Counter-terrorism

Bob Ainsworth Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. Of course there are frustrations, and questions will be asked about who knew what in Pakistan and about how this man could have lived in such a large house in such a comfortable-looking community so close to military installations. I am absolutely clear that the British interest is in working with the democratic politicians of Pakistan to deal with the shared issues of combating extremism; ensuring that we are dealing with a safe, rather than a dangerous, nuclear power; and, as my hon. Friend says, reaching a settlement in Afghanistan so that we can bring Britain’s brave troops home.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The brave and incredibly skilled individuals who carried out this operation deserve our profound gratitude, as do all those who put their lives on the line to protect us, including our own armed forces. In tackling the wider ideology of al-Qaeda, does the Prime Minister think that there are actions that we need to take abroad, as well as those that we need to take at home? The reconciliation track in Afghanistan is enormously important, and surely this operation gives us the opportunity to step up that activity. Did he talk to the President of the United States about that, and if he did not, will he do so?

[The Prime Minister]

I absolutely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this is an opportunity, particularly in Afghanistan. Having discussed this matter with President Obama on many occasions, it is clear that there are two tracks that we should be pursuing. There is the military track, where we are building up the Afghan army and police, and having success against the insurgency in Afghanistan, where our troops are performing magnificently. At the same time, there is a political track, where we are saying to the Taliban that it is time for them to give up violence, break the link with al-Qaeda and enter a political process. Both tracks can continue simultaneously, but the death of bin Laden and the work with Pakistan present a greater opportunity for the second track to yield success.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Bob Ainsworth Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I am a late and very reluctant supporter of these operations, and that is not because I have become a pacifist overnight, I can assure people. It is because it is relatively easy to support things on day one and relatively difficult to support them in month three, or in month nine—and this is a situation that cannot be foreseen. I remind people that, over the past couple of years, I have been somewhat concerned about the degree of enthusiasm in parts of this country—particularly in the media, but in parts of this House and in parts of the population as well—for yet another operation abroad, and I would have thought that that enthusiasm had been somewhat tempered by our recent experiences.

The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) says how different it is now, in the House today, from when we voted for the Iraq war, but may I remind him that it is not? There was a huge majority in favour of the Iraq war, and his own party was massively in favour of it.

[Martin Horwood]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Ainsworth]

indicated dissent.

One hundred and seventy-nine British lives and a lot of other consequences later, we can all see that there were some grave difficulties with getting involved, but many of those people who can see them now could not see them on that day.

On Afghanistan, 360 British lives and many consequences—

[Martin Horwood]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Ainsworth]

I am not going to give way.

On Afghanistan, we are now 360 British lives and many consequences later, but not so many of us could see the consequences on day one as can see them now. I was, and I am unashamedly happy to have been, reluctant and late in my support for the resolution.

I would not give my support tonight for the resolution if it were not for the fact that the United Nations had given its support, and that there was a breadth of support, including from the Arab League, for this intervention. That was because people worked at the issue, and worked at it pretty hard, so I commend the general positioning of the President of the United States of America, who flatly refused to lead on it until he could see that others were prepared to come with him. I think that his position was in part responsible for the breadth of support that there is.

I want people to agree that it is enormously important that we maintain that breadth of support, and I want to know from the Government that there will be a real attempt to maintain it. The Prime Minister has told us that, after American leadership of the military operations, the plans are to hand the mission over to NATO, and he knows that it will be necessary to get Turkey on board in order for NATO to be prepared to take over the command structures of the operation. That will be an enormously positive thing, and we must put all effort into seeing to it that Arab countries—and Turkey, which as a Muslim country, is really important here—are prepared to take a lead. Qatar being prepared to provide hardware is of huge significance.

Are we serious about allowing others to be seen to lead? The Prime Minister told the House that he, President Obama and President Sarkozy had agreed that there were certain non-negotiable conditions. Why can we not have more people involved in deciding what those non-negotiable conditions are? Let us make sure that we do not do anything other than strain every muscle to see to it that the coalition that supports this action is maintained and continues to be as broad as it can.

May I say to the Prime Minister that even if it were sensible that Colonel Gaddafi be targeted as part of this operation, it cannot possibly be sensible for the British Defence Secretary to give the impression that that is okay? I hope that that kind of loose talk does not continue.

There are other issues that we ought to come to—such as the strategic defence review and our own ability to conduct these kinds of operations in future—that it is not appropriate for us to go into at this time. Certain issues need to be talked about because this operation has become necessary, such as our ability to proceed. In these circumstances, and in so many others, there are a lot more legitimate questions as a result of what has needed to be said in the past couple of weeks, and we will have to have those conversations in the months to come.

NATO Summit

Bob Ainsworth Excerpts

Monday 22nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I think that is possible. The problem has been, as my right hon. and learned Friend well knows—he has great expertise in this—that relations between NATO and Russia have been extremely strained in recent years. At the weekend, I observed a proper thawing of that situation, with President Medvedev happy to sit down and discuss what NATO and Russia could do together. I think his view is very much that this should be an expansive agenda whereby we can look at more and more areas that we can discuss.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I agree with so much of what the Prime Minister has said, but there is one area about which I continue to be concerned. Why did he feel he had to say publicly that there would be a deadline of 2015? A timetable for 2014 had already been set, and he knows that some Government Members, including even some Ministers, have struggled and still struggle to use the same words as he does. Why did he feel that he had to say publicly that there is to be a complete end to the combat mission in 2015?

[The Prime Minister]

That is absolutely the right question to ask; let me answer it as clearly as I can. I think that the British people, having paid such a high price in Afghanistan, want some certainty that there is an end point. That is the first reason. I wanted to be clear that the operation will not go on for ever. I am confident that we will succeed in our goals by 2014, which will enable end-of-combat operations and much lower numbers in 2015, but I wanted to make it clear to people so that they can see that there is an end point.

There is a second reason. I think the alternative to having that deadline is endless pressure to set very short-term deadlines for transitioning this province or district at this time. I would rather we had a proper, worked-out process and plan to deliver that. I think that the 2015 deadline helps us to do that and that it gives people confidence that, 14 years after going into Afghanistan in 2001, there is an end point. I am glad I think I heard support from the Labour Front Bench for that.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Bob Ainsworth Excerpts

Tuesday 19th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I really can reassure my hon. Friend. I am a very strong supporter of replacing Trident. We have sought the best military advice on what is right for its replacement, and the fact is that because we have been operating the Vanguard submarines for many years, we know what their life can be. We know that it is absolutely right to go through the initial gate this year—we are spending some £700 million in this Parliament on Trident’s replacement—but to go through the final gate of actually commissioning the building in 2016. We are on track to replace Trident and have a full-service nuclear deterrent. It is the right decision, and it saves money at the same time. That is what we should do.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Is not the Prime Minister doing precisely what he criticises with regard to Trident? He is putting off the decision and delaying the expenditure, thereby increasing it. He has also cancelled the Nimrod aircraft, rendering our nuclear deterrent less than invulnerable. How is that sensible, never mind strategic?

[The Prime Minister]

Let me first answer the right hon. Gentleman’s last question. What we are proposing would mean no reduction in continuous at-sea deterrence, which is vital. We set out that we were committed to Trident’s replacement but wanted a value-for-money review, and we asked the Ministry of Defence to go through all the possibilities and look to see how we could extend the life of the existing submarines, work on Trident’s replacement and ensure that we had continuous at-sea deterrence all the way through. Those are the sorts of questions, frankly, that the last Government should have asked. It would be irresponsible not to do so if we want to have a full-service nuclear deterrent but want value for money. That is the sort of thing that the last Government should have been asking about.