European Council

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Martin Horwood

Thursday 8th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Martin Horwood]

Is this on the subject of nuclear energy? Oh, okay.

[Mr Jenkin]

We have one of the best nuclear inspectorate and safety regimes in the world, if not the best. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously saying that he would prefer nuclear inspections to be run by the people who could not even get their accounts audited for the past 15 years, and who gave us the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy? Does he not see that these multinational European bodies are grossly inefficient and hopelessly unaccountable, which is why the British people have had enough of them?

[Martin Horwood]

Well, no, in short. If the hon. Gentleman has such enormous confidence in Britain’s safety regime, then he should be trying to export those safety standards to the rest of Europe. I cannot see how he can possibly conceive of a better vehicle for doing that than the European Union. Is he seriously going to approach 27 different European nations and try to encourage them to adopt our safety standards, or is he going to use the vehicle of—

[Mr Jenkin]

rose—

[Martin Horwood]

No, we need to move on from safety regimes. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that that will be a more effective approach than trying to reach a common position across the European Union?

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[Martin Horwood]

I have resiled from no undertaking whatever. There is a great habit of selective quotation of the Liberal Democrat manifesto. The whole sentence said that we would offer an in/out referendum at a time of a fundamental shift in the relationship between Britain and Europe. That is why we supported a referendum at the time of the Lisbon treaty—I am not sure which way the hon. Gentleman voted on that, but I do not remember many Conservative Members coming into the Lobby beside us. Incidentally, we also supported a referendum at the time of Maastricht, and did not succeed then, either. If there is another fundamental shift in Britain’s relationship with Europe, I fully expect us to support a referendum at that point.

[Mr Jenkin]

Is the hon. Gentleman merely another of those politicians who only promises a referendum when he knows that he cannot deliver it?

[Martin Horwood]

That is a lovely rhetorical line, but that accusation has been levelled at the Liberal Democrats on many fronts, and yet we find ourselves in government and sticking to the letter and the spirit of our manifesto on a whole range of issues. [Interruption.] I opposed the increase in tuition fees and think that we ought to have stuck to that policy, too. We have, however, certainly delivered on the pupil premium and a whole range of things, such as taking many of the lowest paid out of taxation altogether or developing the green economy, and we will stick to our pledge on the European Union as well, which is to act responsibly and to propose referendums when it is appropriate, which will involve a wholesale examination of the relationship of nation states to the European Union. That is not happening at the moment, because we are looking at an economic crisis in which the eurozone countries face a fundamental question about control of fiscal discipline. Germany, quite reasonably, is saying that, in return for any shift towards, for instance, the European Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort, some process of fiscal discipline that is rather stronger than the one that has operated inside the eurozone until now must be enforced. The other member countries, however, retain the choice whether to submit to that fiscal discipline or to plan some different future for themselves.

National Referendum on the European Union

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Martin Horwood

Monday 24th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Martin Horwood]

The hon. and learned Gentleman has anticipated my next sentence. There has been a lot of talk about manifestos in this debate, so I will tell the House exactly what the Liberal Democrat manifesto said. It stated:

“Liberal Democrats…remain committed to an in/out referendum the next time a British government signs up for fundamental change in the relationship between the UK and the EU.”

We support that now, we supported it at the general election and we supported it at the time of the Lisbon treaty, when such a fundamental change was actually being discussed. What is more, we put the matter to a vote of the House at that time, and many hon. Members who are now rising in criticism voted against it, including the hon. Member for St Albans (Mrs Main) and, actually, the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), who succinctly asked earlier, “If not now, when?” Well, the answer was then, and I am afraid he missed the chance.

[Mr Jenkin]

I recall that debate about referendums at the time of the Lisbon treaty. One got the impression that the Liberal Democrats wanted to say they were in favour of a referendum but not vote for the amendment that might actually create one. It was a cynical manoeuvre and just the kind of thing that has brought the House into disrepute with the British people.

[Martin Horwood]

I thank the hon. Gentleman, but I have with me the list of how Members voted on our proposal for an in/out referendum at the time when we said it was appropriate, and I do not think his name is on the list of the Ayes. A few Labour Members did break ranks, however.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point.

We know from experience that we cannot rely even on the assurances given to us by our European partners. In 1992, we thought we had opted out of what was then called the social chapter. We thought that would protect us from the working time directive, but by the end of that Parliament the EU had circumvented the opt-out in typical fashion: it used a different treaty base to force the directive on to our statute book, against the wishes of our Parliament, by making it a health and safety programme.

