by several things, but the standard of proof is certainly part of the problem and could be part of the solution. In fact, given that we are getting rid of section 21 evictions, I fear that failing to apply the civil standard of proof will risk creating the unintended consequence that illegal evictions will soar, as landlords find a way around the protections introduced by the Bill. I hope that, on that basis, the Minister will consider my amendment.
I will begin by addressing clauses 100 and 101, and I will then turn to amendment 41, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Bristol Central.
Clauses 100 and 101 make provision about the application of rent repayment orders to superior landlords and to company directors. To be most effective, tenants and local authorities need to be able to seek a rent repayment order against any landlord in the chain who has committed an offence. We are seeing a rise in so called rent-to-rent arrangements, which are often used by criminal landlords to mask illegal and exploitative practices and escape enforcement action. Clause 100 provides that superior landlords in such arrangements can be subject to rent repayment orders; that is currently not possible. With this important clause, we are ensuring that superior landlords cannot avoid their responsibilities. Rent repayment orders need to act as a sufficient deterrent to criminal landlords. Some criminal landlords see financial penalties simply as a cost of doing business. Clause 100 therefore doubles the maximum amount payable under a rent repayment order from 12 months to two years, making the deterrent effect significantly stronger.
Clause 101 will enable rent repayment orders to be made against directors and other similar officers of landlord bodies corporate that have committed a listed offence. Currently, if a tenant pursues a rent repayment order against a sham rent-to-rent or landlord company, the company can escape the penalty by virtue of having few or no assets or by simply dissolving. The clause will prevent this practice, for example by ensuring that, where certain conditions are met, individual directors of such companies can have a rent repayment order made against them. The clause ensures that rent repayment orders can be used effectively to tackle unscrupulous landlord companies and sham rent-to-rent companies.
Amendment 41 concerns an issue that the Government have previously considered and that I continue to keep under close review, namely what might be done to address the fact that proving illegal eviction and harassment to a criminal standard is, without doubt, extremely challenging and the prevalence of rent repayment orders in this area relative to other offences is low as a result.
As I have said before during our proceedings, the Government are clear that illegal eviction and harassment are serious criminal offences that cause significant harm and distress. Perpetrators must be robustly punished. It is right that the Housing and Planning Act 2016 extended repayment orders to cover these offences and that this Bill takes steps in other areas, including expanded civil penalties, to bear down on them.
Amendment 41, for which the hon. Member for Bristol Central made the case eloquently, would reduce from criminal to civil the standard of proof that needs to be met for rent repayment orders to be awarded in relation to unlawful eviction and harassment. To be candid with the hon. Lady and to explain my thought process, my concern about her amendment is primarily about the implications that it could have for the integrity of the rent repayment order regime as a whole. RROs are a mechanism designed to provide redress and act as a deterrent in relation specifically to criminal offences. As such, I fear that lowering the standard of proof for individual offences, as proposed in her amendment, runs the risk of weakening the link between the culpability of the landlord and the making of a rent repayment order. If the tribunal does not need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the landlord committed an offence, we could see a weakening of that link.
I am absolutely committed to ensuring that rent repayment orders are effective across all the listed offences. I feel that that has to be balanced against the need to maintain the coherence, efficacy and fairness of a regime that is, as I hope she will acknowledge, in most instances working extremely well and that we want to strengthen. As we introduce the strengthened rent repayment orders in the Bill, I am mindful that we do not want to inadvertently damage the functioning of that regime, which we need to build upon.
Although I am more than happy to continue a dialogue with the hon. Member for Bristol Central on the matter, I kindly ask her to withdraw her amendment. We would have to resist it if she pushed it to a vote, and I would like that not to happen. We keep this area under review, and I would like to keep the conversation going.
I have a follow-up question. If the Minister desires to keep the criminal standard of proof for RROs, will he consider speaking to his colleagues about amending legal aid, so that it is at least available to tenants who would otherwise need to represent themselves in criminal courts?
I hope that the hon. Lady will appreciate that I cannot, as a Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government Minister, give her that commitment in Committee today, but we are having conversations across all Departments. This is an issue that the Government have considered, and I keep it under review. I recognise the challenge that the hon. Lady rightly poses, and which we have considered, which is that rent repayment order prevalence in this area is far too low.
As I have said, I worry about the unintended consequences of making what would amount to quite a significant change to the RRO regime. We want to strengthen it, because it is working and has worked incredibly well—particularly since the changes made in the 2016 Act—in providing effective tenant redress and acting as a deterrent. I am mindful about accepting significant changes in Committee, but I keep the matter under review. I will have those conversations, and my Department’s officials have had conversations across Government on this and many other areas.
On the basis of the Minister’s kind agreement to keep the conversation open—I will follow up on that—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 102
Unlicensed HMOs and houses: offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.