Financial Transaction Tax and Economic and Monetary Union

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Greg Clark

Tuesday 18th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

That goes to the heart of our concern, because under the mechanism set out, we would be under such an obligation, which we consider to be a breach of the protections we enjoy, in particular not to have to incur costs when the benefits do not flow to a non-participating member state. That is precisely one of our objections.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Does the proposal not expose the beguiling attraction of allowing enhanced co-operation as a gesture of good will to our European partners, when in fact it is a trap enabling them to exercise powers through qualified majority voting, without our participation, which then creates obligations in relation to our own financial transactions, even though they might be taking place outside the EU? My right hon. Friend expresses support for co-operation between free, sovereign states in their tax affairs, but that is not what we are talking about here, because enhanced co-operation is likely to result in obligations that are enforceable in European Community law, even though we have not had a chance to vote on them.

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. That is precisely why we are challenging the legitimacy of the proposal. The enhanced co-operation procedure is available to member states provided it is legal and compliant with the treaty, and our view is that it is certainly not. In particular, the extra-territorial effects—exactly what my hon. Friend is concerned about—are contrary to article 327 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, as it fails to respect the competences, rights and obligations of the non-participating member states. Furthermore, the decision to proceed with the FTT has extra-territorial effects for which there is simply no justification in customary international law. The Select Committee has been prominent in its scrutiny of that, and no doubt its Chair will have something to say about it.

We should consider the economic effects of the tax as well as the legal issues. What we are discussing is obviously very important to the economy of the United Kingdom, where 2 million people are employed in financial and related professional services. That sector has created a trade surplus for the country at a time when I think all nations should be trying to increase their trade, and its activities are highly integrated with those in other EU countries. Our best estimate is that 30% of over-the-counter derivatives trading in London involves a counterparty in a proposed FTT zone country; similarly, about 30% of investors in UK gilts are located overseas, which means that the FTT is even likely to affect UK Government funding costs.

However, it is not only the financial sector that would be affected. The European Association of Corporate Treasurers, which represents those who manage companies' finances throughout Europe, has said, very explicitly, that the FTT

“will fall on companies in the real economy, and compound the negative effects of the financial crisis.”

In this country, the CBI agrees.

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[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful point, and I was wrong in seemingly indicating that it was only Government Members who share some of these concerns. He has a long and distinguished record of being not only concerned but an active force in drawing attention and suggesting remedies to some of these matters.

On the proposals before us, one suggestion that has been made is that there should be new mechanisms to increase the level of co-operation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament to contribute to this process—it certainly will not be the end of the matter. It has been stated that how it is done is a matter for the Parliaments to determine themselves. I understand that the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments agreed in April to set up such an inter-parliamentary conference to discuss EMU-related issues. The conclusions of that meeting state that the conference

“should consist of representatives from all the National Parliaments of Member countries of the European Union and the European Parliament”.

That reflects one of the recommendations in the Select Committee’s report.

The Government have consistently highlighted the importance of these issues since the December European Council. For example, it was highlighted by the Prime Minster in his Bloomberg speech in January, when he set out his agenda for EU reform. He was clear that the future European Union we need must entail a bigger and more significant role for national Parliaments. He said:

“It is national parliaments, which are, and will remain, the true source of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU”.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said that

“if the European Parliament were the answer to the question of democratic legitimacy we wouldn’t still be asking it.”

He went on to outline a concrete set of ideas, including the proposal to have an EU “red card” system that would allow national Parliaments, working together, to block legislation that should not be agreed at the European level. Furthermore, we have said that we would support calls by this House to summon a European Commissioner to explain a proposal directly to this Parliament if the Committee demanded it.

[Mr Jenkin]

I wholeheartedly support the principles set out on the primacy of national Parliaments in the Prime Minister’s Bloomberg speech, but neither of the proposals that the Minister has just mentioned—the red card and the summoning of an EU Commissioner—addresses the primacy issue. The red card just creates another opportunity for our national Parliament to be outvoted by other national Parliaments, and summoning an EU Commissioner has no legislative effect whatsoever. What are the Government going to table in concrete terms that will assert the primacy of national—

Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Greg Clark

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. I do not think that we should be shy about insisting on protecting something that is very important to us. The single market in financial services is essential, and the current proposals would compromise it.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I, too, welcome my right hon. Friend’s approach, but may I caution him about the double-edged invocation of the single market? We are threatened not just by the voting rights in the European Banking Authority, but by those in the Council of Ministers. It is equally possible that the member states of the eurozone that are in the banking union will caucus in the Council and use a single-market measure to create a single market in banking services to reflect the policy already adopted by the banking union. How are we to be protected from that?

