European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and William Cash

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 3rd April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

I certainly have. The Speaker has ruled on the matter, and I take the view that if the Speaker has ruled, even if I am unhappy with the ruling, that means that I need not go into all the details. I could spend the next 20 minutes giving all the reasons that I believe that there should be a money resolution, but I will resist the temptation because I want to get on to the meat of the Bill. The fact that it is known that it could cost as much as £90 billion is, I should have thought, enough to alert a great many people and make them seriously worried about whether they should vote for it, and I hope that they will not.

Clause 1(1) is mandatory, and gives rise to the important constitutional question whether Parliament can direct a Prime Minister to move a motion. That is constitutionally ridiculous. In clause 1(2), to which my new clause 4 refers, the “form of the motion” is not mandatory, stating that the House

“agrees for the purposes of section 2 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 to the Prime Minister seeking an extension”.

If passed, the provision would permit the Prime Minister to seek an extension, but that in itself would not force her to ask for it. However, neither clause 1(4) nor clause 1(5) sets any time limit relating to when the Prime Minister must seek the extension, or explains how that would be achieved. Is enough time available for all this to be done? The answer is clearly no.

I assume that Royal Assent would be given after the Bill had been to the House of Lords. God knows what the House of Lords is going to make of it. The House of Lords has a Standing Order, Standing Order No. 72. What have the Government done, no doubt with the connivance—if that is not an inappropriate expression—of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin)? They have simply knocked out Standing Order No. 72, which is an outrageous and completely unconstitutional act.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

My hon. Friend has questioned the ability of the Act to be enforced. My Select Committee, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, put that question to Lord Judge, the former Lord Chief Justice. I asked:

“How would this be enforced?”

He replied:

“I think it could only be enforced politically by the House of Commons. Please do not think for one moment that anybody should be able to seek a judicial review. Not only would it be ludicrous for the judiciary to be involved in deciding a political question, but they would have a way out if anybody took that step, by saying that there is an alternative remedy—to go back to the House of Commons. That is the only way it could possibly be enforced, in my view. It would be up to the House.”

Is this not a completely useless piece of legislation?

[Sir William Cash]

It is not only completely useless, but it is rubbish. I see that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has just come into the Chamber. Let me ask him, if I may, whether he drafted this Bill. He drafted a great many amendments during the passage of the withdrawal Bill itself back in 2017-18, and I noticed that quite a lot of them were so bad that they had to be junked.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I want to make some trouble. The people of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland might well have strong interest in the extent to which they are involved in this process. My amendment is a means to provide them with that opportunity. I will not contradict what the hon. Gentleman says. Under our constitutional settlement, there is a Scottish Parliament, a Northern Ireland Assembly and a National Assembly for Wales, so I would have thought that they will be extremely interested to know whether they were being cut out of the process prescribed in the Bill. It is not my fault that the Government made proposals and had all the joint committees that the various leaders of the devolved Assemblies complained that they had not been properly involved in. I am giving them a chance to be involved. He may be right about the legislative consent point, but I am right to think that in relation to this crazy Bill it would at least be useful for the people of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to be able to make their contributions in their devolved legislatures. I think that point is worth making, and I therefore intend to press amendment 6 to a vote. Of all the amendments I tabled, that is the one that I want to move most.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I will be as brief as I can. I want to speak against clause 1 stand part. The clause is the heart and strategic intent of the Bill. It is trying to put this House in a position to stop the United Kingdom leaving the EU on the date on which the Government might want us to leave. There is no question about that.

I very much agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice) who made the point that the process of attrition in this House to limit the Government’s negotiating freedom in the end very much undermined their ability to get a better deal and to negotiate from a position of strength. If people cannot walk away from a negotiation they are in, and they have to agree something at the end of it, the other party simply calls the shots. That certainly strengthened the hand of those who want us to have a bad deal. I have made some points in the debate on one of the earlier business motions about the constitutional impropriety of this whole process.

