United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Bob Ainsworth Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I am a late and very reluctant supporter of these operations, and that is not because I have become a pacifist overnight, I can assure people. It is because it is relatively easy to support things on day one and relatively difficult to support them in month three, or in month nine—and this is a situation that cannot be foreseen. I remind people that, over the past couple of years, I have been somewhat concerned about the degree of enthusiasm in parts of this country—particularly in the media, but in parts of this House and in parts of the population as well—for yet another operation abroad, and I would have thought that that enthusiasm had been somewhat tempered by our recent experiences.

The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) says how different it is now, in the House today, from when we voted for the Iraq war, but may I remind him that it is not? There was a huge majority in favour of the Iraq war, and his own party was massively in favour of it.

[Martin Horwood]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Ainsworth]

indicated dissent.

One hundred and seventy-nine British lives and a lot of other consequences later, we can all see that there were some grave difficulties with getting involved, but many of those people who can see them now could not see them on that day.

On Afghanistan, 360 British lives and many consequences—

[Martin Horwood]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Ainsworth]

I am not going to give way.

On Afghanistan, we are now 360 British lives and many consequences later, but not so many of us could see the consequences on day one as can see them now. I was, and I am unashamedly happy to have been, reluctant and late in my support for the resolution.

I would not give my support tonight for the resolution if it were not for the fact that the United Nations had given its support, and that there was a breadth of support, including from the Arab League, for this intervention. That was because people worked at the issue, and worked at it pretty hard, so I commend the general positioning of the President of the United States of America, who flatly refused to lead on it until he could see that others were prepared to come with him. I think that his position was in part responsible for the breadth of support that there is.

I want people to agree that it is enormously important that we maintain that breadth of support, and I want to know from the Government that there will be a real attempt to maintain it. The Prime Minister has told us that, after American leadership of the military operations, the plans are to hand the mission over to NATO, and he knows that it will be necessary to get Turkey on board in order for NATO to be prepared to take over the command structures of the operation. That will be an enormously positive thing, and we must put all effort into seeing to it that Arab countries—and Turkey, which as a Muslim country, is really important here—are prepared to take a lead. Qatar being prepared to provide hardware is of huge significance.

Are we serious about allowing others to be seen to lead? The Prime Minister told the House that he, President Obama and President Sarkozy had agreed that there were certain non-negotiable conditions. Why can we not have more people involved in deciding what those non-negotiable conditions are? Let us make sure that we do not do anything other than strain every muscle to see to it that the coalition that supports this action is maintained and continues to be as broad as it can.

May I say to the Prime Minister that even if it were sensible that Colonel Gaddafi be targeted as part of this operation, it cannot possibly be sensible for the British Defence Secretary to give the impression that that is okay? I hope that that kind of loose talk does not continue.

There are other issues that we ought to come to—such as the strategic defence review and our own ability to conduct these kinds of operations in future—that it is not appropriate for us to go into at this time. Certain issues need to be talked about because this operation has become necessary, such as our ability to proceed. In these circumstances, and in so many others, there are a lot more legitimate questions as a result of what has needed to be said in the past couple of weeks, and we will have to have those conversations in the months to come.