The same thing is happening with the agency workers directive, which the Government have bitterly opposed because they know that it will price more young people out of the labour market. We now have above-average youth unemployment in this country when it used to be below-average.

[Martin Horwood]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jenkin]

I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but I have given way twice.

The same thing is happening in the regulation of the City of London. If there is one thing that we should never have agreed to in principle, it is that the European Union and Michel Barnier should take over the regulation of the City—our biggest single tax generator. That was driven by a misplaced notion that Bonn, Frankfurt, Paris and the City should be given equal status as global financial centres. That would be disastrous for the City.

We should oppose the Tobin tax on principle, because at the end of the day, it is another tax that takes money out of the pockets of ordinary people, but you wait, Mr Deputy Speaker, the financial transactions tax proposed by the EU will be forced through on some spurious treaty basis.

North Africa and the Middle East

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Martin Horwood

Thursday 17th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Martin Horwood]

rose—

[Mr Jenkin]

rose—

European Union Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Martin Horwood

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

I thought the exchanges between the two Front Benchers about the real nature of the coalition agreement were very revealing. We have all known about this from the minute that the coalition agreement was first mooted. That is why I was one of the newly elected Members who went to see the then Leader of the Opposition, just after the election, and said, “Do not do this; let us have another election in short order so that we can deliver our mandate and our promises to the British people.” We knew that we were being bound into an arrangement that would mean having to swap our obligations to our electors—let us face it, handing criminal jurisdiction over to the European Union is not exactly a popular thing to do—for a mess of pottage: a compromise with the Liberal Democrats. The Deputy Prime Minister took great interest in these matters, particularly justice and home affairs, when he worked for the European Commission and I understand that he is personally extremely committed to the creation of a federalist criminal justice legal order as part of the state building of the European Union. We are now actively participating in that.

[Martin Horwood]

In the spirit of coalition, which the hon. Gentleman so obviously and positively espouses, does he accept that the Liberal Democrats have moved quite a long way in accepting this Bill at all and that many of the strictures it puts on the progress of proper government at European level are things that do not come particularly naturally to Liberal Democrat Members?

[Mr Jenkin]

I am perfectly prepared to accept that some Liberal Democrats have compromised considerably on the Bill.

What does the Bill add up to? The problem is that it does not change anything. It does not change the relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom one comma or dot. It is about the arrangements between the British Government and the British Parliament. We all know that it is designed to give the impression that this and future Governments will somehow be locked down by the referendum lock and will be obliged to have referendums as never before. It is certainly useful to create that expectation because the disappointment when no referendum occurs will then be much deeper, but what does the Bill actually mean?

Clauses 2 to 7 make a lot of legal arrangements to ensure that decisions taken by the Government are approved by referendum or Act of Parliament. There are certain exclusions that we have already argued about, such as whether the treaty on fiscal union will somehow be exempted from referendum even though it is probably one of the most significant European treaties we will see in our lifetimes. That is the state of the Bill, which has some remarkable tripwires—so many that the Opposition spokesman has been saying, “This is getting too particular and detailed; we will have to have Acts of Parliament and referendums on all kinds of things that are patently ridiculous.” That is why I think that future Governments will wriggle out of the obligations without much difficulty.

My amendments concern the opting-out proposals. In order to make the Lisbon treaty, which establishes the European Union’s authority over criminal and civil law, more palatable, there was an arrangement that the United Kingdom could opt out at a later date. One would have thought that a party and a Government who were elected on a platform to repatriate powers from the EU, and who fought against the Lisbon treaty on the principle that the European Union should not have jurisdiction over our criminal law, would be keen to ensure that any coalition agreement reflected that policy, particularly as they have talked about a sovereignty clause, a referendum lock and so on.

We know that there will probably never be a new treaty amendment that meets the test that triggers a referendum. Indeed, the Minister made it clear that he has no intention of letting a Bill through the House that would trigger such a referendum during the lifetime of this Parliament. The Lisbon treaty has made the EU self-amending. The Liberal Democrat MEP, Andrew Duff, who is chair of the Federal Trust, said on the BBC World Service: “The treaty of Lisbon is in force and it won’t be unpicked by the British. It can’t be. It is the statute which will probably govern the Union for some time.” As I said in the debate on Monday,

“The problem is that this is not the ‘thus far and no further’ Bill; it is the ‘locking the stable door after the horse has bolted’ Bill.—[Official Report, 24 January 2011; Vol. 522, c. 116.]