I also invite the Committee to reflect on what this House looks like tonight as we discuss such highly technical issues. The British people expect us to be discussing the big principles of whether we should leave without a deal on WTO terms or sign up to the withdrawal agreement. This particular debate, however, seems particularly obscure and unavailable to voters. It will make this House look particularly out of touch, especially because the Bill is somewhat otiose.

I have argued for some time with colleagues on the Conservative Benches that the Prime Minister has demonstrated little intention of ever leaving without a withdrawal agreement. The fact that the Government have spewed out a whole raft of information basically about why they do not want to leave without a deal underlines that point. I therefore think that the Bill is unnecessary.

In my comments to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, I pointed out that the Bill is also unenforceable. Just look at the wording of subsection (4), which is that

“the Prime Minister must seek an extension of the period specified in Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union”.

What does “seek” mean in the circumstances? What happens if the Prime Minister makes a telephone call asking for an extension, says “Thank you very much” to what is offered, and puts the phone down again? How will that process be scrutinised and made accountable? How do we judge what is a serious seeking in good faith, and what is a mere technical seeking? That underlines the total futility of the House attempting to legislate in this way. Our system of government is not set up for Parliament to legislate for detailed instructions on how Ministers should carry out their duties. We tend to make laws on a much more general basis than that. That is why the system just does not work.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Yes, and we absolutely know why the Bill is framed in these very vague terms—it is precisely to avoid its falling foul of rules that require a money resolution for a Bill that gives more specific instruction.

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend—a good friend—is making very good points. This also gives rise to the question of scrutiny, which he mentioned. My Committee will undoubtedly have to try to work out how to deal with these scrambled eggs; and how will the House of Lords deal with this, given that it has disallowed Standing Order No. 72? Will it truncate its business to such an extent that it will not be able to get this right? Who will get this right?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I will not attempt to answer that question, because it answers itself. Nobody will be held accountable for what goes wrong as a result of the Bill.

If the Prime Minister goes to the European Council for an extension—I have long been reconciled to the expectation that she will—what really matters are the conditions that come with it. Where is the accountability for the conditions that will apply? Or will she simply accept an enforceable agreement with conditions, and bring it back to the House as a fait accompli, as she did originally?

United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and William Cash

Friday 29th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

That is exactly the point. I see the Solicitor General chuntering a little. He is a good friend of mine, but I have to say that he knows this is a serious point––the Attorney General referred to private conversations I have had, and I will now refer to one that I had with both him and the Solicitor General—and he acknowledges that it would need to be sorted out, because there is a serious worry.

What happened can be very simply stated. On 26 June last year, we passed the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 1 of which states that the European Communities Act 1972 is to be repealed on exit day. Exit day operates in lockstep with whatever exit day turns out to be. However, the reality is that, because of the saving provisions, and under article 4, on the capacity of the Court to disapply enactments, it is just conceivable—indeed, it is highly possible—that issues of interpretation could arise.

We need to discuss this properly, but we cannot do so until we see the implementation Bill. I know that the Solicitor General agrees. In fact, some Secretaries of State—I will not disclose which—have told me that they think we should see a copy of the Bill, because until we see the drafting, we will be unable to judge its impact on the repeal of the 1972 Act, which itself is the anchor of the referendum. I repeat the point that the referendum was itself endorsed by a sovereign Act of this Parliament that transferred the decision to the British people, and the British people make that decision, in line with the wishes of the electorate.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I am perfectly clear that whatever the public voted for in the referendum, or at the last general election, nobody had a clue that they would be voting for a withdrawal agreement anything like the one before the House today. May I ask my hon. Friend about a matter of good faith? I interpreted the Attorney General’s remarks to be a suggestion that we should perhaps approve the agreement today in order to satisfy the technical terms of the extension agreed by the EU27, on the basis of some kind of ruse to get a further extension, even though we have not actually approved the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration in the terms that we said we would. Is that an act of good faith with our European partners?