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend is right to be alert to those dangers and risks. One of the clear principles on which we have insisted throughout all our negotiations on all the different dossiers is that we will accept nothing that would compromise our ability to participate in the single market.

Let me say a bit more about our stance on the EBA. What is currently proposed would not just require but enable members of the eurozone to caucus and adopt positions, which poses the clear risk that the ECB could dominate EBA decision-making. Given that 17 of the 27 EBA members are in the eurozone, that would constitute a blocking minority on all issues decided by qualified majority voting, and indeed a qualified majority under the new Lisbon rules.

Moreover, such action by the Commission would create an asymmetry of treatment between supervisory bodies. The proposal reflects the legal position that, as an EU institution, the ECB cannot be legally bound by EBA decisions on binding mediation, whereas the Bank of England could be. We have argued since the start of the negotiations that it would be inequitable and unacceptable if the Bank of England could be directed in that way but the ECB could not. We are pleased that our concerns are finally being acknowledged, but the asymmetry must be resolved if there is to be any final agreement.

As is required by both the motion and the amendment tabled by the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), we will certainly use what the amendment describes as our

“best endeavours to ensure that the proposed changes…in the European Banking Authority are not adopted”.

In fact, that is an uncharacteristically mild form of words from my hon. Friend. We will insist that those changes are not adopted, and we will require full protection for the position of the United Kingdom and the other non-eurozone members in the EBA.

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[Greg Clark]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that. I am not as familiar as he is with what went on in the previous exchange of correspondence, but I can say that it is essential that the arrangements need to be legal. There is no point marching up a hill of banking union if the whole thing falls apart—I mix my metaphors, but he understands what I mean. There are also other matters on which we will need to be satisfied before any of the proposed measures can be adopted.

[Mr Jenkin]

My right hon. Friend made an important point when he said that the British Government would reserve their position on the legality of this new instrument and how it might be used. Will he just expand on that? Would it not be sensible for UKRep to write a letter similar to the one written in the case of the fiscal union treaty, at the very least, in order to make that clear?

[Greg Clark]

I do not think that there is any difference between us on this. It is essential that this arrangement is legally sound. At the moment, the negotiations are continuing and the shape of the regulation is evolving, but the sensible commitment I have given is to make sure not to proceed unless we are satisfied that it is legally robust.

Let me talk about some of the other measures we need to bear in mind. We must make it absolutely clear that both now and in the future there should be no requirement, for example, for clearing houses that handle significant amounts of euro-denominated business to be located geographically in the eurozone, as proposed by the ECB—a proposal against which we have launched legal proceedings. That blatantly undermines the single market and the United Kingdom’s financial services industry. It is a poor indication of the ECB’s attitude if it intends to proceed in such a way. We need to be clear, too, that London is home to more clearing houses than any other EU capital and such proposals are unacceptable.

As the House will see, there is some way to go before the banking union proposals are acceptable to the Government. They will not be agreed by the United Kingdom unless and until we are satisfied that the UK’s position in the single market has been secured.

Let me turn briefly to the document known as the four presidents’ report, which was published on 12 October. It is an interim report that gives a general overview of the measures that the euro area member states might want to consider taking to improve the functioning of the euro. At this stage, there is little detail in the report apart from in the area of banking union and a great deal more discussion will be needed before there is agreement even on which issues should be explored further. The House will have a particular interest, however, in the discussion about democratic legitimacy and accountability.

I emphasise again that although the UK will not be part of the arrangements, it seems to me to be important that when significant decisions are being taken at the eurozone level about national matters, national Parliaments should be able to scrutinise those decisions, just as the Bank of England, the UK regulatory authorities and not least Ministers are accountable to this House and the House of Lords.