We do not know whether the next five years will see any changes to the EU treaties—I suspect they will—but there is one area in which the Government will have to make a very significant decision: whether to give more powers to Brussels or to bring them back to Britain. I remind the Committee that were the measure outside the jurisdiction of the European Communities Act, there would be no question but that there would be hundreds of pages of Acts of Parliament to implement this stuff, instead of its automatic inclusion in our law and implementation. It is fundamentally undemocratic to reorganise our constitution by the stroke of a Minister’s pen in this way.

In crime and policing, EU measures which were passed under the pre-Lisbon third pillar arrangements are in this transitional period. Under the Lisbon treaty, there is a period in which we can opt out en bloc, as the Minister said. These measures include the European arrest warrant and the recognition of the trial of UK citizens in EU countries held in absentia. I have in my passport something about the protection of UK citizens, and here we are, handing over the possibility that UK citizens can be tried in other European jurisdictions without even being there. That is something that we do not do in our own jurisdiction.

The creation of the European public prosecutor will happen under the arrangement. The Government will have a straight choice between expanding the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over the British justice system, or opting out of the measure. It is a rare opportunity that we have in the treaty to repatriate power. One would have thought that we would want to do it, but the Bill as it stands does not include any control whatever over that decision. All we have is a personal assurance from the Minister that he will bring it to the House for a decision. That is welcome, but it not the kind of democratic control that is needed.

The Government have just announced the revision of control orders, which will require legislation. That is subject to democratic control. Imagine if the control orders decision was announced by the Government and required no legislation. That is what we are being offered in the Bill.

European Union Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Martin Horwood

Monday 24th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Martin Horwood]

That stretches credibility somewhat. The hon. Gentleman has heard in many eloquent speeches from Members on the Government Benches how important the Bill is to our relationship with the European Union and how it offers the possibility of reconnecting the British public with the decision-making processes in the European Union. It is beyond doubt that the Bill will be a significant piece of legislation.

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. Gentleman asked the Minister why the Bill’s language is about the “transfer” of competences, rather than the “pooling” or “sharing” of competences, which has been the language used previously. I put it him—the Minister might not put it this way—that the notion of “pooling” or “sharing” competences does not fully explain what has been happening over the years and that those are weasel words. A competence “shared” is, in fact, a competence transferred and a competence fully transferred is not even shared. The correct word to use is “transferred” and I give the Minister credit for doing that.

[Martin Horwood]

The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful response on behalf of the Minister, but I would say that “transfer” implies a total handing over, not just a partial one, of some UK sovereign powers, as if the European Union were some kind of imperial entity of which this country is a humble subject. That may be what some Conservative Members fear but, as I hope the Minister will confirm, the reality is that the vast majority of powers and competences in the European Union are not exclusive EU competences, but competences shared with member states or merely competences to support inter-state co-operation. We have only to consider an issue such as the environment and climate change to realise that we cannot really transfer competence over that to the European Union alone, because such an arrangement simply would not work.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman referred to “exclusive” competences. Surely if the EU has gained an exclusive competence, a transfer certainly has taken place. A competence shared with the European Union usually results in European Union legislation. Once the European Union has legislated, it has occupied that policy—that part of the field of legal competence—and the doctrine of the European Court is that the EU cannot give that back; the policy can only then be delegated back to the member state. So “transferred” is a good word to have in the Bill.

[Martin Horwood]

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s perspective. He speaks as if the European Union were somewhere else, but we are part of the European Union. Even the hon. Gentleman is a member of the European Union.

[Mr Jenkin]

I certainly am not.

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[Martin Horwood]

That is a good example of how a completely uncontroversial and essentially technical change might nevertheless, if we are not careful, trigger a referendum. Like the hon. Member for Devizes (Claire Perry), I am an enthusiast for referendums in general and voted for one on the Lisbon treaty and for an in/out referendum at the same time, but those are undoubtedly significant changes.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee has noted more recently that there are some risks and costs associated with referendums. We have held just nine referendums since 1973, although only one has been UK-wide. The Committee conducted an in-depth inquiry on referendums in the UK last year, concluding:

“The balance of the evidence that we have heard leads us to the conclusion that there are significant drawbacks to the use of referendums”.

I do not sense any implied rejection of referendums per se, but there are arguments for using them with restraint and ensuring that they are limited to major issues.