[Sir William Cash]

I very much agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, I will go further and say that the change of gear between 26 June, when the withdrawal Act received Royal Assent, and 12 July, when the White Paper that followed the Chequers proposals was published, demonstrated bad faith, because it must have been pre-planned while the withdrawal Bill—which I thoroughly agreed with and gave the Government every conceivable assistance in getting through––was going through Parliament. The reality is that it was produced only 10 days later, so we need only ask how the Government could write an 80-page White Paper without planning it some months in advance.

EU Exit Day Amendment

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and William Cash

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I am going to press on.

This House has now embarked upon an unprincipled constitutional experiment. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which I chair, recently heard from a retired Lord Chief Justice that nothing like this experiment has occurred since the recasting of the role of Parliament in 1688, which shows just how radical it is. I recognise the sincerity of many right hon. and hon. Members involved in the experiment, but they have resorted to the most questionable constitutional methods, which leave no Government or anyone else accountable for what is being decided. Who will the voters now hold to account for the outcome of the Brexit question?

Moreover, the process has been supported by those either embarking upon embellishing the discredited withdrawal agreement with ever greater restrictions on our right of national democratic self-determination or seeking to disrupt Brexit or stop it altogether in defiance of the manifesto promises upon which most of us were elected. I therefore regret to conclude on these matters, including these regulations, that this House is left with questionable democratic legitimacy.

[Sir William Cash]

I absolutely endorse what my hon. Friend has said. I remind Members, including those on the Conservative Benches, that they voted consistently for the Acts of Parliament, including the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, that will give effect to all the enactments and that to pursue such an objective is effectively to reverse their decisions on specious and unacceptable grounds.

European Affairs

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and William Cash

Thursday 15th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I shall proceed as quickly as possible. The hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) rather marred his speech by playing the man and not the ball. It is much better if we deal with the arguments, instead of imputing motives or sentiments that were at that very moment being disowned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). That was rather unfortunate.

I wish to point out that the agenda is not being set by a small group of MPs; it is being set by the British people—more than 52% of the electorate. Those who argue against leaving the customs union or for staying in the single market are arguing against the right of the British people to take control of their own affairs. Let us make no bones about this: the Labour party has now adopted a position in favour of some kind of weaselly half-Brexit, which is not what the British people voted for. The Prime Minister said that she does not recognise any distinction between hard or soft Brexit; there is leaving the European Union or somehow staying in, which seems to be the position the Labour party has now adopted.

Let me set out two contexts. First, many who supported remain seem to believe that people who voted leave in the referendum were voting to turn their back on the world. They claim that the UK’s decision was driven by isolationist and xenophobic undercurrents and see the leave vote as representing intolerance, prejudice and a call for protectionism. Vote Leave did not campaign for that. We deliberately left the Vote Leave website up—Members can take a look if they like. Vote Leave did not argue for isolation, intolerance or economic protectionism. Those may be the views of a vociferous minority, but the Ashcroft polling that was undertaken at the time of the referendum found that for nearly half of leave voters, the biggest single reason for wanting to vote leave was

“the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK”.

Lest we forget, that is the first context. The debate was about taking back control—about democratic self-government and our country’s right to make its own laws, to decide its own taxation and spending and to choose how it engages with other countries on matters such as trade, foreign affairs and defence. It was about leaving a bloc that is not only in relative economic decline but increasingly in a state of economic and political crisis.

[Sir William Cash]

I very much agree with my hon. Friend. Had the speeches by Mr Juncker and President Macron about moving towards a more integrated Europe—a sovereign Europe, as President Macron says—been put to the British people before the referendum, we would have had a proportion of the vote vastly greater than 52%.

[Mr Jenkin]

I was going to make that point later in my speech, but shall no longer do so, for the sake of brevity.

The EU undermines democracy, prosperity and international co-operation. It is plagued by high unemployment, high debts, an ageing population that is much too dependent on state welfare, a dysfunctional euro, unaccountable political institutions and a democratic crisis. It puts up barriers to the combination of world-class universities, technological innovation and venture capital that is fundamental to the technological innovation on which the future of our economy depends.

Since the referendum, we have seen the landmark statements to which the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), referred. In fact, Martin Schulz, the former President of the European Parliament, wants a full united states of Europe by 2025. The formation of the euro, which was always a political project, transformed the EU, making full integration an imperative to try to prevent the eurozone from breaking up. In the end, the euro will fail anyway, because there is no political consent for the scale of fiscal transfers necessary to compensate for the huge internal trade imbalances.

The second context is economic. Shortly before the referendum, the Treasury forecast that a leave vote would inflict an economic shock on the UK, leading to reduced trade and foreign direct investment, recession, and the loss of 500,000 jobs. I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, but the Treasury’s analysis has proved to be manifestly wrong. It also ignored the long-term future of global trade and economic growth. Between 2016 and 2017, UK GDP increased by 1.7%, and economic growth continues to surpass expectations. Tax receipts are higher than expected, and the UK is running a current budget surplus for the first time since the year leading up to July 2002—long before the crash, and two years earlier than anticipated just last year. UK unemployment has continued to fall from 8.5% in late 2011 to 4.4% in late 2017, and the unemployment rate was recently at its lowest point since 1975.

Although some businesses are moving parts of their operations to other EU countries, the number of jobs being moved is significantly lower than expected. Foreign direct investment has continued to grow and, since the referendum vote, there has been a string of major inward investment decisions. In fact, the year of the referendum, 2016, turned out to be another record year for inward investment. We have seen Wells Fargo committing to a new £300 million London headquarters and Nissan announcing its new Qashqai and X-Trail models to be built in Sunderland, making Sunderland a super plant of 600,000 vehicles a year. In December 2017, GlaxoSmithKline revealed its plans to invest £40 million in the UK’s life sciences sector. At the beginning of this month, Siemens committed to building a £200 million train manufacturing plant in the UK if it wins orders for new rolling stock, and, just last week, Toyota announced that it will build the next generation of its Auris hatchback at its Burnaston plant in Derbyshire, including a £240 million upgrade of the plant.

That is not a matter for gloating or complacency, but it shows that inward investment is not dependent on membership of the EU. What about the longer-term prospects for trade and economic growth? In recent years, UK trade has shown a well-established trend, as the proportion of UK exports sent to the EU has been declining. It peaked at 54% of UK exports in 2006. By 2016, that had fallen to 43%. That decline in the importance of our EU trade has set in despite the UK being in the EU, in a customs union and in the single market. Conversely, over the same period, the non-EU share of UK exports has increased. For example, China’s share of UK exports grew from 1.6% in 2006, worth a mere £5.4 billion, to 3.3%, worth £16.8 billion, in 2016.

Trade has also grown significantly with the Commonwealth. UK exports to Commonwealth countries have increased from 8.8% of our exports, worth £21.5 billion, in 1999 to 8.9%, worth £48.5 billion, in 2016. The Commonwealth is a fast-growing market, reflecting much of our language, values and administrative and constitutional heritage, and therefore has great potential for the UK.

The EU is still the UK’s largest trading partner if taken as a bloc, but if we consider individual countries, the UK’s largest trading partner is the United States of America. It seems to have passed the hon. Member for Sheffield Central by that, while the UK has had a trade deficit with the EU every year since 1999—worth £82 billion in 2016—we achieved a £39 billion trade surplus with non-EU countries in 2016. Outside the EU and the customs union, the UK will be able to develop new trading relationships with many of these countries, but not under his party’s policy. Some of these opportunities, including the possibility of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the strong prospects of a comprehensive free trade agreement with the US, including financial services, more than match the potential of our existing relationships with the EU.

The 11 TPP countries have a population of almost 500 million people and represent more than $10 trillion in economic output, which is 13.5% of the global total. The Commonwealth has a population of 2.3 billion people. A comprehensive trade deal with the US, which includes services, would give UK firms better access to its population of more than 320 million and to the world’s largest single economy. With the UK accounting for 7% of world service exports and the USA 15%, they would together account for over a fifth of the global total—a market of huge significance.