Some of the drawbacks cited in the Committee’s report include, first, that referendums can undermine representative democracy—not a point that I necessarily agree with, but one that some Opposition Members have made; secondly, that referendums are costly—unarguably an important point in the current austere environment; thirdly, that voters show little desire to participate in them; fourthly, that referendums tend not to be about the issue in question—very likely with some of the technical issues in this case; fifthly, that referendums fail to deal with complex issues; sixthly, that referendums never “settle” the issue—despite expectations; and seventhly, that referendums are a “conservative device” or a block on progress. As a result, the Lords Committee concludes that referendums should be used on questions only of “fundamental constitutional change”. Some examples given are, rather alarmingly, referendums to abolish the monarchy, to change the electoral system for the House of Commons and to change the UK’s system of currency.

I have to ask the Minister whether including all SRP changes under the referendum lock in the Bill is in keeping with the Lords Committee’s detailed findings on the use of referendums. Given the current “treaty fatigue” throughout the European Union, SRP is highly likely to be the most common form of treaty change for the foreseeable future. It is highly likely also that future treaty changes will be relatively small and targeted affairs designed to tweak existing treaties rather than to rewrite them substantially. Is it not therefore highly likely that the referendum lock in clause 3 will capture highly specific, arguably complex, limited and uncontroversial treaty changes?

Such changes might, nevertheless, be urgent. For example, in 2007 my constituency was badly flooded, as was much of Gloucestershire, and we benefited significantly from European emergency funds. If, during any future emergency in a part of Europe which technically fell outside the fund’s scope, a treaty amendment were technically required, it would surely be uncontroversial and, in fact, very urgent, so would we seriously say to whichever stricken part of Europe was affected, “Fine, we’ll send aid from the European emergency funds, but we’ll just have to hold a referendum on it first”? That would be inconceivable. My example may be hypothetical, but it is not impossible to conceive of equally uncontroversial and desirable things that the referendum proposal might block completely.

Given the conclusions of the Lords Committee’s report on referendums, can the Minister reassure me that the provisions in clauses 3 and 4 will not produce a plethora of complex and costly referendums that exasperate the public, frustrate proper decision making at European level and are highly vulnerable to hijack by questions that are completely different from those on the ballot paper? Does he agree that the most appropriate democratic check on the use of article 48(6) is primary legislation, as it would give Parliament alone, as the representative of the people, the power to ratify those limited, specific and complex treaty changes that are likely to come under the use of that article?

On the complexity of the referendums that the Bill could produce, can the Minister provide the House with some examples of referendum questions that the referendum lock on SRP treaty changes might create? It is quite difficult to conceive of one so significant that it would justify the use of a national referendum. Can the Minister provide the House with an estimate either of the number of referendums that the Bill is likely to produce in the foreseeable future, or, if that means looking too far into the crystal ball, of the number of SRP changes that are currently in discussion at the European Council or expected to be in the near future? Most significantly in these austere times, can he indicate the expected cost of each referendum on current projections?

The Minister will be aware that the purpose of creating the SRP under the Lisbon treaty was to avoid the need for long drawn-out intergovernmental conferences and painful ratification processes in instances where EU member states wished to undertake targeted and limited treaty changes, particularly uncontentious improvements or enhancements to the workings of the EU for the benefit of all member states. I therefore have concerns over the inflexibility of the referendum lock, and what it will mean in practice. Will the Minister reassure me that the threat or fear of losing a referendum on a treaty change will not prevent future Governments from supporting even uncontroversial and popular changes, and changes that are in the UK’s national interest?

I point out to the Committee that on many occasions in the history of the UK’s membership of the European Union, it has been deemed in the UK’s interest to further pool powers and competence in the European Union. The most obvious example, which should be close to Conservative hearts, is the Single European Act, which was a massive shift away from unanimity voting and towards dropping national vetoes. The European Union was able to dramatically accelerate integration across the internal market—the basic economic rationale that I thought was shared across the coalition Benches. The forward-thinking move to pool and share powers and competence has been of huge economic benefit to the UK and the European Union as a whole. Can the Minister not think of potential instances in the future when further pooling of powers and sovereignty would be dramatically to the UK’s benefit?

In the light of the time and the desire for other Members to take part, I will cut short my planned remarks. In asking the Minister to consider amendments 67 and 68, I suggest that there is a risk of the Bill triggering, on a hair trigger, referendums on every conceivable issue. Liberal Democrat Members, who perhaps do not share some of the fears of those on the Conservative Benches, need considerable reassurance on that issue.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am most grateful to be speaking under your chairmanship, Mr Brady. I will endeavour to be briefer than some hon. Members have been this afternoon.