Outside the EU, the UK will also be better placed to develop trading opportunities with countries in Asia and Africa, where the most rapid growth is expected to occur in the future. When concluding free trade agreements, we can set our own negotiating priorities that best match our economic interests. The EU has historically represented the UK’s interests poorly not just because it is incredibly slow, but because, inevitably, the EU cannot prioritise UK trading interests such as access for services, which is, of course, of prime importance to our economy. EU negotiators have to take account of 28 states’ interests, which can be very different from our own, and to reflect the protectionist priorities of producer interests, such as the Italian shoe industry, French agriculture and the German chemicals manufacturers.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and William Cash

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

It is for the European Court of Justice to continue to interpret what the charter of fundamental rights actually means within the European Union, so if the charter was incorporated into our law, what relationship does my hon. Friend think would exist between our Supreme Court and the interpretations that would continue to be developed in the European Union?

[Sir William Cash]

The Supreme Court would be applying the European interpretation in that context, and I simply say that it will involve disapplication of law. It is a matter not of assertion but of fact and law that that is precisely what will happen.

I urge my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and others not to press their amendments on the charter, because to do so would be totally unacceptable. I refer to what I have alluded to already: the principle set out by Lord Justice Bingham in chapter 12 of his magisterial book on “The Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament?”, in which he publicly criticised the attitude of Baroness Hale, now President of the Supreme Court, and Lord Hope of Craighead in suggesting that the courts have constitutional authority, as against an Act of Parliament. With respect to the whole question of parliamentary sovereignty and the issue of the courts, he says that various remarks had been made but:

“No authority was cited to support them, and no detailed reasons were given.

I cannot for my part accept that my colleagues’ observations are correct... To my mind, it has been convincingly shown”—

by Professor Goldsworthy, one of the greatest authorities on this subject—

“that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty has been recognised as fundamental in this country not because the judges invented it but because it has for centuries been accepted as such by judges and others officially concerned in the operation of our constitutional system. The judges did not by themselves establish the principle and they cannot by themselves change it… What is at stake”—

said Professor Goldsworthy—

“is the location of ultimate decision-making authority… If the judges were to repudiate the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, by refusing to allow Parliament to infringe on unwritten rights, they would be claiming that ultimate authority for themselves.”

Moreover, Lord Bingham went on to say that they would then be transferring the rights of Parliament to judges:

“It would be a transfer of power initiated by the judges, to protect rights chosen by them, rather than one brought about democratically by parliamentary enactment or popular referendum.”

With some irony, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has put some of the contrary arguments.

Exiting the European Union and Global Trade

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and William Cash

Thursday 6th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

I will not give way just yet.

The speech by Mr Barnier today is extremely relevant, and I have the benefit of having the full text here. I will not go through every detail of it, I can assure you, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I note that some of the things that he said are highly relevant to what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State rightly pointed out in his speech. On the question of what happens if there is no deal, Mr Barnier said:

“Here also, I want to be very clear: in a classic negotiation, ‘no deal’ means a return to the status quo. In the case of Brexit, ‘no deal'”,

he claimed,

“would be a return to a distant past.”

He is wrong—that is not the case. I think the hon. Member for Brent North said that under the World Trade Organisation tariffs, there would be a 40% tariff on lamb, but even Mr Barnier says that custom duties would include

“an average of 12% on lamb and also fish”,

which is very different from what the hon. Gentleman asserted. I do not blame him—he was speaking from memory, so I am not criticising him—but I am just pointing out what Mr Barnier said.

Mr Barnier also made the extraordinary assumption:

“In practice, ‘no deal’ would worsen the ‘lose-lose’ situation which is bound to result from Brexit.”

Again, he is wrong. He went on to say:

“And I think, objectively, that the UK would have more to lose than its partners.”

That is just not so. He then went on to reveal what is really going on at the EU and with his negotiating position:

“I therefore want to be very clear: to my mind there is no reasonable justification for the ‘no deal’ scenario. There is no sense in making the consequences of Brexit even worse. That is why we want an agreement.”

They want an agreement because they know, just as Allister Heath, the distinguished editor of The Sunday Telegraph, pointed out in an article two weeks ago, that German car makers are getting really worried about the idea that there will not be an agreement, because that is not in their interests either.

On trading relationships, it is absolutely essential to remember that, while we will continue to have some 40% of our trade—although the figure is declining—with the internal market, or the framework of the remaining 27 member states, we run a monumental deficit of £71 billion a year with the EU, as the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) has said. That figure went up by £10 billion last year alone, and we do not even have this year’s figures, which will be even greater. The Office for National Statistics may have indicated to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State how much worse they will be by this time next year.

By the same token, our global trade surplus with the rest of the world, in goods and services, imports and exports—that is the golden thread and the parameter that international trade statistics rely on—is expanding at an enormous, accelerating rate. That is the basis of our future prosperity. I say with respect to Opposition Members that more effective trade with the rest of the world, including taxing companies, will result in greater profitability. Out of that enormously growing prosperity zone, we will be able to pay for the public services that the public want and we want. The national health service will actually have more money at its disposal as a result of our successful international trading relationship with the rest of the world.

Mr Barnier went on to make an interesting observation:

“To my British partners I say: a fair deal is far better than no deal.”

That may be how it looks, but the truth is that they have to be very careful that they do not put us in the position of having to accept the idea of no deal. If that happens, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said, the advantages to us of trading on WTO terms are simply not unsatisfactory at all—quite the opposite. We all need to be realistic.

Interestingly, Mr Barnier then referred to the great port of Zeebrugge, which he said he will visit shortly,

“and for which the UK is the primary market with 17 million tonnes of roll-on roll-off traffic in 2016”.

He went on to say that he could not imagine, in the interests of the UK, Flanders and Belgium, that it would be a good idea to have

“an interruption of supply or a highly efficient organisation being called into question.”

We do not want a trade war over ports with the rest of the European Union. As I pointed out in an intervention, it was the EU that introduced the ports regulation. We had a massive row in the House of Commons, including in Committee, and I have been dealing with the issue as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee for the past two years. It is, however, going ahead, and the reason for that is that there is no way we can stop it. That is the response to the questions that have been asked. The reality is that until we get our sovereignty back and get the ability to run our own ports system on our own terms, we will be subjected to things like the ports regulation, which was put through by a majority vote behind closed doors. Nobody really knows who decided what. I tried to find out, but we could not make any serious progress in discovering who was making decisions. A lot of it, I think, was coming from Hamburg, because it has an enormous interest in preserving its own position.

The imposed rules were rejected by every single one of our 47 ports—not just the employers but the trade unions, which all piled in and said, “We can’t tolerate this new ports regulation.” Yet there it is, going through, if it has not gone through already while we were away for the general election. The bottom line is that our ports are the arteries for the lifeblood of our international trade, and they have been such for four centuries, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said.

[Mr Jenkin]

I remind my hon. Friend and the House that the reason it is a ports regulation is that when it was a directive it was blocked by the European Parliament. So undemocratic is the EU’s legislative system that the Commission can force it through as a regulation, so even the European Parliament cannot block it. What kind of democracy is that, and is it not a good thing that we are getting back control over our laws?

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend and I have been battling on these questions for 30 years, including since Maastricht. He hits the nail on the head. Democracy is lacking in the European Union. The freedom of choice to which Donald Trump referred today—the freedom of sovereign nations to decide their own democratic decision-making processes, including the right to determine their own trade policies—does not mean that there is anything negative about our ability to deliver what is in our national interest. All our history, and every single aspect of our life in this Parliament for centuries, has depended on our ability to make up our own minds about what is in the interests of our own electorate, based on the general elections at which they exercise their freedom of choice. That freedom of choice is based on the word “freedom”.

The key point is that, as the likes of John Bright and Richard Cobden understood, freedom includes freedom of choice—freedom of choice in the marketplace and economics, and freedom of choice to make electoral decisions in the ballot box. That is why they worked towards giving working people the right to vote in 1867. It is all about freedom; when we have that freedom, we will be able to make decisions in our own national interest. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is right to say that we have done so successfully for centuries.