We are discussing the trigger for a referendum in the Bill. It is worth pointing out the undercurrent in this debate: some people are speaking because they do not think that there have been enough referendums and others are speaking because they do not want referendums. The official Opposition have got into a bit of trouble with their amendment. My right hon. Friend the Member for Charnwood (Mr Dorrell) had some fun at their expense, because they tried to present a set of amendments as pro-referendum when their record on referendums is rather lamentable—perhaps as lamentable as ours when we have been in government.

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[Mr Jenkin]

Amendment 1 would remove wriggle room for any Government by requiring a referendum on any new treaty. That was promised at the Conservative party conference, but it is not being delivered in the Bill.

I reiterate that if we want to protect ourselves from the consequences of the inclusion of fiscal union in the arrangements for the European Union, we need to separate ourselves considerably from all the other paraphernalia in which we are currently embroiled. Even the Liberal Democrats are beginning to talk about repatriation of powers on some labour market regulations, such as the working time directive. Incidentally, we were told that we had opted out of that, but it turned out that we had not—something else that we were right about when we debated the Maastricht treaty.

If we allow fiscal union to go ahead, it is inconceivable that it will not have an impact on taxation throughout the European Union. Taxation is already a shared competence. It is not difficult for the European Court of Justice to argue that, as tax union takes place in the euro area, in order to maintain a single marketplace and a level playing field—and all the jargon that is regularly used—it will enlarge the EU’s competences over taxation. That is inevitable. I am fed up with warning about what will happen and being proved right. It is time that the House acted on the warnings that it has been given for many years.

I want to consider amendment 11 and the test for significance. The amendment is in keeping with the spirit of the Bill. Its scope is narrow. Clause 2 covers “Treaties amending or replacing” the existing treaties. Clause 3 deals with amending the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Each relies on clause 4, which provides for a whole lot of tests, including subsection (1)(i) and (j), which are subject to the significance test.

The problem with the significance test was best described by the European Scrutiny Committee. I appreciate that many of my colleagues say, “Oh well, that’s chaired by the hon. Member for Stone. What do you expect? It’s been completely hijacked by the ultra Eurosceptic extremists.” However, I invite hon. Members to consider the membership of that Committee. Its members are a pretty reasonable bunch of people. I happen to believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is a reasonable person, too. Although some of the report was contested, paragraph 98 was supported unanimously by Labour and Liberal Democrat as well as Conservative members of the Committee. Paragraph 98 states, in bold:

“We think the possibility for successful judicial review of a ministerial decision whether a transfer of power under clause 4(1)(i) and (j) is significant will, in practice, be limited.”

That is based on evidence given to that Committee. The problem is:

“The expressions ‘if the Minister is of the opinion’ and ‘in the Minister’s opinion’ in clause 4(4) underline the subjectivity of the process and the difficulty of judicial review.”

My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) said that somehow Mr and Mrs Citizen from Dover can toddle into the administrative court to bring an action that threatens the whole Government’s policy when the Minister has opined to the House of Commons that something is not significant enough to attract a referendum. That is absolutely bonkers. My noble Friend Lord Rees-Mogg and Mr Stuart Wheeler are hardly two typical citizens—perhaps they are my hon. Friend’s constituents—but they have both failed to attract the attention of the courts or to engage them in such fundamentally political decisions. The phrase “in the Minister’s opinion ”clearly makes the decision political. It is a political problem. The skill of amendment 11, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison), is that it brings decisions home to the House of Commons, where political decisions should be made.

The main argument against amendment 11 is that judicial review is superior to the Government’s obtaining the consent of the House of Commons. We do not like rule by judges or judicial supremacy. We prefer democracy, which commends the proposal. The second argument against amendment 11 is even more bizarre.

[Martin Horwood]

Surely the hon. Gentleman will concede that under the Bill, every treaty change will be subject to a vote in Parliament, because an Act of Parliament will be required for every single treaty change, whether there is a referendum or not.

[Mr Jenkin]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that, because it is the only other argument against amendment 11. He is saying, “You don’t need to bring a decision to the House of Commons, because you can’t get a treaty change without an Act of Parliament and the whole issue can be dealt with then.” However, that is an argument against clauses 2, 3 and 4. What is the point of the Bill? The point of the Bill is to bring matters to Parliament or to the people for decision before we legislate to enact a new treaty change. If the Government and the Committee do not accept amendment 11, which would transfer a decision from the courts to the House of Commons, why are we bothering with the Bill at all? The hon. Gentleman makes an argument against the Bill.